Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This Rent Control Revision is filed by the respondent/tenant in R.C.P. No.3/2018 on the file of the Rent Control Court (Munsiff), North Paravur. The aforesaid R.C.P. was filed by the respondent herein, the landlord, under Sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), seeking eviction of the tenant.

2. The Rent Control Court, after considering the pleadings and the evidence on record, passed an order of eviction on the ground of arrears of rent, but declined to grant eviction on the ground of bona fide need under Section 11(3) of the Act. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the petition under Section 11(3), the landlord approached the Rent Control Appellate Authority by filing R.C.A. No.19/2024. The respondent/tenant, who was aggrieved by the order of eviction passed under Section 11(2)(b), filed a cross-objection in the said appeal.

3. The Rent Control Appellate Authority, after hearing both sides and considering the evidence on record, allowed the appeal filed by the landlord, ordered eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, and dismissed the cross-objection filed by the tenant. Impugning the said judgment, the present Rent Control Revision has been filed.

4. Before delving into the question regarding the legality and propriety of the impugned order, it is to be noted that the landlord–tenant relationship between the parties is not in dispute. As already stated, the landlord filed the Rent Control Petition seeking eviction of the revision petitioner, the tenant of the building, on the grounds of arrears of rent and bona fide need.

5. The Rent Control Court, after holistically considering the oral and documentary evidence, including the rent deed, entered a finding that the agreed monthly rent of the building was ₹5,000/-. The Court also accepted the case of the landlord that rent was in arrears from February 2016 onwards.

6. Although the tenant contended that the default commenced only from January 2017, no documents or receipts evidencing payment of rent from February 2016 to January 2017 were produced. In the absence of any such evidence, the bald contention of the tenant that rent was paid for the said period cannot be accepted.

7. The tenant further contended that the arrears from January 2017 were not due to his default, but because the landlord was reluctant to accept the rent. This contention was rightly found to be unsustainable by both the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority, as the tenant failed to establish that he had resorted to any of the statutory modes of payment contemplated under Section 9 of the Act when the landlord allegedly refused to accept rent.

8. In short, the concurrent finding of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority that rent of the petition schedule building was in arrears, attracting eviction under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act, suffers from no illegality or infirmity.

9. The remaining question that arises for consideration is whether the finding of the Rent Control Appellate Authority granting eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act warrants interference.

10. In the Rent Control Petition, it is pleaded that the landlord’s son, who was working abroad, is now unemployed and intends to start a business in the petition schedule shop room after evicting the tenant. Undisputedly, to succeed under Section 11(3) of the Act, the landlord must establish that he bona fide requires the building for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family dependent on him.

11. The term “dependency” used in Section 11(3) does not connote financial dependency alone, but also dependency for occupation of a building. It is well settled through a catena of decisions that, while considering bona fide need, the Court has to examine whether the requirement is natural, real, sincere, and honest. Further, when a landlord asserts that he requires the building for his own occupation, the Rent Control Court shall not proceed on a presumption that such requirement is not bona fide (see Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [AIR 1999 SC 100]).

12. In the present case, the need projected is for the landlord’s son to start a business in the petition schedule shop room. This need was substantiated by the oral testimony of the landlord, examined as PW1. No material was produced by the tenant to show that the landlord is in possession of any other suitable building of his own in the same city, town, or village.

13. After considering the pleadings and evidence, the Appellate Authority arrived at the conclusion that the need projected under Section 11(3) is bona fide. There is nothing on record to indicate that the said finding is perverse or patently illegal so as to warrant interference by this Court.

14. The protection available to the tenant under the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act has also been considered. The proviso mandates that eviction shall not be ordered if the tenant is mainly depending for his livelihood on the income derived from the business carried on in the tenanted premises and if there is no other suitable building available in the locality to carry on such business.

15. It is well settled that the burden of proving entitlement to the protection under the second proviso lies squarely on the tenant. The two ingredients of the proviso are conjunctive and not disjunctive; hence, both must be satisfied. In the present case, the tenant failed to produce convincing material to establish either that he mainly depends on the income from the business carried on in the tenanted premises for his livelihood or that no other suitable building is available in the locality.

Therefore, the Appellate Authority was justified in holding that the tenant is not entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act.

16. It is also pertinent to note that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act is limited and not as wide as the appellate jurisdiction. A revisional court cannot reappreciate evidence and substitute its own findings unless the findings of the Appellate Authority are shown to be perverse or illegal.

17. In Regy V. Edathil v. Hubert Leslie D’Cruz [2016(2) KLJ 164], a Division Bench of this Court held that the High Court (in revision) is obliged to test the order of the Rent Control Court on the touchstone of whether it is according to law. For that limited purpose, it may enter into a reappraisal of evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Control Court is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material available.

18. Viewed in the light of the above, the conclusion is irresistible that the reasoning of the Rent Control Appellate Authority while ordering eviction of the tenant under Section 11(3) of the Act is not perverse. There is no illegality, irregularity, or impropriety in the order of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, warranting interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 20 of the Act.

                  Resultantly, the Rent Control Revision fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, taking note of the fervent plea made by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the petitioner/tenant is granted five months’ time from the date of this order to vacate the building, subject to the following conditions:

                  i) The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, expressing an unconditional undertaking that he will surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room to the petitioner-landlord within five months from the date of this order and that, he shall not induct third parties into possession of the petition schedule shop room and further he shall conduct any business in the petition schedule shop room only on the strength of a valid licence/permission/consent issued by the local authority/statutory authorities;

                  (ii)      The respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition shall deposit the entire arrears of rent as on date, if any, before the Rent Control Court or the Execution Court, as the case may be, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, and shall continue to pay rent for every succeeding months, without any default;

                  (iii)     Needless to say, in the event of the respondent-tenant in the Rent Control Petition failing to comply with any one of the conditions stated above, the time limit granted by this order to surrender vacant possession of the petition schedule shop room will stand cancelled automatically and the petitioner- landlord will be at liberty to proceed with the execution of the order of eviction.