P.V. Balakrishnan,J
1. This intra-court appeal is filed by the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.30721/2021, challenging the judgment dated 29.04.2022, dismissing his writ petition.
2. The facts in brief, as are necessary for the disposal of this writ appeal, are as follows:
The appellant entered the service of the 2nd respondent as a Mazdoor (Electrical Worker), on 02.05.2014. The appellant was an accused in a criminal case bearing number CC No.459/1999 on the files of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Mattannur for allegedly committing the offences punishable under Sections 448 and 326 of IPC. The said court convicted the appellant on 04.09.2003, under Section 326 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-. The Sessions Court, Thalassery in Criminal Appeal No.596/2003, filed by the appellant, confirmed the conviction and modified the sentence to one of rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- Subsequently, as per Ext.P1 order dated 29.09.2020, this Court in Crl.R.P.No.3722 of 2008 upheld the conviction, but modified the sentence to one of simple imprisonment till the rising of the court under Section 326 IPC and also directed the appellant to pay compensation of Rs.15,000/-. In Ext.P1 order, an observation was also made by this Court to the effect that the offence committed by the appellant is not one involving moral turpitude. While so, during the pendency of the Crl.R.P., a show cause notice dated 25.06.2015 was issued to the appellant, as to why he shall not be terminated from service. The appellant challenged this show cause notice by filing W.P. (C)No.21454 of 2015 and during the pendency of this writ petition, the 2nd respondent issued Ext.P3 termination order. This Court vide Ext.P2 judgment, set aside Ext.P3 order and directed the KSEB to issue fresh orders by following the dictum of this Court in KSEB Ltd. Tvm., and Others v. Damodaran P [2017(3) KLT 794]. During the pendency of the writ petition, the appellant also challenged Ext.P3 order by filing an appeal before the 3rd respondent, which was rejected as per Ext.P4 order. Ext.P4 order was not brought to the notice of this Court when it passed Ext.P2 judgment setting aside Ext.P3 order. Thereafter, the appellant submitted Ext.P5 representation dated 27.01.2021 before the 4th respondent seeking reinstatement. The same was dismissed by the 3rd respondent on 07.09.2021, as per Ext.P6 order. It is challenging Exts.P4 and P6 orders, the appellant filed the writ petition.
3. The learned Single Judge, by judgment dated 29.04.2022 dismissed the writ petition.
4. Heard Adv.Tarun Philip, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Adv.Sunilkumar Kuriakose, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent and Adv. Antony Mukkath, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 4.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant cannot be removed from service by invoking Rule 10(b)
(iii) of Part II of KS & SSR, 1958, since the said provision can be invoked only for the purpose of appointment in service and not afterwards. He submitted that once an employee is admitted in service, it is untenable to terminate his service by invoking the afore provision, without initiating disciplinary proceedings. He argued that since the appellant got involved in a crime as early as in 1999, much before his appointment in 2014, there is no proximity between his implication and the time of his appointment. He also contended that, applying the nexus test, there is no casual connection between the implication of the appellant and the nature of duties of the post of Mazdoor, so as to disqualify him from service. He relied on the decisions of this Court in Jijin R v. State of Kerala (2025 KHC OnLine 710) and Binnesh Babu @ Bineesh Babu v. State of Kerala [2024 (3) KHC 364] in support of his contentions. He further argued that since the timeline fixed for verifying antecedents has not been complied with in this case, the same is also fatal.
6. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondents 2 to 4 submitted that there are no grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. He, by relying on the decision in Anil Kumar A v. State of Kerala and Others [2012(2) KHC 257], contended that Rule 10(b)(iii) of KS & SSR is squarely applicable to the case of the appellant, since he was appointed only temporarily, subject to the verification of his antecedents and character. He also submitted that, as per Rule 10(b)(iii) of KS & SSR, only if the Government is satisfied about the character and antecedents, the appellant can be appointed in regular service, and it is the subjective satisfaction of the employer which decides the same. He contended that the appellant was thus appointed temporarily on 02.05.2014, subject to the condition that his appointment will be terminated without notice, if the Government is not satisfied with his character and antecedents on subsequent verification. He also contended that the verification report of the appellant was received only on 02.02.2015 resulting in the issuance of show cause notice in June 2015. He argued that the offence under which the appellant is convicted is a very serious offence and there is a considerable nexus between the offence and the nature of the post, which involves regular contact with public at large. He added that the contentions regarding proximity and nexus now raised by the appellant do not find a place in the writ petition, writ appeal memorandum and was also not raised before the learned Single Judge.
7. On an anxious consideration of the rival submissions and the materials on record, we do not find any merit in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the appellant has been appointed temporarily to the post of Mazdoor and he is on probation. It is also not in dispute that the appellant has been removed from service by invoking Rule 10(b)(iii) of KS & SSR. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the afore Rule is not applicable to the case of the appellant does not hold water in the light of the dictum laid down by this court in Anil Kumar's case (cited supra). In that decision, this Court has categorically held that it is the proviso to Rule 10(b)(iii) which enables the appointment of a person temporarily before the Government are satisfied as to his character and antecedents. It was also held that, it is only in cases where the character and antecedents are found satisfactory on subsequent verification, a person thus appointed will be eligible for appointment in regular service. It is further held that if the Government is not satisfied with the character and antecedents of a person, he can be terminated without notice and hearing. If so, we do not find any illegality in the KSEB invoking Rule 10(b)(iii) of KS & SSR, while issuing Exts.P4 and P6 orders.
8. As regards the contention raised by relying upon Binnesh Babu's case and Jijin's case (all cited supra), at the outset itself, we may say that the operation of the judgment in Jijin R's case (cited supra) has been stayed by the Hon'ble Apex Court (in SLP(C) No.31203/2025) and that the facts in Binnesh's case (cited supra) are entirely different from the facts of the instant case. That apart, it is very pertinent to note that these contentions were never raised in the writ petition and considered by the learned Single Judge and the writ appeal memorandum is also silent regarding these grounds. Now be that as it may, it is to be taken note that, it is the satisfaction of the State Government regarding the character and antecedents of the person which is to be considered before appointing a person in regular service. In the instant case, the appellant has been convicted and sentenced under Section 326 of IPC, which is a serious offence, pertaining to causing grievous hurt by a dangerous weapon. The incident took place on 08.03.1999 and the appellant was convicted by the trial court on 04.09.2003. The appeal and revision filed by the appellant were decided by the Sessions Court and the High Court on 05.08.2008 and on 29.09.2020 respectively. The appellant joined the service as a Mazdoor on 02.05.2014, during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. Even going by the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, one of the prime factors which is to be considered, while applying the nexus test is the nature of the post occupied by a person and the suitability of such a person to the post, from a point as to how the public would view if such a person is appointed in service. The factors such as the nature of the post, the duties assigned to the post, the manner in which the person occupying the post is expected to discharge his duties, etc., also will have a bearing. In the instant case, the post of the appellant being a Mazdoor (Electrical worker) involves regular contact/interaction with the public at large belonging to various strata, and the duties assigned to him can be around the clock. Unless the KSEB finds the person suitable after considering his character and antecedents, then only it can repose confidence in that person and entrust him with a job of the afore nature, which requires public confidence. Furthermore, there is also no material before us to ascertain the social and economic background of the appellant, which is the second consideration, as laid down in Jijin R's case (cited supra). If so, we do not find any ground to interfere with Exts.P4 and P6 on this ground.
9. As far as the contention regarding proximity between the implication in the crime and the time of the appointment is concerned, it is to be seen that, it is during the pendency of the criminal proceedings and especially after the confirmation of the conviction by the appellate court, the appellant has joined the service. That apart, as stated earlier, the appellant has been convicted for committing a very serious offence of causing grievous hurt using a dangerous weapon. The decision in Binnesh Babu's case (cited supra) is not applicable to the facts of the instant case since in that case, the petitioner therein was acquitted in all cases charged against him under IPC and was only sentenced with fine, for other small offences.
10. As regards the contention of non-compliance of the timeline prescribed for completion of the verification process, it is true that Note 2 to Rule 10(b)(iii) proviso of KS & SSR, 1958 states that the authority must obtain the verification report of the candidate within a period not exceeding six months. But, it is very pertinent to note that, (and as stated in the decision in Anil Kumar's case (cited supra)) as stated in the proviso to Rule 10(b)(iii), a candidate will be eligible for appointment in regular service only if his character and antecedents are found satisfactory on such verification. In other words, a candidate can be inducted into regular service only after such verification process is complete and not otherwise. In such circumstances, Note 2 to Rule 10(b) (iii), prescribing a time frame to obtain verification report, cannot be considered as rigid/inflexible, one and an interpretation which would defeat the statutory provision cannot be given. This is more so, considering the fact that no consequence is also provided for non-compliance of the time frame fixed in the Note. Be that as it may, in the instant case, it cannot be stated that there is an inordinate delay in obtaining the verification report and proceeding with the matter. As stated earlier, the appellant was appointed on 02.05.2014 and the verification report has been obtained on 02.02.2015 and thereafter, the show cause notice has been issued in June 2015. In such circumstances, we find that the afore contention raised by the appellant also does not have any legs to stand.
Hence, in the light of the afore discussions, we do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge.
Ergo, we find no merit in this writ appeal, and the same is accordingly dismissed.




