1. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioners assailing the order dated 15.09.2025 (Annexure P/1) passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Nagda, District Ujjain (M.P.) in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 12/2025, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioners under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was dismissed, thereby affirming the order dated 08.07.2025 (Annexure P/2) passed by the II Additional Civil Judge to the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Nagda, District Ujjain (M.P.) in RCS No. 39-A/2025, rejecting the petitioners' application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC for temporary injunction.

2. Brief facts leading to the filing of this petition are that the petitioners instituted a civil suit against the respondents for declaration of ownership on the basis of adverse possession and for permanent injunction in respect of land bearing Survey No. 563/1 admeasuring 0.178 hectares and Survey No. 564/1 admeasuring 0.084 hectares, situated at Village Padliyakala, Tehsil Nagda, District Ujjain (M.P.) (hereinafter referred to "suit land"). It is the case of the petitioners that though the suit land is recorded as Government land in the revenue records, their forefathers have been in continuous, open, and hostile possession thereof for more than 75 years. They claim that during the regime of Gwalior State, a kavelu posh house was constructed on the land, which has been used for residential purposes, and the adjoining land for agricultural activities, cattle rearing, etc. A 'well' was also constructed for irrigation. The petitioners aver that despite notices issued in 1980 and 2017 for eviction under Section 248 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (for short, "MPLRC"), no actual dispossession occurred, and their possession continued uninterrupted. On 19.05.2025, another notice was issued by respondent No. 2 (Tehsildar, Nagda) for removal of encroachment, leading to the filing of the suit along with an application for temporary injunction to restrain the respondents from interfering with their possession during the pendency of the suit.

3. The respondent/State opposed the application, contending that the suit land is Government land, and the petitioners are mere encroachers. They submitted that eviction proceedings under Section 248 MPLRC have been initiated from time to time, and the principle of adverse possession does not apply to Government land without strict proof of 30 years' continuous hostile possession. The Trial Court, vide order dated 08.07.2025, rejected the temporary injunction application, holding that no prima facie case was made out, as the documents did not establish continuous possession over both survey numbers since 1980, and the respondents were following due process under Section 248 MPLRC. The balance of convenience and irreparable loss were also not in favor of the petitioners. The Appellate Court, vide order dated 15.09.2025, affirmed the Trial Court's findings, relying on precedents such as Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria (2012) 5 SCC 370, State of M.P. vs. Ismail Khan 2 006 RN 271 , and others, emphasizing that where legal proceedings under Section 248 MPLRC are underway with due notice, no injunction can be granted to protect unauthorized possession.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the courts below erred in not appreciating the prima facie case in their favor, as the long- standing possession (over 45-75 years) with structures like house, well, and fencing raises triable issues. He contended that even unlawful possession cannot be disturbed without due process, and proceedings under Section 248 MPLRC are summary in nature, not constituting "due process" under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Reliance was placed on Shivkumar Chadha vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(1993) 3 SCC 161], Nagar Palika Parishad Malajkhand vs. Hindustan Copper Ltd. [ILR 2009 M.P. 485], and further relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Balkrishan vs. Satyaprakash and Ors [(2001) 2 SCC 498] so also the judgment of this Court in the case of Secretary Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Damoh vs. Labour Court, Sagar (W.P. No.4027/2000 order dated 27.08.2003) and other judgments to urge that the balance of convenience and irreparable harm tilt in favor of maintaining status quo.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents/State supported the impugned orders, submitting that the suit land is admittedly Government land, and the petitioners have failed to produce revenue records (such as Khasra Panchsala entries) showing continuous possession for the requisite 30 years under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963. He highlighted that notices under Section 248 MPLRC were issued repeatedly (in 1980, 2017, and 2025), indicating intermittent encroachments rather than uninterrupted possession. The respondents are following the statutory procedure for eviction, which includes notice and opportunity of hearing, thus satisfying due process. Reliance was placed on Poona Ram vs. Moti Ram [(2019) 11 SCC 309], T. Anjaneyulu vs. Somalingappa [(2006) 7 SCC 570 ], and State of M.P. vs. Ismail Khan (supra) to argue that no injunction can be granted to perpetuate wrongful possession against the State.

6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record, and considered the rival contentions.

7. Admittedly, the suit land is recorded as Government land. The petitioners' claim rests on adverse possession, which requires proof of continuous, uninterrupted, hostile possession for 30 years against the State (Article 112, Limitation Act, 1963). As held by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Mukesh Kumar (2011) 10 SCC 404 and more recently in Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020) 2 SCC 569 , adverse possession against Government land must be pleaded and proved with stringent evidence, as it involves divestiture of public property.

8. On perusal of the record, the petitioners have relied on notices issued in 1980 (only for Survey No. 563/1), 2017, and 2025, along with affidavits of neighbors. However, no revenue records (Khasra Panchsala) have been produced to demonstrate entries of possession in their favor for the past 30 years or more. The Trial Court rightly noted that the 1980 notice and panchnama pertain only to Survey No. 563/1, and the 2017 notice first mentions both survey numbers, indicating no prima facie evidence of continuous possession over the entire suit land since 1980. The continuous possession is not proved, as entries in revenue records are absent for the last 7-8 years, and 20 years' entries are unavailable. Repeated proceedings under Section 248 MPLRC suggest intermittent dispossession , breaking the chain of continuity essential for adverse possession.

          248. Penalty for unauthorisedly taking possession of land. - (1) Any person who unauthorisedly takes or remains in possession of any unoccupied land, abadi, service land or any other which has been set apart for any special purpose under Section 237 [or upon any land which is the property of Government, or any authority, body corporate, or institution constituted or established under any State enactment,] may be summarily ejected by order of the Tahsildar and any crop which may be standing on the land and any building or other work which he may have constructed thereon, if not removed by him within such time as the Tahsildar may fix shall be liable to forfeiture. Any property so forfeited shall be disposed of as the Tahsildar may direct and the cost of removal of any crop, building or other work and of all works necessary, to restore the land to its original condition shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue from him. Such person shall also be liable at the discretion of the Tahsildar [to a fine with may extend to one lakh rupees] and to a further fine which may extend to twenty rupees for every day on which such unauthorised occupation or possession continues after the date of first ejectment. The Tahsildar may apply the whole or any part of the fine to compensate persons, who may in his opinion have suffered loss or injury from the encroachment :] Provided that the Tahsildar shall not exercise the powers conferred by this sub-section in regard to encroachment made by buildings or works constructed-

          (i) in the Mahakoshal region-

          (a) in areas other than the merged States before the first day of September, 1917;

          (b) in the merged States, before the third day of April, 1950;

          (ii) in the Madhya Bharat region, before the fifteenth day of August, 1950;

          (iii) in the Vindhya Pradesh region, before the first day of April, 1955;

          (iv) in the Bhopal region, before the eighth day of November, 1933; and

          (v) in the Sironj region, before the first day of July, 1958.

9. With a view to consider nature and scope of proceedings of Section 248 of the Code, extract of Section 248 of the Code is given below :-

10. As per Section 248 MPLRC, the Tahsildar is empowered to evict unauthorized occupants after notice and opportunity, which is a statutory due process for removal of encroachments on Government land. The Supreme Court in Maria Margarida (supra) clarified that due process is satisfied when rights are adjudicated by a competent authority, and it does not require a full civil trial. Here, the respondents have issued notices and are proceeding under Section 248, providing the petitioners opportunity to respond.

11. The courts below have correctly applied the triple test for temporary injunction (prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable loss). No prima facie case exists, as the petitioners' possession appears unauthorized and non-continuous. Granting injunction would prejudice public interest in Government land, while denial would not cause irreparable harm, as the petitioners can challenge eviction in appropriate forums. The precedents cited by the petitioners are distinguishable, as they involve different factual matrices (e.g., leases or documented grants).

12. The scope of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is supervisory and limited. This Court does not sit as an appellate authority to re-appreciate evidence or substitute its view unless the impugned orders suffer from jurisdictional error, perversity, or manifest illegality. [Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675].

13. In view of the above, no jurisdictional error or perversity is discernible in the impugned orders. The findings are based on material on record and settled legal principles. Consequently, this petition lacks merit and is dismissed.

14. No order as to costs.

15. A copy of this order be sent to the courts below for information and necessary action.