1. By means of filing this writ petition, the petitioner has sought for the following relief/reliefs:

               i) ISSUE RULE, calling upon the respondents and each one of them, to show cause as to why for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari and/or in the nature thereof, for calling for the records, lying with the respondents, for rendering substantial and conscionable justice to the petitioner, and for quashing/setting aside the impugned Memo No.F.1(92)-ADMN/TPSC/2016(Part II), dated 25.08.2025 whereby memo of Charge was framed against the petitioner; Order No. vide No. F.1(92)-ADMN/TPSC/2016(Part- II)-932, dated 11.09.2025, whereby it is held that enquiry should be conducted against the petitioner and Inquiry Officer was appointed; Show-cause Notice dated 21.02.2025; and impugned Order dated 03.06.2025 and 28.08.2025, and the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner and Order No. F.1(121)-ADMN/TPSC/2024-359, dated 03.06.2025, whereby the petitioner was suspended and Order vide No. F.1(121)- ADMN/TPSC/2024-832, dated 28.08.2025, whereby the order of suspension of extended for 90 days;

               ii) ISSUE RULE, calling upon the respondents and each one of them, to show cause as to why for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus and/or in the nature thereof, mandating/directing the respondents to revoke/rescind the impugned Memo No. F.1(92)- ADMN/TPSC/2016(Part II), dated 25.08.2025 whereby memo of Charge was framed against the petitioner; Order No. vide No. F.1(92)-ADMN/TPSC/2016(Part-II)-932,   dated   11.09.2025, whereby it is held that enquiry should be conducted against the petitioner and Inquiry Officer was appointed; Show-cause Notice dated 21.02.2025; and impugned Order dated 03.06.2025 and 28.08.2025, and the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner and Order No. F.1(121)-ADMN/TPSC/2024-359, dated 03.06.2025, whereby the petitioner was suspended and Order vide  No.  F.1(121)-ADMN/TPSC/2024-832,  dated  28.08.2025, whereby the order of suspension of extended for 90 days;

               iii) ISSUE RULE, calling upon the respondents and each one of them, to show cause as to why for issuance of a Writ of Prohibition and/or in the nature thereof, prohibiting the respondents to act upon the impugned Memo No. F.1(92)- ADMN/TPSC/2016(Part II), dated 25.08.2025 whereby memo of Charge was framed against the petitioner; Order No. vide No. F.1(92)-ADMN/TPSC/2016(Part-II)-932,  dated  11.09.2025, whereby it is held that enquiry should be conducted against the petitioner and Inquiry Officer was appointed; Show-cause Notice dated 21.02.2025; and impugned Order dated 03.06.2025 and 28.08.2025, and the disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioner and Order No. F.1(121)-ADMN/TPSC/2024-359, dated 03.06.2025, whereby the petitioner was suspended and Order vide  No.  F.1(121)-ADMN/TPSC/2024-832,  dated  28.08.2025, whereby the order of suspension of extended for 90 days;

               iv) After hearing the parties, be pleased to make the Rules absolute in terms of Prayer ii. above;

               v) Call for the records, appertaining to this petition;

               vi) Costs of and incidental to this proceeding;

               vii) Any other relief(s) as to this Hon'ble High Court deem fit and proper;

2. Heard Learned Counsel Mr. Sankar Lodh appearing on behalf of the petitioner and also heard Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Somik Deb assisted by Learned Counsel Kundan Pandey appearing on behalf of the respondents.

3. The brief facts of the case are as under:

The petitioner has joined in Tripura Public Service Commission, (in short, TPSC) on 02.09.2008 as a Lower Division Assistant-cum-Typist on fixed pay basis and after completion of 5(five) years of continuous service, she was regularized to the post of the Lower Division Assistant-cum-Typist.

               Thereafter, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Upper Division Assistant (UDA) and on 12.08.2021, she was further promoted to the post of Head Assistant(ad hoc) and continued to serve as Head Assistant (ad hoc) up to the date of her suspension.

               On 25.08.2023, the Section Officer (DDO), TPSE issued an order reallocating duties amongst the staffs of the Accounts Section. Under this order, although the petitioner was holding the post of Head Assistant, she was assigned a substantial number of accounting related duties like GPF Group-B (Gazetted and Non- Gazetted), Advocate Bills, SGST, CGST, IGST and IT matters, hiring of private vehicles for interviews and examinations, purchase of petrol, telephone and mobile bills, Joint Performance of certain works with the Accountant.

               On 15.08.2024, the petitioner was admitted in Tripura Medical College & Dr. B. R. Ambedkar Memorial Teaching Hospital for treatment of gall bladder stone and after availing medical leave, she joined her duties.

               By this time, the Section Officer(DDO), TPSE by another office order dated 22.10.2024, again reallocated certain works in the Accounts Section and the petitioner was given additional responsibilities in addition to her normal jobs. On that relevant point of time, two more designated Accountants were posted in TPSC but the petitioner was assigned more duties without the assistance of any LDACT or UDA.

               From November, 2024 to February, 2025, certain bills under Grant-in-Aid fund including confidential bills were remained pending in the Accounts Section, which aggregated to Rs.16,57,082/-. On 10.02.2025, the petitioner applied for 9 (nine) days Child Care Leave from 24.02.2025 to 04.03.2025 under Rule 39(C) of the TSCS (Leave) Rules, 1986.

               The Under Secretary(HO), TPSC by memo dated 21.02.2025 granted 9 (nine) days Child Care Leave with condition that she must clear all pending bills on or before 12.03.2025 and on the same day i.e. on 21.02.2025, the Under Secretary(HO), TPSC issued show cause notice alleging that the bills amounting to Rs.16,57,082/- were pending since November, 2024 which were remained in the custody of the petitioner seeking her explanation within 5(five) days. Show cause notice was served at 02.10 pm while the leave was served at 04.55 pm on the same day i.e. on 21.02.2025.

               The petitioner sought for extension of time on 25.02.2025 to submit her reply. On 28.02.2025, the petitioner submitted her reply. The petitioner cleared up all the pending bills within the stipulated period i.e. on or before 12.03.2025.

               Despite receipt of the reply and clearance of bill, the Secretary, TPSC by an order dated 03.06.2025 placed the petitioner under suspension and on 28.08.2025, the respondent-authority issued another order for extending the petitioner's suspension period for a further period of 90 days. On 25.08.2025, the authority issued a charge memo proposing disciplinary inquiry and framed four Articles of Charge against the petitioner.

               The petitioner submitted her written statement of defence and requested for personal hearing which was not considered. Thereafter, on 11.09.2025, order was issued proposing that a formal inquiry under Rule 14 of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 be conducted and after that, by the notice dated 16.09.2025, the Inquiring Officer directed the petitioner to appear on 24.09.2025 for disciplinary proceeding and being aggrieved with the order, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking the reliefs as mentioned above.

4. At the time of hearing, Learned Counsel Mr. S. Lodh referred the writ petition and the documents annexed with the writ petition as Annexures and Learned Counsel has drawn the attention of the Court, referring the contentions of the petitioner as mentioned in the writ petition, and submitted that the respondent-authority most arbitrarily has drawn up departmental proceeding against the petitioner which is liable to be interfered with. It was further submitted by Learned Counsel for the petitioner that from the chronology of the events, it will transpire that the respondent-authority all along harass the petitioner and always tried to humiliate her by assigning huge job in addition to her normal duties inspite of having similar staff in the department and as the petitioner raised her voice to the authority, narrating her grievances, so out of grudge, the petitioner has been falsely implicated in the departmental proceeding for which the interference of the Court is required for quashing the departmental proceeding.

               However, in course of hearing Learned Counsel Mr. Lodh confined his argument to the following two points:

               1. That the constitution of Review Committee was in violation of Rule 10(6) of CCS(CCA) and the guidelines of Government of India because according to Learned Counsel, the Review Committee was not the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority or the Authority of the same nature and as such, the constitution of Review Committee by the respondent itself was illegal which cannot be sustained in the eye of law and the Review Committee had no jurisdiction to recommend for further extension of suspension of the present petitioner and urged for the recommendation of the review committee.

               2. Learned Counsel further referred memorandum dated 25.08.2025 issued by the Secretary, TPSC (Annexure- 10) wherein in para No.3 it was specifically stated that it was informed to the petitioner to submit her written statement of defence within 10 days of receipt of the memorandum and also to state whether she desires to be heard in person and accordingly, the present petitioner submitted one reply on 02.09.2025 wherein it was specifically appealed by the petitioner for giving her the opportunity for personal hearing but the respondent- authority without giving any opportunity to be heard proceeded to inquire the matter by drawing up departmental proceeding.

               For the sake of convenience, the Articles of Charge are mentioned herein below:

               STATEMENT OF ARTICLES OF CHARGE FRAMED AGAINST SMT. BHARATI SARKAR, HEAD ASSISTANT, TRIPURA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, AGARTALA

               ARTICLE-I

               Smt. Bharati Sarkar, Head Assistant, TPSC, exhibited gross negligence in performing her official duties by failing to dispose of pending bills amounting to Rs. 16,57,082/- under the Grant-in-Aid fund, which had been in her custody since November 2024 for approximately 4(four) months. These bills, being of top priority and confidential in nature, remained pending, causing embarrassment to the Commission. This conduct is unbecoming of a public servant and constitutes a violation of Rule 3(1)(ii) of the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988, which mandates devotion to duty.

               ARTICLE-II

               Smt. Bharati Sarkar, Head Assistant, TPSC, displayed insubordination by failing to adequately respond to a show cause notice issued vide No. F.1(2-86)- ADMN/TPSC/2008(P)-1622  dated  21.02.2025,  which required her to explain the delay in disposing of the aforementioned bills. Her reply dated 28.02.2025 did not address the core issue of negligence and instead raised baseless allegations of harassment without evidence, not even following the laid down channel for any grievance redressal if at all in any stage as allegation of "harassment of women in the workplace". This conduct of Smt Sarkar violates Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988, requiring conduct befitting a public servant.

               ARTICLE-III

               Smt. Bharati Sarkar, Head Assistant, TPSC, made unsubstantiated allegations of harassment against the Commission in her reply dated 28.02.2025 to the show cause notice, claiming continuous harassment of women in the workplace without providing specific instances or evidence. This act of levelling baseless accusations against a constitutional body is an act of misconduct and insubordination, breaching Rule 3(1)(i) of the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988, which requires maintaining integrity.

               ARTICLE-IV

               Smt. Bharati Sarkar, Head Assistant, TPSC, resisted lawful orders regarding her work allotment, as assigned vide Office Order No. F.2/TPSC/DDO/2019/918 dated 22.10.2024, by claiming she was overburdened and not supposed to work in the Accounts Section despite her accounts cum Administrative training and capability. This refusal to accept assigned duties reflects a lack of devotion to duty and insubordination, violating Rule 3(1)(ii) and Rule 3(1)(iii) of the Tripura Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1988.

               Referring those charges, Learned Counsel Mr. Lodh drawn the attention of the Court that those charges are misconceived, manufactured, without any basis which cannot be sustained in the eye of law and without considering the principles of natural justice, the Articles of Charge have been framed against her for which the show cause notice and the Departmental Proceeding be quashed by this Court by allowing this writ petition.

5. Reliance was placed by Learned Counsel for the petitioner in a case reported in (2009) 12 SCC 78 [titled as Union of India and other Vs. Gyan Chand Chattar dated 28.05.2009] wherein in para No.34, Hon'ble the Apex Court Observed as under:

               “34. In Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan:(1986) 3 SCC 454, this Court held that even in a domestic enquiry, the charge must be clear, definite and specific as it would be difficult for any delinquent to meet the vague charges. Evidence adduced should not be perfunctory even if the delinquent does not take the defence or make a protest against that the charges are vague, that does not save the enquiry from being vitiated for the reason that there must be fair play in action, particularly, in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences.”

               Referring the same, Learned Counsel Mr. Lodh has drawn the attention of the Court that the charge must be clear, definite, and specific, as it would be difficult for any delinquent to meet the vague charges. It was further submitted by Learned Counsel Mr. Lodh that in the case at hand from the contents of the Articles of Charge, it would transpire that those are nothing but vague charges and on the basis of vague charges, departmental proceeding cannot be proceeded further and urged for interference of this Court.

               Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon another citation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in AIR 2025 SC 1656 [titled as State of Jharkhand and others Vs. Rukma Kesh Mishra dated 28.03.2025] wherein in para No.11, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:

               “11. A coordinate bench of this Court in Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana:(2006) 12 SCC 28 has held that ordinarily no writ lies against a show cause notice or charge-sheet. The reason is that a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order affecting the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so (emphasis supplied). Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge-sheet. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a show cause notice or charge-sheet if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason it is wholly illegal (emphasis supplied). However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter.”

               Referring the same, Learned Counsel submitted that this is a very exceptional case where the principle of natural justice was violated, so, the departmental proceeding needs to be quashed and the interference of the Court is required.

               Learned Counsel further relied upon another citation of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2022) 6 SCC 563 [titled as State of  Karnataka  and  another  Vs.  Umesh  dated  22.03.2022]

               wherein in the last part of para No.19, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:

               “19. * * *

               Therefore, the standard that was applied by the Court for determining the validity of the departmental proceedings was whether (i) there was relevant material for arriving at the finding; and (ii) the principles of natural justice were complied with.”

               Referring the same, Learned Counsel Mr. Lodh submitted that in the case at hand there is no material for arriving to any finding against the petitioner as the principles of natural justice have not been complied with. So, the Articles of Charge needs to be set aside by invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

               Learned Counsel further referred another citation reported in (1979) 2 SCC 286 [titled as Union of India and others Vs. J. Ahmed dated 07.03.1979] wherein in the last part of para No.9, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:

               “9. ……… This code of conduct being not exhaustive it would not be prudent to say that only that act or omission would constitute misconduct for the purpose of Discipline and Appeal Rules which is contrary to the various provisions in the Conduct Rules. The inhibitions in the Conduct Rules clearly provide that an act or omission contrary thereto so as to run counter to the expected code of conduct would certainly constitute misconduct. Some other act or omission may as well constitue misconduct. Allegations in the various charges do not specify any act or omission in derogation of or contrary to Conduct Rules save the general Rule 3 prescribing devotion to duty. It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency, failure to attain the highest standard of administrative ability while holding a high post would themselves constitute misconduct. If it is so, every officer rated average would be guilty of misconduct. Charges in this case as stated earlier clearly indicate lack of efficiency, lack of foresight and indecisiveness as serious lapses on the part of the respondent. These deficiencies in personal character or personal ability would not constitute misconduct for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings.”

               Referring the same, Learned Counsel submitted that the respondent in this case could not prove any misconduct on behalf of the petitioner. So, in absence of any misconduct or misdemeanourr there is no scope to proceed against the petitioner.

               Reliance was further placed upon another citation of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (1986) 3 SCC 454 [titled as Sawai Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan dated 02.05.1986] wherein in para No.14, 15, 16 and 17, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:

               “14. Quite apart from that fact, it appears to us that the charges were vague and it was difficult to meet the charges fairly by any accused. Evidence adduced was perfunctory and did not at all bring home the guilt of the accused.

               15. Shri B.D. Sharma, learned advocate for the respondent, contended that no allegations had been made before the enquiry officer or before the High Court, that the charges were vague. In fact the appellant had participated in the enquiry. That does not by itself exonerate the department to bring home the charges.

               16. It has been observed by this Court in Surath Chandra Chakrabarty v. State of W.B.:AIR 1971 SC 752 that charges involving consequences of termination of service must be specific, though a departmental enquiry is not like a criminal trial as was noted by this Court in the case of State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao:AIR 1963 SC 1723 and as such there is no such rule that an offence is not established unless it is proved beyond doubt. But in a departmental enquiry entailing consequences like loss of job which nowadays means loss of livelihood, there must be fair play in action; in respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences against an employee, there must be investigations to the charges consistent with the requirement of the situation in accordance with the principles of natural justice insofar as these are applicable in a particular situation.

               17. The application of those principles of natural justice must always be in conformity with the scheme of the Act and the subject-matter of the case. It is not possible to lay down any rigid rules as to which principle of natural justice is to be applied. There is no such thing as technical natural justice. The requirements of natural justice depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with and so on. Concept of fair play in action which is the basis of natural justice must depend upon the particular lis between the parties. (See K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India:(1984) 1 SCC 43.) Rules and practices are constantly developing to ensure fairness in the making of decisions which affect people in their daily lives and livelihood. Without such fairness democratic governments cannot exist. Beyond all rules and procedures that is the sine qua nоn.”

               Referring the same, Learned Counsel submitted that in the instant case on bare perusal of Articles of Charge No.1 to 4, it will transpire that the charges framed were vague. So, on the basis of vague charges there is no scope to proceed further against the petitioner and urged for setting aside the departmental proceeding.

               Finally, Learned Counsel further referred another citation of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2007 AIR SCW 607 [titled as Union of India and another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana dated 22.11.2006] wherein in para No.16, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:

               “16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter.”

               Referring the same, Learned Counsel submitted that although ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in a matter like this present petition but in some very rare and exceptional cases, the High Court can interfere where there are other materials for quashing the departmental proceeding. Here in the case at hand from the materials on record according to Learned Counsel, it transpires that just to harass the petitioner the respondent-authority has formulated some vague charges, as such, in the eye of law the same cannot be sustained and urged for dismissal of the departmental proceeding.

               Finally, Learned Counsel Mr. S. Lodh also relied upon a judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this High Court in WP(C) No.563 of 2024 dated 27.09.2024 wherein in similarly situated circumstances, this High Court interfered with the extension of suspension period by the Review Committee which was constituted illegally violating Rule 10(6) of the CCS(CCA) Rules.

6. This writ petition has been contested by the respondents by filing counter affidavit denying the entire assertions of the petitioner in the writ petition. However, Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, Mr. S. Deb at the very outset drawn the attention of the Court that this writ petition is not maintainable as because there is no scope under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere any show cause notice or charge-sheet by this Court and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that since the proceeding is at nascent stage so at this stage there is no scope to grant any relief to the petitioner.

               Furthermore, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that based upon the materials on record, departmental proceeding has been initiated by the Authority against the petitioner and as the proceeding is still sub-judiced for decision and the petitioner shall have the ample scope to appear and to conduct her defence before the Departmental Inquiring Authority, so, at this stage no relief can be granted to the present petitioner.

               Regarding maintainability, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that there were series of judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court and different High Courts.

               Reference was placed upon one judgment of Hon'ble the Apex Court reported in (1987) 2 SCC 179 [titled as State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Brahm Datt Sharma and another dated 25.02.1987] wherein in para No.9, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:

               “9. The High Court was not justified in quashing the show cause notice. When a show cause notice is issued to a government servant under a statutory provision calling upon him to show cause, ordinarily the government servant must place his case before the authority concerned by showing cause and the courts should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that stage unless the notice is shown to have been issued palpably without any authority of law. The purpose of issuing show cause notice is to afford opportunity of hearing to the government servant and once cause is shown it is open to the government to consider the matter in the light of the facts and submissions placed by the government servant and only thereafter a final decision in the matter could be taken. Interference by the court before that stage would be premature. The High Court in our opinion ought not have interfered with the show cause notice.”

               Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that in view of the observation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforenoted case at this stage there is no scope to interfere with the departmental proceeding initiated by the respondent-authority against the petitioner.

               Learned Senior Counsel referred another citation of Hon'ble the Apex Court reported in (1990) 4 SCC 744 [titled as Bank of India Vs. T.S. Kelawala and others dated 04.05.1990] wherein in the first part of para No.5, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:

               “5. It is necessary to clear yet another misconception. There is no doubt that whenever a worker indulges in a misconduct such as a deliberate refusal to work, the employer can take a disciplinary action against him and impose on him the penalty prescribed for it which may include some deduction from his wages. ”

               Referring the same Learned Senior Counsel submitted that here in the case at hand there was evidence of sheer negligence on the part of the petitioner in discharging her duties in preparation of some confidential pending bills which amounted to misconduct, as such, the respondent-Authority rightly initiated the departmental proceeding against the petitioner and at this stage there is no scope to interfere with the proceeding pending before the Authority against the petitioner.

7. Learned Senior Counsel also referred another citation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in (1996) 1 SCC 327 [titled as Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board Vs. Ramesh Kumar Singh and others dated 22.11.1995] wherein in para No.10, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:

               “10. We are concerned in this case, with the entertainment of the writ petition against a show-cause notice issued by a competent statutory authority. It should be borne in mind that there is no attack against the vires of the statutory provisions governing the matter. No question of infringement of any fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution is alleged or proved. It cannot be said that Ext. P-4 notice is ex facie a 'nullity' or totally "without jurisdiction" in the traditional sense of that expression-that is to say, that even the commencement or initiation of the proceedings, on the face of it and without anything more, is totally unauthorised. In such a case, for entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against a show-cause notice, at that stage, it should be shown that the authority has no power or jurisdiction, to enter upon the enquiry in question. In all other cases, it is only appropriate that the party should avail of the alternate remedy and show cause against the same before the authority concerned and take up the objection regarding jurisdiction also, then. In the event of an adverse decision, it will certainly be open to him to assail the same either in appeal or revision, as the case may be, or in appropriate cases, by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

               Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the present case is squarely covered by the said observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court.

               Further, reference was made in another citation of Hon'ble the Apex Court reported in (2001) 10 SCC 639 [titled as Ulagappa and others Vs. Divisional Commissioner, Mysore and others dated 26.07.2000] wherein in para No.2, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:

               “2. During the course of hearing, we enquired from learned counsel for the parties as to whether any final notification, including certain area within the limits of Tarikere Town Panchayat consequent upon the notification dated 22-8- 1997 has been issued or not. Learned counsel for the parties stated that so far no such notification has been issued. Under such facts and circumstances, we feel that the writ petition filed by the petitioner was premature and ought not to have been entertained by the High Court. Merely by issue of a notification dated 22-8-1997, none of the rights of the petitioner were affected. Therefore, a decision on the basis of the notification dated 22-8-1997 was totally unnecessary. In this view of the matter, the judgment and order of the High Court shall stand modified.

               The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order as to costs.”

               Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel has drawn the attention of the Court although Learned Counsel for the petitioner in course of hearing relied upon a judgment passed by this Court in WP(C) No.564 of 2024 dated 27.09.2024 wherein regarding violation of GOI instructions vide O.M. No. 11012/4/2003 dated 07.01.2024 but the said notification has not been adopted by the Authority and as such, relying upon the same no relief can be granted in favor of the petitioner.

               Learned Senior Counsel referred another citation reported in (2006) 12 SCC 28 [titled as Union of India and another Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana dated 22.11.2006] wherein in Para Nos.13 to15 Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:

               “13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge-sheet or show- cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh:(1996) 1 SCC 327, Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse:(2004) 3 SCC 440, Ulagappa v. Divisional Commr., Mysore:(2001) 10 SCC 639, State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma:(1987) 2 SCC 179, etc.

               14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge- sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance.

               15. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge- sheet.”

               Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that writ jurisdiction should not be ordinarily exercised by quashing a show cause notice or charge sheet. Here in the case at hand only the show cause notice and charge sheet is submitted, so, at this stage there is no scope to interfere with the disciplinary proceeding pending against the petitioner.

8. I have heard both the sides at length and perused the writ petition along with the documents submitted by the petitioner as Annexures, and also the counter affidavit and the documents annexed with the counter affidavit submitted by the respondents, and the subsequent rejoinder filed by the petitioner. Admittedly, the departmental proceeding drawn up against the petitioner is still pending before the Inquiring Authority. The petitioner in this petition has prayed for setting aside the memorandum on the basis of which departmental proceeding initiated against the petitioner with the Articles of Charge and also the extension of suspension period on the basis of recommendation of the review committee. It is on record that the petitioner was placed under suspension by the respondent- Authority and vide order No.F1(121)-ADMN/TPSC/2024/359 dated 03.06.2025 and later on, her order of suspension was further extended for next 90 days in exercise of the power conferred under Rule 10 at Sub-Rule (6) of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 vide order dated 28.08.2025. The said extended period of suspension also has been expired by this time. The petitioner at the time of filing writ petition did not file any Interlocutory Application for staying the operation of said extension of suspension order dated 28.08.2025, although in the main petition the petitioner has challenged the constitution of Review Committee as well as the recommendation of Review Committee. Since the order dated 28.08.2025 extending the period of suspension of 90 days has been expired, so, any interim order in this regard at this stage will be unwarranted.

               However, since the writ petition is finally heard, so let us decide the subject matter of this writ petition on merit. As already stated, the proceeding before the Inquiring Authority is at nascent stage. At the time of hearing, Learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of the Court that certain irregularities were committed by the respondent-Authority, but it is settled position of law that in exercise of the power conferred under Article 226 of Constitution of India, there is very limited scope on the part of the High Court to interfere with the show cause notice or the Articles of charge, because in the departmental proceeding, it is expected that all the opportunities would be given to the petitioner to substantiate her defense by producing documentary evidence on record, if so requires. So, considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the materials on record and in view of the aforesaid judgments at this stage, I do not find any scope to grant any relief to the petitioner in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for setting aside/quashing the order of departmental proceeding.

9. In this regard, in a very recent judgment reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 676 [titled as State of Jharkhand and others Vs. Rukma Kesh Mishra dated 28.03.2025] in para Nos.11 and 12, Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India observed as under:

               “11. A coordinate bench of this Court in Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana(supra) has held that ordinarily no writ lies against a show cause notice or charge-sheet. The reason is that a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order affecting the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so (emphasis supplied). Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge- sheet. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a show cause notice or charge- sheet if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason it is wholly illegal (emphasis supplied). However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter.

               12. Having read the decision in Kunisetty Satyanarayana (supra), we are of the view that it was open to the High Court to examine the question of jurisdiction to issue the charge-sheet to the respondent since he had invoked the writ jurisdiction after suffering the order of dismissal from service and not at an initial stage of the inquiry. The writ petition, therefore, could not have been thrown out at the threshold.”

               From the aforesaid observation, it appears that a mere show- cause notice or charge-sheet does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order affecting the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. Here in the case at hand, it is not the case of the petitioner that the proceeding itself is defective one being initiated by an authority, not legally empowered to do so and based upon the materials on record, it appears to this Court that the petitioner before this Court at the time of hearing could not place any materials on record to treat this case as a rare and exceptional case to invoke jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India.

10. However, at the time of hearing, Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of Rule 10(6), further extension order of suspension by the Review Committee was unconstitutional and the same fact also covers by a judgment of co-ordinate bench of this Court in a case No.WP(C)/563/2024 dated 27.09.2024. In this regard, let us reproduce herein below the relevant provision of Rule 10 Sub-Rule (6) of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 which provides as under:

               “10.(6) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall be reviewed by the authority which is competent to modify or revoke the suspension before expiry of ninety days from the effective date of suspension on the recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose and pass orders either extending or revoking the suspension. Subsequent reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension. Extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days at a time.”

               From the aforesaid rule, it appears that in the instant case at hand, the Review Committee was constituted by order dated 26.08.2025(Annexure-14) without inclusion of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority as such, the composition of the Review Committee and the order dated 26.08.2025 appears to be in violation of the statutory rules. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent in this regard could not place any convincing material to counter the submission made by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner. Even there is no evidence on record that the judgment of this Court dated 27.09.2024 passed in WP(C)/563/2024 was annulled by any other forum. Thus, it appears that the constitution of Review Committee by the Authority vide order dated 26.08.2025(Annexure- 14) and subsequent order dated 28.08.2025(Annexure-8) issued by the Authority was made in absence of the statutory power violating the rules.

11. So, after hearing both the sides and also after going through the observations made by Hon'ble the Apex Court as stated above and the citations relied upon by the Learned Counsel for the parties, it appears to this Court that the present petitioner is partly entitled to get some relief in this writ petition.

12. In the result, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is hereby partly allowed. The order dated 26.08.2025 (Annexure-14) and subsequent order dated 28.08.2025(Annexure-8) issued by the Authority stands set aside/quashed but the show cause notice dated 21.02.2025 (Annexure-3) and order dated 03.06.2025 (Annexure-6), memorandum dated 25.08.2025 (Annexure-10) at this stage stands affirmed, not interfered with.

               However, it is made clear that the respondent-authority shall make all endeavor to dispose of the departmental proceeding drawn up against the petitioner within a period of 4(four) months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. Furthermore, the respondent- Authority shall give scope to the petitioner to substantiate her defense before the Inquiring Authority at the time of hearing of the departmental proceeding.

               With this observation, the present writ petition stands disposed of.

               Pending applications(s), if any, also stands disposed of.