Sujit Narayan Prasad J.

1. The instant appeal has been filed on behalf of the appellant under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 against the order/judgment dated 31.05.2024 [decree signed on 05.06.2024] passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro in Original Suit No. 288 of 2023, whereby and whereunder, the said Suit filed by the appellant-husband under the provisions of Sections 13(1)(i-a)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 against his wife has been dismissed.

Factual matrix

2. The brief facts of the case as per pleadings made in the instant appeal needs to be referred herein which reads as under:

                  It has been stated that marriage of the petitioner was solemnized with the responded on 28.5.2011 as per Hindu rites and custom. After marriage they lived together as husband and wife. Out of their wedlock, they have been blessed with two female babies, namely, Shrishti Kumari, aged about 09 years and Anesha Kumari aged about 08 years and both are school going students. During their conjugal life, the respondent wife started some abnormal behaviour. On being asked she stated since before their marriage, she was suffering from mental illness. Her parents got her treated but could not be cured. The appellant/ husband also get her treated at Bokaro General Hospital and also in Ranchi but there was no changes rather her condition deteriorated and quite often she without any rhyme and reason used to abuse him and his family members. Whenever they tried to persuade her, she used to thrash her head. Despite this, he keeping in mind the future of their children, got their children admitted in Ayyappa School, Bokaro but she always used to assault him and their children too. On being persuaded, she became more aggressive and used to abuse. Due to her mental illness, she could not discharge her marital obligations.

                  It has further been stated that on being informed about death of his mother-in-law, he along with the respondent and the children went to his sasural on 09.08.2019, where on 10.08.2019, the respondent and her family members without any reasonable cause, abused and assaulted him brutally and ousted him and their children from their house with a threatening to face dire consequences if he comes again and since then neither there is any relationship of husband and wife between them nor the respondent take any initiative for restitution of their conjugal rights.

                  It is alleged that on 10.10.2019, the respondent/wife and her father came to his house, abused him and went away taking her all belongings and never returned. He left no stone unturned to bring her back and lead their conjugal life but all proved futile. She is not ready to lead her conjugal life with him and in future there is no chance of their living together as husband and wife. They are living in desertion for last four years and due to cruel behaviour of the respondent, there is no ray of hope for living together as husband and wife. There is no collusion to file this suit. Cause of action is said to be arisen on 28.05.2011, when their marriage was solemnized and on 10.08.2019, when she left her matrimonial home and on 10.10.2019, when she came to her matrimonial home, left her matrimonial home taking away her all belongings. Therefore, the suit was filed for decree of divorce.

3. It is evident that the appellant-husband has made out a case by making allegation of cruelty and desertion for dissolution of marriage. The ground has been taken that the respondent-wife is mentally sick and, as such, the behavior which has been meted out in the family life has made the life of the appellant difficult which amounts to cruelty.

4. The ground of desertion has also been taken on the pretext that from the year 2019 the respondent-wife is living away from the company of the husband.

5. The learned Family Judge has called upon the respondent-wife by issuing notice. The respondent-wife has not appeared. The proceeding has been made ex-parte.

6. The issues have been framed by the learned Family Court and the appellant-husband has been called upon to produce his evidence.

                  Accordingly, the evidence was laid on behalf of the appellant-husband and altogether two witnesses have been examined, i.e., PW-1, the appellant himself and one of his friends, namely, Rajesh Kumar as PW-2.

7. The learned Family Judge has considered the statements of the witnesses and has come to the conclusive finding thatthe petitioner/appellant/ husband has not produced any evidence or any report of the doctor in order to substantiate the fact of mental sickness of respondent wife. Further, the ground of desertion has also not been found to be established, since, as per the learned court, the marriage between the parties was solemnized in the year 2011 and as per the allegation respondent-wife has deserted the petitioner/appellant in the year 2019 and at the time of filing of the suit two children who had taken birth from their wedlock were in between the age of 9 years and 8 years respectively. The learned Family Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that if respondent wife had not performed her conjugal life and responsibilitiesin a proper manner then the petitioner/husband could not have waited for such a long period to get rid of her.

                  The learned Family Judge, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has come to the conclusion that none of the ingredients either of the cruelty or desertion has been found to be proved and, therefore, the suit was dismissed which is the subject matter of the present appeal.

                  Arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner/appellant:

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant assailing the impugned judgment has taken the following points:

                  (i) It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the learned Family Judgehas not appreciated the statement of PW-1, the appellant himself, wherein it has been specifically stated that the respondent- wife is suffering from mental disorder but even though the same has not been accepted rather contrary finding has been given.

                  (ii) The learned Family Judge has also not appreciated the evidence of PW-2, the friend of the appellant, who has corroborated the statement given by the appellant.

                  (iii) The learned counsel has submitted that the impugned judgment therefore suffers from perversity due to non-consideration of the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 and, as such, the impugned judgment needs interference.

Arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent/respondent:

9. Per contra, Mr. Arpit Kumar, the learned counsel for respondent-wife has raised the following grounds:

                  (i) The learned counsel for the respondent-wife has contended that none of the ingredients either of cruelty or desertion has been found available even after going through the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, the witnesses who have been examined on behalf of the appellant.

                  (ii) It is further been contended that the learned Family Judge has given a finding that in absence of any document leading to prove that the respondent-wife is suffering from mental disorder and merely on the basis of saying of a person who is husband herein, the learned Family Judge has rightly not accepted the version of mental disorder of respondent wife.

                  (iii) It has been contended that the ground which is being agitated that the appellant husband has been subjected to cruelty rather if the entire case of the appellant supported by the evidence will be taken into consideration it is the husband who has subjected the respondent- wife with cruelty by making false allegation that she is suffering from mental disorder even though the respondent wife had lived with the appellant-husband from 2011 to 2019 as per admitted case of the appellant-husband. Therefore, ample opportunities was there to produce the medical certificate or opinion of the doctor showing suffering of the respondent-wife from mental sickness but not a single chit of paper has been produced by the appellant-husband.

                  (iv) It has further been contended that in the facts and circumstances of the present case due to false allegation of mental sickness the respondent wife is living away and even both the children have been compelled to be parted away from the love and affection of their mother which itself amounts to cruelty.

10. The learned counsel for the respondent-wife on the basis of the aforesaid submissions has submitted that the impugned judgment needs no interference.

Analysis:

11. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the findings recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment and the trial court records.

12. This Court before appreciating finding recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment needs to refer herein that upon issuance of notice upon the respondent-wife has not appeared and, as such, the proceeding has been made ex-parte.

13. The learned Family Judge has proceeded to adjudicate the issues and has called upon the appellant-husband to produce his evidence who has produced two witnesses, i.e., PW-1 the appellant himself and PW-2 his friend Rajesh Kumar. The evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 are being referred herein under:

                  (i) PW-1(Petitioner) has stated in his examination-in-chief on affidavit that he and the respondent are legally married husband and wife and from their wedlock, they have been blessed with two daughters namely Shrishti Kumari, aged about 09 years and Anesha Kumari, aged about 08 years and both the children are school going students. During leading their conjugal life, the respondent sometimes used to behave abnormally. On being asked by him, she stated that since before marriage, she was suffering from mental illness for which her parents got her treated but did not cure. Concealing her mental illness, her parents got her married to him. Despite this he got her treated at Bokaro General Hospital and also in Ranchi but in vain rather her condition deteriorated and she used to abuse him whenever he tried to persuade her. In spite of having their two daughters, she never discharged her motherly obligation rather he and his family members keeping in view the future of their children got them admitted in Ayyappa Public School, Bokaro. She also used to brutally assault their children. Due to her illness, neither she could do household work properly nor perform her conjugal life. On being informed about death of the mother of the respondent, he, the respondent and their children went to his sasural on 09.08.2019, where on 10.08.2019, the respondent, her father and the brother without any rhyme and reason had assaulted him brutally, ousted him along with their children and threatened to face dire consequences, if he comes again and since then there is no relationship of husband and wife between them.

                  (ii) PW-2 Rajesh Kumar (Friend) has stated almost same facts as stated by PW-1 (Petitioner) in his examination-in-chief on affidavit. In court question, he has stated that the parties are living separately from each other from the year 2019. At present, the respondent is living in her parent’s home. The petitioner did not file any case against his wife/respondent for restitution of conjugal rights. The respondent is not of sound mind, for which the petitioner got her treated at Bokaro General Hospital, Bokaro, but he could not say about filing of any documents/treatment paper in this case. The petitioner works in Electrical Department in B.S.L., Bokaro but he does not know his salary.

14. The learned Family Judge has proceeded to examine the truthfulness of the grounds as has been taken in the pleading to assess as to whether on the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 the element of cruelty and desertion have been proved or not.

15. The learned Family Judge has come to the conclusion that the element of cruelty and desertion has not been proved and hence, dismissed the suit filed by the appellant-husband against which the present appeal has been preferred.

16. This court in order to appreciate the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties as referred herein above, first needs to refer herein the interpretation of the word “cruelty” as has been defined by Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in Dr. N.G. Dastane Vs. Mrs. S. Dastane [(1975) 2 SCC 326], wherein it has been held that the Court is to enquire as to whether the charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause in the mind of the petitioner, a reasonable apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent.

17. In the case of Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddi [(1988) 1 SCC 105], wherein the wife alleged that the husband and his parents demanded dowry, the Hon’ble Apex Court emphasized that “cruelty” can have no fixed definition.

18. According to the Hon’ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the “conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations”. It is the conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or unintentional. For example, unintentionally waking your spouse up in the middle of the night may be mental cruelty; intention is not an essential element of cruelty but it may be present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more “a question of fact and degree.”

19. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed therein that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty that it is important for the Court to not search for a standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another case. What must be considered include the kind of life the parties are used to, “their economic and social conditions”, and the “culture and human values to which they attach importance.”

20. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations against the spouse in the written statement filed before the court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute cruelty.

21. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC 337, the wife alleged in her written statement that her husband was suffering from “mental problems and paranoid disorder”. The wife’s lawyer also levelled allegations of “lunacy” and “insanity” against the husband and his family while he was conducting cross-examination. The Hon’ble Apex Court held these allegations against the husband to constitute “cruelty”.

22. In Vijay Kumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed by taking into consideration the allegations levelled by the husband in his written statement that his wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity with a person outside wedlock and that his wife was having an extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute “cruelty” itself.

23. It is the settled position of law that cruelty is a mixed question of law and fact. Cruel treatment can be inferred from the entire course of conduct and incidents showing display of temperament, emotion and perversion by one spouse whereby one gives vent to his or her feelings, without intending to injure the other. Where there is proof of a deliberate course of conduct on the part of one, intended to hurt and humiliate the other spouse, and such a conduct is persisted cruelty can easily be inferred. Neither actual nor presumed intention to cause hurt to other spouse is a necessary element in cruelty reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble apex Court in the case of Sujata Uday Patil v. Uday Madhukar Patil, (2006) 13 SCC 272.

24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742, has been pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct, which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to make one live with the other. The conduct may take the form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct complained of must be “grave” and “weighty” and trivial irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.

25. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vidhya Viswanathan v. Kartik Balakrishnan, (2014) 15 SCC 21 has specifically held that cruelty is to be determined on whole facts of the case and the matrimonial relations between the spouses and the word ‘cruelty’ has not been defined and it has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct and one which is adversely affecting the other.

26. Thus, from the aforesaid settled position of law it is evident that “Cruelty” under matrimonial law consists of conduct so grave and weighty as to lead one to the conclusion that one of the spousecannot reasonably be expected to live with the other spouse. It must be more serious than the ordinary wear and tear of married life.

27. Cruelty must be of such a type which will satisfy the conscience of the Court that the relationship between the parties has deteriorated to such an extent that it has become impossible for them to live together without mental agony. The cruelty practiced may be in many forms and it must be productive of an apprehension in the mind of the other spouse that it is dangerous to live with the erring party. Simple trivialities which can truly be described as a reasonable wear and tear of married life cannot amount to cruelty. In many marriages each party can, if it so wills, discover many a cause for complaint but such grievances arise mostly from temperamental disharmony. Such disharmony or incompatibility is not cruelty and will not furnish a cause for the dissolution of marriage.

28. Since the appellant husband has also contended the issue of desertion therefore, it would be apt to discuss herein the element of “desertion”. It needs to refer herein that the word ‘desertion’ has been given in Explanation to Section 13 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955wherein it has been stated that “the expression desertion means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.”

29. It is pertinent to note that the word ‘desertion’, as has been defined in Explanation part of Section 13 of the Act, 1955, means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wishes of such party, and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.

30. Rayden on Divorce ,which is a standard work on the subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.), has summarised the case-law on the subject in these terms:

                  “Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party.”

31. The legal position has been admirably summarised in paras-453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words:

                  “In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases.”

32. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, ‘the home’. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party.

33. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or, where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer.

34. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted, desertion is a continuing offence.

35. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of meaning of desertion that the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiate desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end.

36. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to from the necessary intention aforesaid.

37. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs. Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the definition of ‘desertion’ on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40 which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court.

38. The law consistently has been laid down by the Court that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home.

39. Thus, from the aforesaid settled position of law, it is evident from the interpretation of the word “cruelty” that daily tear and wear is not construed to be the cruelty while on the other hand desertion means parting away one spouse from the other, but while deciding the issue of desertion the factum of parting away is to be seen as to whether the parting away is due to compulsion or with her volition.

40. This Court is proceeding to examine the finding so recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment, the touch stone of the interpretation of the word cruelty and definition of the word desertion.

41. The factual aspect as per the pleadings made in the memo of appeal as has been incorporated in the impugned judgment and as also available in the trial court records is that the ground of cruelty has been taken on behalf of the appellant that the respondent-wife is suffering from mental disorder. The admitted fact is that the marriage in between the parties was solemnized in the year 2011. They lived together up to the year 2019. In the meanwhile, two girl children had born out of their wedlock and by the time when the appeal was filed both the children had attained the age of about 9 years and 8 years. This Court on the basis of the admitted case of the appellant wherein it has been admitted that conjugal life of the parties was going on from the year 2011 to 2019 and, in between that period, two girl children had born and at the time of filing of appeal they attained the age of 9 years and 8 years. The respondent-wife has deserted the appellant-husband in the year 2019. The question of mental disorder therefore is to examine on the pretext of the fact that if a lady, the mother is suffering from any mental sickness then is it possible for a mother to take care of two children that is too, two girl children. It is quite impossible for a lady having mental disorder to take care of upbringing of girl children up to the age of 9years and 8 years. In our considered view the allegation which has been leveled that the respondent-wife is suffering from mental disorder cannot be said to be justified one.

42. The aforesaid fact has also been corroborated from the pleading itself as has been taken note by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment that no any cogent evidence has been brought on record to substantiate the element of mental sickness. Further it is admitted case of the appellant-husband that the respondent-wife was with him from the year 2011 to 2019 and the pleading which was made making allegation of mental disorder then the question is that when the respondent wife was living with the appellant husband at-least up to the year 2019 then some documents must have been there in the possession of the husband to show the mental ailment of the respondent-wife, but no such document has been produced by the appellant-husband and, therefore, this court is of the view that such finding cannot be said to be suffer from perversity.

43. At this juncture it requires to refer herein the Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under:

                  “24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.

                  25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings.

                  26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.

                  27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:

                  1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn. “Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.”

                  2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn. Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.

                  3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.

                  Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.

                  4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)

                  Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.

                  5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.

                  “Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.”

44. This Court after discussing the aforesaid factual aspect along with the legal position and adverting to the consideration made by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment has found therefrom that the issue of element of cruelty has been appreciated at length by the learned Family Judge, therefore the finding of the learned Family Court on the point of alleged cruelty, is not coming under the fold of the perversity.

45. So far as ground of desertion as provided under section 13 (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 is concerned the desertion is to be taken into consideration if one of the spouses has been forcefully kept away from the company of another spouse. Here it is evident from the pleadings that the respondent wife is living away from the year 2019 which led the appellant-husband to file the suit for divorce. In the present case the ground of desertion has been connected with the ground of cruelty which is totally based upon the accusation of mental sickness as has been leveled by the appellant-husband. Save and except the ground of mental disorder, no other ground has been taken to prove that respondent-wife, at her own wish, has left the company of her husband.

46. This Court since has concurred with the view taken by the learned Family Judge so far as not proving the element of cruelty and, as such, is of the view that the moment the accusation of mental sickness was leveled by the appellant-husband upon the respondent-wife the same itself amounts to cruelty meted out to the wife by the husband and in that view of the situation how can it be said that the respondent-wife at her own wish has left the company of her husband.

47. The learned Family Judge has taken into consideration meaning of the word “desertion” and by coming to conclusion that the appellant husband has failed to substantiate that the responded wife at her own will had left the matrimonial house. We are conscious that as an appellate court if any finding found to be erroneous or perverse then certainly the appellate court may reverse the same. This court in order to consider the issue of perversity needs to refer herein the definition of perversity first which has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence and further, if any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law then it will come under the purview of perverse order. Further “perverse verdict" may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.

48. This Court, on consideration of the finding arrived at by the learned Family Judge and based upon the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the judgment and decree passed by the learned Family Judge is not coming under the fold of the perversity as defined by the Hon’ble Apex Courtas discussed and referred in the preceding paragraph, since, the conscious consideration and appreciation of all issues has been made as would be evident from the impugned judgment.

49. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the judgment dated This Court, therefore, is of the view that the judgment dated 31.05.2024 [decree signed on 05.06.2024] passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro in Original Suit No. 288 of 2023, need no interference.

50. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.

51. Pending I.A.(s), if any, stands disposed of.