1. This second appeal is filed aggrieved against the Judgment and decree dated 20-08-2018 in A.S.No.20 of 2013 on the file of the Judge, Family Court- cum-III Additional District Judge at Srikakulam, confirming the Judgment and decree dated 04.02.2013 in O.S.No.56 of 2006 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge at Srikakulam.

2. The appellant herein is the defendant and the respondent herein is the plaintiff in O.S.No.56 of 2006 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge at Srikakulam. The sole-respondent died during the pendency of the first appeal before the First Appellate Court and her son was brought on record as the respondent No.2 in the first appeal proceedings.

3. The plaintiff initiated action in O.S.No.56 of 2006 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge at Srikakulam, with a prayer for eviction of the defendant from the plaint schedule property as a trespasser as lease period was over on 21.08.2005 and also to pay Rs.2,600/- per month towards damages from September, 2005 for unauthorized occupation and for costs of the suit.

4. The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge at Srikakulam, decreed the suit with costs directing the defendant to vacate the plaint schedule property within 3 months from the date of decree and deliver vacant possession to the plaintiff and also directed to pay damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs.2,600/- per month from September, 2005 till the property is deliver to the plaintiff. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful defendant in the above said suit filed the aforesaid appeal before the first appellate Court. The learned Judge, Family Court-cum-III Additional District Judge at Srikakulam, dismissed the first appeal by confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful defendant/appellant approached this Court by way of second appeal.

5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the second appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit.

6. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.56 of 2006, is as follows:

                  The plaintiff is the owner of the plaint schedule property and the defendant took the plaint schedule property under lease for his business purpose to run a photo studio under the name and style of ‘Satish Photo Studio’ for rent from the plaintiff. Thereafter, the defendant executed a rent deed agreeing to pay the rent of Rs.2,000/- per month on 10.09.2003, for the period of two years and the said lease period was over on 31.08.2005. The plaintiff further pleaded that after expiry of the lease period, a fresh lease would be executed, taken for further two years on the enhancement of the rent by 30% per hundred per year in the present rent of Rs.2,000/-. However, the defendant did not come forward to execute the fresh lease deed after expiry of the lease period i.e. on 31.08.2005, nor the defendant handed over the possession of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff and the defendant became trespasser, who is in unlawful possession of the property from 01.09.2005.

                  While so, the plaintiff gave a registered legal notice to the defendant on 27.10.2005, through her advocate to vacate the plaint schedule property. The defendant received the same and gave a reply through his counsel on 09.11.2005 stating that he has been in possession of the property from February, 1995 onwards, with a rent of Rs.500/-, which has been extended from time to time up to the year 2005 and that the lease period was over by 31.08.2005. The plaintiff further pleaded that her son has no business to collect the rent and even if the defendant paid the same, it is not binding on the plaintiff and she did not receive any amounts from the defendant. As such, the defendant became trespasser after the lease period, and a notice was also given by the plaintiff to the defendant to vacate the plaint schedule property and also to pay an amount of Rs.2,600/- per month towards damages from September, 2005 to till the defendant vacates the plaint schedule property. Hence, the plaintiff is constrained to file the present suit.

7. The defendant filed written statement before the trial Court. The brief averments in the written statement are as follows:

                  On 01.09.2003, the plaintiff and her son approached the defendant and requested to register the lease deed for the purpose of income tax and also requested the defendant to enhance the rent to Rs.2,000/- per month from Rs.800/- as the municipal taxes were enhanced. As there is no other alternative, the defendant agreed to pay the rent of Rs.2,000/- per month because the defendant modernised the photo studio by investing huge amounts. The defendant further pleaded that he believed the story of the plaintiff and registered the rent deed on 10.09.2003, since then the defendant obtained a rent receipts from the plaintiff’s son and sincerely paid the rents without any default till the expiry of the lease deed i.e. on 31.08.2005.

                  The defendant further pleaded that on 31.08.2005, the deceased plaintiff and her son approached the defendant and collected an amount of Rs.2,000/- towards rent from him and issued a rent receipt to the defendant on the said date, the deceased plaintiff and her son requested the defendant orally to enhance 10% on Rs.2,000/- rent, but the defendant did not agree to pay additional 10% of rent and he requested the plaintiff that he will pay a 5% added rent on Rs.2,000/- in the presence of elders namely,

                  1) S.Venkateswararao, 2) G.Giribaby and 3) R.Manmadharao and the deceased plaintiff and her son agreed to enhance the rent of 5% on Rs.2,000/- rent and accordingly the deceased plaintiff and her son approached the defendant on 19.06.2005, and collected the rent from him and issued the rent receipts for the same and even on 16.09.2005, the deceased plaintiff and her son did not demand the defendant to vacate the premises and both the plaintiff and her son maintained cordial relations with the defendant.

                  The defendant further pleaded that he made several efforts to pay the rents and he continued as tenant in the plaint schedule property under the oral agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant, as such, the question of trespass does not arise and the defendant is not liable to be evicted from the plaint schedule property. He further pleaded that the plaintiff with mala fide intention has issued a legal notice through her counsel with false allegations on 27.10.2005, to call upon the defendant to vacate the premises; the defendant received the legal notice and issued a reply notice on 09.11.2005 with all facts. The defendant further pleaded that he is unemployed, having old parents and a large number of persons depending on the earning of the defendant and the he has no business other than the photo studio and he is eking out his livelihood through the source of photo studio business, as such, he prayed to dismiss the suit with costs.

8. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge at Srikakulam, framed the following issues for trial:

                  1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to evict the defendant from plaint schedule property?

                  2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages as prayed for? and

                  3) To what relief?

                  9. During the course of trial before the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiff,

                  P.W.1 was examined and Exs.A-1 to A-4 were marked. On behalf of the defendant, D.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-22 were marked.

10. The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge at Srikakulam, after conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, decreed the suit with costs. Felt aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful defendant filed the appeal suit in A.S.No.20 of 2013, on the file of the Judge, Family Court-cum-III Additional District Judge at Srikakulam, wherein the following points came up for consideration:

                  1) Whether the Decree and Judgment dated 04.02.2013 passed by the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Srikakulam in O.S.No.56 of 2006 is liable to be set aside as prayed for?

                  2) Whether this Court needs interference?

11. The learned Judge, Family Court-cum-III Additional District Judge at Srikakulam, i.e., the first appellate Judge, after hearing the arguments, answered the points, as above, against the defendant and dismissed the appeal suit filed by the defendant. Felt aggrieved of the same, the defendant in O.S.No.56 of 2006 filed the present second appeal before this Court.

12. Heard Sri P.Rama Sharana Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri P.Rajasekhar, learned counsel for the respondents.

13. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. It is regulated in accordance with law. A second appeal preferred under Section 100 of C.P.C., could be admitted only when the appellant satisfies the Court that substantial question of law between the parties arise in the case. A proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would be or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so, whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by the superior Courts or is not free from difficulty or cause for discussion of alternative views. In a case of Boodireddy Chandraiah v. Arigela Laxmi((2007) 8 SCC 155), the Apex Court held that it is not within the domain of High Court to investigate grounds on which the findings were arrived at by the last Court of fact namely, the first appellate Court. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of facts are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate Court will not be interfered by the High Court in a second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. Where, the facts required for a point of law have not been pleaded, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. Mere appreciation of facts, documentary evidence and contents of documents cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law.

14. The defendant having chosen to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code, it is for him to meet the above principles and satisfy the Court whether there exists any substantial question of law.

15. This second appeal is filed against the concurrent findings arrived by both the Courts below, therefore, the grounds urged in the second appeal are to be scrutinized to find out whether the appellant has shown any substantial question of law. The contention of appellant is that the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court are contrary to law and that the second appeal may be allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts below i.e. the trial Court and the first appellate Court.

16. The respondent No.1 is the plaintiff in the suit proceedings; the respondent No.1 filed a suit for eviction of the appellant from the plaint schedule property and also for damages as stated by the plaintiff in the plaint. The relationship of tenant and land-lady in between the appellant and the plaintiff is undisputed by the appellant. The undisputed facts are that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property and there a lease deed in between the tenant/appellant and the land-lady/plaintiff on 10.08.2003, under Ex.A-1 and the terms of the lease deed are that “after the lease period expires in the month of August, 2005, a fresh lease deed has to be obtained by the plaintiff and the tenant/appellant has to pay 30% of the enhanced rent to the plaintiff in the event of continuation in the premises and he has to obtain a fresh lease deed from the plaintiff.” Admittedly, there is no fresh lease deed in between the appellant and the plaintiff beyond 10.08.2005 and Ex.A-1 expired in the month of August, 2005.

17. The contention of the appellant is that the son of the plaintiff used to collect the rent from him and issued the receipts to him and that the son of the appellant did not demand the appellant to vacate the premises. Admittedly, to prove the same, no prima facie evidence was adduced by the appellant. Another contention put forth by the appellant is that he continued as the tenant in the suit schedule property under an oral agreement, hence the question of trespass does not arise and he is not liable to vacate the suit schedule property. Admittedly, no evidence was produced by the appellant to show that there was an oral agreement in between the plaintiff and the appellant to continue as a tenant by the appellant in the plaint schedule premises. Admittedly, the lease period under Ex.A-1 expired in the month of August, 2005, and later no fresh lease deed was obtained by the appellant from the plaintiff. D.W.2, who is none other than the own witness of the defendant admitted that on 31.08.2008, the plaintiff demanded the appellant to enhance the rent and the appellant is his friend. D.W.3 is the person, who worked as a photographer in the studio run by the appellant in the plaint schedule premises. D.W.3 fairly admits that the lease deed expired in the month of August, 2005, and on 31.08.2005, the plaintiff and her son came to the schedule premises and made a demand to enhance the rent and he did not advise the appellant to enter into a fresh lease deed for extension of the lease deed.

18. The contention of the appellant is that he continued as a tenant in the suit schedule premises under an oral agreement as stated supra and to that extent, no evidence was produced by the appellant. A registered legal notice under Ex.A-2 was issued by the plaintiff to the defendant by demanding the defendant to vacate the suit schedule property. Having received the notice, the appellant issued a reply notice and did not vacate the premises and also did not obtain a fresh lease deed beyond 31.08.2005, and continued possession in the plaint schedule property.

19. It is well settled that on expiry of period of lease, the erstwhile lessee continuous in possession because of the law of the land viz., that original land-lady cannot physically thrown out such an erstwhile tenant by force. She must get her claim for possession adjudicated by a competent Court as per the relevant provisions of law. It is also equally settled that the status of an erstwhile tenant has to be treated as tenant at sufferance akin to a trespasser having no independent right to continue in possession. Learned counsel for the appellant has brought to the notice of this Court that the appellant is not paying damages as ordered by the trial Court, which was confirmed by the First Appellate Court. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that in case, if the appellant has to pay any arrears of damages as ordered by both the Courts below, he will pay the arrears of damages to the plaintiff.

20. Law is well settled that in the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure the High Court cannot substantiate its own opinion unless the Court finds that the conclusions drawn by both the Courts are erroneous being, (i) contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law or (ii) contrary to the law as pronounced by the Apex Court or based on inadmissible or no evidence. Admittedly, in the case on hand, the defendant failed to prove that the conclusions drawn by the First Appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of applicable law or the conclusions drawn by the First Appellate Court is based on inadmissible in evidence.

21. Having regard to the reasons assigned, this Court is satisfied that the concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below on all the issues/points against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff do not brook interference and that both the Courts below are justified in decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff. The findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on record and there was neither illegality nor irregularity in those findings and therefore, the findings do not require to be upset. Further, the existence of substantial questions of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court as per Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure. The questions raised, strictly speaking, are not even pure questions of law, let alone substantial questions of law.

22. Viewed thus, this Court finds that none of the questions raised are substantial questions and there is no subsistence in the questions raised and that therefore, the second appeal is devoid of merits and is liable for dismissal at the stage of admission. The law is well settled that a second appeal shall not be admitted if no substantial questions of law arise for consideration and when no substantial questions of law is involved. The view of this Court is reinforced by the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki(AIR 2006 SC 1975). In the case on hand, as stated supra, this Court finds after careful examination of the pleadings, evidence and contentions that no substantial question of law is involved, this second appeal is liable for dismissal at the stage of admission, in view of narrow compass of Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code.

23. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed at the stage of admission, confirming the judgment and decree of both the Courts below, by directing the appellant to deposit the arrears of damages to be paid to the respondent/plaintiff, as ordered by the trial Court, if not paid, which was confirmed by the First Appellate Court, within a period of two (02) months before the Executing Court from the date of this order, failing which the Executing Court shall proceed in the Execution Petition in accordance with law. In the event of deposit of arrears of amount of damages by the appellant, as ordered by the trial Court, which was confirmed by the First Appellate Court, additional time for a period of three (03) months is granted to the appellant to deliver the vacant possession of the schedule premises to the respondent/plaintiff. Considering the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.

                  As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall stand closed.