Oral:

1. The present revision petition has been filed by the petitioner– plaintiff Ram Kishan challenging the concurrent findings of the Courts below whereby the learned Trial Court, vide order dated 30.07.2025, dismissed the application filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC, and the learned Lower Appellate Court, vide judgment dated 16.10.2025, affirmed the said order.

2. The case of the plaintiff, as set out in the plaint and submissions before the Trial Court, is that the land in question originally belonged to his grandfather Nand Ram s/o Deva, who, according to him, was allotted proprietary rights during the consolidation proceedings of the year 1957–58. It is asserted that after consolidation, the names of the ancestors of the plaintiff were duly recorded in the relevant Khasra Girdawaris and Jamabandis and that Khasra No. 122/1, Murabba No.17, Killa Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and Murabba No.18, Killa Nos. 5 and 6, fell to the share of Nand Ram, whose heir the plaintiff claims to be. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants, namely Harlal and Har Chand, belonging to the lineage of one Pokhar son of Chaina, in collusion with the officials of the Consolidation Department, got their names wrongfully entered in the revenue record of village Jagan in the year 1957–58, despite having no ancestral or legal claim over the suit property. The plaintiff contends that the record of 1885–86 of village Jagan contains no trace of ownership of the ancestors of the defendants and that neither the pedigree table nor any other revenue document supports their claim of ownership. It is further alleged that the defendants and their predecessors have illegally sold portions of the suit land from time to time to different purchasers despite having no title, thereby creating multiple chains of transfers which, according to the plaintiff, are all fraudulent, illegal and not binding on his rights.

3. The plaintiff states that the defendants have recently started raising construction of a poultry farm on Murabba No.17, Killa Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and Murabba No.18, Killa Nos. 5 and 6, which according to him amounts to illegal encroachment over his ancestral land. The plaintiff seeks an injunction restraining the defendants from raising any construction, cultivating or interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the suit land. It is further pleaded that the plaintiff has already filed objections before the Consolidation Officer challenging the illegal allotment of the suit land in favour of the defendants, and the said petition is still pending adjudication.

4. The defendants, in reply, have refuted the allegations and asserted that they are the absolute owners in possession of the suit land. It is contended that during the consolidation proceedings their predecessors-in- interest were duly allotted specific khasra numbers which included the land presently in dispute, and the corresponding entries were incorporated in the Jamabandi for the year 1967–68. The defendants submit that their predecessors purchased the land vide registered sale deed dated 19.09.1966 and have remained in continuous possession ever since. According to the defendants, they have full legal right to use the land as they deem fit, and the plaintiff has no concern, title or lawful claim over the land. They further contend that the poultry farm has been functioning on the suit land for a considerable period and that they possess electricity connection and other documents proving their possession. Thus, the defendants assert that they are not encroachers but rightful owners in settled possession of the land.

5. After hearing both parties, the learned Trial Court, in its order dated 30.07.2025, examined the pleadings and documents very minutely. The Court first considered whether the plaintiff had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case in his favour. It was noted that the revenue entries produced on record consistently showed the names of the defendants and their predecessors as owners or co-sharers of the land from at least the year 1996 onwards, and in many records since consolidation itself. The plaintiff himself admitted in his plaint and in his own application that the suit property was in possession of the defendants. It was further observed that the plaintiff’s challenge to the consolidation allotment was already pending before the Consolidation Officer and unless and until the said authority altered the entries, the existing revenue record held the field. The Trial Court held that the plaintiff had not produced any cogent document to prima facie establish his ownership over Khasra No. 122/1 or the other khasra numbers mentioned in the application.

6. The Court then examined whether the balance of convenience lay in favour of the plaintiff. It found that the defendants had been in longstanding possession of the suit property, running a poultry farm over part of it, and that the plaintiff had admittedly not been in possession for decades. Therefore, restraining the defendants from using the land, when their possession was reflected in revenue records and admitted in pleadings, would amount to disturbing an existing factual position which had remained undisturbed for years. On this reasoning, the Court held that the balance of convenience did not support the plaintiff.

7. Lastly, with respect to irreparable loss, the Court observed that since the plaintiff’s objections regarding ownership were pending before the Consolidation Officer, the rights of the parties would ultimately be governed by the outcome of those proceedings. If the plaintiff were eventually to succeed, he would not be without remedy and could seek restoration of possession or damages as permitted by law. Furthermore, the construction or use of the land for poultry farming, when already in existence, would not cause irreparable loss to the plaintiff who was not in possession. For these reasons, the Trial Court concluded that none of the three essential ingredients for grant of temporary injunction were satisfied, and accordingly, the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC was dismissed on 30.07.2025.

8. In appeal, the learned Lower Appellate Court affirmed the reasoning of the Trial Court and held that no prima facie case was made out by the plaintiff, as the revenue entries consistently reflected the defendants or their ancestors as owners since 1957–58 and the plaintiff himself admitted their possession since long. It was further observed that the plaintiff had separately challenged the consolidation allotment before the competent authorities and, until that challenge succeeded, he could not claim any right over the suit land. The Appellate Court noted that the suit property had changed hands multiple times over the last sixty years, and the plaintiff had slept over his alleged rights for decades. The present defendants appeared to be bona fide purchasers, and the plaintiff could not reopen the consolidation proceedings indirectly through an injunction application. Since neither prima facie case nor balance of convenience nor irreparable loss was established in favour of the plaintiff, the learned Appellate Court held that the injunction could not be granted. Finding no illegality or perversity in the order of the Trial Court, the appeal was dismissed.

9. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of present revision petition.

10. According to the petitioner the matter involved only a short controversy turning upon the documentary record already on file, therefore no notice was required to be issued before deciding the application, as no prejudice was caused to the opposite party.

11. The petitioner has contended that the courts below have gravely erred in dismissing his application for temporary injunction despite the overwhelming documentary material that, according to him, clearly establishes his ancestral title over the suit land. It has been argued that the entire basis of the defendants’ claim rests on forged and fabricated revenue entries and a registry that never existed in the official records, as revealed from the certified documents obtained from the concerned authority. The petitioner further pointed out that the defendants’ claim of long possession is built upon incorrect and manipulated entries introduced during consolidation proceedings, whereas the true and original record of rights demonstrates that the suit land was allotted to the petitioner’s grandfather in the consolidation scheme of 1957–58 and has remained in the possession of the petitioner’s branch of the family ever since.

12. It is further urged that the fake mutation and Jamabandi entries relied upon by the defendants stand contradicted by the spot Jamabandi of the recent years, which does not record any valid transfer in favour of the defendants. The petitioner asserted that the defendants have wrongly represented themselves as owners on the basis of forged documents and have now started raising construction over the land without any lawful right, causing irreparable loss to him. He submitted that the lower courts failed to appreciate these vital documents and proceeded merely on the basis of the defendants’ alleged long possession, which itself is under challenge in separate proceedings before the consolidation authorities.

13. Having considered the record placed before this Court as well as the submissions advanced, it is apparent that the dispute raised by the petitioner relates fundamentally to the validity of the entries made during consolidation proceedings and the effect of the alleged forged registry and mutations on the title of the suit land. The petitioner seeks to establish his claim on the basis of entries which he asserts to be true reflection of ancestral ownership, while simultaneously impeaching the defendants’ claim on the ground of alleged fabrication. These assertions, however, require detailed examination of evidence, comparison of multiple Jamabandi entries, scrutiny of consolidation records, and determination of whether the alleged forged registry affects the chain of title. All these issues are essentially triable issues which cannot be adjudicated at the interlocutory stage.

14. The material relied upon by the petitioner does not, at this stage, conclusively displace the documentary possession and the repeated transfers pleaded by the defendants. Moreover, from the petitioner’s own pleadings, it is evident that he has separately challenged the allotment and entries made during consolidation before the competent consolidation authority, and that proceeding remains pending. Until the petitioner succeeds in that challenge, his claim to exclusive title cannot be treated as established for the purpose of granting interim injunction. The petitioner has also admitted that the defendants are in possession of the suit land and have been dealing with it for several decades. Mere allegation of forgery, without a finding from the competent forum, cannot be treated as sufficient to disturb settled possession through an interlocutory order.

15. This Court also finds that the petitioner has failed to show any immediate change in the nature of the property that would constitute irreparable loss incapable of compensation. The claim of impending construction does not, in the circumstances of the present case, tilt the balance of convenience in favour of the petitioner when his own title remains under serious cloud and subject to pending adjudication before the consolidation authority. The petitioner’s grievance that certain documents were not appreciated by the courts below also does not persuade this Court to take a different view, as the nature of the controversy requires a fullfledged trial rather than an interim protective order.

16. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds no illegality or perversity in the concurrent findings of the courts below rejecting the injunction application. The petitioner has not been able to demonstrate any ground warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction, which is limited to examining jurisdictional error or material irregularity and does not extend to re-appreciation of facts.

17. The revision petition, therefore, stands dismissed.

18. All pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, stands disposed of.