1. The plaintiff, Mahabir Singh, has approached this Court in the present second appeal, challenging the reversal of the decree passed in his favour by the trial court. His suit for specific performance had been decreed on 09.02.1995 by the Trial Court. However, the first appellate court, by judgment dated 26.10.1995, allowed the appeal filed by defendant Nos.2 to 4 and dismissed the suit in its entirety.

2. To avoid any ambiguity, the parties are referred to by their original description before the trial court. The entire record, as available on DMS, has been duly perused.

3.1 Plain8ff’s Case: Mahabir Singh (plaintiff) and Dharambir Singh (defendant No.1) are real brothers. The plaintiff alleged that defendant No.1, being the owner of the suit property situated in Village Gochhi, Tehsil Jhajjar, District Rohtak, comprising 59 Kanals 3 Marlas of agricultural land, a residential house (marked ABCD in site plan Ex.P2), and a Gher (marked ABCD in site plan Ex.P3), had agreed to sell the same to him. This agreement to sell, dated 21.10.1989 (Ex.P1), was allegedly executed for total sale consideration of ?1,00,000/-, out of which ?20,000/- was paid as earnest money. The stipulated date for execution of the sale deed was fixed as 15.06.1990.

                   3.2 According to the plaintiff, he duly presented himself before the Sub-Registrar, Beri, on the appointed date, ready with the balance consideration. However, defendant No.1 did not appear. Subsequently, the plaintiff learnt that defendant No.1 had sold 32 Kanals of the suit land to defendant Nos.2 to 4 for a consideration of ?1,60,000/- vide sale deed dated 28.05.1991 (Ex.P4). He then instituted the present suit seeking (i) specific performance of the agreement dated 21.10.1989, and (ii) a declaration that the subsequent sale deed in favour of defendant Nos.2 to 4 was illegal and void.

4.1 Defendant No.1 did not contest the suit and was proceeded against ex parte.

                   4.2 Contesting Defendants’ Stand: Defendant Nos.2 to 4 in their written statement asserted that they had purchased 32 Kanals of the land lawfully, for valuable consideration, and without any notice of the alleged prior agreement. They alleged that the agreement relied upon by the plaintiff was a forged and fabricated document, created in collusion between the two brothers. They accordingly claimed the protection of being bona fide purchasers and prayed for dismissal of the suit.

5. Findings of the Trial Court: Upon evaluating the pleadings of the parties and the evidence led by them, the trial court held that the agreement dated 21.10.1989 (Ex.P1) stood duly proved and further held that defendant Nos.2 to 4 were not bona fide purchasers. The suit was thus decreed on 09.02.1995.

6. Findings of the Appellate Court: However, in appeal filed by defendants N: 2 to 4, the learned Additional District Judge took a different view. While affirming the finding that agreement Ex.P1 was proved to have been executed by defendant No.1, the appellate court observed that the agreement did not contain any description whatsoever of the agricultural land intended to be sold - neither khasra numbers nor khewat, khatauni, or boundaries. The appellate court further held that the sale deed in favour of defendant Nos.2 to 4 was executed almost a year after the target date of the agreement and so, not in haste as was observed by trial court; and that the vendees had no notice, actual or constructive, of the alleged prior contract. Defendant Nos.2 to 4 were accordingly held to be bona fide purchasers for value, leading to a dismissal of the plaintiff's suit in toto, vide judgment dated 26.10.1995.

                   1. Appellant’s Contentions : Assailing the appellate court’s judgment, learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that once both courts had concurrently held the agreement (Ex.P1) to be duly executed, the appellate court erred in denying specific performance. It is argued that the trial court had correctly discarded the sale deed dated 28.05.1991, particularly noting (i) the suspicious choice of aBesting witnesses from different villages despite the availability of the Numberdar from the same village, (ii) the absence of any bona fide inquiries by the vendees, and (iii) the fact that one of the vendees was a resident of the same village and thus, presumably aware of the prior agreement. Ld. Counsel contends that the sale deed was the result of collusion between defendant No.1 and defendant Nos.2 to 4.

                   2. Alternatively, it is argued that even if defendant Nos.2 to 4 were considered bona fide purchasers to the extent of 32 Kanals, the plaintiff was at least entitled to specific performance for the remaining portion of the property owned by defendant No.1.

                   3. Prayer is accordingly made to restore the judgment of Trial Court.

                   1. Respondents’ Contentions : Defendant Nos.2 to 4 maintained that the appellate court has correctly held them to be bona fide purchasers. It is pointed out that the revenue records disclosed nothing regarding the alleged agreement, and no circumstance existed to put defendant Nos.2 to 4 on inquiry. They asserted that the alleged agreement between two brothers was deliberately kept secret.

                   2. Ld. counsel for defendant No.1, though the said defendant had not appeared before the trial court, argued that an appellant may still defend the decree on the existing record. It was emphasised that agreement Ex.P1 failed to specify, which land to the extent of 9.5 acres was agreed to be sold, and that the total land owned by defendant No.1 was in fact less than the land described in the agreement, rendering it inherently uncertain and unenforceable.

7. Court’s Consideraton : This Court has considered the rival submissions and carefully examined the entire record.

8. There is no justification to disturb the concurrent finding regarding the execution of agreement Ex.P1. The scribe (PW-1), an attesting witness (PW2), and a handwriting expert (PW-3) all supported the plaintiff’s case. Defendant No.1 neither filed a written statement nor entered the witness box, and so, an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act is well justified.

9. However, the mere proof of execution of an agreement does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to the relief of specific performance, as it is an equitable remedy subject to strict judicial scrutiny, particularly regarding the certainty of the terms of the contract, readiness and willingness, and the rights of third parties.

10. A closer scrutiny of agreement Ex.P1 raises legitimate doubts about its authenticity and timing. The document is written on a plain sheet bearing only an adhesive revenue stamp, without a proper stamp paper. The scribe failed to produce any register showing its contemporaneous execution. Given that the parties are real brothers, the possibility of a document being created later i.e., aFer the sale deed in favour of defendant Nos.2 to 4, cannot be ruled out. Although the Court refrains from formally declaring the agreement collusive, the surrounding circumstances cast a significant shadow on its genuineness.

11. Pleas Bona Fide Purchasers : Even assuming agreement Ex.P1 to be genuine, the appellate court’s finding that defendant Nos.2 to 4 are bona fide purchasers deserves affirmation. The revenue records (Jamabandi and mutations, Ex.P5–P7) depicted defendant No.1 as the owner in self-cultivating possession. There was no entry, remark, or encumbrance indicating any prior agreement. Under Sec on 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a transferee is expected to exercise such diligence as an ordinary prudent purchaser would. This ordinarily involves verifying the title of the transferor and the revenue entries. Unless there are suspicious circumstances, a purchaser is not required to go beyond the apparent title of the transferor.

12. The appellate court rightly noted that the sale deed dated 28.05.1991 (Ex.P4) was executed almost one year after the date fixed for performance under agreement Ex.P1, negating allegations of undue haste. The mere fact that the attesting witnesses belonged to nearby villages does not by itself cast suspicion on the sale deed, particularly when two vendees were from the same village as one of the witnesses.

13. The law is consistent to the effect that where there exists no circumstance to put the purchaser on inquiry, and the title appears clear on the record, the purchaser is entitled to the protection accorded to a bona fide transferee for value.

14. Uncertainty and Vagueness of the Agreement : The most crucial infirmity in the plaintiff’s case lies in the uncertainty and indefiniteness of the agreement itself. The agreement recites a total area of 9.5 acres, whereas the plaintiff’s own claim in the plaint pertains to 59 Kanal 3 Marla (i.e., 7 acre 3 Kanal 3 Marla). No explanation emerges for this discrepancy. More importantly, no khasra numbers, boundaries, or identifying particulars were provided, which is contrary to the strict requirement that a contract sought to be specifically enforced must be definite and capable of execution.

15. The legal precedents such as: Surjit Singh and another v. Manohar Lal and others, 2004(3) RCR (Civil) 761; Bhagwan Singh (deceased) represented by LRs v. Nawab Mohammad I!ikhar Ali Khan and others, 1984 RRR 532; Megh Raj v. Subhash Rani and others, 2012 (2) PLR 392; and Smt. Sant Kaur (deceased) thr LRs v. Balwinder Singh and others, 2016 (4) Law Herald 2832, all affirm the principle that an agreement lacking essential particulars concerning the identity of the property is uncertain and unenforceable. The court cannot, by adducing oral evidence or conjecture, create clarity where the parties themselves have failed to do so. Section 29 of the Contract Act reinforces this by declaring agreements void, where meaning is uncertain or not capable of being made certain.

16. In the light of this legal position, it has been rightly held by the first appellate court that the agreement Ex.P1 suffers from incurable vagueness and is therefore incapable of enforcement, either wholly or partly. The argument that the plaintiff should at least be granted a decree for the land remaining aFer excluding the 32 Kanals sold to the bona fide purchasers cannot be accepted. Courts cannot rewrite contracts or infer terms not agreed upon between the parties.

17. Conclusion : For all the reasons as discussed above, this Court finds no infirmity in the judgment of the first appellate court. The findings regarding the bona fide status of defendant Nos.2 to 4 and the unenforceability of the agreement Ex.P1 due to inherent vagueness are legally sound and supported by both precedent and principle. The plea for partial specific performance is equally untenable.

18. Consequently, the present second appeal is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. The judgment and decree of the appellate court are affirmed.