(Prayer: Original Applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 praying

                   (i) to grant an order of interim injunction restraining the respondent from permitting any third party connections to the respondent’s LPG pipelines (O.A.No.66 of 2025); and

                   (ii) to grant an order of interim injunction restraining the respondent from accepting supplies of propane, butane and/or LPG through any means apart from the applicant’s facilities except by road receipts (O.A.No.67 of 2025).

                   ARBITRATION APPLICATIONS under Section 9(1)(ii)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 praying

                   (i) to vacate the order dated 25.2.2025 in O.A.No.66 of 2025 (Arb.A.No.1352 of 2025); and

                   (ii) to vacate the order dated 25.2.2025 in O.A.No.67 of 2025 (Arb.A.No.1353 of 2025).)

Common Order:

1. O.A.Nos.66 and 67 of 2025 have been filed by the applicant namely one M/s.Ennore Tank Terminals Private Limited under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity, the Act) seeking respectively (i) for an order of interim injunction restraining the respondent namely one M/s.Indianoil Petronas Private Limited from permitting any third party connections to the respondent’s LPG pipelines and (ii) for an order of interim injunction restraining the respondent from accepting supplies of propane, butane and/or LPG through any means apart from the applicant’s facilities except by road receipts.

2. The said original applications were disposed of by a common order dated 25.2.2025. Later, the respondent filed the present applications namely Arbitration Application Nos.1352 and 1353 of 2025 seeking to vacate the common order dated 25.2.2025 passed in both O.A.Nos.66 and 67 of 2025.

3. In this common order, for the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to as per their ranking in the said original applications.

4. Heard both.

5. The facts leading to filing of the present applications are as follows:

                   (i) The applicant is a special purpose vehicle of one M/s.IMC Limited. The respondent wanted to receive the products from the port to their LPG terminal, for which, tailor-made pipelines and other facilities would have to be created by the applicant from the applicant’s Jetty. A memorandum of understanding dated 20.4.2010 was entered into for the construction of specialised pipelines by the applicant from the applicant’s Jetty to the port boundary and usage of these specialised pipelines as well as the applicant’s Jetty by the respondent for their entire business requirements for its LPG terminal for handling the products except road receipts. The parties executed a pipeline services agreement dated 13.7.2012.

                   (ii) As per the agreement, the respondent specifically acknowledged and agreed to certain terms that were relied upon by the applicant and they are extracted as hereunder:

                   “(a) that the pipelines are being specifically created and tailor made exclusively for the respondent to handle the products (Recital 3);

                   (b) that the respondent would use the facilities and services of the applicant in relation to the products for their entire business requirements at the LPG Terminal, Ennore (Recital 4);

                   (c) that the agreement shall be for a fixed period up to May 31, 2036, and that the respondent has waived its right of termination until the expiry of such term and has agreed not to abandon usage of the facilities, either wholly or partly (Clauses 2 and 24);

                   (d) that the respondent agrees to receive the products only through the applicant's pipelines, except road receipts (Clause 6.5);

                   (e) that the respondent shall maintain their pipelines in good order (Clause 6.10);

                   (f) that the applicant shall not be responsible for berthing delays of vessels and/or incur liability to pay any demurrage or detention charges for the vessels (Clause 14.2);

                   (g) that the respondent would ensure compliance of the provisions of this agreement by its affiliates and/or agents and/or public sector oil companies (Clause 16.2);

                   (h) that the respondent shall not transfer, assign, sublet, underlet, or grant a sub-license or encumber any of its rights granted under the agreement in respect of the services and facilities provided under this agreement without prior approval of the applicant (Clause 18);

                   (i) that if there is any default in the usage of the facilities by IPPL, it is considered a material breach and the affected party has the right to enforce specific performance of the agreement (Clause 26);

                   (j) that the disputes between the parties are to be resolved by way of arbitration to be held at Chennai (Clause 29);

                   (k) that the respondent shall use its best endeavours to act in good faith towards the commercial intention of the agreement (Clause 30i);

                   (l) that the respondent shall abide by the fixed lock in period and shall not attempt to terminate the agreement for any reason including by virtue of an alternate facility being established during the tenure of the agreement (Clause 30j); and

                   (m) that the respondent shall utilize only the applicant's facilities (Recital 4 read with Schedule 2) for their entire business requirements for its Ennore LPG Terminal (Schedule 5, Clause 1.5).”

                   (iii) Pursuant to the said agreement, the applicant constructed pipelines from the applicant’s Jetty to the port boundary along with other facilities as defined in Schedule II of the agreement. The applicant’s pipelines were connected via a ‘golden joint’ to the respondent’s pipelines from the port boundary to the LPG terminal for the purpose of handling the products. Substantial amounts were spent by the applicant in this regard.

                   (iv) The grievance of the applicant is that the Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL) awarded a contract to an entity namely one M/s.ITD Cementation for the construction of IOC Captive POL/LPG marine jetty and associated mechanical, electrical, fire-fighting and instrumentation facilities at Kamarajar Port Limited, Ennore. According to the applicant, the IOCL was proposing to lay LPG pipelines from their new jetty towards the golden joint of the existing LPG pipelines of the applicant and the respondent.

                   (v) Hence, the apprehension of the applicant was that the IOCL was planning to connect their pipelines to the respondent’s pipelines after bypassing the applicant’s pipelines so as to facilitate receipt of the products from the IOCL’s jetty to the LPG terminal, which, according to the applicant, would be in breach of the respondent’s obligations under the agreement. Later, the applicant issued a letter dated 02.8.2024 to the respondent expressing their grievance and informed the respondent that such a step would be in violation of the terms of the agreement.

                   (vi) The parties had a meeting on 19.9.2024 to discuss and resolve the issues, at which point of time, the respondent informed the applicant that it was the IOCL’s decision to lay and connect the pipelines and that the respondent had nothing to do with the pipeline proposed to be laid by the IOCL. The letter dated 23.9.2024 was also sent by the respondent to the applicant in this regard. As a subsequent development, the IOCL published a Notification dated 25.10.2024 calling for potential bidders for the purpose of supply fabrication erection and laying of pipelines including HDD and hook up with existing and operational propane or butane IPPL pipeline through hot tapping method near under-construction captive jetty of the IOCL at Kamarajar Port Limited, Ennore, Chennai.

                   (vii) According to the applicant, the tender document reflected the intention of the IOCL to connect their new pipelines to the respondent’s pipeline that connects to the LPG terminal. This, according to the applicant, could not be done without their consent. Had this been done, the operational control of the pipelines and valves would be with the IOCL, which would also be in control of the receipt of products through the applicant’s pipelines. This would effectively create a third party interest in the agreement between the parties in violation of the provisions of the agreement. It was under those circumstances, O.A.Nos.66 and 67 of 2025 came to be filed by the applicant.

                   (viii) When O.A.Nos.66 and 67 of 2025 came up for hearing on 28.1.2025, this Court, on considering the averments made in the affidavits filed in support thereof and also the documents relied upon by the applicant, passed the following interim order:

                   “Original Application No.66 of 2025:

                   Application filed to grant an order of injunction restraining the respondent from permitting any third party connections to the respondents LPG Pipelines.

                   Original Application No.67 of 2025:

                   Application filed to grant an order of injunction restraining the respondent from accepting supplies of propane, butane and /or LPG through any means apart from the applicant's facilities, except by road receipts.

                   2. I have heard Mr.N.Vijay Narayan, learned Senior Counsel for Mr.K.Gowtham Kumar, counsel for the the applicant.

                   3. Learned Senior Counsel would take me through various documents filed in support of the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and contend that the applicant is in the business of port-based bulk liquid storage and international trading, Outsource being awarded by Kamarajar Port Limited in January 2004, for the construction and development of a Marine Liquid Terminal consisting of a Marine Liquid Jetty for the purposes of handling liquid bulk as well as storage and handling facilities dock-lines and other allied facilities, on a build, operate and transfer basis.

                   4. In the course of business, the respondent a joint venture Company of Petronas and Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL) evinced interest to receive products from Port to their LPG terminal and in that regard, wanted the applicant to construct tailor-made pipelines and other facilities to be created by the applicant from their Jetty.

                   5. The parties have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding dated 20.04.2010 and Pipeline Services Agreement dated 13.07.2012, in and by which agreement, it was agreed between the parties that the pipe lines are being created and tailor made exclusively for the respondent to handle the products and it was further agreed that the agreement will be valid upto 31.05.2036 which would be a lock in period.

                   In other words, the respondent waived its right to terminate the agreement either wholly or partly prior to 31.05.2036.

                   6. The respondent further agreed to receive the products only through the Applicant's pipelines, except road receipts as seen from Clause 6.5. Clause 26 sets out that in the event of any default in the usage of the facilities by the respondent, then it would amount to material breach and the affected party would have the right to specifically enforce the agreement. Clause 29 provides for resolution of dispute by reference to Arbitration.

                   7. Referring to all these clauses, learned Senior Counsel Mr.N.Vijay Narayan would submit that IOC was proposing to lay LPG pipelines from their new Jetty which would facilitate IOCL to connect their pipelines to the respondent's pipeline, by passing the applicant's pipeline.

                   8. Realising the lurking hardship and prejudice that would be caused to the applicant, the applicant has issued a letter on 02.08.2024. In response to the said letter, the respondent sent a reply dated 23.09.2024 stating that the respondent has already handled 16.97 MMT of products through the applicant's pipelines and that they have no role to play in the construction of IOCL Jetty pipelines.

                   9. The real apprehension of the applicant is that a Tender Notification was published by the respondent on 25.10.2024 calling for potential bidders for Supply, Fabrication, Erection and Laying of pipelines, including HDD and hook up with existing and operational Propane or Butane IPPL pipeline through hot tapping method near under construction captive jetty of IOCL at Kamarajar Port Limited, Ennore, Chennai and from the tender documents, it is evident that IOCL intends to connect their new pipelines to the respondent's pipelines that connects to the LPG terminal.

                   10. Learned Senior Counsel would invite my reference to a Map showing the lay of the existing Port, applicant's Jetty, IOCL's newly laid pipeline, their Jetty and also “Golden Joint” spotlighting on the genuine apprehension of the applicant as to how the IOCL pipelines would be used by the respondent to deprive the applicant of its valid rights under the agreement.

                   11. In fact, learned Senior Counsel would point out that if the respondent connects their pipelines to IOCL is newly laid pipelines, then it would in fact amount to breach of respondent's obligations. Learned Senior Counsel would therefore pray for an interim injunction to be granted in favour of the applicant as prayed for pending arbitration proceedings.

                   12. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel and I have also gone through the documents.

                   13. From a plain reading of the agreement between the applicant and the respondent, it is clear that the respondent has contracted with the applicant for a tailor made route to handle products, clearly promising that the entire business requirement of the respondent would be using the facility and the services of the applicant. I have already referred to the lock-in period agreed upon under the agreement, upto 31.05.2036. Clause 6.5 clearly reinforces the assurance of the respondent that the products would be received only through the applicant's pipelines and the only exception carved out was road receipts.

                   14. Rightly, apprehending that IOCL being already a 50% stake holder in the respondent, it is very likely that the respondent would start using the new facility of the IOCL and divert the business of the applicant, the applicant having spent Rs.80 crores towards construction of tailor made pipeline and provision of other facility to enable the respondent to use them, it was also brought to the notice of the respondent by letter dated 02.08.2024. However, the respondent replied in a wishy-washy manner that they have already handled the minimum agreement quantity of products through the applicant's pipelines. The reply dated 23.09.2024 does not even meet and deny the allegations and the apprehensions raised by the applicant. The reply appears to be very vague and bald. It only gives an indication that the respondent is proposing to use the new laid pipeline of IOCL, without saying so.

                   15. I also find that the stand taken by the respondent that they have achieved minimum quantity of 16.97 MMT to be handled by them through the applicant's pipelines appears to be mischievous and misleading. From the Pipeline Services Agreement dated 13.07.2012, I do not find that the parties have anywhere agreed upon the respondent achieving a minimum quantity to be handled through the applicant's pipelines. The Supplementary agreement that has been entered into indicates that annexure which has been relied upon by the respondent in the reply notice is only for factoring the costs and not for any other purpose. In fact, much reliance has been placed on the financial statement of the respondent for the period from 01.04.2023 to 31.03.2024 of the respondent. In the said financial statement, the respondent has voluntarily declared as follows:

                   ‘42. During the year 2012-13, the company entered into an agreement with Ennore Tank Terminal Private Limited (ETTPL), to construct 2 insulated pipelines for the purpose of handling the products. Under the agreement, specific pipelines (the ownership of Pipeline is with ETTPL) are constructed that are used exclusively for the purpose of handling the products of IPPL only. Further, IPPL has voluntarily offered to be a committed user of the facilities for the fixed tenure unequivocally waived any right of termination of agreement during the fixed tenure on any ground whatsoever.

                   The agreement is for a period of 24 years, a minimum guaranteed lock in period upto March 31, 2036 commencing from the date of this Agreement. IPPL shall pay 13% of post-tax project IRR or 3% above the term loan interest rate for ETTPL whichever is higher irrespective of the quantity purchased.

                   The pipelines shall be used dedicatedly for the Company which means the Company will be using these for a significant portion of time which in this case is 100%.....’

                   16. Therefore, from a reading of the Financial Statement of the respondent, it is clear that there is a reinforcement of the terms of the agreement with the applicant, viz., exclusively for the purpose of handling the products and that the respondent having committed to use the facility for a fixed tenure and also waived its right of termination agreeing for a minimum guaranteed lock in period upto 31.03.2036.

                   17. I find force in the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the applicant that the minimum handling quantity can only be for the purposes of factoring the costs and when the respondent has categorically disclosed in its financial statement that the agreement with the applicant is on an exclusive basis for handling only the respondent's products, if the respondent now proceeds to breach the agreement and start using IOCL pipelines, then, serious prejudice would be caused to the applicant who has already invested more than Rs.80 crores for even setting up the facility for the exclusive benefit of the respondent.

                   18. In such view of the matter, I find a prima facie case has been made out by the applicant for grant of interim injunction in both the applications.

                   19. The parties themselves have contemplated that any violation of the terms of agreement would amount to material breach as already discussed above and giving a right to the aggrieved party to enforce the agreement by way of specific performance. Therefore, the parties themselves have been conscious of the fact, even at the time of entering into the agreement that damages would not be adequate to compensate the aggrieved party. The applicant has also shown that that the applicant would be put to irreparable loss if injunction is not granted.

                   20. The balance of convenience is also clearly loaded in favour of the applicant since the terms of the contract between the applicant and the respondent are specific and clear and any breach or violation on the part of the respondent would certainly result in irreparable loss and hardship to the applicant. On the other hand, since the respondent is anyway handling their products through applicant's pipelines on exclusive basis, no prejudice would be caused to them if injunction is granted prohibiting them from using IOCL pipe line.

                   21. In view of the above, there shall be an order of interim injunction in OA.Nos. 66 and 67 of 2025 as prayed for. Order 39 Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure to be complied with.

                   22. Notice to the respondent, returnable by 13.02.2025. Private Notice is also permitted.”

                   (ix) After service of notice, O.A.Nos.66 and 67 of 2025 once again came up for hearing on 13.2.2025, on which date, the following order was passed by this Court:

                   “Counter affidavit is yet to be filed in these applications. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent on instructions would submit that as on date, IOCL pipelines have not been laid and therefore, interim injunction sought for by the applicant is premature. However, the same is disputed by the learned Senior counsel for the applicant.

                   2. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent has placed before this Court a notice received by the respondent from the applicant dated 31.01.2025. Under the said notice, the applicant has requested the respondent for a meeting between the CEOs/Managing Directors of the parties as per Clause 29 of the Agreement, which is the subject matter of the dispute, for arriving at an amicable resolution of the dispute.

                   3. The learned Senior counsel for the respondent seeks time to get instructions as to whether the CEO/Managing Director of the respondent is willing to meet the CEO/Managing Director of the applicant for the purpose of arriving at an amicable settlement.

                   Post the matter on 25.02.2025.”

                   (x) O.A.Nos.66 and 67 of 2025 once again came up for hearing on 25.2.2025 and on that day, the following order came to be passed by this Court:

                   “These applications have been filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, seeking for interim protection pending arbitration. The applicant has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding dated 20.04.2010 and Pipeline Services Agreement dated 13.07.2012 with the respondent, under which, it was agreed between the parties that the pipelines are being created and tailor made exclusively for the respondent to handle the products and was further agreed that the agreement was valid upto 31.05.2036, which should be the lock in period. Under the aforementioned agreements, the respondent has waived its rights to terminate the agreements either wholly or partly prior to 31.05.2036.

                   2. According to the applicant, under the aforementioned agreements, the respondent has agreed to receive the products only from the applicant's pipelines, except road receipts, as seen from clause 6.5. Clause 26 of the Pipeline Services Agreement dated 13.07.2012 stipulates that in the event of default in the usage of the facilities by the respondent then it would amount to material breach and the affected party would have the right to specifically enforce the agreement. Clause 29 contains the arbitration clause. The applicant has expressed its willingness to go for arbitration in accordance with the said arbitration clause since the dispute has arisen out of the Memorandum of Understanding dated 20.04.2010 and Pipeline Services Agreement dated 13.07.2012. As per the arbitration clause, the parties have agreed to a mechanism through which the arbitration will have to be initiated.

                   3. At the first stage, the parties will have to seek for an amicable resolution of the dispute at the managerial level of both the parties and if the said attempt fails, the CEO/Managing Directors of the respective parties shall meet for the purpose of arriving at an amicable resolution. Only thereafter, any party can go for arbitration. The said mechanism is also not disputed by both the counsels.

                   4. Learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant by drawing the attention of this Court to a communication sent by the applicant to the respondent on 02.08.2024 submits that, the first stage of negotiation i.e., to comply with the dispute resolution clause has been complied with by the applicant, as according to him, the said communication has been rejected by the respondent on 23.09.2024. However, the same is disputed by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, who would reiterate that the dispute resolution mechanism as stipulated in the agreement is yet to commence.

                   5. According to the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant and as seen from the affidavit filed in support of these applications, the respondent is attempting to use the pipeline of I.O.C.L. (third party) for the purpose of transporting propane, butane and other LPG gases mentioned in the agreement, thereby committing breach of contract of Pipeline Services Agreement dated 13.07.2012. To protect its interest, pending arbitration, it has filed these applications.

                   6. However, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent disputed the submissions made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant and he would submit as follows:

                   a) I.O.C.L. is not a party to these applications and therefore, the submissions made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant is not sustainable;

                   b) Since the applicant has achieved its target as per the Pipeline Services Agreement dated 13.07.2012, the question of granting an interim protection, pending arbitration, in favour of the applicant does not arise.

                   7. However, the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant would submit that as per the contract, no target was fixed for the applicant to achieve. On the last hearing date i.e., on 13.02.2025, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent sought time to get instructions as to whether the CEO/Managing Director of the respondent is willing to meet the CEO/Managing Director of the applicant for the purpose of arriving at an amicable settlement in accordance with clause 29 of the Pipeline Services Agreement dated 13.07.2012, which is the subject matter of dispute between the parties.

                   8. Today, the learned senior counsel for the respondent, on instructions, would submit that the managerial team of both the parties have to meet at the first instance as per clause 29 of the agreement for the purpose of arriving at an amicable resolution of the dispute. He would submit that if the conciliation through the managerial level fails, only thereafter, both the CEO/Managing Director of the applicant and the respondent shall meet for arriving at an amicable settlement as per Clause 29 of the Pipeline Services Agreement dated 13.07.2012.

                   9. However, the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant would submit that the interim protection granted by this Court by its order dated 28.01.2025 in these applications will have to continue until further orders to enable the parties to meet and to arrive at an amicable settlement for which the learned senior counsel for the respondent has not raised any serious objection but at the same time, he would submit that any interim protection granted by this Court for the purpose of arriving at an amicable settlement may be granted without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the respondent to raise objections if the conciliation fails. The applicant is having the benefit of an interim order in these applications from this Court from 28.01.2025.

                   10. Learned senior counsel for the respondent, on instructions, would submit that the respondent undertakes as follows:

                   a) They shall not permit any third party connection to the respondent's LPG pipelines;

                   b) They shall not accept supplies of propane, butane and/ or LPG through any means apart from the applicant's facilities, except by road receipts.

                   11. This Court, after giving due considera tion to the submissions made by both the counsels and after giving due consideration to the fact that the parties are willing to negotiate the dispute amongst themselves, as per the dispute resolution clause contained in clause 29 of the Pipeline Ser vices Agreement dated 13.07.2012 and, to bal ance the interest of both the parties to the dis pute, is issuing the following directions:

                   a) The applicant as well as the respondent at their respective managerial level shall meet within a period of one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order as per the dispute resolution clause in Clause 29 of the Pipeline Services Agreement dated 13.07.2012 in order to arrive at an amicable settlement of the dispute;

                   b) If in the managerial level, the dispute does not get resolved, the CEO/Managing Director of the respective parties shall meet thereafter within a period of three weeks from the date when the conciliation in the managerial level had failed in order to arrive at an amicable settlement as per Clause 29 of the Pipeline Services Agreement dated 13.07.2012.

                   12. In terms of the undertaking given by the respondent before this Court, the respondent is restrained from permitting any third party connection to the respondent's LPG pipelines. They are also restrained from accepting supplies of propane, butane and/or LPG through any means apart from the applicant's facilities, except by road receipts until further orders of this Court. If the parties are unable to arrive at an amicable settlement, either of the parties are granted liberty to approach this Court once again by filing an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, seeking to protect their interests. This arrangement is made without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the respective parties for the purpose of arriving at an amicable settlement.

                   13. In terms of the above directions, these applications are disposed of.”

                   (xi) The said common order dated 25.2.2025 was passed by this Court after taking into consideration the fact that the agreement itself provided for arriving at an amicable resolution of the dispute as per Clause 29. This clause contemplated conciliation through managerial level personnel and if the same failed, it would reach the second stage before the CEO/CMD. This Court extended the interim order with the fond hope that the parties would be able to reach a compromise and timelines were also fixed for the completion of the conciliation process. O.A.Nos.66 and 67 of 2025 were disposed of on 25.2.2025 by issuing the above directions without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the respective parties.

                   (xii) Several rounds of discussions were held. However, the parties were not able to reach an amicable settlement. In view of the same, the respondent filed Arbitration Application Nos.1352 & 1353 of 2025 seeking to vacate the common order dated 25.2.2025 rendered respectively in O.A.Nos.66 and 67 of 2025.

6. All the applications were taken up for hearing on 11.12.2025. On that day, it was brought to the notice of this Court that the applicant issued a trigger notice dated 14.10.2025 to the respondent under Section 21 of the Act by invoking the arbitration clause. On receipt of this notice, the respondent issued a reply dated 10.11.2025 and nominated the Hon’ble Mr.Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Retired Judge of the Supreme Court of India, as the Arbitrator of their choice in the arbitral tribunal to be constituted. After receipt of the said reply notice of the respondent, the applicant, through their communication dated 21.11.2025, nominated the Hon’ble Mr.Justice Vikramjit Sen, Retired Judge of the Supreme Court of India, as the Arbitrator of their choice. Subsequently, the applicant and the respondent received a communication to the effect that the Hon’ble Mr.Justice L.Nageswara Rao, Retired Judge of the Supreme Court of India has been nominated as the Presiding Arbitrator and that the Arbitral Tribunal decided to hold the first case management conference on 05.1.2026 at 11 AM through virtual hearing.

7. During the course of arguments, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted that in so far as the interim protection sought for by the applicant to restrain the respondent from permitting any third party connections to the respondent’s LPG pipelines is concerned, the same is directly relatable to the terms of the agreement and this interim order may be directed to be continued till the Arbitral Tribunal commences the arbitration proceedings. However, serious objections were raised in respect of the other interim protection sought for by the applicant to the effect that the respondent must be restrained from accepting supplies of propane, butane and/or LPG through any means apart from the applicant’s facilities, which, according to the respondent, would go beyond the terms of the agreement and it would virtually stifle the third parties from utilizing the services of the respondent through any other means away from the port area.

8. In the light of the above submissions, this Court directed the respondent to make their stand further clearer by filing an affidavit. Accordingly, an additional affidavit dated 12.12.2025 has been filed by the respondent (applicant in Arb.A.Nos.1352 & 1353 of 2025) wherein the relevant portions read thus:

                   “3. In view of the same, I state that the applicant will continue to use the respondent's pipelines for transport of LPG products as per the Pipeline Services Agreement dated 13.07.2012 for the purposes of meeting its own business requirements viz., products manufactured/ marketed by the applicant using such LPG products.

                   4. I state that any third party who will be availing the applicant's facility only for the purpose of storage and dispatch of its own LPG products does not fall under the ambit of the applicant's 'business requirement’ under the Agreement.

                   5. I further state that if any third party such as Indian Oil Corporation Limited avail the applicant's facility for purpose of storage of their LPG products, the same will be cleared from our premises for sale by such third party in course of their own business. The applicant will only be charging such third parties reasonable charges for storage and use of its pipeline. I further submit that the stored LPG products of such third parties will not be sold/marketed by this applicant under any circumstances.”

9. In response to the said affidavit of the respondent dated 12.12.2025, on 15.12.2025, the applicant filed a reply dated 14.12.2025 and vehemently opposed the stand taken by the respondent and they took a stand that if the respondent is permitted to go ahead with the facility that is now proposed to be utilized by the IOCL for storage of their LPG products, it would virtually amount to a breach of the express terms of the agreement.

10. In the light of the rival contentions raised on either side, this Court heard the respective learned Senior Counsel appearing on either side and carefully perused the materials available on record.

11. In this case, three issues fall for consideration. They are:

                   (1) Whether the applicant has the manifest intention to arbitrate the dispute?

                   (2) Whether the applicant is attempting to indirectly get over what they were not able to achieve before the Delhi High Court in W.P. (C).Nos.15285 of 2023 and 2896 of 2024 dated 14.8.2024? and

                   (3) Whether the interim protection sought for to prevent the respondent from permitting the IOCL to avail such storage facility is beyond the scope of the agreement entered into between the parties or it would tantamount to breach of the agreement on account of the exclusive rights granted in favour of the applicant?

12. The primary contention that was raised on the side of the respondent is that there was absolutely no manifest intention on the part of the applicant to arbitrate the dispute since the trigger notice was issued on 14.10.2025 only after Arbitration A.Nos.1352 and 1353 of 2025 were filed by the respondent to vacate the common order dated 25.2.2025 made respectively in O.A.No.66 and 67 of 2025.

13. In the considered view of this Court, after the interim orders were granted by this Court and the parties were directed to resolve their dispute through conciliation, several rounds of discussions went on between the parties at the managerial level, which is evident from various e-mail communications exchanged between the parties. Since the parties were not able to reach any settlement, the conciliation process was escalated to the level of CEO/CMD during April 2025.

14. Even at this level, the proposals that were exchanged did not fructify and ultimately, through e-mail communication dated 07.10.2025, the representative of the respondent made it clear that the objective of an amicable resolution could not be met and therefore, expressed their intention to exercise their rights. Immediately on the very next day, the present applications namely Arbitration Application Nos.1352 and 1353 of 2025 to vacate the common order dated 25.2.2025 made respectively in O.A.Nos.66 and 67 of 2025 came to be filed. The parties came to the conclusion that the dispute reached the next level and that therefore, it has to be referred to an arbitral tribunal and accordingly, the trigger notice dated 14.10.2025 was issued by the applicant.

15. As noted supra, the Arbitral Tribunal has now been constituted and the first hearing is fixed on 05.1.2026. In the considered view of this Court, the manifest intention to arbitrate on the part of the applicant cannot be said to be absent as was contended on the side of the respondent.

16. There was a delay in issuing the trigger notice since an attempt was made between the parties to conciliate between themselves and to arrive at an amicable solution. The moment the conciliation proceedings failed, within a reasonable time, the applicant issued the trigger notice. Thus, the first issue is answered in favour of the applicant.

17. Before going into the other two issues, this Court must take into consideration the subsequent development namely the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal, which has fixed the first hearing date on 05.1.2026. In view of this development, this Court has to see if the present applications will have to be considered on merits at this stage or the parties can be relegated to the Arbitral Tribunal for agitating the same under Section 17 of the Act.

18. A reference was made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel (India) Ltd. Vs. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd. [reported in 2022 (1) SCC 712]. While referring to this judgment, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant also brought to the notice of this Court Sub-Section (3) of Section 9 of the Act, which provides that once the Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted, the Court should not entertain an application under Sub-Section (1) of Section 9, unless the Court finds that circumstances exist, which may not render the remedy provided under Section 17 efficacious.

19. In the said judgment, the Hon’ble Apex Court dealt with the scope of Sub-Section (3) of Section 9 of the Act and it was held as follows:

                   “62. Sub-section (3) of Section 9 has two limbs. The first limb prohibits an application under sub-section (1) from being entertained once an Arbitral Tribunal has been constituted. The second limb carves out an exception to that prohibition, if the Court finds that circumstances exist, which may not render the remedy provided under Section 17 efficacious.

                   63. To discourage the filing of applications for interim measures in courts under Section 9(1) of the Arbitration Act, Section 17 has also been amended to clothe the Arbitral Tribunal with the same powers to grant interim measures, as the Court under Section 9(1). The 2015 Amendment also introduces a deeming fiction, whereby an order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 is deemed to be an order of court for all purposes and is enforceable as an order of court.

                   64. With the law as it stands today, the Arbitral Tribunal has the same power to grant interim relief as the Court and the remedy under Section 17 is as efficacious as the remedy under Section 9(1). There is, therefore, no reason why the Court should continue to take up applications for interim relief, once the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted and is in seisin of the dispute between the parties, unless there is some impediment in approaching the Arbitral Tribunal, or the interim relief sought cannot expeditiously be obtained from the Arbitral Tribunal.

                   ...........

                   84. It is now well settled that the expression “entertain” means to consider by application of mind to the issues raised. The court entertains a case when it takes a matter up for consideration. The process of consideration could continue till the pronouncement of judgment as argued by Mr Khambata. Once an Arbitral Tribunal is constituted the Court cannot take up an application under Section 9 for consideration, unless the remedy under Section 17 is inefficacious. However, once an application is entertained in the sense it is taken up for consideration, and the Court has applied its mind to (sic the issues raised) the Court can certainly proceed to adjudicate the application.

                   85. Mr.Sibal rightly submitted that the intent behind Section 9(3) was not to turn back the clock and require a matter already reserved for orders to be considered in entirety by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act.

                   86. On a combined reading of Section 9 with Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, once an Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, the Court would not entertain and/or in other words take up for consideration and apply its mind to an application for interim measure, unless the remedy under Section 17 is inefficacious, even though the application may have been filed before the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. The bar of Section 9(3) would not operate, once an application has been entertained and taken up for consideration, as in the instant case, where hearing has been concluded and judgment has been reserved. Mr Khambata may be right, that the process of consideration continues till the pronouncement of judgment. However, that would make no difference. The question is whether the process of consideration has commenced, and/or whether the Court has applied its mind to some extent before the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. If so, the application can be said to have been entertained before constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal.

                   87. Even after an Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, there may be myriads of reasons why the Arbitral Tribunal may not be an efficacious alternative to Section 9(1). This could even be by reason of temporary unavailability of any one of the arbitrators of an Arbitral Tribunal by reason of illness, travel, etc.

                   88. Applications for interim relief are inherently applications which are required to be disposed of urgently. Interim relief is granted in aid of final relief. The object is to ensure protection of the property being the subject matter of arbitration and/or otherwise ensure that the arbitration proceedings do not become infructuous and the arbitral award does not become an award on paper, of no real value.

                   89. The principles for grant of interim relief are (i) good prima facie case, (ii) balance of convenience in favour of grant of interim relief and (iii) irreparable injury or loss to the applicant for interim relief. Unless applications for interim measures are decided expeditiously, irreparable injury or prejudice may be caused to the party seeking interim relief.

                   90. It could, therefore, never have been the legislative intent that even after an application un der Section 9 is finally heard, relief would have to be declined and the parties be remitted to their remedy under Section 17.

                   91. When an application has already been taken up for consideration and is in the process of consideration or has already been considered, the question of examining whether remedy under Section 17 is efficacious or not would not arise. The requirement to conduct the exercise arises only when the application is being entertained and/or taken up for consideration. As observed above, there could be numerous reasons which render the remedy under Section 17 inefficacious. To cite an example, the different arbitrators constituting an Arbitral Tribunal could be located at far away places and not in a position to assemble immediately. In such a case, an application for urgent interim relief may have to be entertained by the Court under Section 9(1).

                   ..............

                   98. It is reiterated that Section 9(1) enables the parties to an arbitration agreement to approach the appropriate court for interim measures before the commencement of arbitral proceedings, during arbitral proceedings or at any time after the making of an arbitral award but before it is enforced and in accordance with Section 36 of the Arbitration Act. The bar of Section 9(3) operates where the application under Section 9(1) had not been entertained till the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. Of course it hardly need be mentioned that even if an application under Section 9 had been entertained before the constitution of the Tribunal, the Court always has the discretion to direct the parties to approach the Arbitral Tribunal, if necessary, by passing a limited order of interim protection, particularly when there has been a long time gap between hearings and the application has for all practical purposes, to be heard afresh, or the hearing has just commenced and is likely to consume a lot of time. In this case, the High Court has rightly directed the Commercial Court to proceed to complete the adjudication.”

20. The above judgment makes it clear that a Court would not entertain or take up for consideration and apply its mind on an application filed under Section 9 once an Arbitral Tribunal is constituted. However, this bar provided under Sub-Section (3) of Section 9 of the Act would not operate once an application has been entertained and taken up for consideration. Even in such a case, it is always left to the discretion of the Court to direct the parties to approach the Arbitral Tribunal, if necessary, by passing a limited order of interim protection to be heard afresh and more particularly where the interim protection has enured in favour of a party for a long period of time.

21. In terms of the merits of the case, issue Nos.2 and 3, which have been captured supra, were canvassed at length.

22. According to the respondent, one M/s.IMC Limited is the holding company of the applicant and they questioned the permission granted to the IOCL to lay down the pipeline from outside the boundary of the Ennore Port from KPL Jetty to Vellur Terminal, which is operated by the IOCL. The IOCL was also proposing to lay down three pipelines from Vellur Terminal to Manali Industrial Area.

23. The main contention that was raised in the writ petitions filed before the Delhi High Court was that these pipelines were being laid without getting any authorization from the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB). The Delhi High Court, by the common order dated 14.8.2024 in W.P.(C) Nos.15285 of 2023 and 2896 of 2024, came to the conclusion that no authorization was required from the PNGRB for the IOCL to lay down the pipeline for transporting its petroleum and petroleum products from its own jetty to the terminal.

24. It is brought to the notice of this Court that both parties in the said writ petitions filed appeals against the common order passed by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court and that the same are pending.

25. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant submitted that the pipeline, which is the subject matter in the present applications, has nothing to do with the dispute pending before the Delhi High Court and that the respondent is attempting to link an issue, which is unconnected with the issue on hand.

26. In the case on hand, the applicant is only trying to safeguard their interest arising out of the agreement after having spent a huge amount of money towards laying pipelines and getting exclusive rights to transport the LPG products.

27. The third issue pertains to an interim protection sought for by the applicant, which prevents the IOCL from utilizing the storage facility of the respondent. The undertaking affidavit filed before this Court by the respondent is to the effect that the LPG products of third parties would not be sold/marketed by the respondent under any circumstances and that it is only the IOCL, which would clear the products from the storage facility and deal with the same in the course of their business.

28. The applicant has objected even to the undertaking affidavit filed on the side of the respondent on the ground that the respondent is taking a contrary stand to the stand that was already taken by them in the pleadings before this Court and is thereby misinterpreting the terms of the agreement to suit their convenience. According to the applicant, the agreement clearly recorded that the respondent’s terminal is a storage terminal and that the business of the respondent includes storage of LPG, propane and butane on behalf of the third parties including the IOCL.

29. It was also admitted on the side of the respondent that the business of the respondent reflected only the storage and blending of the products at the terminal and that they would merely facilitate the onward supply of such stored and/or blended material to its customers like IOCL, BPCL, etc. Further, it was contended on the side of the applicant that since the operationalization of the facilities under the agreement, approximately 87% of the product transported through it to the respondent’s LPG terminal was only on behalf of the IOCL and that hardly 1% of the products belonging to the respondent was transported through the facility belonging to the respondent.

30. Under such circumstances, Clause 16.2 of the agreement obligates the respondent to ensure that the IOCL and the other third parties comply with the terms of the agreement. The other clauses mandate that the respondent should only accept the products through the applicant’s facilities except for road receipts for its entire business requirement and that the respondent has been restrained from terminating the agreement inter alia on the ground that an alternative facility was established during the term of the agreement.

31. Thus, according to the applicant, the respondent is trying to come up with a new case as if they are going to deal with their own products, which, in the current calendar year, constituted only 1% of the product transported through the facility belonging to the respondent. The further ground taken by the applicant is that the respondent is now trying to create an artificial distinction between the respondent’s own business requirements and the entire business requirements at the LPG terminal.

32. In the considered view of this Court, if this Court, at this stage, ventures to deal with the merits of the case to decide issue Nos.2 and 3, prima facie findings will have to be rendered. It may not be appropriate for this Court to do it at this stage since the Arbitral Tribunal has already been constituted and the date of hearing is fixed on 05.1.2026.

33. Even during the course of hearing, this Court expressed its mind and informed the counsel appearing on either side that the interim order is in force from January 2025, that it can be extended till the first date of hearing before the Arbitral Tribunal and that the matter can be agitated before the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act.

34. But, an apprehension was raised on the side of the respondent that the same reasoning will be put against the respondent even by the Arbitral Tribunal, which may extend the interim order till the completion of the arbitration proceedings.

35. This Court is unable to agree with the above stand taken on the side of the respondent.

36. Considering the stature of the Arbitral Tribunal consisting of three retired Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court of India, there is no doubt in the mind of this Court that the applications will be dealt with under Section 17 of the Act on their own merits and in accordance with law. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel (India) Ltd., the Court can always exercise its discretion and direct the parties to approach the Arbitral Tribunal to prosecute the applications under Section 17 of the Act. This is more so in a case where the interim order is in force from January 2025, the Arbitral Tribunal has already been constituted and the first date of hearing is fixed on 05.1.2026. Apart from that, it is not a case as if the remedy under Section 17 of the Act is not efficacious.

37. In the light of the above reasonings, this Court is inclined to extend the interim order already granted by this Court till the first date of hearing before the Arbitral Tribunal. These applications can be placed before the Arbitral Tribunal and the same can be prosecuted under Section 17 of the Act. If really the respondent is put to irreparable loss and hardship due to the continuation of the interim order, the same can always be impressed upon before the Arbitral Tribunal to get the interim order vacated or modified. This observation will take care of the interest of both parties and it is left open to both parties to raise all the issues before the Arbitral Tribunal. It is further made clear that the interim order granted by this Court shall stand extended till the first date of hearing before the Arbitral Tribunal i.e. 05.1.2026. These applications shall be placed before the Arbitral Tribunal for passing further orders under Section 17 of the Act.

38. These applications are disposed of in the above terms.