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CDJ 2025 MHC 7409 print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Judicature at Madras
Case No : W.P. No. 29765 of 2019
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE T. VINOD KUMAR
Parties : C. Joseph Premnath Versus The Director, Directorate of Employment & Training, Chennai & Others
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: S.V. Karthikeyan, Advocate. For the Respondents: R1, V. Yamunadevi, Special Government Pleader, R2, S. Bharathirajan, R4, Sathia Chandran, Advocates.
Date of Judgment : 19-12-2025
Head Note :-
Constitution of India - Article 226 -
Judgment :-

(Prayer: Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying to issue a Writ of Certiorari, to call for the records of the third respondent herein and quash the letter dated 11.10.2019, relieving the petitioner from the Directorship of Katpadi Industrial Institute, Katpadi, Vellore District and pass orders.)

1. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the learned Special Government Pleader for the first respondent, learned counsel for the second respondent and the learned counsel for the fourth respondent and perused the records.

2. The case of the petitioner in brief is that the third respondent had caused an advertisement calling for applications for the post of Director in Katpadi Industrial Institution; that in response to the aforesaid advertisement, he had applied and was selected after interview and was appointed as Director with effect from 23.10.2012; that his appointment was approved by the first respondent vide proceedings dated 05.04.2013.

3. It is the further case of the petitioner that though his appointment order dated 22.10.2012 mentioned that he would be put under regular salary structure, but, the same was not fixed or finalized; that despite his regular salary was not fixed, he had performed the duty with utmost integrity leading to development of the Institution in production wise and admission of students; that prior to his joining in the institution, was in financial crisis, which was handled by him carefully and solved almost all the pending issues of the Institution.

4. It is the further case of the petitioner that whenever he was making enquiry requesting the respondents with regard to the fixation of remuneration, the respondents were only replying that the services would be recognized and salary would be paid to his satisfaction including the arrears right from the date of his appointment; that while he was awaiting for settlement of his salary and receipt of arrears, which was assured to him, he was taken by surprise, when the fourth respondent served on him a charge memo dated 06.08.2019, calling for an explanation within three days regarding certain irregularities; that he had submitted the elaborate explanation dated 24.08.2019; and that the fourth respondent did not take any further action thereon.

5. The petitioner further contended that all of a sudden, he had received a letter from the third respondent dated 11.10.2019 relieving him from the directorship with immediate effect; and that before relieving him from the directorship, no proceedings were initiated against him and even no reason was assigned for his removal from service; that as per the selection process through which he was selected in the year 2012, as his appointment was approved by the first respondent, it is only the said authority, who is competent to initiate any action against him or issue any order and since, the impugned order has been served, under the signature of the fourth respondent, the same is without jurisdiction, illegal and arbitrary.

6. The petitioner further contended that since, his appointment to the post of Director was approved by the first respondent being the competent authority, it is the said authority who can remove him from service on the recommendation of the third respondent, after following due process of law; and that as no disciplinary action was initiated against him and even the impugned order of removal does not mention any reason or disqualification for his continuation of service; and that his appointment being duly approved by the first respondent, he cannot be thrown out from service under an arbitrary order of the third respondent, without following due process of law of issuing a notice and affording an opportunity to adduce evidence and marking of documents.

7. It is the further case of the petitioner that since the Katpadi Industrial Institution (KII) in which he has been appointed as Director, being an aided Institution receiving grant-in-aid from the State Government, the said Institution would be considered as discharging public duties and as such, the petitioner is entitled to assail the action of the respondents by filing the present writ petition.

8. Separate counter has been filed on behalf of the first respondent and fourth respondent.

9. The learned Special Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the first respondent submits that KII is affiliated with National Council for Vocational Training, New Delhi and imparting Industrial Training under the supervision of the first respondent office in three courses namely, (I) Carpentry and Cabinet making, (ii) Electrician and (iii) Mechanic General Electrician; that the aforesaid Training Institute is receiving Grant-in-Aid under the minority Institute from the Government to meet out their expenditure for the salary of the teaching staff as well as non-teaching staff; that grant-in-aid, 75% of the total net loss or 75% of the teaching salary plus capitation grant, whichever is less, is paid to the Aided Institutes; that teaching and non-teaching staff are appointed by the Management of KII or the Bishop of the Dioceses or any other authority appointed by the Dioceses.

10. The first respondent by the counter affidavit contended that the Management of the Industrial Training Institution submitted the details of the appointments of the teaching and non-teaching staff for obtaining approval for such posts, since, the Institute is in receipt of grant-in-aid; that the KII under the cover of letter dated 07.12.2012, had informed that the petitioner was appointed as Manager-cum-Correspondent as non-teaching Staff and requested to accord approval for the petitioner’s appointment as Correspondent; that on the recommendation of the Committee, KII had appointed the petitioner to the post of Manager-cum-Correspondent under the Order dated 22.10.2012 and intimated the same to first respondent of such appointment, which was approved by the first respondent vide proceedings dated 05.04.2013, as the said post become vacant, pursuant to the earlier employee Thiru.Amuthan having retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation.

11. The first respondent by the counter affidavit further contended that the said respondent is no way connected with the removal of the petitioner from the post of Director, except the fact that the first respondent recorded, it is required to grant approval for the appointment of the petitioner as Manager-cum- Correspondent, based on the recommendation of the Correspondent of KII; that the first respondent has no role to play in the internal dispute between the petitioner and the respondent and is only empowered to settle the dispute relating to imparting the Industrial Training and its administration and not for the managerial decision of the Dioceses; and thus, the present writ petition is purely an internal clash between the petitioner and the fourth respondent and accordingly, sought for dismissal of the writ petition.

12. The learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent further contended that the post of Director of KII is not a regular or sanctioned post, for which the appointment was required to be made as contended by the petitioner.

13. The fourth respondent by the counter affidavit while admitting the fact of the petitioner being appointed as Director by the impugned proceedings, contended that the petitioner was only relieved from the post of Director and the said order is neither a dismissal nor termination for the petitioner to feel agitated or stigma whatsoever being attached to him; that the first respondent sanctioned grant-in-aid to a limited extent; that the petitioner not being a teaching staff, the fourth respondent had only intimated of the petitioner’s appointment as a Manager-cum- Correspondent, which has been duly taken note by the first respondent vide his proceedings dated 05.04.2013; that the petitioner, on the basis of the said approval, cannot claim as being appointed against a sanctioned post for him to claim that it is only the first respondent who can terminate his service or to issued with article of charge, conducting enquiry by appointing an enquiry officer, the said officer submitting a report and thereafter, further notice is to be issued for removing him from service.

14. By the counter affidavit, the fourth respondent contended that since, the petitioner appointment is by the third respondent, the service of the petitioner as Director was terminated, pursuant to the decision taken by the Execution Committee of the second respondent represented by its General Secretary.

15. The fourth respondent, by the counter affidavit, further contended that on receiving numerous complaint and also the way the petitioner was conducting himself in relation to the various matter of KII, the respondents have served on the petitioner, a charge memo dated 06.08.2019; that the explanation submitted by the petitioner to the articles of charge not being satisfactory, a decision was taken by the Executive Committee to relieve him from the directorship with immediate effect and accordingly, the impugned proceedings dated 11.10.2019 was issued.

16. The fourth respondent by the counter affidavit, contended that since relieving of the petitioner from service of the Director of KII is for better management of its affairs, the petitioner cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

17. Contending as above, the fourth respondent seeks for dismissal of the writ petition.

18. Since the petitioner by the present writ petition has assailed the action of the third respondent in issuing proceedings dated 11.10.2019, relieving him from directorship of KII, this Court felt that the petitioner cannot maintain the present writ petition, being an internal dispute between the petitioner and the private respondents 2 to 4 and called upon counsel appearing for the parties to address the Court on the maintainability of the writ petition.

19. On behalf of the petitioner, it is contended that since, the petitioner's appointment was approved by the first respondent vide proceedings dated 05.04.2013, the said post being a sanctioned post of KII which is receiving grantin- aid from the Government, the respondents while terminating him from service of directorship required to follow due process of law, it is only the said authority who can remove him from the said post, and in as much as the respondent did not issue with any notice, the decision of the third respondent, who had issued the impugned proceedings is in violation of statutory rules and regulations, the writ petition is maintainable.

20. In order to buttress the aforesaid contention, reliance has been placed on the decision of Full Bench of this Court in W.P.No.30472 of 2022 dated 29.02.2024.

21. Placing reliance on the aforesaid decision of this Court, it is contended that since the third respondent/KII is an Educational Institution and the petitioner being appointed as director to manage the affairs of the said Institution, the respondents would be amenable to writ jurisdiction.

22. On the other hand, learned Special Government Pleader had categorically stated that the post of director to which the petitioner is appointed, is not a regular sanctioned post and as such, the petitioner cannot claim the Rules and Regulations as applicable to the sanctioned post, would be applicable to the petitioner.

23. The learned counsel appearing for the fourth respondent contended that since the petitioner was appointed as Correspondent of KII by the third respondent, the said Institute is receiving grant-in-aid in respect of teaching Staff, the appointment of the petitioner was informed to the first respondent as the Institute was required to send the details of its teaching and non-teaching Staff to Government periodically.

24. On behalf of the respondents, it is also contended that since, the petitioner was not appointed against any sanctioned post of “Director” having approval of the State Government and no grant being received for the said post, the petitioner cannot claim that the required procedure in relation to his relieving from the directorship to be followed for him to approach this Court by filing writ petition invoking extraordinary jurisdiction under the Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

25. The learned counsel for the respondents thus contended that the present writ petition as filed is not maintainable.

26. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance is placed on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Army Welfare Educational Society Vs. Sunil Kumar Sharma reported in 2024 16 SCC 598.

27. I have taken note of the respective contentions as urged.

28. Since, this Court had called upon the counsel appearing for the parties to satisfy on the maintainability of the present writ petition and counsel having made submission as noted above, this Court proceeded to examine as to whether the appointment of the petitioner is against the sanctioned post or otherwise for him to claim that while his relieving/removing from directorship, the respondents are required to follow the Rules and Regulations as prescribed by the Government; and that as said procedure is not followed he is entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction.

29. Though the petitioner placing emphasis on the proceeding dated 05.04.2013 claimed that his appointment as Correspondent having been approved by the first respondent implied that his appointment is against the sanctioned post, however, a perusal of the said proceeding would firstly, show that the petitioner’s appointment was communicated to the first respondent by the third respondent under a cover of letter dated 07.12.2012, nearly after 1½ month from the date of petitioner taking charge as Secretary of KII.

30. Further, the so-called approval granted by the first respondent would also show that the said respondent having accepted the letter of the third respondent, whereby, the petitioner is stated to have been appointed as Manager-cum- Correspondent on a consolidated pay of Rs.100/- per month. If only the contention of the petitioner of the aforesaid post of Director to which he is appointed by the third respondent vide order dated 22.10.2012 is a sanctioned post, the appointment of the petitioner cannot be on pay of Rs.100/- per month. Further, if only the said post is a sanctioned post, the position to which the petitioner is appointed could not continue to pay of Rs.100/- per month from December 2012 to October 2019 ie., for a period of more than 6 years.

31. Thus, the mere fact of the first respondent according approval to the appointment of the petitioner to act as a Correspondent of KII under non-teaching category as Correspondent on a monthly pay of Rs.100/- would go to show that the said post is not a regular sanctioned post for the petitioner to claim that he is being appointed in a sanctioned post and that it is only the first respondent, who can terminate his service by following the Rules and Regulations.

32. Since, the appointment of the petitioner is not against the sanctioned post, the said appointment would have to be considered as a contract of service between the petitioner and the third respondent and thus, would be governed by the terms of the contract. In case of employment governed by contract, in the event of breach, aggrieved party has to work out his remedy before the competent forum/authority and for the said reason, cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as the third respondent cannot be conferred with the status of the “State” for maintaining the Writ Petition.

33. In the Full Bench decision of this Court on which heavy reliance is placed by the petitioner, the Full Bench of this Court referred to the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of St. Marys Education Society and another v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava and others [(2023) 4 SCC 498], wherein, the Apex Court had drawn the distinction between the discharge of public duty for which public law action by invoking extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be maintained and individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part, which cannot be sought to be redressed by invoking the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

34. The relevant extracts from the Judgment of the Apex Court as referred to in the Full Bench decision of this Court forming part of Paragraph 22 of the Judgment is reproduced hereunder:-

                     “75.2. Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through a writ petition under Article 226. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State”within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action complained of has public law element.

                     75.3. It must be consequently held that while a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to judicial review by a constitutional court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An educational institution may perform myriad functions touching various facets of public life and in the societal sphere. While such of those functions as would fall within the domain of a “public function”or “public duty”be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service.” [Emphasis supplied by Court]

35. The aforesaid dicta laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court binds this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Apex Court as noted herein above had categorically held that the employee would not have right to invoke the power of High Court conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in respect to the matter relating to service, which are not governed or controlled by statutory provisions.

36. In the fact of the present case, though the petitioner had claimed he being appointed against the sanctioned post and thus, the statutory Rules relating to removal from service are applicable and to be followed, in as much as this Court had now found appointment of the petitioner is not against the sanctioned post, the said appointment of the petitioner would only be governed by the ordinary contract of service between the petitioner and third respondent as detailed in the letter of appointment dated 22.10.2012. Since the appointment of the petitioner is governed by the ordinary contract of service, the petitioner merely by claiming that since, his appointment is approved by the first respondent, cannot maintain the present writ petition.

37. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the present writ petition as filed is not maintainable and accordingly, dismissed. However, it is open for the petitioner to work out his remedy available in law. No order as to costs.

 
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