(Prayer: Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 115 of CPC, to set aside the order passed in I.A.No.2 of 2024 in AS.CFR.No.2445 of 2024 dated 16.12.2024 on the file of the Sub-Court, Palladam, Tiruppur District.)

1. The appellants in an unnumbered AS.CFR.No.2445 of 2024 are the revision petitioners, aggrieved by the dismissal of their application for condonation of delay of 3879 days in filing the appeal against the judgment and decree in O.S.No.14 of 2013 dated 28.11.2013 on the file of the District Munsif, Palladam.

2. I have heard Mr.Ramanlaal, learned Additional Advocate General, assisted by Mr.T.Arun Kumar, learned Additional Government Pleader for the petitioners and Mr.K.Govi Ganesan, learned counsel for the respondent.

3. Mr.Ramanlaal, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the petitioners would submit that though the delay may be huge in number, the trial Court has committed a serious error in decreeing the suit, contrary to the provisions of the Minor Inam Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act, 1963. He would therefore state that the plaintiff, having lost his right to seek patta, cannot approach the civil Court and get a decree, which runs contrary to the provision of the said Act, as the property vests with the Government and the question of violation of the principles of natural justice will not apply in the facts of the present case, to enable the plaintiff to approach the civil Court and seek a decree in his favour.

4. Mr.Ramanlaal, learned Additional Advocate General would further state that public interest is involved in the matter since the property has already vested with the Government and therefore, the condone delay application should be considered liberally, especially, taking into account the fact that the Government is the appellant and laxity should be shown while approaching the delay application filed by the State. He would rely on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in M.N.Sugumaran (Died) and another Vs. The Special Commissioner, Chennai in CMP.No.26380 of 2024 dated 07.07.2025, where a delay of 6527 days in filing the writ appeal has been condoned by the Division Bench of this Court and also the decision of the Madurai Bench in The State of Tamil Nadu Vs. R.Ramanathan Chettiar (Died) and others in CMP(MD).No.1391 of 2023 dated 23.10.2025, where a delay of 11926 days has been condoned by the Madurai Bench of this Court. He would also state that this is also a fit case where this Court should not be carried away by the length of delay and the delay in preferring the appeal should be condoned, taking into account the larger issue involved and concerning the merits of the suit claim.

5. Per contra, Mr.K.Govi Ganesan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that the suit was filed way back in 2009 in O.S.No.109 of 2009. The revision petitioners herein entered appearance and even filed the written statement in April 2010 and thereafter, the suit was transferred to the District Munsif Court, Palladam and renumbered as O.S.No.14 of 2013. The suit was thereafter decreed on merits, that is after contest on 28.11.2013. Based on the decree, the respondent approached the Tahsildar for issuance of patta. The Tahsildar, by proceedings dated 11.01.2017, rejected the application for patta, stating that the Government Pleader has been advised to file an appeal as against the judgment and decree in O.S.No.14 of 2013. Thereafter, the respondent moved this Court in WP.No.6597 of 2017, challenging the rejection of the application for patta by the Tahsildar. This Court, in the said WP, by order dated 27.01.2022, directed the Tahsildar to issue patta.

6. The learned counsel for the respondent would further contend that even the said order of this Court was not complied with by the Tahsildar and hence, a contempt petition was filed in Cont.P.No.198 of 2023. The order passed by the writ Court in WP.No.6597 of 2017 was challenged in WA.No.2255 of 2024 and the writ appeal was also subsequently dismissed on 01.08.2024.

7. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that in the meantime, the contempt petition was closed, recording the submission of the Government that the Tahsildar had forwarded the entire files to the Commissioner, Land Acquisition for reclassification of lands and in view of the same, the Commissioner was directed to pass orders regarding issuance of patta. The learned counsel for the respondent would therefore state that there is absolutely no sufficient cause shown or made out by the petitioners and are not entitled to the condonation of the inordinate delay of 3879 days and the trial Court has rightly dismissed the application, which does not warrant interference in this revision. He would also rely on the recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in H.Guruswamy and others Vs. A.Krishnaiah since deceased by LRs, reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 54.

8. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned Additional Advocate General for the petitioners and the learned counsel for the respondent.

9. Though the arguments of Mr.Ramanlaal, learned Additional Advocate General mainly revolved around the merits of the suit claim and the entitlement of the plaintiff to patta and citing public interest, especially, since the lands have vested with the Government under the Minor Inam Abolition Act, it is contended that a liberal approach should be adopted and the delay should be condoned.

10. In the decision that has been cited by the learned Additional Advocate General in M.N.Sugumaran's case, cited supra, the Division Bench of this Court finding that substantial rights of the petitioners were involved over the subject property and therefore, the matter required an adjudication on merits, proceeded to condone the delay.

11. Similarly, in the State of Tamil Nadu Vs. R.Ramanathan Chettiar's case, cited supra, this Court held that to achieve social justice and to protect public justice and to avoid miscarriage of justice, delay can be condoned. Placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Inder Singh Vs. State of Mahdya Pradesh, reported in 2025 Live Law SC 339, where also the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that since valuable land of the Government was involved, the merits of the case cannot be discarded on a technical ground of limitation. However, recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in H.Guruswamy's case, cited supra and Shivamma (Dead) by L.Rs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board and others, reported in 2025 INSC 1104, has considered the entire gamut of case law, touching the issue of condonation of delay and have clearly held that though the length of delay is a relevant matter which the Court must take into consideration, while considering the delay application, at the same time, the parties cannot fix their own period of limitation for purposes of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a particular period of limitation.

12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that a party, who has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits, because of his own inaction for long, cannot be presumed to contend that the delay was nondeliberate and that substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against technical considerations. More relevant to the facts of the present case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while considering the plea of condonation of delay, the Court must not start with the main matter and the Court over the duty to first ascertain the bonafide or explanation offered by the parties seeking condonation and only if sufficient cause is assigned, then the Court can balance the opposition of the other side by bringing into the aid the merits of the matter for purposes of condoning delay.

13. In Shivamma's case, cited supra, referring to condone delay applications being preferred by the State, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

                     “249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration.

                     254. We say so because if such observations by the High Court, to condone delay in the interest of a Statemachinery, were allowed to be sustained by us, it would allow the State-machineries a leeway to systematically orchestrate delays in the guise of laxity exhibited by their authorities. Given the majesty and colossality a Statemachinery would hold against a private litigant, it would be grossly unfair to a litigant, who would be perpetually entangled in the clutches of litigation, if enormous delays, like that of almost 11 years in the present case, are permitted to be condoned. This Court has never turned a blind eye to the gradients of substantive justice.

                     255. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 11-years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned.

                     256. As far as the contention of the respondent no. 1 is concerned apropos to the merits of molding of relief by awarding of compensation by the First Appellate Court, the same is squarely answered by the principles encapsulated in Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), wherein it is categorically maintained that the court considering a condonation of delay ought not go into the merits of the case at hand.

                     257. We also wish to highlight that the High Court applied the legal position incorrectly in the impugned order and performed an exercise of “merit-hunting”. It gave a prima facie relevance to the argument of the respondent no. 1 on the grounds that the suit of the appellant was not at all maintainable in the first place. In paragraph 13 of the impugned order, the High Court recorded that a semblance of right in favour of respondent no. 1 swayed its mind to allow the condonation of delay, and it accepted the same as a “sufficient cause”. We hold such observations to be erroneous and ex facie bad in law. Similar contentions were rejected by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654, wherein the appellant-State was seeking a condonation of delay of 663 days. This Court sternly noted that it will not let the courts to be forums wherein the Government can walk-in, when it desires, entirely ignoring the period of limitation, and buttress reliance on cases of this Court wherein it allowed condonation, employing its discretionary powers, on merits or modalities of peculiarities of those cases. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below:

                     “3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology hadnot advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government […] xxx xxx xxx

                     5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be propounded that ifthere is some merit in the case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by. If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in any case. It is really a bar of limitation which can even shut out good cases. This does not, of course, take away the jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate case to condone the delay.

                     6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is beingadopted in what we have categorised earlier as “certificate cases”. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the officer concerned responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straightaway the counsel appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.

                     7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.” (Emphasis supplied)

                     258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be nondeliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

                     259. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.”

14. In view of the recent pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, I need not look into the decisions that have been rendered by the Division Bench of this Court and this Court in second appeal proceedings. Testing the cause shown by the petitioners, I find that even assuming the petitioners were not able to prefer the appeal in time, that is within the period of limitation provided under the Act, at least when the Tahsildar passed an order in January 2017, it has come on record, in the open that they intend to prefer an appeal as against the judgment dated 28.11.2013.

15. In fact, the Tahsildar has rejected the application for patta only on the ground that the Government Pleader has advised an appeal to be preferred against O.S.No.14 of 2013. Thereafter, a writ petition was also filed before this Court in February 2017 and the petitioners suffered adverse orders in January 2022, which led to even contempt proceedings. Despite all this, the appeal along with the condonation of delay application was filed only on 11.07.2024. There is absolutely no explanation on the side of the petitioners as to why at least, after 11.01.2017, the appeal was not filed without any further delay being caused. Therefore, the conduct of the petitioners clearly smacks of inaction and falls miserably short of “sufficient cause”, which is a sine qua non for allowing an application for condonation of delay. In the light of the above, I do not find any merit in the revision and the well considered order of the trial Court does not warrant any interference in this revision.

16. In fine, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.