Subba Reddy Satti, J.

1. The sole accused in Sessions Case No.240 of 2016 on the file of the Court of the Principal Sessions Judge, Kurnool, is the appellant. He was tried and convicted by the learned Principal Sessions Judge under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for ‘LIFE’ and also to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/-, in default, to undergo Simple Imprisonment for three months.

2. Gravamen of the charge is that on 28.05.2013 at about 7:30 p.m., in front of S.L.V. Dish Office, Venkata Ramana Colony, Road No.3, Kurnool City and District, the accused knowingly slit the throat of his father, T.C. Venkataiah (hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’), causing homicidal death, thereby, committed offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.

3. The case of the prosecution, as emanated from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, is:

                  (i) The accused and the material witnesses are residents of Kurnool. P.Ws.1 and 2 are wife and son of the deceased. The deceased was managing three B.Ed. Colleges at Kurnool, Nandikotkur and Yemmiganur. The appellant/accused, who is the younger son of the deceased, started demanding to handover the administration and maintenance of the B.Ed. Colleges and share in properties. However, the deceased did not oblige the demand. Earlier, a case in crime No.37 of 2011 was registered at Kurnool III Town Police Station against the appellant for the offence under Section 307 I.P.C., based on a complaint given by the deceased. Later, the matter was compromised, and the said case ended in acquittal. Thereafter, the accused put pressure on the deceased, demanding, the deceased to hand over the administration of B.Ed. colleges. The accused held mediation through the elders. At the instigation of accused No.2, the appellant used to harass the deceased. While so, on 28.05.2013, at about 7:30 p.m., P.W.1 had gone out for walking and when she was at road No.3 of Venkata Ramana Colony, Kurnool, she  observed the deceased getting down from an auto. When both of them were proceeding in front of S.L.V. Dish Networks, the appellant came there and quarrelled with the deceased. The deceased tried to pacify the appellant, stating that he would give him property soon and suggested him to wait for some time. The appellant grew wild and picked up a knife from his waist, slit the throat of the deceased and fled away from the scene of offence. P.W.1 was shocked and raised a hue and cry. Thereafter, P.W.1 lodged  a report, Ex.P1, to the Police.

                  (ii) P.W.7, ASI of II-Town Police Station, Kurnool, received the complaint and registered a case in crime No.117 of 2013 for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 120-B IPC. He submitted express FIRs to all the concerned. The endorsement made on Ex.P1 is marked as Ex.P1-A. Ex.P6 is the original F.I.R. dated 28.05.2013.

                  (iii) P.W.8, Inspector of Police, in charge of II Town Police Station, after receipt of Exs.P1 and P6, complaint and F.I.R., went to the scene of the offence and prepared an observation report, Ex.P3 in the presence of P.W.5 and another. He seized M.Os.1 to 3 and 5 to 8 at the scene of offence and prepared a rough sketch of the scene of the offence, Ex.P7. P.W.8 also got photographed at the scene of offence, and the photographs, along with C.D., are marked as Ex.P8. The dead body was shifted to mortuary of Government General Hospital, Kurnool, at about 11:00 p.m. on 28.05.2013. On 29.05.2013, P.W.8 went to the mortuary and held the inquest over the dead body in the presence of blood relatives, P.W.6 and others. Ex.P5 is the inquest report. He also examined P.Ws.1 to 3 and recorded their statements.

                  (iv) P.W.9, Assistant Professor, Department of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, Kurnool Medical College, Kurnool, conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and opined that the deceased died due to haemorrhage shock, resulting from a cut throat injury. Ex.P9 is postmortem certificate.

                  (v) P.W.10, Inspector of Police, II Town Police Station, took up further investigation. He verified the investigation done by P.W.8. He secured the presence of D.W.1, the daughter of the deceased and visited the scene of offence. P.W.10 recorded the statement of D.W.1. On 13.06.2013, on receipt of credible information, he secured the mediators, P.W.5 and others and proceeded to Venkata Ramana Colony in a Police Jeep and on reaching Punnami Guest House gate, they saw the accused trying to skulk away. P.W.10, along with this staff, apprehended the accused, who, in turn, revealed his name and confessed to the commission of murder of the deceased. P.W.10 recorded confession statement of the accused, Ex.P11, in the presence of P.W.5 and others. In pursuance of the confession, the accused led the team to the thorny bushes situated in the middle of the Thungabhadra river, near Sunkesula road and produced a knife, M.O.4 and the same was seized under Ex.P4, seizure panchanama. Later, the accused was remanded to judicial custody. He forwarded M.Os.2 to 6 to RFSL under a letter of advice dated 11.06.2013, Ex.P10.

                  (vi) P.W.11, Sub Divisional Police Officer, Kurnool, took up further investigation and later handed over the C.D. file to his successor, P.W.12.

                  (vii) P.W.12 later took up further investigation and verified the investigation done thus far and found it to be in correct lines. Initially, three persons, including the appellant, were arrayed as accused. In view of the orders, dated 22.01.2015 of the Superintendent of Police, Kurnool, Ex.P12, the name of the accused No.3 was deleted from the array of the accused. After completion of the investigation, P.W.12 filed the charge sheet against accused Nos. 1 and 2. Subsequently, the case against accused No.2 was quashed by the High Court, by order dated 14.10.2015 in Criminal Petition No.4259 of 2015.

4. In support of its case, the prosecution examined PWs 1 to 12, marked Exs.P1 to P13 and exhibited M.Os.1 to 8. On behalf of the defence, D.W.1 was examined. However, no documents were marked.

5. When the accused was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., he denied the incriminating evidence appearing against him.

6. The learned Principal Sessions Judge, Kurnool, after considering the ocular and documentary evidence, found the accused guilty of the offence under Section 302 I.P.C. and convicted him as foresaid.

7. Heard Sri P.Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Smt. Sodum Anvesha, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Marri Venkata Ramana, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State.

8. Learned Senior Counsel made the following submissions.

                  (i) P.W.10 is a planted witness, and she has not seen the happening/incident. Due to suspicion, P.W.1 deposed against the appellant, since he insisted the deceased to share the properties.

                  (ii) The inconsistencies in the testimony of P.W.1 were not properly appreciated by the trial Court.

                  (iii) The deceased had enemies regarding the running of the colleges, and some other person might have killed the deceased.

                  (iv) The testimony of D.W.1 was not properly considered.

9. Learned Senior Counsel further pointed out the discrepancies regarding the scribing of Ex.P1 and the discrepancy regarding the scene of offence. He also contended that the RFSL report was not marked as one of the exhibits. Thus, the learned Senior Counsel urged the Court to set aside the conviction recorded by the trial Court and to acquit the accused.

10. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor contended that P.W.1, the mother of the accused, is an eyewitness to the incident. He would also submit that some minor contradictions in the evidence of P.W.1 may not impeach her evidence in toto. He would further contend that the trial Court appreciated the ocular and documentary evidence and found the appellant guilty of the alleged offence. Eventually, he prayed to dismiss the appeal.

11. We have carefully scrutinised the entire evidence on record.

12. P.W.1 is the mother, and the deceased is the father of the appellant. P.W.2 and D.W.1 are the brother and sister of the appellant, respectively. In Ex.P1, report, P.W.1 mentioned lodging a case on an earlier occasion and the compromise in the said case, at a later point in time. In fact, P.W.1, deposed that in the year 2011, the appellant attempted to murder the deceased with a vegetable cutter. As there was a compromise, the said case ended in acquittal. However, the appellant did not change his attitude. In the cross-examination of P.W.1, it was elicited that the appellant mediated with her through elders for giving a share in both colleges. In fact, P.W.1 replied that the appellant has to relinquish his right over the colleges. No doubt, in further cross- examination, it was elicited that the college at Yemmiganur was sold to one Ismail Baig on 01.07.2011.

13. It is a settled principle of law in criminal jurisprudence that, while appreciating the evidence of a witness, the court must assess whether, read as a whole, it is truthful. In doing so, the court must keep in mind the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities to find out whether such discrepancies shake the truthfulness. Only when discrepancies are so incompatible as to affect the credibility of the version of a witness, the court may reject the evidence. The court must filter the chaff from the grain and find out the truth.

14. In Balu Sudam Khalde Vs. State of Maharashtra((2023) 13 SCC 365) the Hon’ble Apex Court, after considering several judgments, regarding the appreciation of oral evidence, summed up as follows:

                  Appreciation of oral evidence

                  25. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or strait jacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under:

                  “I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief.

                  II. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details.

                  III. When eyewitness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.

                  IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole.

                  V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.

                  VI. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen.

                  VII. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties, therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.

                  VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.

                  IX. By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.

                  X. In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals which varies from person to person.

                  XI. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on.

                  XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross- examination by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him.

                  XIII. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the later statement, even if the later statement is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.”

15. It is also a settled principle in criminal jurisprudence that if the testimony of a single witness is trustworthy and it inspires confidence in the court, the Court can rely upon the evidence and convict the accused. There is no legal impediment to convict the accused on the sole testimony of a single witness. However, if there are doubts about the testimony, it requires corroboration. It is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise.

16. In the case at hand, except for some minor contradictions, nothing contra was elicited from the evidence of P.W.1 to render her evidence untrustworthy. The contention of learned Senior Counsel regarding the drafting of Ex.P1 report hardly matters in the case at hand. No mother would try to implicate her son in a criminal case of murder. There are no inherent improbabilities in the prosecution's story regarding the commission of the homicide of his father by the appellant, due to property disputes.

17. The learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on Amar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)( (2020) 19 SCC 165) and contended that there are inherent improbabilities in the prosecution's story and the conduct of the eye witness, and hence, he prayed that the conviction recorded by the trial Court needs to be set aside.

18. In Amar Singh’s case, the trial Court convicted the accused for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for ‘LIFE’. The High Court confirmed the judgment of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. In the said case, the prosecution produced three eyewitnesses, P.W.1, 11, two brothers of the deceased and P.W.5, in support of its version. P.Ws.11 and 5 turned hostile. In para No.16 of the said decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as follows:

                  16. Thus, the finding of guilt of the two appellant-accused recorded by the two courts below is based on sole testimony of eyewitness PW 1. As a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of single eyewitness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the courts will insist on corroboration. It is not the number, the quantity but quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. On this principle stands the edifice of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise [see Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055] ].

19. Having considered the said legal position and facts of that case, the Hon’ble Apex Court considered the testimony of P.W.1 and found the unnatural conduct of P.W.1 and eventually allowed the appeal. The facts in Amar’s case are different from the facts in the case at hand.

20. In the case at hand, P.W.1 is the mother, and the deceased is the father of the accused. P.W.1, in her cross-examination, specifically deposed as follows:

                  “… Though the accused came nearer to us with the knife, we did not obstruct him. We never had any fear that the accused would murder us. The accused hacked the throat of my husband, for which my husband fell down facing towards the sky. I fell on my husband and weeped … The ambulance has come to the scene of offence after one hour. … I alone went to the II Town Police Station to prefer report.”

21. Thus, the testimony of P.W.1 inspires confidence in the Court, and it cannot be impeded for small discrepancies. The incident occurred around 7:30 p.m., and thereafter, P.W.1 reported at 8:30 p.m. without any delay. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel that, due to suspicion, P.W.1 implicated the appellant, we are not persuaded by the said submission. The prosecution also examined P.W.4, who acted as a mediator to settle the property disputes.

22. Learned Senior Counsel further relied upon Varkey Joseph v. State of Kerala(1993 Supp (3) SCC 745), wherein it was held as under:

                  “Suspicion is not the substitute for proof. There is a long distance between ‘may be true’ and ‘must be true’ and the prosecution has to travel all the way to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt.”

23. The facts of Varkey Joseph’s case have no application to the facts of this case.

24. The other contention of the learned Senior Counsel regarding he injuries may not be possible with M.O.4, knife seized by the Police under Ex.P4. We are not persuaded by the said submission. As per Ex.P9, the deceased received the following anti-mortem injuries :

                  1. Cut throat injury of size measuring 14x4 cms, with irregular margins, bone deep, reddish in colour, horizontally placed present over the front of the neck 6cms below to the chin 0.5 cms above to the thyroid prominence with exposure of the underlying lacerated soft tissues and greater vessels and fracture of anterior surface of 4th cervical vertebra bone with ragged margins to a death of 0.5 cms.

                  2. Pressure abrasion of size measuring 2x1 cms noted over the right side of the fore head.

                  3. Pressure abrasion of size measuring 2x2 cms noted over the right temple.

                  4. Grazed abrasion of size measuring 1x1 cms noted over the tip of the nose.

25. In the cross-examination of P.W.9, the Assistant Professor, Department of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, Kurnool Medical College, Kurnool, it was elicited that the injury sustained by the deceased cannot be caused by the knife when the deceased is in a standing position, and it can be caused only when the deceased is in a lying position. This may not be helpful to the appellant. When the evidence of P.W.1, inspires confidence, the direct witness to the occurrence, the medical evidence, alternative possibilities need not be accepted. The medical evidence is opinion evidence, and it cannot nullify the evidence of an eyewitness, when the evidence of such eye eyewitness inspires confidence and trustworthiness.

26. In State of M.P. v. Dharkole((2004) 13 SCC 308), the Hon’ble Apex Court considered the aspect that medical evidence is at variance with ocular evidence and observed as follows:

                  8. Coming to the plea that the medical evidence is at variance with ocular evidence, it has to be noted that it would be erroneous to accord undue primacy to the hypothetical answers of medical witnesses to exclude the eyewitnesses' account which had to be tested independently and not treated as the “variable” keeping the medical evidence as the “constant”.

                  9. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses' account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' account would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility which should not be adversely prejudged making any other evidence, including medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.

27. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Prem v. Daula((1997) 9 SCC 754 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 754 at page 757), considered a similar aspect as to variance of medical evidence with ocular evidence and observed as follows:

                  14. ….. Coming to the actual assault on Ishwar, the evidence of Prem Singh (PW 9), Krishan (PW 10) and Dhan Kaur (PW 11) is absolutely unimpeachable and each one of them had testified how all the four accused came to the house of Ishwar and assaulted him with the weapons in their hands. All these three witnesses were searchingly cross-examined on behalf of the defence but hardly any material could be brought out during their cross-examination to discredit their evidence. It is true that Dr Rohtas Yadav (PW 3) who conducted the post-mortem examination on the dead body of Ishwar while referring to Injury 1 during the cross-examination admitted that such an injury may not be possible with a ranpi (Ex. P-6). The measurements of the said ranpi (Ex. P-6) which were referred to by the High Court in its impugned judgment could not persuade us to disbelieve the evidence of the three eyewitnesses as regards the assault on Ishwar by A-1 with the ranpi (Ex. P-6). We have no hesitation in saying that Dr Rohtas Yadav (PW 3) has given the evidence in a very casual manner. His evidence being the opinion evidence in the facts and circumstances of this case cannot nullify the evidence of Prem Singh (PW 9), Krishan (PW 10) and Dhan Kaur (PW 11) who have testified that A-2 and A-3 were holding Ishwar and when he bent a little, A-1 gave a ranpi blow on his back We prefer to believe the evidence of these eyewitnesses notwithstanding the fact that Dr Rohtas Yadav (PW 3) had expressed some doubt as regards Injury 1 having been caused with the ranpi (Ex. P-6). We accept the evidence of these three eyewitnesses and hold that the ranpi (Ex. P-6) was the weapon of assault used by A-1 and had caused the injuries on the person of Ishwar which were proved to be fatal.”

28. Of course, the daughter of P.W.1 and sister of the accused and P.W.2 was examined as D.W.1; she is not an eyewitness to the incident, and her evidence does not inspire confidence in this Court.

29. Having considered the entire ocular and documentary evidence, since the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and the learned Additional Sessions Judge considered all the aspects, we find no merit in the appeal.

30. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellant is hereby dismissed, confirming the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Kurnool, in S.C.No. 240 of 2016, dated 15.05.2018 under Section 302 I.P.C. As the appellant was released on bail, by order dated 19.04.2024, in I.A.No.1 of 2024, in terms of the orders passed by the composite High Court in Batchu Rangarao and others v. State of A.P.( 2016 (3) ALT (Crl.) 505 (DB) (A.P.)), he is directed to surrender before the concerned, to serve the remaining sentence of imprisonment, failing which, the learned trial Judge is directed to secure his presence by issuing warrants and commit him to prison for serving the remaining portion of the sentence. It is needless to state that the period already undergone by the accused shall be given set off, as per the provisions of Section 428 Cr.P.C.

                  Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.