(Prayer: This writ appeal is filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, praying to set aside order in W.P. no.28289/2013 (S-Res) dated 25.09.2025 passed by the learned single judge and pass such other orders.)

Cav Judgment:

Anu Sivaraman, j.

1. The Writ Appeal No.1901 of 2024 is preferred against the order dated 25.09.2024 of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.28289/2013 (S-RES).

2. We have heard Shri. Vighneshwar S. Shastri, learned senior counsel as instructed by Shri. Udaya Shankar Rai.P, learned Advocate appearing for the Indian Bank and Shri P.S. Rajagopal, learned senior counsel as instructed by Shri. Anand S.G., learned Advocate appearing for the respondent.

3. The Writ Petition had been filed seeking the following reliefs:-

                  "a) ISSUE a Writ in the nature of certiorari to Quash the order bearing No.BGZO;VIG;528:2010-11 as per ANNEXURE-K dated 02.04.2011 and the order dated 14.07.2011 bearing No.1575 VG; SR No.18864: APP: 2011-12 as per ANNEXURE-M passed by Respondent, and order dated 26.05.2012 bearing No. VG:FC 1988:801:REV;SRI 8664-2012-13 as per ANNEXURE-P AND

                  b)       To reinstate the Petitioner to the original post and to grant all consequential benefits including arrears of Salary, pay fixation with 12% interest from the date of the order of punishment."

4. By the judgment under appeal, the learned Single Judge considered the contentions advanced on either side and held that the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings was proper. However, on the ground that "A birds eye view of the facts extracted in the enquiry does show that the petitioner is guilty of some misconduct in the matter of ensuring transparency in transactions brought about by him and also in not ensuring the safety and security of the business interest of the Bank. This however, does not justify the imposition of major punishment of compulsory retirement."

5. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge has erred in substituting his own reasoning for the reasoning of the Disciplinary Authority which is completely impermissible in law. It submitted that after specifically finding that the charges alleged against the Writ Petitioner stood proved in a properly conducted enquiry, it was not open to the learned Single Judge to have substituted the penalty with absolutely no justification at all.

6. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant has placed reliance on the following decisions:-

                  *        Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others v. T.T. Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108;

                  *        General Manager (Operations) State Bank of India and another v. R. Periyasamy reported in (2015) 3 SCC 101; and

                  *        Western Coal Fields Ltd. v. Manohar Govinda Fulzele disposed of on 17.02.2025 in Civil Appeal No.2608/2025.

7. The learned senior counsel has also placed the Indian Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 for our perusal.

8. It is contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent that the enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. It is submitted that the entire enquiry report is based on statements in the preliminary enquiry report without any supporting material to substantiate the charges. The Head Office Circular referred to in the memo of charges was not produced in the enquiry. No proper procedure was followed in the enquiry and no oral evidence was adduced. It is submitted that only the punishment of bar of 2 increments was imposed on the respondent's predecessor in office which was also later restored. It is therefore contended that the respondent was subjected to hostile discrimination in the matter of imposition of punishment.

9. The         learned seniorcounsel appearing for the employee/respondent relies on the following decisions:-

                  •        Moni Shankar v. Union of India and another

reported in (2008) 3 SCC 484;

                  •        Govt. of A.P. and others v. A. Venkata Raidu

reported in (2007) 1 SCC 338;

                  •        United Bank of India v. Biswanath Bhattacharjee

reported in (2022) 13 SCC 329;

                  •        Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v. Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank Employees Assn. and another reported in (2007) 4 SCC 669;

                  •        State of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava and others reported in (2006) 3 SCC 276; and

                  •        E v. Secretary of State for the Home Department

reported in (2004) EWCA (Civ) 49.

10. We have considered the contentions advanced. It is not in dispute that the learned Single Judge, after considering the contentions advanced on either side, had found no error in the procedure or the conduct of the Enquiry. The learned Single Judge has not found fault with the finding in the enquiry or the decision of the Disciplinary Authority to impose punishment on the petitioner. No reason has been stated as to why the punishment of compulsory retirement was found to be disproportionate. We notice that the lack of findings with regard to conduct of the enquiry have attained finality as no appeal has been filed by the respondent/employee.

11. It is a trite law that the proportionality of the punishment is a question that can be considered by the Constitutional Courts or Tribunals exercising the power of judicial review only if the penalty imposed is so disproportionate as to shock the conscience of the Court.

12. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others v. T.T. Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108, the Apex Court held at paragraphs No.28, 29, 32 and 34 as follows:-

                  "28. Presently, we shall proceed to scrutinise whether the High Court is justified in applying the doctrine of proportionality. The doctrine of proportionality in the context of imposition of punishment in service law gets attracted when the court on the analysis of material brought on record comes to the conclusion that the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court. In this regard a passage from Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Arora (1997) 3 SCC 72, is worth reproducing: (SCC pp. 77-78, para 20)

                  “20. At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of appellate court/authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity; findings are based on no evidence, and/or the punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee.”

                  29. In Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463, the Court analysed the conception of proportionality in administrative law in England and India and thereafter addressed itself with regard to the punishment in disciplinary matters and opined that unless the court/Tribunal opines in its secondary role that the administrator was, on the material before him, irrational according to Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn (1948) 1 KB 223, and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 1985 AC 374, norms, the punishment cannot be quashed.

                  x x x x x

                  32. The learned counsel for the respondent has endeavoured hard to impress upon us that the respondent had not been a habitual absentee. We really fail to fathom the said submission when the respondent had remained absent for almost one year and seven months. The plea of absence of “habitual absenteeism” is absolutely unacceptable and, under the obtaining circumstances, does not commend acceptation. We are disposed to think that the respondent by remaining unauthorisedly absent for such a long period with inadequate reason had not only shown indiscipline but also made an attempt to get away with it. Such a conduct is not permissible and we are inclined to think that the High Court has erroneously placed reliance on the authorities where this Court had interfered with the punishment. We have no shadow of doubt that the doctrine of proportionality does not get remotely attracted to such a case. The  punishment    is definitely not shockingly disproportionate.

                  x x x x x

                  34. Judged on the anvil of the aforesaid premises, the irresistible conclusion is that the interference by the High Court with the punishment is totally unwarranted and unsustainable, and further the High Court was wholly unjustified in entertaining the writ petition after a lapse of four years. The result of aforesaid analysis would entail overturning the judgments and orders passed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court and, accordingly, we so do."

13. In General Manager (Operations) State Bank of India and another v. R. Periyasamy reported in (2015) 3 SCC 101, the relevant portions of the judgment reads as follows;

                  "12. Further, in Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan reported in (1992) 4 SCC 618, this Court was confronted with a case which was similar to the present one. The respondent therein was also a bank employee, who was unable to demonstrate to the Court as to how prejudice had been caused to him due to non-supply of the inquiry authorities report/findings in his case. This Court held that in the banking business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee and in particular the bank officer. If this were not to be observed, the Court held that the confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired. Thus, in that case the Court set aside the order of the High Court and upheld the dismissal of the bank employee, rejecting the ground that any prejudice had been caused to him on account of non-furnishing of the inquiry report/findings to him.

                  13. While dealing with the question as to whether a person with doubtful integrity ought to be allowed to work in a government department, this Court in Commr. of Police v. Mehar Singh reported in (2013) 7 SCC 685,, held that while the standard of proof in a criminal case is proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is merely the preponderance of probabilities. The Court observed that quite often the criminal cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile and therefore, such acquittals are not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand on a par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. The longstanding view on this subject was settled by this Court in R.P. Kapur v. Union of India reported in AIR 1964 SC 787, whereby it was held that a departmental proceeding can proceed even though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other than honourable. We are in agreement with this view."

14. We are in respectful agreement with the legal propositions stated in the decisions relied on by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent. It is clear that the Courts exercising the powers of judicial review can consider whether proper evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts had been excluded. It is also clear that the disciplinary proceedings must be conducted complying with the provisions of the rules and the principles of natural justice. However, we further notice that the learned Single Judge has clearly held that the disciplinary proceedings have been conducted properly and there is no material to hold otherwise. On this point, there is no appeal preferred by the respondent/employee. However, the punishment has been reduced without any finding as to proportionality.

15. In the instant case, where there are clear allegations of financial irregularities against an employee of a Bank, we are of the opinion that the finding of the learned Single Judge that the penalty of compulsory retirement was grossly disproportionate is not supported by any material. We are of the opinion that it is well within the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority to impose an appropriate punishment and it is not for the Constitutional Courts to substitute their reasoning or opinions for that of the Disciplinary Authority. We are of the opinion that the appeal is therefore liable to succeed.

16.    In the result:-

                  (i)       Writ Appeal is allowed.

                  (ii)      The Order dated 25.09.2024 of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.28289/2013 (S-RES),is set aside.

                  (iii)     Writ Petition No.28289/2013 (S-RES),is dismissed.

                  Pending interlocutory applications shall stand disposed