Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The petitioners in W.P.(C)No.21471 of 2025 filed this writ appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the judgment dated 24.06.2025 in that writ petition and the order dated 24.10.2025 in R.P.No.1093 of 2025, passed by the learned Single Judge.

2. The appellants filed W.P.(C)No.21471 of 2025, invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to withdraw all further proceedings against the appellants under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’ in short), especially against the property measuring 1.06 acres in Survey Nos.502/2 and 507/1 situated in Pudussery Central Village, Palakkad Taluk, belonging to the 5th respondent and all the assets situated therein. The appellants have also sought for a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P19 possession notice dated 16.05.2025 issued by the 3rd respondent Indian Bank Ltd., Stressed Assets Management Vertical Branch, Coimbatore.

3. Going by the averments in the writ petition, the 1st appellant is a public Limited company incorporated on 09.01.2003 under the Companies Act, and the 2nd appellant is its Managing Director. The initial name of the company was ‘SH Cold Storage Private Limited’, and the same was subsequently changed to the present name on 01.12.2014. In the year 2012, the 1st appellant had taken a land from the 5th respondent for establishing a cold storage as per Ext.P3 agreement. The 1st appellant had also availed a loan from the 3rd respondent based on Ext.P3 and NOC from the 5th respondent. Subsequently, the NOC expired, and the loan was subsequently provided by another entity created by the 3rd respondent and 4th respondent as a consortium, namely the 2nd respondent. However, there was no fresh NOC in favour of the 2nd respondent nor any new lease agreement between the 1st appellant and the 5th respondent. Hence, there is no valid mortgage for proceeding under the SARFAESI Act by the respondent banks. Further, the NPA classification is also in violation of the RBI guidelines, MSME Act and its Rules, apart from the Consortium norms violations by the 3rd respondent. Therefore, the coercive proceedings initiated against the appellants are illegal and unsustainable. The 1st appellant and the property sought to be possessed as per Ext. P19 are within the jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, the appellants filed the writ petition before this Court.

4. On 24.06.2025, when the writ petition came up for consideration, the learned Single judge, by the impugned judgment, closed the writ petition. The said judgment read thus:

                  “The petitioner challenges Ext.P19, which is the Possession Notice issued by the Bank dated 16.05.2025.

                  Today, when the matter is taken up, the 3rd respondent Bank, made available a copy of the proceedings withdrawing the possession notice dated 16.05.2025. Given the above, nothing further is required to be considered in this writ petition. The writ petition is accordingly closed without prejudice to the right of the petitioners to challenge the actions of the secured creditor, if the petitioners are aggrieved. All the contentions of the petitioners are left open.”

5. Challenging the aforesaid judgment dated 24.06.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge, the appellants filed W.A.No.1644 of 2025. By the judgment dated 04.08.2025, this Court closed that writ appeal, considering the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, holding that the remedy open to the appellants is to file a review petition before the learned Single Judge, seeking review of the impugned judgment. Paragraph 5 and the last paragraph of that judgment read thus:

                  “5. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, on instructions from the learned instructing counsel would submit that on 24.06.2025, when the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent Indian Bank Limited handed over a letter dated 20.06.2025 regarding withdrawal of Ext.P19 possession notice dated 16.05.2025 due to technical reasons, it was pointed out before the learned Single Judge that the basic proceedings pursuant to the notice issued under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, is still pending against the appellants herein and therefore, time was sought to challenge the said notice by amending the writ petition. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel regarding illegal classification of the account as NPA, with specific reference to the grounds raised in the writ petition, were not adverted to by the learned Single Judge while closing the writ petition. Having considered the aforesaid submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, we are of the view that, the remedy open to the appellants- writ petitioners is to file a review petition before the learned Single Judge, seeking review of the judgment dated 24.06.2025 in W.P.(C)No.21471 of 2025. Without prejudice to the aforesaid right of the appellants, this writ appeal is closed, leaving open the legal and factual contentions raised by both sides”.

6. After the disposal of W.A.No.1644 of 2025, the appellants filed R.P.No.1093 of 2025 before the learned Single Judge. However, by the order dated 24.10.2025, the learned Single Judge closed the said review petition, holding that all grounds raised by the appellants on the invalidity of the mortgage and other statutory grounds can be raised before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. Paragraphs 2 and the last paragraph of that order read thus:

                  “2. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners would argue that the ground of invalidity of the mortgage and the statutory noncompliance with the notifications issued by the Reserve Bank, which afforded protection to the MSMEs, are questions to be considered in this Review Petition. The question of the invalidity of the mortgage, which involves questions of fact as well, can be raised before the Tribunal, which is a Tribunal of law and facts. Since the petitioners have an effective alternate statutory remedy against the actions of the secured creditor, I am not inclined to entertain this Review Petition. All grounds raised by the petitioners on the invalidity of the mortgage and other statutory grounds can be raised before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.

                  Without prejudice to the right of the petitioners to avail of the same, this review petition is closed”.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed in the writ petition and the order in the review petition by the learned Single Judge, the appellants are now before this Court with the present writ appeal.

8. Heard the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, the learned Standing Counsel for the Indian Bank Ltd, the learned Standing Counsel for the Canara Bank and the learned counsel for the 5th respondent Kerala Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation.

9. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants would argue that in the impugned judgment passed in the writ petition and in the order passed in the review petition, the learned Single Judge did not consider the contentions of the appellants on merits. In fact, the appellants have a case that the property against which the Bank proceeded was not at all validly mortgaged to the Bank for proceeding against it under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that Section 31(e) of the Unamended SARFAESI Act, which was applicable at the relevant time, has to be taken into consideration, as per which the provisions of the Act do not apply to any conditional sale, hire- purchase or lease or any other contract in which no security interest has been created. Therefore, in the present case, since it involves a lease arrangement, the SARFAESI Act cannot be applied.

10. On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel for the 3rd respondent Indian Bank, argued that the appellants had approached the High Court of Judicature at Madras by filing W.P.No.12656 of 2022 when the Bank issued notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act. However, by the judgment dated 24.06.2022, the High Court of Judicature at Madras disposed of that writ petition, granting liberty to the appellants to take remedy of sending a reply or objection by invoking Section 13(3A) of the SARFAESI Act and then to take a remedy further, if the objection or reply is not appropriately considered by the Bank. Thereafter, the appellants have sent a detailed objection dated 22.06.2022, which is produced as Annexure R3(d) along with the statement filed on behalf of the 3rd respondent Bank in R.P.No.1093 of 2025. To that objection, the 3rd respondent Bank sent a rejoinder dated 08.07.2022, which is produced as Annexure R3(e) along with the statement filed in the review petition. The learned Standing Counsel further submitted that subsequent to the issuance of notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, some of the properties of the appellants situated in Tamil Nadu are sold by following the procedure. It is vehemently submitted by the learned Counsel that against the proceedings initiated by the Bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, the remedy of the appellants is under Section 17 of the said Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and not a writ petition. Therefore, the present writ appeal is not maintainable.

11. From the prayers in the writ petition, we notice that the reliefs sought by the appellants are against the proceedings initiated by the respondents under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act against the secured asset. According to the appellants, the property against which the respondents now started proceedings under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act is not validly mortgaged. While appreciating the aforesaid contention of the appellants and also the contention of the respondents regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, it would be appropriate to go through Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and also some of the judgments on the point. Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act reads thus:

                  “17. Application against measures to recover secured debts (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measures had been taken:

                  Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower.

                  Explanation.-For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery

                  Tribunal under sub-section (1) of Section 17.

                  3A(1A) An application under sub-section (1) shall be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction-

                  (a)      the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises;

                  (b)      where the secured asset is located; or

                  (c)      the branch or any other office of a bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding for the time being.

                  (2)      The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder.

                  (3)      If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management or restoration of possession, of the secured assets to the borrower or other aggrieved person, it may, by order,-

                  (a)      declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by the secured creditor as invalid; and

                  (b)      restore the possession of secured assets or management of secured assets to the borrower or such other aggrieved person, who has made an application under sub-section (1), as the case may be; and

                  (c)      pass such other direction as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13.

                  (4)      If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under sub-section (4) of section 13 to recover his secured debt.

(4A) Where-

                  (i) any person, in an application under sub-section (1), claims any tenancy or leasehold rights upon the secured asset, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts of the case and evidence produced by the parties in relation to such claims shall, for the purposes of enforcement of security interest, have the jurisdiction to examine whether lease or tenancy,-

                  (a) has  expired  or  stood  determined;  or

                  (b) is contrary to section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882;

or

                  (c) is contrary to terms of mortgage; or

                  (d) is created after the issuance of notice of default and demand by the Bank under sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act; and

                  (ii) the Debt Recovery Tribunal is satisfied that tenancy right or leasehold rights claimed in secured asset falls under the sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) or sub- clause (d) of clause (i), then notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Debt Recovery Tribunal may pass such order as it deems fit in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

                  (5) Any application made under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty days from the date of such application:

                  Provided that the Debts Recovery Tribunal may, from time to time, extend the said period for reasons to be recorded in writing, so, however, that the total period of pendency of the application with the Debts Recovery Tribunal, shall not exceed four months from the date of making of such application made under sub-section (1).

                  (6)      If the application is not disposed of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the period of four months as specified in sub-section (5), any party to the application may make an application, in such form as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal for directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal for expeditious disposal of the application pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may, on such application, make an order for expeditious disposal of the pending application by the Debts Recovery Tribunal.

                  (7)      Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of application in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and the rules made thereunder”.

(Underline supplied)

12. In Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Another v. Mathew K.C. [2018 (1) KHC 786], the Apex Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain a writ petition only under exceptional circumstances and that it is a self-imposed restraint by the High Court. The four exceptional circumstances such as, where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, were reiterated in paragraph 6 of the said judgment by relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax and Others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603].

13. In South Indian Bank Ltd. (M/s.) v. Naveen Mathew Philip [2023 (4) KLT 29] after discussing the various judgments on the point as to circumstances in which the High Court can interfere with matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act, it is held by the Apex Court as under:

                  “Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi - judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute”.      (Underline supplied)

14. In PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank [2024 (3) KHC SN 3] the Apex Court held that it is more than a settled legal position of law that in matters arising out of RDB Act and SARFAESI Act, the High Court should not entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution, particularly when an alternative statutory remedy is available.

15. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Jasmin K. v. State Bank of India [2024 (3) KHC 266] reiterated the position of law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments.

16. From the judgments referred to supra, it is clear that unless any of the four exceptional circumstances mentioned by the Apex Court in Mathew K.C. [2018 (1) KHC 786] is made out, the appellants cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, against the proceedings initiated by the Bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. From the materials placed on record, the appellants failed to make out any such circumstance. The learned Single Judge now closed the review petition filed by the appellants by the impugned order dated 24.10.2025, holding that the remedy of the appellants is before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. It is clear from the reading of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act that any person claiming a right on the secured asset can move the Debts Recovery Tribunal if aggrieved by the proceedings initiated against that property by the secured creditor under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. In such circumstances, we find no illegality or impropriety in the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge.

In the result, the writ appeal stands dismissed.