1. This civil revision under Section 115 of CPC has been filed against the order dated 17.01.2019 passed by the Fourth Civil Judge, Class-I, Gwalior, in MJC No.2200010/2015 by which application filed by applicant under Section 383 of Indian Succession Act has been rejected.

2. I.A. No.5477/2021 has been filed for substitution of legal representatives of Bachchu Lal Sharma.

3. There was a dispute as to whether Smt. Kamla is the legal heir of applicant or not. Accordingly, in view of the claim and counterclaim, in connected Civil Revision No.132/2019, this Court had directed the Trial Court to conduct a summary enquiry as to whether Smt. Kamla is the legally wedded wife of Bachchu Lal Sharma or not.

4. An enquiry report has been received in a sealed cover in connected Civil Revision No.132/2019, according to which Smt. Kamla is not the legally wedded wife of Bachchu Lal Sharma. Even otherwise, Smt. Kamla, in her evidence before the Trial Court, had claimed that she got married to Bachchu Lal Sharma on the strength of an agreement of marriage. Marriage in Hindu law is not a contract, and unless and until saptapadi is performed, it cannot be said that the persons have got legally married.

5. Under these circumstances, for the purposes of this application, it is held that Smt. Kamla is not the legally wedded wife of respondent No.1, Bachchu Lal Sharma. Accordingly, this civil revision has stood abated.

6. It is also a well-established principle of law that the trial under Sections 372 or 383 of Indian Succession Act is summary in nature and does not finally determine the rights of the parties.

7. Even otherwise, the findings given under Sections 372 & 383 of Indian Succession Act are not final. The Supreme Court in the case of Banarsi Dass v. Teeku Dutta (Mrs) and Another , reported in (2005) 4 SCC 449 , has held as under:

          "14. The main object of a succession certificate is to facilitate collection of debts on succession and afford protection to the parties paying debts to the representatives of deceased persons. All that the succession certificate purports to do is to facilitate the collection of debts, to regulate the administration of succession and to protect persons who deal with the alleged representatives of the deceased persons. Such a certificate does not give any general power of administration on the estate of the deceased. The grant of a certificate does not establish title of the grantee as the heir of the deceased. A succession certificate is intended as noted above to protect the debtors, which means that where a debtor of a deceased person either voluntarily pays his debt to a person holding a certificate under the Act, or is compelled by the decree of a court to pay it to the person, he is lawfully discharged. The grant of a certificate does not establish a title of the grantee as the heir of the deceased, but only furnishes him with authority to collect his debts and allows the debtors to make payments to him without incurring any risk. ...."

8. The Supreme Court in the case of Madhvi Amma Bhawani Amma and Others v. Kunjikutty Pillai Meenakshi Pillai and Others , reported in (2000) 6 SCC 301 , has held as under:

          "13. This sub-section reveals two things: first, adjudication is in summary proceedings and secondly, if the question of law and facts are intricate or difficult, it could still grant the said certificate based on his prima facie title. In other words the grant of certificate under it is only a determination of prima facie title. This as a necessary corollary confirms that it is not a final decision between the parties. So, it cannot be construed that the mere grant of such certificate or a decision in such proceedings would constitute to be a decision on an issue finally decided between the parties. If that be so how could the principle of res judicata be made applicable to a case in a subsequent suit? The effect of such certificate is also laid down in Section 381 which is quoted hereunder:

          "381. Effect of certificate.--Subject to the provisions of this Part, the certificate of the District Judge shall, with respect to the debts and securities specified therein, be conclusive as against the persons owing such debts or liable on such securities, and shall, notwithstanding any contravention of Section 370, or other defect, afford full indemnity to all such persons as regards all payments made, or dealings had, in good faith in respect of such debts or securities to or with the person to whom the certificate was granted."

          (emphasis supplied)

14. So, this certificate merely affords full indemnity to the debtor for the payment he makes to the person holding such certificate. Thus when the debtor pays the debts or the securities as specified in the certificate, to the holder of such certificate, then on such payment, he is absolved from his obligation to pay to anyone else as it conclusively concludes his part of his obligation and such payment is construed to be in good faith. This safeguards such debtor or person liable to pay that he may not be later dragged into any litigation which may arise subsequently inter se between the claimants. The use of words "good faith" in Section 381 reinforces that the decision in these proceedings are not final. When statute recognises such payment to be in good faith it gives clear undercurrent message that there may be in future better claimant but that would not affect the indemnification of the debtor. Thus we find accumulatively because of the grant of succession certificate being for a limited purpose, limited in its sphere, the declaration of title being prima facie, payment tendered is declared to have been made in good faith, leads to only one conclusion that any decision made therein cannot be treated to be final adjudication of the rights of the parties, except such declaration being final for the purpose of these proceedings. If that be so, the amount received by the holder of such certificate can yet be questioned, and in subsequent proceedings it may be held to belong to other claimant, including the contesting party.

15. This can be examined from another angle. The grant of the succession certificate falls under Part X of the aforesaid Act. Its range is between Sections 370 to 390. It is significant to refer here Section 387. This declares the effect of decisions made under this Act and the liability of the holder of such certificate. It lays down that any decision made under this Part (Part X) upon any question of right between the parties shall not bar the trial of the same question in any suit or other proceedings between the same parties. It further records that nothing in this Part shall be construed to affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of any debts or security to account therefor to the person lawfully entitled thereto. Section 387 is quoted hereunder:

          "387. Effect of decisions under this Act, and liability of holder of certificate thereunder.--No decision under this Part upon any question of right between any parties shall be held to bar the trial of the same question in any suit or in any other proceeding between the same parties, and nothing in this Part shall be construed to affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of any debts or security, or any interest or dividend on any security, to account therefor to the person lawfully entitled thereto."

          (emphasis supplied)

          16. This leaves no room for doubt. Thus any adjudication made under Part X of this Act which includes Section 373 does not bar the same question being raised between the same parties in any subsequent suit or proceeding. This provision takes the decisions under Part X of the Act outside the purview of Explanation VIII to Section 11. This gives protective umbrella to ward off from the rays of res judicata to the same issue being raised in a subsequent suit or proceedings.

          17. No doubt Explanation VIII to Section 11 enlarges the field of res judicata, by including in its field the decisions on the same issue, between the same parties even by a court of limited jurisdiction even though such court may not have the competence of deciding such an issue in a suit. But as we have held above this grant of certificate would not fall within the field of Explanation VIII to Section 11."

9. Under these circumstances, liberty is granted to Smt. Kamla to file a civil suit for declaration of her title.

10. It is made clear that the order under challenge shall be subject to the final outcome of the civil suit.

11. With the aforesaid observation, this civil revision is finally disposed of.