Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This writ petition is directed against an order of detention dated 24.11.2025 passed against the petitioner, Anandhu Shaji (herein after referred to as the 'detenu'), under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (‘PITNDPS Act’ for brevity).

2. The records reveal that, on 17.09.2025, a proposal was submitted by the District Police Chief, Idukki, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 1st respondent. Altogether, five cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is Crime No.899/2025 of Nedumkandam Police Station, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 20(b)(ii)B, and 29 of the NDPS Act.

3. We heard Sri. Arun Mathew Vadakkan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K. A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that Ext.P1 order was passed on improper consideration of facts and without proper application of mind. The learned counsel submitted that the jurisdictional authority passed the impugned order without taking note of the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity, and that the conditions imposed on him at the time of granting bail itself were sufficient to deter him from being involved in further criminal activities. According to the learned counsel, the sufficiency of the bail conditions was not properly considered by the jurisdictional authority, and casually passed the impugned order. The learned counsel submitted that while passing Ext.P1 order, the jurisdictional authority failed to take note of the fact that there was a time gap of around one year and nine months between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case registered against the detenu, and the said time gap itself shows that the detenu is not a person having the propensity to be involved in criminal activities repeatedly. The learned counsel further urged that the jurisdictional authority passed Ext.P1 order in a hasty manner without considering the fact that there was an effective remedy of cancellation of the bail granted to the detenu. According to the counsel, as an alternative remedy was available to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities, a drastic measure of preventive detention was not at all necessitated. On these premises, it was urged that the impugned order of detention is liable to be set aside.

5. In response, the learned Government Pleader submitted that Ext.P1 order was passed after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. The learned Government Pleader asserted that the jurisdictional authority passed the Ext.P1 order after taking note of the fact that the detenu was on bail in connection with the last prejudicial activity and after being satisfied that the bail conditions imposed while granting bail to the detenu are not sufficient to prevent him from being involved in criminal activities. The learned Government Pleader further urged that   the contentions taken by the counsel for the petitioner lack merit and the impugned order requires no interference.

6. The records reveal that the detention order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after considering the recurrent involvement of the detenu in narcotic peddling activities. As already stated, five cases in which the detenu got involved formed the basis for passing Ext.P1 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is Crime No.899/2025 of Nedumkandam Police Station, alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 20(b)(ii)B, and 29 of the NDPS Act. The incident that led to the registration of the said case occurred on 16.08.2025, and he was arrested on the same day. As evident from the records, he was granted bail in the said case on 16.10.2025. It was on 17.09.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody, that the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the PITNDPS Act was forwarded by the sponsoring authority. Subsequently, on 24.11.2025, the detention order was passed.

7. One of the main contentions taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that it was without taking note of the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity and without considering the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court at the time of granting bail, the jurisdictional authority passed the detention order. While considering the contention of the counsel for the petitioner in the above regard, it is to be noted that there is no law that precludes the jurisdictional authority from passing an order of detention against a person who is already on bail. However, when a detention order is passed against a person who is already on bail, it is incumbent upon the authority to take note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed on such a person while granting bail to him are sufficient to restrain him     from   being involved in criminal activities. Undisputedly, an order of detention is a drastic measure against a person. Therefore, when there are other effective remedies available under the ordinary criminal law to deter a person from engaging in criminal activities, an order of preventive detention is neither necessitated nor legally permissible. Therefore, when a person is already on bail, the compelling circumstances that necessitated the passing of the detention order should be reflected in the order itself.

8. Keeping in mind the above, while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that in the detention order itself, the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the cases registered against him is specifically adverted to. Moreover, in the order, the sufficiency of the bail conditions is also properly considered by the jurisdictional authority. In the order, it is specifically mentioned that from the past criminal activities of the detenu, it is evident that the present bail conditions are not sufficient to prevent the detenu from committing further crimes, since he has violated similar bail conditions in the past. Likewise, in Ext.P1 order, it is recorded that the detenu is likely to violate those bail conditions, and there is a high propensity that he will indulge in drug peddling activities in the future while on bail. Moreover, it is stated that the present bail conditions are not sufficient to curb the detenu’s narcotic criminal activities. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above regard will fail.

9. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the jurisdictional authority failed to take note of the fact that there was a time gap of around one year and nine months between the last prejudicial activity and the last but one case registered against the detenu, and therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived on by the detaining authority is vitiated. It is true that the last prejudicial activity was committed by the detenu on 16.08.2025, whereas the date of occurrence of the last but one case registered against him (crime No. 1365/2023) is on 15.11.2023. Thus, there is indeed a gap of one year and nine months between the two incidents. However, it cannot be overlooked that the involvement of a person, even in a single case registered under the NDPS Act, is sufficient to pass an order of detention under the PITNDPS Act. Therefore, the time gap between the two cases highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of little consequence in the context of the impugned order.

10. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the purported hasty action on the part of the jurisdictional authority in passing an order under Section 3(1) of the PITNDPS Act is not justified, as there was a remedy under ordinary criminal law to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities. According to the counsel, if the authority was concerned about violations of bail conditions imposed on the detenu in the cases registered against him and his recurrent involvement in criminal activities, the course open was to file a petition to cancel the bail granted to the detenu and to detain him in terms of the provisions contained under Cr.P.C.

11. We are not oblivious to the fact that when an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to detention under preventive detention laws is neither warranted nor permissible. However, merely because a remedy of bail cancellation is available, it cannot be said that a detention order under the PITNDPS Act cannot be passed. When there is an imminent danger of repetition of criminal activities by a person who indulges in drug peddling activities, cancellation of bail orders already secured by him would not be sufficient to deter such a person from indulging in criminal activities. The reason is that, first of all, the purpose and scope of an application for cancellation of bail and preventive detention are different. That apart, the bail cancellation procedure, having regard to the ground realities, is a time-consuming one. There is no assurance that an order of cancellation of bail could be secured in time before the person concerned indulges in another criminal activity. Preventive detention laws are enacted to address such exigencies. It is on account of these reasons that it has been held by the courts consistently that the authorities under the preventive detention laws need not have to wait till orders are passed on the application for cancellation of bail, for passing an order of detention. If it is held that, if there is an option for cancellation of bail, a detention order cannot be passed, it would render the preventive detention laws ineffective. Moreover, even after the cancellation of bail, there is no legal impediment to granting bail subsequently. Therefore, it cannot be said that cancellation of bail is an effective alternative remedy, and when such an alternative remedy is available, a detention order is not at all necessitated.

                  In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.