1. Petitioners filed S.A.No.481 of 2024 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam against the recovery measures initiated against the property belonging to them. In the said S.A., I.A. Nos.3135 of 2025 and 3134 of 2025 were filed. I.A.No.3135 of 2025 was filed with a prayer to stay all further proceedings including confirmation of sale, issuance of sale certificate and registration of sale certificate pursuant to Anex.A21 sale notice. I.A.No.3134 of 2025 is an application filed to amend the S.A. by incorporating certain facts, grounds and reliefs.

2. The DRT took up I.A.No.3135 of 2025 and dismissed the same as per Ext.P1 dated 18.8.2025. Earlier, the petitioners filed I.A.No.564 of 2025 in the said S.A. to depute an Advocate Commissioner to ascertain the potential nature of the mortgaged property and to prepare valuation report with the help of an approved valuer and to submit a report with the comparability of both the lands with the property covered by Ext.P18 and secured assets. The Tribunal dismissed the said application by Ext.P2 order dated 24.3.2025. Both Ext.Nos.P1 and P2 orders are impugned in this O.P. (DRT).

3. The counsel appearing for the respondent bank opposed the prayers in the O.P. on the ground of entertainability of the same under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the question of entertainability is heard as a preliminary issue.

4. The counsel for the petitioners, Smt. Liza P. Cherian submitted that there is a procedural lapse from the part of the Tribunal in passing Ext.Nos.P1 and P2 orders. According to the petitioners, Annex.A21 (Ext.P13 herein), is the sale notice dated 28.7.2025 for sale of the property on 19.8.2025. It was produced with supporting grounds and reliefs in I.A.No.3134 of 2025. I.A. No.3135 of 2025 is filed for stay of the sale of property scheduled on 19.8.2025. When an application is filed for amending the S.A. by producing the sale notice, the Tribunal ought to have allowed the petitioners to amend it and then consider the stay application. This is because the sale notice is annexed to the amendment application and, unless and until the amendment is allowed, it does not become a part of the record. The sale notice is challenged in the S.A., because the property which is sought to be sold is in the prime locality and with a residential building of 2100 sq. ft. and office building of 1200 sq.ft. which is not separately valued and shown by the approved valuer. Ext.P2 was dismissed on the ground that the petitioners have not produced any evidence or not pointed out in the affidavit as to what is the marketable or saleable price of the property. The counsel submitted that Ext.P19 sale deed is produced in the S.A. to show that similar land that of the secured asset was sold for a land value of ₹18,60,000/- per cent. The comparability and the valuation of the secured asset in relation to Ext.P19 is highly essential for determining the reserved price of the property which is sought to be sold. Since the Tribunal failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested with it, interference is warranted with Ext.P6 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

5. Though a remedy by way of an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act is available to the petitioners, both the orders; Ext.Nos.P1 and P2 are perverse and passed without exercising the jurisdiction vested with it, occasioning failure of justice. Thus, the petitioners are entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, Ext.Nos.P1 and P2 are to be set aside and remitted for fresh consideration after considering I.A.No.3134 of 2025.  The counsel for the petitioners relied on a judgment of the hon’ble apex court in Radhey Shyam and another v. Chhabi Nath and others [(2015) 5 SCC 423] to contend for the proposition that power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, can be exercised when there is a failure of justice because of non - exercise of jurisdiction which it does have. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of this court in Veena Prabhakumar and another v. Dhanlaxmi Bank, Kollam branch and another [2019 (3) KHC 268] and contended that if a sale is pending, any proceedings after the filing of the S.A. can be challenged by way of an amendment as the DRT is well within its powers available under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to determine the real question between the parties. In Advani Oerlikon Ltd. v. Mahindra Govind Makasare and others (2011 KHC 2423), the High court of Bombay, relying on the judgment in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath (AIR 1964 SC 215), has held that when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the Tribunal and court subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted, the High Court can interfere with its power of superintendence.

6. The standing counsel for the respondent bank opposes the contentions raised by the petitioners and submits that under Section 18 of Act, any person aggrieved, by any order made by the DRT, under Section 17, may prefer an appeal along with such fee, as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal within 30 days from the date of receipt of the DRT. The 2nd proviso prescribed that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the appellate tribunal 50% of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the DRT, whichever is less. The Appellate Tribunal is also given the discretion for reasons to be recorded in writing to reduce the amount of pre - deposit to not less than 25% of the debt due. It is to by-pass the pre-deposit that the petitioners chose to invoke the jurisdiction of this court.

7. When an efficacious statutory remedy by way of an appeal is provided against Ext.Nos.P1 and P2 orders, the petitioners ought to have invoked the same. Ext.P1 is a well - reasoned order passed by the DRT in I.A.No.3135 of 2025 taking note of Annex.A21 sale notice produced by the petitioners along with the application for amendment. The petitioners have earlier approached the DRT with I.A. No.2460 of 2024 in respect of the same contentions which are raised herein and the same was considered and rejected by the Tribunal by its order dated 18.7.2024.  The  said  order  has  become  final  as  it  was  not challenged before any appellate forum. Therefore, the petitioners cannot raise the same contentions in this I.A. (Ext.P1) or before this court in view of the dismissal of I.A. No.2460 of 2024 as it is hit by the principles of res judicata. As far as Ext.P2 is concerned, the same was also dismissed with reasons.

8. Rule 8 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (the Rules, 2002) deals with sale of immovable secured assets. Sub rule (5) prescribes that before effecting sale of immovable property referred to in sub-rule (1) of rule 9, the authorised officer shall obtain valuation of the property from an approved valuer and in consultation with the secured creditor ,fix the reserve price of the property and may sell in whole or any part of such immovable secured asset. As per Rule 2(d) of the Rules, 2002, ‘approved valuer’ means a person registered as a valuer under section 34 – AB of Wealth Tax Act, 1957 and approved by the Board of Directors or Board of Trustees of the secured creditor, as the case may be. The Bank has strictly followed the Rules and obtained the valuation certificate. Therefore, appointing another Advocate Commissioner and an Approved Valuer, is outside the scope of the SARFAESI Act and Rules. Under the said Act and Rules, the Approved Valuer can only be a person as defined in Rule 2(d) above. Moreover, Ext.P2 was passed on 24.3.2025 and the same is challenged only in this O.P., which is filed on 15.10.2025. Thus, it is quite discernible that the petitioners had not availed the appellate remedy before and therefore, cannot, at present, invoke the jurisdiction of this court.

9. The standing counsel relied on judgments of the hon’ble apex court in Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan and others (2001 KHC 1142) and the Commissioner of Income Tax and others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal (2013 KHC 4619).

10. A perusal of Ext.P1 order would show that the petitioners have sought for a stay of all further proceedings including the confirmation of sale, issuance of sale certificate, and registration of sale certificate pursuant to Annex.A21 (Ext.P13) sale notice. The very fact that the tribunal has relied on Annex.A21 sale notice would show that the contention of the petitioners that Annex.A21 was not looked into as the same was filed along with I.A.No.3135 of 2025, cannot be sustained. The Tribunal has in fact gone in depth and also took note of the fact that the contentions have already been rejected by the Tribunal earlier by its order dated 18.7.2024 in I.A.No.2460 of 2024. An order, which is passed on appreciation of facts, cannot be interfered by this court, by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The jurisdiction of this court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, is not the appellate, but supervisory. It cannot interfere with the finding of the fact recorded by the Tribunal/lower courts unless there is no evidence to support that the finding is perverse.

11. In Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta and another [(1975 (1) SCC 858], the hon’ble apex court has held that the High Court cannot, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, interfere with the finding of the fact recoded by the subordinate court or Tribunal. Its function is limited to see that the subordinate court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and re - appreciating it. It would, therefore, be seen that the High Court cannot, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, interfere with findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or tribunal. The scope and ambit of certiorari jurisdiction must apply equally in relation to exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227. That jurisdiction cannot be exercised as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie in order to bring up an order or decision for rehearing of the issues raised in the proceedings.

12. If an error of fact, even though apparent on the face of the record, cannot be corrected by means of a writ of certiorari it should follow a fortiori that it is not subject to correction by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227. The power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior court can do in exercise of its statutory power as a court of appeal. The High Court cannot in guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the Legislature has not conferred a right of appeal and made the decision of the subordinate court or tribunal final on facts.

13.    In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) LTD. reported in [(2001) 8 SCC 97], the scope and ambit of Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the jurisdiction of this Court has been ex- amined and explained. The relevant paragraph reads as follows:

                  “6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to."

14. The power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can only be used sparingly and in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and Tribunals within the limits of their authority, and not for correcting mere errors. The power can be exercised in cases concerning grave injustice or failure of justice, when the court or Tribunal has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise its jurisdiction which it does have, such failure occasioning a failure of justice, or the jurisdiction though available is exercised in a manner which tantamounts to overstepping the limits of its jurisdiction. As mentioned earlier, Ext.P1 is an order passed on merits touching the factual issues. The said order cannot be brought into any of the three exceptions mentioned above. Ext.P2 also is not perverse warranting interference by this court.

                  Therefore, relying on the precedents mentioned above in respect of the invocation of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, I am not inclined to entertain this O.P. for interference with Ext.Nos.P1 and P2 orders. Accordingly, this O.P. (DRT) fails and it is dismissed. The petitioners are at liberty to challenge the orders before the appellate Tribunal as per the statutory remedy available under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.