(Prayer: This Writ Petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking certain reliefs.)

Oral Order

1. Sri.Siddeswara Swamy S.B., counsel for the petitioner, Additional Government Advocate for respondents Nos.1 to 4, and Sri.K.R.Anand, counsel for respondents Nos.5 and 6, appeared in person.

2. The petition averments are as follows:

          The petitioner was a permanent employee of M/s Prism Johnson Limited, a company registered under the Companies Act. To reduce surplus manpower, the company decided to launch a Voluntary Separation Scheme. After several rounds of discussion with the Union, the company launched the VSS scheme on the fifteenth of January 2021, and the closing date of the scheme was 23.01.2021. The petitioner submitted the application on 23.01.2021, expressing his desire to retire under VSS. On the very same day, the company accepted the application of the petitioner to retire under VSS. On the very same day, the petitioner signed a statement of settlement of legal dues by receiving a sum of Rs.13,17,124/- towards the legal dues, excluding the gratuity. On 23.01.2021, the petitioner submitted Form No.1 for the settlement of gratuity dues receivable from the Gratuity Trust. On 02.02.2021, the company received the gratuity amount of Rs.1,04,94,021/- from HDFC Life Insurance Co. Ltd. in respect of all such workers who opted to retire under VSS. On 24.02.2021, the petitioner acknowledged the receipt of a cheque towards the gratuity of Rs.3,01,362/-. The cheque for Rs.3,01,362/- towards the gratuity dues was credited to the account of the petitioner on 26.02.2021.

3. As matters stood thus, in 2024, the petitioner raised a dispute before the Conciliation Officer, alleging forceful resignation. The company filed detailed objections and contended that the workman had voluntarily opted for VSS and had received the gratuity amount and all legal dues, and there was no force or duress at any point in time. Urging other grounds, the company had prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

4. Taking note of the contentions urged on behalf of the respective parties, the Conciliation Officer submitted a failure report on 01.02.2025 to the Government. The Government, taking note of the entire material evidence on record, issued an endorsement on 04.04.2025 stating that the petitioner raised a dispute after three years and three months from the date of receipt of the full and final settlement under the VSS scheme, and the matter cannot be referred to for adjudication. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is before this court.

5. Counsel for the respective parties urged several contentions.

6. Sri.Siddeswara Swamy S.B., Counsel for the petitioner in presenting his argument strenuously urged that the workman raised the dispute before the Conciliation Officer, alleging that he was forced to sign the VSS scheme, which amounts to termination; when the statement of the workman and the management was in dispute, the Government ought to have considered as an industrial dispute and referring a dispute for adjudication. He argued by saying that there is no provision restricting the period for raising the dispute under the ID Act. The Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its power under the ID Act to pass an order of reference for adjudication. Urging other contentions, he submitted that the endorsement may be quashed and the writ petition may be allowed.

7. By way of reply to this contention, Sri.K.R.Anand and AGA justified the action on the part of the Government. They argued by saying that the stale dispute cannot be a subject matter of reference under Section 10 of I.D. Act. The power under Section 10 of the I.D. Act to refer a dispute for adjudication should not be exercised in respect of stale claims. They submitted that the petitioner was seeking a reference three years after accepting voluntary retirement. Urging other contentions, they prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

8. Heard the arguments and perused the writ papers with utmost care.

9. The facts are sufficiently said and do not require reiteration. The issue revolves within a narrow compass and relates to the refusal to refer the dispute for adjudication.

10. This is an interesting case of a claim raised by a former employee regarding his retirement scheme, long after the cessation of his employment relationship and acceptance of benefits. As we all know that the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, popularly known as VRS, is the process by which the workmen voluntarily end their employment relationship. There will be a Cessation of the Employer-Employee Relationship, i.e., upon the acceptance of the VRS and associated benefits, the legal jural relationship between the employer and employee generally comes to an end. The legal principle of Aprobate and Reprobate generally prevents a person from taking inconsistent positions; one cannot accept benefits under a scheme (VRS) and then later challenge its validity or claim ongoing employee status.

11. Reverting to the facts of the case, the petitioner voluntarily retired and accepted associated benefits. Strangely, after a lapse of almost three years, he raised a dispute alleging a forceful resignation. The government refused to order a reference. In my view, the refusal to refer the dispute is based on germane and relevant considerations. The reference for adjudication cannot be made without satisfying the precondition of an existing or apprehended industrial dispute. In the complete absence of an existing or at least "apprehended" industrial dispute, the government cannot pass an order of reference of a faded dispute for adjudication. The petitioner accepts the benefits of a transaction (VRS package) and then challenges its validity later. By accepting the full settlement, the petitioner is deemed to have waived all previous or pending claims. The underlying legal principle is that while the law of limitation does not strictly apply to these proceedings, the government must still determine if a dispute is a "live" or "existing" dispute, keeping in mind that very stale claims are generally not encouraged or allowed due to the unsettling effect on employers' financial arrangements. The Government can refuse to refer a dispute if it is considered "stale" or has faded due to a long, unexplained lapse of time. The rationale is to avoid unsettling the employer's financial arrangements and ensure industrial peace. A formal way to state that the government cannot refer a claim for adjudication after a significant, unexplained delay is to say the government may not refer a stale dispute or stale claim for adjudication, as the dispute would be considered to have faded with the efflux of time.

12. A workman who opts for voluntary retirement and accepts all monetary benefits generally cannot seek a reference for an industrial dispute related to their retirement. This is because the voluntary retirement constitutes a full and final settlement, severing the employer-employee relationship by mutual consent and waiver of future claims. This is a perfect example of a stale and non-existent dispute and a remarkable instance of a stale and non-existing dispute raised by a workman three years after voluntarily retiring and accepting associated benefits. The government is within its discretion to decline the reference for adjudication.

13. Lastly, counsel for the petitioner submits that the Government, in exercising its power of reference under Section 10 of the Act, lacks the jurisdiction to definitively determine whether the dispute is stale or time-barred at that initial stage. This contention must necessarily fail. The reason is simple. The administrative authority of the government includes the preliminary power to assess whether a matter is a bona fide industrial dispute and has not faded with the efflux of time, thus allowing it to decline reference on grounds of staleness or lack of an existing dispute. In the present case, the government is justified in declining the reference.

14. To conclude, I can say only this much that the petitioner's claim is patently frivolous and does not merit adjudication. The petition is devoid of merit.

15. Resultantly, it is dismissed.