Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The petitioners in W.P.(C)No.19544 of 2025 filed this writ appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the judgment dated 09.10.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in that writ petition.

2. Going by the averments in the writ petition, the 1st appellant, as principal borrower, availed a loan of Rs.5,00,000/- on 24.04.2003 from the 1st respondent bank, which was later enhanced to Rs.20,00,000/-. The appellant's loan fell in arrears by January 2005. As on 10.01.2006, the liability swelled to Rs.28,34,318/-.

                  2.1.    Respondent No.1 bank filed O.A No.31 of 2006 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (the ‘Tribunal’ in short), Ernakulam. Finally, a Recovery certificate dated 11.01.2012 was issued to recover Rs.76,90,252.22/- from the properties scheduled in the OA.

                  2.2.    The Recovery Officer initiated proceedings for sale of the mortgaged property by issuing proclamation of sale on 24.05.2016, and an e-auction sale was conducted on 25.07.2016, wherein the 3rd respondent purchased item No.3 property scheduled in the sale proclamation for Rs. 75.6 lakhs, and the 4th respondent purchased item No.2 property scheduled in the sale proclamation for Rs. 30.2 lakhs.

                  2.3.    According to the appellants, the said auction is non est in the eye of law. The auction is conducted in breach of the requirements under Rule 68B of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act 1961, which has been made applicable to the proceedings under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, (‘the RDDB Act’, for short), by section 29 thereof. Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act mandates that no sale of immovable property shall be made after the expiry of three years from the end of the financial year in which the order giving rise to a demand of dues became conclusive.

                  2.4.    The appellants plead that, since the auction is non est and a nullity, all the subsequent orders and actions on the basis of the auction are also nullities, and it has to be declared so. With these pleadings the appellants filed the writ petition seeking a declaration that Ext.P2 sale proclamation dated 24.05.2016 and the auction conducted under the same as illegal, void and non est and all continuation orders, proceedings and actions sequel to the auction are also void; set aside the Sale Certificated issued to respondents 3 and 4 by the Recovery Officer; and direct the respondents to revers all the revenue records and mutation made in their favour consequent to the auction.

3. The 1st respondent filed a counter affidavit dated 10.06.2025 in the writ petition opposing the reliefs sought by the appellants and producing therewith Exts.R1(a) to R1(r) documents. Similarly, the 3rd respondent also filed a counter affidavit dated 05.08.2025, producing therewith Ext.R3(a) document and opposing the reliefs sought in the writ petition.

4. After hearing both sides and on appreciation of materials on record, by the impugned judgment dated 09.10.2025, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. Being aggrieved, the appellants are now before this Court.

5. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent Bank, the learned Senior counsel for the 3rd respondent and the learned counsel for the 4th respondent.

6. The learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is contrary to the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in C.N.Paramasivam v. Sunrise Plaza [(2013) 9 SCC 460]. By relying on paragraphs 21 and 31 of the said judgment, the learned counsel vehemently argued that Ext.P2 proclamation of sale and the consequent steps are void and non est. According to the learned counsel, the judgments of this Court relied by the learned Single Judge are contrary to the judgment of the Apex Court in C.N.Paramasivam. Similarly, the learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation v. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society, Jaipur [(2013) 5 SCC 427] to argue that Ext.P2 is void proceedings and hence cannot be revalidated in a later stage.

7. The learned counsel for the 1st  respondent Bank addressed extensive arguments pointing out the various steps taken in respect of the loan availed by the appellants, right from 2006. The learned counsel pointed out that in C.N.Paramasivam, the Apex Court did not consider Rule 68B of the second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, and hence the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. The judgments of the Apex Court and also of this Court relied by the learned Single Judge, are once again pointed out by the learned counsel to argue that those decisions are in favour of the 1st respondent.

8. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent would submit that the property was auctioned in the year 2016, and after obtaining possession, the 3rd respondent has invested a substantial amount to improve the property. It was after the finalisation of all proceedings such an investment was made by the 3rd respondent. Now again, the appellants have come up with the writ petition with new grounds, not raised by them in the earlier round of litigation. The learned Senior Counsel pointed out that the present writ petition filed by the appellants-writ petitioners is not maintainable for the reason of:

                  1.       Delay and laches,

                  2.       Principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata.

                  3.       Abandonment of the claim in the previous round of litigations.

                  The learned Senior counsel relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna [2024 KHC 6706] to argue that a piecemeal litigation is barred under the principles of constructive res judicata.

9. The learned counsel for the 4th respondent would submit that the 4th respondent has purchased item No.2 property covered in Ext.P2 sale proclamation. In fact, the said property belongs to the guarantor of the loan, who is not a party in the writ petition. Therefore, there was no challenge raised against the purchase of the property by the 4th respondent by the actual owner of the property. The certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 29 of the RDDB Act, has the effect of a charge decree. The provisions of attachment and charge decree are not contemplated under the IT Act, and therefore, the limitation period stated in C.N.Paramasivam is not applicable to the present case.

10. In order to understand the contentions raised by the parties, it would be appropriate to refer Section 29 of the RDDB Act and Rule 68B of the second schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961. Section 29 of the RDDB Act reads thus:

                  “29. Application of certain provisions of Income- tax Act.—The provisions of the Second and Third Schedules to the Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961) and the Income-tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962, as in force from time to time shall, as far as possible, apply with necessary modifications as if the said provisions and the rules referred to the amount of debt due under this Act instead of to the Income-tax: Provided that any reference under the said provisions and the rules to the “assessee” shall be construed as a reference to the defendant under this Act.”

11. Similarly, Rule 68B of the second schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961, reads thus:

                  “68B.Time limit for sale of attached immovable property -(1) No sale of immovable property shall be made under this Part after the expiry of seven years from the end of the financial year in which the order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum, for the recovery of which the immovable property has been attached, has become conclusive under the provisions of Section 245-I or, as the case may be, final in terms of the provisions of

                  Chapter XX:

                  Provided that the Board may, for reason to be recorded in writing, extend the aforesaid period for a further period not exceeding three years.

                  Provided further that where the immovable property is required to be re-sold due to the amount of highest bid being less than the reserve price or under the circumstances mentioned in rule 57 or rule 58 or where the sale is set aside under rule 61, the aforesaid period of limitation for the sale of the immovable property shall stand extended by one year.

                  (2)      In computing the period of limitation under sub-rule (1), the period—

                  (i)       during which the levy of the aforesaid tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum is stayed by an order or injunction of any court; or

                  (ii)      during which the proceedings of attachment or sale of the immovable property are stayed by an order or injunction of any court; or

                  (iii)     commencing from the date of the presentation of any appeal against the order passed by the Tax Recovery Officer under this Schedule and ending on the day the appeal is decided,

                  shall be excluded :

                  Provided that where immediately after the exclusion of the aforesaid period, the period of limitation for the sale of the immovable property is less than 180 days, such remaining period shall be extended to 180 days and the aforesaid period of limitation shall be deemed to be extended accordingly.

                  (3)      Where any immovable property has been attached under this Part before the 1st day of June, 1992, and the order giving rise to a demand of any tax, interest, fine, penalty or any other sum, for the recovery of which the immovable property has been attached, has also become conclusive or final before the said date, that date shall be deemed to be the date on which the said order has become conclusive or, as the case may be, final.

                  (4)      Where the sale of immovable property is not made in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (1), the attachment order in relation to the said property shall be deemed to have been vacated on the expiry of the time of limitation specified under this rule”.

12.    It is apposite to refer paragraphs 21, 23, 26, 27, 28 and 31 of the judgment of the Apex Court in C.N.Paramasivam, which, according to the appellants, is in their favour and was not properly considered by the learned Single Judge. The aforesaid paragraphs read thus:

                  “21. Applying the above principles to the case at hand Section 29 of the RDDB Act incorporates the provisions of the Rules found in the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act for the purposes of realisation of the dues by the Recovery Officer under the RDDB Act. The expressions "as far as possible" and "with necessary modifications" appearing in Section 29 have been used to take care of situations where certain provisions under the Income Tax Rules may have no application on account of the scheme under the RDDB Act being different from that of the Income Tax Act or the Rules framed thereunder. The provisions of the Rules, it is manifest, from a careful reading of Section 29 are attracted only insofar as the same deal with recovery of debts under the Act with the modification that the "amount of debt" referred to in the Rules is deemed to be one under the RDDB Act. That modification was intended to make the position explicit and to avoid any confusion in the application of the Income Tax Rules to the recovery of debts under the RDDB Act, which confusion could arise from a literal application of the Rules to recoveries under the said Act. Proviso to Section 29 further makes it clear that any reference "to the assessee" under the provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Rules shall be construed as a reference to the defendant under the RDDB Act. It is noteworthy that the Income Tax Rules make provisions that do not strictly deal with recovery of debts under the Act. Such of the Rules cannot possibly apply to recovery of debts under the RDDB Act. For instance Rules 86 and 87 under the Income Tax Act do not have any application to the provisions of the RDDB Act, while Rules 57 and  58 of the said Rules in the Second Schedule deal with the process of recovery of the amount due and present no difficulty in enforcing them for recoveries under the RDDB Act. Suffice it to say that the use of the words "as far as possible" in Section 29 of the RDDB Act simply indicates that the provisions of the Income Tax Rules are applicable except such of them as do not have any role to play in the matter of recovery of debts recoverable under the RDDB Act. The argument that the use of the words "as far as possible" in Section 29 is meant to give discretion to the Recovery Officer to apply the said Rules or not to apply the same in specific fact situations has not impressed us and is accordingly rejected.

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                  23. It follows that while the phrase "as far as possible", may be indicative of a certain inbuilt flexibility, the scope of that flexibility extends only to what is "not at all practicable". In order to show that Rules 57 and 58 of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act may be departed from under the RDDB Act, it would have to be proved that the application of these Rules is "not at all practicable" in the context of the RDDB Act.

                  xxxx   xxxx     xxxx     xxxx

                  26.     It is, therefore, reasonable to hold that the phrase "as far as possible" used in Section 29 of the RDDB Act can at best mean that the Income Tax Rules may not apply where it is not at all possible to apply them having regard to the scheme and the context of the legislation.

                  27.     There is nothing in the provisions of Section 29 of the RDDB Act or the scheme of the Rules under the Income Tax Act to suggest that a discretion wider than what is explained above was meant to be conferred upon the Recovery Officer under Section 29 of the RDDB Act or Rule 57 of the Income Tax Rules which reads as under:

                  "57. Deposit by purchaser and resale in default. (1) On every sale of immovable property, the person declared to be the purchaser shall pay, immediately after such declaration, a deposit of twenty-five per cent on the amount of his purchase money, to the officer conducting the sale, and, in default of such deposit, the property shall forthwith be resold.

                  (2) The full amount of purchase money payable shall be paid by the purchaser to the Tax Recovery Officer on or before the fifteenth day from the date of the sale of the property."

                  It is clear from a plain reading of the above that the provision is mandatory in character. The use of the word "shall" is both textually and contextually indicative of the making of the deposit of the amount being a mandatory requirement.

                  28.     The provisions of Rules 57 and 58 of the Income Tax Rules have their equivalent in Order 21 Rules 84, 85 and 86 CPC which are pari materia in language, sweep and effect and have been held to be mandatory by this Court in Manilal Mohanlal Shah v. Sardar Sayed Ahmed Sayed Mahmad in the following words: (AIR pp. 351-52, paras 8-9 & 11)

                  "8. The provision regarding the deposit of 25 per cent by the purchaser other than the decree- holder is mandatory as the language of the rule suggests. The full amount of the purchase money must be paid within fifteen days from the date of the sale but the decree-holder is entitled to the advantage of a set-off. The provision for payment is, however, mandatory... (Rule 85). If the payment is not made within the period of fifteen days, the court has the discretion to forfeit the deposit, and there the discretion ends but the obligation of the court to resell the property is imperative. A further consequence of non-payment is that the defaulting purchaser forfeits all claim to the property (Rule 86).

                  9. These provisions leave no doubt that unless the deposit and the payment are made as required by the mandatory provisions of the Rules, there is no sale in the eye of the law in favour of the defaulting purchaser and no right to own and possess the property accrues to him.

                  xxx     xxx     xxx     xxx   xxx

                  11. Having examined the language of the relevant Rules and the judicial decisions bearing upon the subject we are of the opinion that the provisions of the Rules requiring the deposit of 25% of the purchase money immediately on the person being declared as a purchaser and the payment of the balance within 15 days of the sale are mandatory and upon non-compliance with these provisions there is no sale at all. The Rules do not contemplate that there can be any sale in favour of a purchaser without depositing 25% of the purchase money in the first instance and the balance within 15 days. When there is no sale within the contemplation of these Rules, there can be no question of material irregularity in the conduct of the sale. Non-payment of the price on the part of the defaulting purchaser renders the sale proceedings as a complete nullity. The very fact that the court is bound to resell the property in the event of a default shows that the previous proceedings for sale are completely wiped out as if they do not exist in the eye of the law. We hold, therefore, that in the circumstances of the present case there was no sale and the purchasers acquired no rights at all.

                  xxxx   xxxx   xxxx   xxxx

                  31. In the light of the above we see no reason to hold that Rules 57 and 58 of the Income Tax Rules are anything but mandatory in nature, so that a breach of the requirements under those Rules will render the auction non est in the eye of the law”.

                  (underline supplied)

13. While going through the judgment in C.N.Paramasivam, we noticed that in that judgment, the Apex Court considered Rules 57 and 58 of the Income Tax Act read with Section 29 of the RDDB Act. The Apex Court did not consider Rule 68B of the second schedule to the Income Tax Act. The question of law considered in C.N.Paramasivam and the principles laid down as extracted above do not pertain to Rule 68B of the second schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961, and hence the principles laid down in C.N.Paramasivam are not at all applicable to the facts of the present case.

14. It is also apposite to refer to some of the judgments of the Apex Court and of this Court pertaining to the recovery proceedings initiated by way of a sale certificate issued by the Tribunal. In C. Bright v. District Collector and Others [(2021) 2 SCC 392], the Apex Court held thus:

                  “21. The Act was enacted to provide a machinery for empowering banks and financial institutions, so that they may have the power to take possession of secured assets and to sell them. The DRT Act was first enacted to streamline the recovery of public dues but the proceedings under the said Act have not given desirous results. Therefore, the Act in question was enacted. This Court in Mardia Chemicals, Transcore and Hindon Forge (P) Ltd. has held that the purpose of the Act pertains to the speedy recovery of dues, by banks and financial institutions. The true intention of the legislature is a determining factor herein. Keeping the objective of the Act in mind, the time-limit to take action by the District Magistrate has been fixed to impress upon the authority to take possession of the secured assets. However, inability to take possession within time-limit does not render the District Magistrate functus officio. The secured creditor has no control over the District Magistrate who is exercising jurisdiction under Section 14 of the Act for public good to facilitate recovery of public dues. Therefore, Section 14 of the Act is not to be interpreted literally without considering the object and purpose of the Act. If any other interpretation is placed upon the language of Section 14, it would be contrary to the purpose of the Act. The time-limit is to instil a confidence in creditors that the District Magistrate will make an attempt to deliver possession as well as to impose a duty on the District Magistrate to make an earnest effort to comply with the mandate of the statute to deliver the possession within 30 days and for reasons to be recorded within 60 days. In this light, the remedy under Section 14 of the Act is not rendered redundant if the District Magistrate is unable to handover the possession. The District Magistrate will still be enjoined upon, the duty to facilitate delivery of possession at the earliest”.

                  [Underline supplied]

15. In Tottempudi Salalith v. State Bank of India and Others [(2024) 1 SCC 24], the Apex Court held thus:

                  “24. What has been filed before NCLT is a composite application based on three recovery certificates, two of which have been instituted within the three-year period as postulated in Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The third recovery certificate was issued in the year 2015. Thus, there is more than three years' gap between the date of issue thereof and the date of filing of the application before NCLT. But a recovery certificate under the 1993 Act is also clothed with the character of a deemed decree. The provisions of Section 19(22- A) of the 1993 Act specifies:

                  "19. Application to the Tribunal.-(1)-(22) * * * (22-A) Any recovery certificate issued by the Presiding Officer under sub-section (22) shall be deemed to be decree or order of the Court for the purposes of initiation of winding-up proceedings against a company registered under the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013) or limited liability partnership registered under the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (6 of 2009) or insolvency proceedings against any individual or partnership firm under any law for the time being in force, as the case may be."

                  25.  Life of a decree is twelve years for enforcement as per Article 136 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.

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                  26. There is authority for the proposition that the time for computing limitation period for filing an application under Section 7 IBC would be guided by Article 137 of the Limitation Act. That is the ratio of this Court in Kotak Mahindra-1. The same authority has also analysed the position of a recovery certificate as a deemed decree. It has been, inter alia, held in this judgment:

                  (SCC pp. 216-17, paras 79-80)

                  "79. From the plain and simple interpretation of the words used in sub-section (22-A) of Section 19 of the Debts Recovery Act, it would be amply clear that the legislature provided that for the purposes of winding-up proceedings against a company, etc. a recovery certificate issued by the Presiding Officer under sub-section (22) of Section 19 of the Debts Recovery Act shall be deemed to be a decree or order of the court. It is thus clear that once a recovery certificate is issued by the Presiding Officer under sub-section (22) of Section 19 of the Debts Recovery Act, in view of sub-section (22-A) of Section 19 of the Debts Recovery Act it will be deemed to be a decree or order of the court for the purposes of initiation of winding-up proceedings of a company, etc. However, there is nothing in sub- section (22-A) of Section 19 of the Debts Recovery Act to imply that the legislature intended to restrict the use of the recovery certificate limited for the purpose of winding-up proceedings. The contention of the respondents, if accepted, would be to provide something which is not there in sub-section (22-A) of Section 19 of the Debts Recovery Act.

                  80. In any case, when the legislature itself has provided that any recovery certificate issued under sub-section (22) of Section 19 of the Debts Recovery Act will be deemed to be a decree or order of the court for initiation of winding-up proceedings, which proceedings are much severe in nature, it will be difficult to accept that the legislature intended that such recovery certificate could not be used for initiation of CIRP, which would enable the corporate debtor to continue as an ongoing concern and, at the same time, pay the dues of the creditors to the maximum,. We, therefore, find not substance in the said submission.

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                  28. The corporate debtor in this proceeding was incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. In Kotak Mahindra-1, credit facilities were extended to the borrower entities in the years 1993-1994. It is obvious that the three corporate entities involved in that case were incorporated under the Companies Act that prevailed prior to coming into operation of the 2013 Act. The position of law to guide the subject proceeding should be the same. In the event a financial creditor wants to pursue a recovery certificate as a deemed decree, he would get twelve years' time. We are of this view as the extent of operation of a recovery certificate has been construed by this Court in Kotak Mahindra-1 to go beyond filing of winding-up petition alone. It would retain the character of a decree to lodge a claim in an IBC proceeding.

                  [Underline supplied]

16. In Raghunath Rai Bareja and Others v. Punjab National Bank and Others [(2007) 2 SCC 230], the Apex Court held thus:

                  “14. In Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank and Anr. (supra) (vide para 23) this Court observed:

                  ...In our opinion, the prescription of an exclusive Tribunal both for adjudication and execution is a procedure clearly inconsistent with realization of these debts in any other manner.

                  Since Section 24 of the RDB Act applies the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, to applications filed before the Tribunal, and since Article 136 of the Limitation Act provides a period of limitation of 12 years for filing an Execution Petition, hence now no such application can be filed since that period of 12 years expired on 15.1.1999. Hence, in our opinion the debt became time barred after 15.1.1999.   (Underline supplied)

17. The High Court of Madras in J.N. Krishnan and Others v. Branch Manager, Canara Bank and Others [Manu/TN/3287/2011:2011(106)AIC 621] held thus:

                  20.     The DRT Act, 1993 is a self-contained Code dealing with all aspects commencing from filing Application to the Tribunal to pass a decree, and ending with the recovery of the amount through Recovery Proceedings. Section 19 deals with the Procedure of the Tribunal. There is nothing like Original proceedings (like Original Suit) and the subsequent Execution Petitions to execute the decree insofar as the DRT Act is concerned. Section 19 contemplates a comprehensive Application for the purpose of deciding the claim and the consequential issue of Recovery Certificate. Section 24 deals with limitation. The said provision shows that the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to an Application made to a Tribunal. The Recovery Officer is an agent of the Tribunal. The function of the Recovery Officer would commence the moment Recovery Certificate is Issued by the DRT under Sub-section (7) of Section 19.

                  21.     It is true that an Appeal would lie to the Tribunal against the orders passed by the Recovery Officer. That does not mean that the Recovery Officer is conducting an independent proceeding, unconnected with the proceedings under the DRT Act. The Recovery Officer is a creature of the Statute and he would get jurisdiction only on issuance of a Recovery Certificate by the Tribunal.

                  22.     The DRT does not contain any provision regarding limitation in the matter of sale of attached property. The provisions of Second and Third Schedule to the Income Tax Act and the Income Tax Certificate Proceeding, 1963, were made applicable to the Recovery proceeding under DRT Act only for the purpose of a fair and transparent procedure to be adopted by the Recovery Officer in the matter of Recovery of the Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions. In case the Recovery Officer is given a free hand without any kind of established procedure governing the Recovery proceedings, it would result in arbitrariness. It was only to regulate the proceedings the relevant Recovery Rules under the Income Tax Act were made applicable to a Recovery proceeding under the DRT Act. The various other provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Recovery Rules cannot be imported to nullify the action taken by the Recovery Officer. Therefore, we are of the view that Rule 68B dealing with time limit for sale of immovable property after the expiry of three years from the end of the financial year in which the order giving rise to a demand for recovery of which, the property has been attached by the Recovery Officer has no application to an attachment made by the Recovery Officer under Section 25 of the DRT Act. Accordingly, we reject the principal contention regarding the alleged violation of Rule 68B.

                  The Second Issue:

                  23.     The second contention relates to the initiation of Recovery proceedings and proclamation of sale after a period of eight years from the date of decree passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal.

                  24.     The decree was made on 29th October 2001. It is a matter of record that the Recovery Officer passed an order of attachment on 2nd December 2002. The proclamation of sale was made on 23rd December 2009. There are no provisions either under the DRT Act or under Second and Third Schedule to the Income Tax Act prohibiting sale of property to realise the debts due to the Banks or Financial Institutions after a particular period. Even as per the Code of Civil Procedure, Decree could be executed within a period of twelve years. The proclamation of sale was issued within eight years from the date of decree and as such, the proclamation of sale was well within time.”(Underline supplied)

18. While going through the aforesaid judgments, it is clear that, as held by the learned Single Judge, Section 29 of the RDDB Act adopts the procedural framework of the second and third schedules only to the extent they align with the object of expeditious recovery under the RDDB Act. The time limit of three years, which was later extended to four years and further to 7 years, is merely directory and not mandatory, since Rule 68B imposes a duty upon the Recovery Officer but confers no corresponding right upon the debtor, nor prescribes any consequence for delay. The limitation applicable to the recovery proceedings under Section 19 of the RDDB Act would, therefore, be governed by Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

19. In the present case, the dispute pertaining to the default committed by the appellants arose as early as in the year 2006. The 1st respondent Bank approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal (the ‘Tribunal’ for short), Ernakulam, with a petition under Section 19 of the RDDB Act, by filing Ext.R1(a) original application bearing No.31 of 2006 for a recovery certificate contending that a total outstanding sum of Rs.32,98,807/- was due as on the date of filing of that original application from the part of the appellants and other co-borrowers towards one overdraft credit loan, one agricultural medium terms loan and another loan under the Federal Bank Kisan Card Scheme availed for a total sum of Rs.23,60,000/-. The original application was later referred to the Lok Adalath, and Ext.R1(b) award dated 20.02.2010 was passed in the Lok Adalath. Thereafter, since the appellants and other co-borrowers committed default, the bank initiated securitisation proceedings as per Ext.P1 notice issued by the Recovery Officer. Pursuant to the recovery certificate, Ext.R1(c) demand notice dated 12.03.2012 was issued by the Recovery Officer of the Bank to the appellants and other co- borrowers. Since the amount was not paid, a notice for settling the sale proclamation was issued by the Recovery Officer as per Ext.R1(d) dated 09.03.2015. Meanwhile, the property belonging to the appellants was attached by the Recovery Officer as per Ext.R1(e) attachment order dated 02.02.2015. Thereafter, Ext.P2 sale proclamation dated 24.05.2016 was issued by the Recovery Officer. Against the securitisation proceedings, the father of the appellants had filed S.A.No.520 of 2012 before the Tribunal, Ernakulam. Similarly, the appellants challenged the sale notice by filing Appeal No.5 of 2016 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam. By Ext.R1(i) order dated 31.07.2018, the Tribunal dismissed appeal No.5 of 2016. Against that, the appellants approached this Court by filing W.P.(C)No.26972 of 2018 and the same was disposed of by virtue of Ext.R1(j) judgment dated 19.11.2018, holding that the appellants can avail the remedy before the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (‘DRAT’ for short), Chennai. The appellants then approached the DRAT, Chennai, and the same was ended in dismissal. Meanwhile, they have also filed W.P.(C)No.40389 of 2018 before this Court. In Ext.R1(k) judgment dated 03.01.2019, this Court disposed of the writ petition with certain observations. It was thereafter, the DRAT dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants as per Ext.R1(l) order dated 12.05.2022. Ext.R1(l) order of the DRAT was challenged by the appellants before this Court in W.P.(C)No.16681 of 2022, and the same was dismissed by Ext.R1(m) judgment dated 25.07.2024. Against the Ext.R1(m) judgment, the appellants filed a writ appeal No.1352 of 2024 and the same was also dismissed as per Ext.R1(n) judgment dated 08.10.2024. Thereafter, the appellants approached this Court with this writ appeal.

20. From the materials placed on record, we notice that the appellants have challenged the recovery proceedings initiated by the bank right from the year 2006. As discussed above, there were several rounds of litigation between them and the Bank, before the Tribunal, DRAT, Single Bench of this Court and also before the Division Bench of this Court, as evident from Ext.R1(g), Ext.R1(h), Ext.R1(i), Ext.R1(j), Ext.R1(k), Ext.R1(l), Ext.R1(m) and also Ext.R1(n) documents produced along with the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent in the writ petition. But surprisingly, in none of the earlier proceedings, the appellants challenged Ext.P2 sale proclamation on the ground of delay, by taking the contentions now raised by them in the writ petition.

21. While coming to the contention of the appellants regarding the nullity of Ext.P2 sale proclamation, it is also relevant to note that, as stated above, the appellants have not raised the claim of nullity of Ext.P2 sale proclamation in the previous rounds of litigation. The appellants relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in Subhash Sindhi [(2013) 5 SCC 427, wherein at paragraphs 17 and 18, the Apex Court held thus:

                  “17. The word "void" has been defined as: ineffectual; nugatory; having no legal force or legal effect; unable in law to support the purpose for which it was intended. (Vide Black's Law Dictionary.) It also means merely a nullity; invalid; null; worthless; cipher; useless and ineffectual and may be ignored even in collateral proceeding as if it never were.

                  18. The word "void" is used in the sense of incapable of ratification. A thing which is found non est and not required to be set aside, though it is sometimes convenient to do so. There would be no need for an order to quash it. It would be automatically null and void without more ado. The continuation orders would be nullities too, because no one can continue a nullity. (Vide Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay, Pankaj Mehra v. State of Maharashtra, Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University and Govt. of Orissa v. Ashok Transport Agency)”

                  (Underline supplied)

22. But, to attract the principles laid down in the aforementioned paragraphs of Subhash Sindhi, it has to be proved that Ext.P2 sale proclamation issued by the Recovery Officer is void. But from the discussions made above, such a conclusion cannot be arrived at in the instant case. Therefore, the judgment in Subhash Sindhi is not applicable to the facts of the present case.

23. As far as the principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata are concerned, the Apex Court in paragraph 135 of the judgment in Celir LLP [2024 KHC 6706] held thus:

                  “135.  b. The 'Henderson' Principle as a corollary of Constructive Res - Judicata.

                  The 'Henderson Principle' is a foundational doctrine in common law that addresses the issue of multiplicity in litigation. It embodies the broader concept of procedural fairness, abuse of process and judicial efficiency by mandating that all claims and issues that could and ought to have been raised in a previous litigation should not be relitigated in subsequent proceedings. The extended form of res - judicata more popularly known as 'Constructive Res Judicata' contained in S.11, Explanation VII of the CPC originates from this principle.

                  136.    In Henderson v. Henderson reported in 1843 (3) Hare 999, the English Court of Chancery speaking through Sir James Wigram, V. C. held that where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation and the adjudication of a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties so litigating are required to bring forward their whole case. Once the litigation has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the same parties will not be permitted to reopen the lis in respect of issues which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest but were not, irrespective of whether the same was due to any form of negligence, inadvertence, accident or omission. It was further held, that principle of res judicata applies not only to points upon which the Court was called upon by the parties to adjudicate and pronounce a judgement but to every possible or probable point or issue that properly belonged to the subject of litigation and the parties ought to have brought forward at the time. The relevant observations read as under: -

                  "In trying this question I believe I state the rule of the Court correctly when I say that, where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and of adjudication by, a Court of competent jurisdiction, the Court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have, from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the Court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time. xxxx    xxxx  xxxx

                  137.    The above proposition of law came to be known as the 'Henderson Principle' and underwent significant evolution, adapting to changing judicial landscapes and procedural requirements. The House of Lords in Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co reported in 2002 (2) AC 1,upon examining         the 'Henderson Principle' authoritatively approved it with thefollowing observations: -                                         (i)       Lord Bingham of Cornhill integrated the principle with the broader doctrine of abuse of process and held that the bringing of a claim or the raising of a defence in later proceedings which ought to have been raised earlier will not always be hit by this principle, but rather will apply where such point is sought to be raised as an additional or collateral attack on a previous decision and the bringing forth of such ground amounts to misusing or abusing the process of the court or as a means for unjust harassment of a party. The relevant observations read as under: -

                  "Henderson v Henderson abuse of process, as now understood, although separate and distinct from cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel, has much in common with them. The underlying public interest is the same: that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter. This public interest is reinforced by the current emphasis on efficiency and economy in the conduct of litigation, in the interests of the parties and the public as a whole. The bringing of a claim or the raising of a defence in later proceedings may, without more, amount to abuse if the court is satisfied (the onus being on the party alleging abuse) that the claim or defence should have been raised in the earlier proceedings if it was to be raised at all. I would not accept that it is necessary, before abuse may be found, to identify any additional element such as a collateral attack on a previous decision or some dishonesty, but where those elements are present the later proceedings will be much more obviously abusive, and there will rarely be a finding of abuse unless the later proceeding involves what the court regards as unjust harassment of a party. It is, however, wrong to hold that because a matter could have been raised in earlier proceedings it should have been, so as to render the raising of it in later proceedings necessarily abusive. That is to adopt too dogmatic an approach to what should in my opinion be a broad, merits - based judgment which takes account of the public and private interests involved and also takes account of all the facts of the case, focusing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it the issue which could have been raised before. As one cannot comprehensively list all possible forms of abuse, so one cannot formulate any hard and fast rule to determine whether, on given facts, abuse is to be found or not [...]"

                  (ii)      Lord Millett construing the Principle held that it does not belong to the doctrine of res - judicata in the strict sense but rather was analogous to the doctrine, as it goes a step further to encompass even those proceedings that either culminated into a settlement or issues which had never been adjudicated previously in order to protect the process of the court from abuse and the defendant from oppression. The relevant observations read as under:

                  "As the passages which I have emphasised indicate, Sir James Wigram V - C did not consider that he was laying down a new principle, but rather that he was explaining the true extent of the existing plea of res judicata. Thus he was careful to limit what he was saying to cases which had proceeded to judgment, and not, as in the present case, to an out of court settlement. Later decisions have doubted the correctness of treating the principle as an application of the doctrine of res judicata, while describing it as an extension of the doctrine or analogous to it ... But these various defences [res judicata, issue or cause of action estoppel] are all designed to serve the same purpose : to bring finality to litigation and avoid the oppression of subjecting a defendant unnecessarily to successive actions. While the exact relationship between the principle expounded by Sir James Wigram V - C and the defences of res judicata and cause of action and issue estoppel may be obscure, I am inclined to regard it as primarily an ancillary and salutary principle necessary to protect the integrity of those defences and prevent them from being deliberately or inadvertently circumvented.

                  In one respect, however, the principle goes further than the strict doctrine of res judicata or the formulation adopted by Sir James Wigram V- C, for I agree that it is capable of applying even where the first action concluded in a settlement. Here it is necessary to protect the integrity of the settlement and to prevent the defendant from being misled into believing that he was achieving a complete settlement of the matter in dispute when an unsuspected part remained outstanding.

                  However this may be, the difference to which I have drawn attention is of critical importance. It is one thing to refuse to allow a party to relitigate a question which has already been decided; it is quite another to deny him the opportunity of litigating for the first time a question which has not previously been adjudicated upon. This latter (though not the former) is prima facie a denial of the citizen's right of access to the court conferred by the common law and guaranteed by Art.6 ... While, therefore, the doctrine of res judicata in all its branches may properly be regarded as a rule of substantive law, applicable in all save exceptional circumstances, the doctrine now under consideration can be no more than a procedural rule based on the need to protect the process of the court from abuse and the defendant from oppression [...]"

                  xxxx   xxxx     xxxx     xxxx

                  144. From the above exposition of law, it is clear that the 'Henderson Principle' is a core component of the broader doctrine of abuse of process, aimed at enthusing in the parties a sense of sanctity towards judicial adjudications and determinations. It ensures that litigants are not subjected to repetitive and vexatious legal challenges. At its core, the principle stipulates that all claims and issues that could and should have been raised in an earlier proceeding are barred from being raised in subsequent litigation, except in exceptional circumstances. This rule not only supports the finality of judgments but also underscores the ideals of judicial propriety and fairness.

                  (Underline supplied)

24. It is also relevant to note that in Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule [(2004) 8 SCC 706], the Apex Court held thus:

                  “14. Suffice it to say that recently a Bench of two Judges of this Court has considered the distinction between null and void decree and illegal decree in Rafique Bibi v. Sayed Waliuddin. One of us (R.C.Lahoti, J., as his lordship then was), quoting with approval the law laid down in Vasudev Dhanjibhai Medi stated: (SCC pp. 291-92, paras 6-8)

                  6. What is 'void has to be clearly understood. A decree can be said to be without jurisdiction, and hence a nullity, if the court passing the decree has usurped a jurisdiction which it did not have; a mere wrong exercise of jurisdiction does not result in a nullity. The lack of jurisdiction in the court passing the decree must be patent on its face in order to enable the executing court to take cognisance of such a nullity based on want of jurisdiction, else the normal rule that an executing court cannot go behind the decree must prevail.

                  7. Two things must be clearly borne in mind. Firstly, 'the court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be "a nullity" and "void" but these terms have no absolute sense: their meaning is relative, depending upon the court's willingness to grant relief in any particular situation. If this principle of illegal relativity is borne in mind, the law can be made to operate justly and reasonably in cases where the doctrine of ultra vires, rigidly applied, would produce unacceptable results. (Administrative Law, Wade and Forsyth, 8th Edn., 2000, p. 308.) Secondly, there is a distinction between mere administrative orders and the decrees of courts, especially a superior court. 'The order of a superior court such as the High Court, must always be obeyed no matter what flaws it may be thought to contain. Thus a party who disobeys a High Court injunction is punishable for contempt of court even though it was granted in proceedings deemed to have been irrevocably abandoned owing to the expiry of a time-limit.' (ibid., p. 312)

                  8. A distinction exists between a decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction and consequently being a nullity and not executable and a decree of the court which is merely illegal or not passed in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. A decree suffering from illegality or irregularity of procedure, cannot be termed inexecutable by the executing court; the remedy of a person aggrieved by such a decree is to have it set aside in a duly constituted legal proceedings or by a superior court failing which he must obey the command of the decree. A decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be denuded of its efficacy by any collateral attack or in incidental proceedings."

                  xxxx    xxxx  xxxx   xxxx

                  17. In Ittavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey this Court stated: (SCR pp. 502-03)

                  If the suit was barred by time and yet, the court decreed it, the court would be committing an illegality and therefore the aggrieved party would be entitled to have the decree set aside by preferring an appeal against it. But it is well settled that a court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide right may decide wrong; and that even though it decided wrong it would not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. …..If the party aggrieved does not take appropriate steps to have that error corrected, the erroneous decree will hold good and will not be open to challenge on the basis of being a nullity."         (Underline supplied)

25. Again, in Rafique Bibi v. Sayed Waliuddin [(2004) 1 SCC 287], the Apex Court held thus:

                  “6.What is 'void' has to be clearly understood. A decree can be said to be without jurisdiction, and hence a nullity, if the Court passing the decree has usurped a jurisdiction which it did not have; a mere wrong exercise of jurisdiction does not result in nullity. The lack of jurisdiction in the Court passing the decree must be patent on its face in order to enable the executing Court to take cognizance of such nullity based on want of jurisdiction; else the normal rule that an executing Court cannot go behind the decree must prevail.

                  7. Two things must be clearly borne in mind. Firstly, the Court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be 'a nullity' and 'void' but these terms have no absolute sense; their meaning is relative, depending upon the Court's willingness to grant relief in any particular situation. If this principle of illegal relativity is borne in mind, the law can be made to operate justly and reasonably in cases where the doctrine of ultra vires, rigidly applied, would produce unacceptable results. (Administrative Law, 8th Edition, 2000, Wade and Forsyth, p. 308). Secondly, there is a distinction between mere administrative order and the decrees of Courts, especially a superior Court. The order of a superior Court such as the High Court, must always be obeyed no matter what flaws it may be thought to contain. Thus a party who disobeys a High Court injunction is punishable for contempt of Court even though it was granted in proceedings deemed to have been irrevocably abandoned owing to the expiry of a time limit. (Ibid, p. 312)

                  8. A distinction exists between a decree passed by a Court having no jurisdiction and consequently being a nullity and not executable and a decree of the Court which is merely illegal or not passed in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. A decree suffering from illegality or irregularity of procedure, cannot be termed inexecutable by the executing Court; the remedy of a person aggrieved by such a decree is to have it set aside in a duly constituted legal proceedings or by a superior Court failing which he must obey the command of the decree. A decree passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be denuded of its efficacy by any callateral attack or in incidental proceedings”.

                  (Underline supplied)

26. The appellants who raised the contention that Ext.P2 is void in the present writ petition did not raise that contention in the previous rounds of litigation. Therefore, they are barred by the principles of constructive res judicata, i.e., might and ought principles, from raising the said contention in the present writ petition. Moreover, as discussed above, even otherwise Ext.P2 cannot be said as void since the time limit mentioned in Rule 68B of the second schedule to the Income Tax Act is not applicable to the sale certificate issued under Section 29 of the RDDB Act.

27. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar, in the light of the judgments referred to supra, we find no ground to hold that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge is perverse or illegal, which warrants interference of this Court by exercising appellate jurisdiction.

                  In the result, the writ appeal stands dismissed.