Anil K. Narendran, J.

1. The appellants are the petitioners in W.P.(C)No.24267 of 2025, a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P3 application dated 10.10.2024, i.e., M.C.No.1167 of 2024 filed by the Kerala State Co-operative Bank Ltd., invoking the provisions under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act), before the Special Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Court (MPs/MLAs), Ernakulam and Ext.P4 order dated 20.12.2024 passed by the said court in that application; a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to extend the benefit of Navakeraleeyam One Time Settlement Debts Relief Scheme of the Government of Kerala and to allow the petitioners to pay off the outstanding dues in convenient instalments; a writ of mandamus commanding the respondent Bank to permit the petitioner to pay the overdue amount in convenient instalments and drop the recovery proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act. The interim relief sought for in the writ petition is stay of all further proceedings pursuant to Ext.P3 application dated 10.10.2024, till the disposal of the writ petition. The proceedings under the SARFAESI Act are in respect of a loan availed by the petitioners from Vazhakkulam Branch of the Kerala State Co- operative Bank. On account of the default committed in repayment of the monthly installments, coercive steps were initiated against the property having an extent of 4.05 Ares comprised in Sy.No.358/7/1/2 of Muvattupuzha Village, in the name of the 3rd petitioner.

2. On 08.07.2025, when the writ petition came up for admission, the learned Single Judge issued notice before admission and passed the following order;

                  “Notice before admission. Issue notice by speed post to the 1st respondent. The learned Standing Counsel takes notice for the 1st respondent. The learned Government Pleader takes notice for the 2nd respondent. The 1st respondent is directed to file a statement. To consider the prayers sought in the writ petition seeking instalment facility and to defer further coercive steps against the petitioner, as an interim measure, there will be a direction to the petitioner to remit an amount of Rs.10 lakhs (Rupees ten lakhs only) within one month. It is made clear that if the above payment is not made, the respondents will be at liberty to proceed further, in accordance with law.”

3. On 11.08.2025, when the writ petition came up for consideration, it was pointed out that the petitioner has not complied with the condition stipulated in the order dated 08.07.2025. The learned Single Judge, by the judgment dated 11.08.2025, dismissed the writ petition, without prejudice to the right of the petitioners to challenge the measures taken by the secured creditor, as provided under the SARFAESI Act. Paragraphs 3 to 5 of that judgment read thus;

                  “3. It is not disputed before me that the above order has not been complied with by the petitioner.

                  4. This Court exercises very limited jurisdiction in matters arising under the SARFAESI Act, as repeatedly held by the Honourable Supreme Court in several judgments, including in South Indian Bank Ltd. and others v. Naveen Mathew Philip and others [(2023) 17 SCC 311] that the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are rather wide but are required to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances in matters pertaining to proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so in commercial matters involving a lender and a borrower, when the legislature has provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal. When this Court is approached with a prayer to permit the borrowers to clear the liability in instalments, the borrowers must prove bona fides. The non-compliance of the interim order indicates that the petitioners in this case have not shown any bona fides to enable this Court to permit them to clear the liability in instalments.

                  5. Therefore, I find no reason to grant the reliefs sought for in this writ petition, and the same will stand dismissed without prejudice to the right of the petitioners to challenge the measures taken by the secured creditor as provided under the SARFAESI Act, if so advised.”

4. Challenging the judgment dated 11.08.2025 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.24267 of 2025, the appellants-petitioners are before this Court in this writ appeal, invoking the provisions under Section 5(i) of Kerala High Court Act, 1958.

5. The main relief sought for in this writ petition is a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P3 petition dated 10.10.2024, i.e., M.C.No.1167 of 2024 filed by the Kerala State Co-operative Bank Ltd., invoking the provisions under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, before the Special Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Court (MPs/MLAs), Ernakulam and Ext.P4 order dated 20.12.2024 passed by the said Court in that application.

6. In South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], in the context of the challenge made against the notices issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, the Apex Court reiterated the settled position of law on the interference of the High Court invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India in commercial matters, where an effective and efficacious alternative forum has been constituted through a statute. In the said decision, the Apex Court took judicial notice of the fact that certain High Courts continue to interfere in such matters, leading to a regular supply of cases before the Apex Court. The Apex Court reiterated that a writ of certiorari is to be issued over a decision when the court finds that the process does not conform to the law or the statute. In other words, courts are not expected to substitute themselves with the decision-making authority while finding fault with the process along with the reasons assigned. Such a writ is not expected to be issued to remedy all violations. When a Tribunal is constituted, it is expected to go into the issues of fact and law, including a statutory violation. A question as to whether such a violation would be over a mandatory prescription as against a discretionary one is primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. The issues governing waiver, acquiescence and estoppel are also primarily within the domain of the Tribunal. The object and reasons behind the SARFAESI Act are very clear as observed in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India [(2004) 4 SCC 311]. While it facilitates a faster and smoother mode of recovery sans any interference from the court, it does provide a fair mechanism in the form of the Tribunal being manned by a legally trained mind. The Tribunal is clothed with a wide range of powers to set aside an illegal order, and thereafter, grant consequential reliefs, including repossession and payment of compensation and costs. Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act gives an expansive meaning to the expression ‘any person’, who could approach the Tribunal.

7. In Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], the Apex Court noticed that, in matters under the SARFAESI Act, approaching the High Court for the consideration of an offer by the borrower is also frowned upon by the Apex Court. A writ of mandamus is a prerogative writ. The court cannot exercise the said  power  in  the  absence  of  any  legal  right.  More circumspection is required in a financial transaction, particularly when one of the parties would not come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent that mode shall not be encouraged by a writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the non- compliance of approaching the Tribunal, which requires the prescription of fees, and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative. In paragraph 17 of the decision, the Apex Court reiterated the position of law regarding the interference of the High Courts in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act by quoting its earlier decisions in Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas [(2003) 10 SCC 733], United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir [(2022) 5 SCC 345] and Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu [(2023) 2 SCC 168] wherein the said practice has been deprecated while requesting the High Courts not to entertain such cases. In paragraph 18 of the said decision, the Apex Court observed that the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are rather wide, but are required to be exercised only  in  extraordinary  circumstances  in  matters pertaining to proceedings and adjudicatory scheme qua a statute, more so in commercial matters involving a lender and a borrower, when the legislature has provided for a specific mechanism for appropriate redressal.

8. Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act deals with the powers of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate to assist a secured creditor in taking possession of a secured asset.

9. In Indian Bank v. D. Visalakshi [(2019) 20 SCC 47], a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court considered the question as to whether ‘the Chief Judicial Magistrate’ is competent to deal with the request of the secured creditor to take possession of the secured asset under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act as can be done by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in metropolitan areas and the District Magistrate in non-metropolitan areas. The Apex Court noted that the Chief Judicial Magistrate is equated with the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for the purposes referred to in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and those expressions are used interchangeably, being synonymous with each other. Approving the view taken by this Court in Muhammed Ashraf v. Union of India [2008 (3) KHC 935] and Radhakrishnan V.N. v. State of Kerala [2008 (4) KHC 989], by the Karnataka High Court in Kaveri Marketing v. Saraswathi Cooperative Bank Ltd. [2013 SCC OnLine Kar 18], by the Allahabad High Court in Abhishek Mishra v. State of U.P. [AIR 2016 All 210] and by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in T.R. Jewellery v. State Bank of India [AIR 2016 Hyd 125], the Apex Court held that the Chief Judicial Magistrate is equally competent to deal with the application moved by the secured creditor under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act.

10. In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that if the 1st respondent guarantor had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act or the action taken under Section 14, then he could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1) before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The expression ‘any

person’ used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved        personunder  the SARFAESIAct are          both expeditious and effective.

11. In Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], on the facts of the case at hand, the Apex Court noted that the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. While dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves, inasmuch as, they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.

12. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Satyawati Tondon [(2010) 8 SCC 110] and reiterated in Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], if the appellants-petitioners have any grievance against the proceedings initiated by the secured creditor under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, they have to avail the statutory remedy by filing an application under Section 17 of the said Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.

                  In the above circumstances, we find absolutely no grounds to interfere with the judgment dated 11.08.2025 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.24267 of 2025. This writ appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed.