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CDJ 2025 MHC 7150 print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Judicature at Madras
Case No : CRP. No. 2559 of 2025
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B. BALAJI
Parties : Bay Resorts Limited, Represented by its Chairman A. Sakthivel, Chennai Versus Nenmeli Arulmigu Alavandar Naicker Charity, Mahabalipuram, Represented by its Executive Officer, Chengalpattu District
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: P.V. Balasubramaniam, Senior Counsel, V. Ramamurthy, Advocate. For the Respondent: V. Srikanth, Advocate.
Date of Judgment : 12-12-2025
Head Note :-
Civil Procedure Code - Section 115 -
Judgment :-

(Prayer: Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 115 of CPC, to set aside the fair and decreetal order dated 19.03.2025 made in I.A.No.17 of 2024 in O.S.No.137 of 2001 on the file of the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate, Thiruporur.)

1. The 1 st defendant, whose application to condone the delay of 4892 days in filing the application to set aside the ex-parte decree was dismissed, is the revision petitioner.

2. I have heard Mr.P.V.Balasubramaniam, learned Senior Counsel for Mr.V.Ramamurthy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr.V.Srikanth, learned counsel for the respondent.

3. Mr.P.V.Balasubramaniam, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that though the delay is 4892 days, the trial Court mechanically rejected the application without appreciating the reasons given by the petitioner to explain the delay. He would also state that the judgment passed by the trial Court is a non-speaking order and in clear violation of mandate of Section 2(9) r/w Order XX Rule 4(2) of CPC and on this ground alone, learned Senior Counsel contends that decree would have to go, being a nullity, as held by Courts repeatedly and in such circumstances, the petitioner would have to be given an opportunity to test the suit claim on merits.

4. The learned Senior Counsel would also state that one of the Executive Directors of the petitioner, by name Vetrivel was attending the proceedings on behalf of the petitioner and there was no occasion for the other Directors to approach the Court, who, in fact, subsequent to being aware of the suit proceedings initially filed the application and in such circumstances, the delay having been explained, the trial Court should have proceeded to condone the delay. He would also submit that there has been yet another suit filed before this Court in C.S.No.920 of 2003 by the revision petitioner, where the respondent/plaintiff herein is the 6 th defendant. The suit has been filed for permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property at the hands of the revision petitioner and this Court, by order dated 12.12.2003, had also granted an interim injunction, restraining the defendants therein, including the respondent herein from trespassing or interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property.

5. The learned Senior Counsel would further state that till date, the said interim order remains in force and the suit is also pending and in such circumstances, the learned Senior Counsel prays for the revision being allowed.

6. Per contra, Mr.V.Srikanth, learned counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that the delay is more than 13 years and the revision petitioner is a private limited Company and the reasons assigned for explaining the inordinate delay of 4892 days, throwing the blame on the former Director, can never be an acceptable cause, much less sufficient cause, to condone the huge delay. He would further submit that even in the suit filed in the year 1994 in O.S.No.107 of 1994, the respondent had the benefit of an interim order, till the suit came to be decreed and in such circumstances, the petitioner cannot now contend that subsequently they had filed a suit before this Court, which is pending in C.S.No.920 of 2003 and since there was an interim order in the said suit, the petitioner should be given an opportunity to contest the suit on merits.

7. The learned counsel for the respondent also relies on the recent pronouncement of this Court in R.Rasappan Vs. D.Rajalakshmi, reported in 2025 SCC Online Mad 4068, besides also the order in I.A.No.656 of 2001 in O.S.No.137 of 2001, where the interim injunction application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 r/w Section 151 of CPC came to be allowed on contest and the same was also become final, with no appeal or revision therefrom and till such time, the suit itself was subsequently decreed in favour of the respondent. He would therefore pray for the dismissal of the revision petition.

8. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent. I have also gone through the records, including the order impugned in the present revision petition.

9. The revision petitioner has been arrayed as the 1 st defendant in O.S.No.137 of 2001. The suit has been filed for the relief of permanent injunction. According to the petitioner, one of the Directors, by name, Vetrivel suffered cardiac problem in the year 1995 and then on, he was unable to follow the Court proceedings, which resulted in the ex-parte decree being passed and the petitioner came to know of the ex-parte decree only when he approached the counsel in the lower Court, after the Division Bench of this Court dismissed the impleading application in CMP.No.6412 of 2023 in A.S.No.505 of 2011.

10. It is further contended on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner has been effectively defending the title in various Courts and therefore, the delay is neither willful nor wanton. However, the application has been resisted by the respondent/plaintiff, stating that all along it was only one, A.Sakthivel, who has been representing the Company in various proceedings and for the purposes of explaining the inordinate delay and getting over the lapses on the part of the petitioner, an attempt is being made to throw the blame on a former Director, by name, Vetrivel and therefore, the respondent prayed for dismissal of the Section 5 application, as the petitioner was not diligent in prosecuting the case at any point of time.

11. The trial Court, finding that the only reason assigned was that the former Director, by name, Vetrivel had suffered cardiac problem and therefore, the application could not be filed in time, held that even the said self serving claim had not been established by production of relevant acceptable documents and proceeded to dismiss the application for condonation of delay. It appears that there are two parallel and conflicting orders, one passed in O.S.No.137 of 2001, granting an interim injunction in favour of the respondent even as early as on 30.12.2002. The revision petitioner was very much aware of the said injunction granted in I.A.No.656 of 2001 in O.S.No.137 of 2001, as the order was passed after detailed enquiry and contest. However, without even disclosing the fact that the petitioner has suffered an interim order in O.S.No.137 of 2001, the petitioner has filed C.S.No.920 of 2003 and obtained an interim injunction, as if the petitioner is in possession of the suit property. The petitioner has not come clean in disclosing material facts and circumstances before this Court when C.S.No.920 of 2003 was filed and an interim injunction was also obtained in their favour.

12. Be that as it may, now I am concerned only with the delay in approaching the Court to set aside the ex-parte decree. The delay is 4892 days. No doubt, the length of delay is immaterial, as long as the applicant is able to show sufficient cause for the entire period of delay. The fact that the judgment came to be passed, violating the mandate of Section 2(9) and Order XX Rule 4(2) of CPC cannot be a ground in an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay.

13. This Court, in R.Rasappan's case, cited supra, has elaborately discussed various case law on the subject and ultimately held that the ground of violation of mandate of Order XX Rule 4 of CPC can only be available to the defendant, in an application under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC or in appeal and not in an application for condonation of delay or even in a revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the light of the above, I do not deem it necessary to even go into the nature of the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in the present case.

14. With regard to the delay, as rightly pointed by the learned counsel for the respondent, the petitioner is a limited Company and it is not proper on the part of the Company to contend that they were dependent on one Director alone and since he did not follow up the case because of his personal medical problems, the ex-parte decree came to be passed, which was also not never brought to the notice of the Company.

15. It is also seen from the discussion earlier that one Mr.Sakthivel has consistently represented the petitioner Company in various legal proceedings and in such circumstances, the excuse attempted to be given by the revision petitioner is clearly unacceptable that one Vetrivel was in charge of the legal matters.

16. As rightly pointed out by the trial Court, the petitioner has not been able to substantiate the delay and the delay is also more than 13 years and clearly inordinate. The decree has been passed way back in the year 2010 itself and rightly, the trial Court has exercise discretion not to condone the delay. I do not find that the said order requires interference in this revision.

17. In fine, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

 
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