Muralee Krishna, J.

1. The respondents in O.P.(DRT)No.293 of 2025 filed this writ appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the judgment dated 04.11.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in that original petition, in so far as it prevents the Bank from proceeding with the measures under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’ in short).

2. Going by the averments in the original petition and in this writ appeal, the respondents are three Cashew Exporting Firms, who had defaulted various loans availed from the appellants, entered into a One Time Settlement (‘OTS’ in short) with the 1st appellant Bank for Rs.55 Crores, documented through a joint compromise petition filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Ernakulam (the ‘Tribunal’ in short), with a final payment deadline of 31.03.2025. After failing to meet this deadline, the respondents requested an extension, to which the Bank responded on 16.05.2025, by asking for a detailed property status, a payment schedule and an upfront token payment of Rs.25 lakhs as a sign of bona fide intent. Although the respondents made this token payment, the Bank, after reviewing their submission, was not inclined to grant the extension and formally cancelled the OTS on 01.07.2025, citing the respondents’ failure to adhere to the agreed terms. Consequently, the Bank initiated recovery measures under the SARFAESI Act, leading to the issuance of a possession notice by an Advocate Commissioner appointed by the Jurisdictional Court.

                  2.1.    The respondents then filed W.P.(C)No.29765 of 2025 challenging the OTS cancellation, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge as per the judgment dated 22.08.2025, holding that Courts could not interfere in OTS terms, though paradoxically directing the Bank to consider a fresh settlement and deferring recovery for three weeks. The said judgment of the learned Single Judge was challenged by the appellants by filing W.A.No.2114 of 2025, wherein the Division Bench of this Court by Ext.P6 judgment dated 27.08.2025 allowed the appeal and thereafter, the respondents initiated S.A.No.598 of 2025 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Ernakulam, wherein they have also sought for an interim stay by filing I.A.No.3615 of 2025. By Ext.P7 order dated 16.09.2025, the Tribunal declined to grant the interim stay, noting that in Ext.P6 judgment in W.A.No.2114 of 2025, this Court declined to defer the further proceedings in the securitisation proceedings and also holding that no prima facie case is made out by the respondents to grant any interim relief. The respondents then approached this Court by filing O.P.(DRT)No.293 of 2025, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P7 order of the Tribunal.

                  2.2.    In O.P.(DRT)No.293 of 2025, the appellants filed a counter affidavit dated 24.09.2025 raising various contentions, including the maintainability of the original petition. Along with the counter affidavit, the appellants have produced Ext.R1A order dated 14.06.2024, passed by the Tribunal in S.A.No.446 of 2022, which was initially filed by the respondents along with some other persons, challenging the proceedings initiated by the Bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act.

                  2.3.    After hearing both sides and on appreciation of the materials on record, the learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment dated 04.11.2025 allowed the original petition by setting aside Ext.P7 order of the Tribunal and also directed the Tribunal to take up I.A.No.3615 of 2025, after the 1st appellant Bank has filed its counter to the said interlocutory application, and after giving opportunity to both sides, and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law, taking into consideration the well settled principles governing the grant of interim relief. Till the matter is considered and decided, all coercive proceedings against the respondents are directed to be deferred. Being aggrieved, the appellants are now before this Court with the present writ appeal.

3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the respondents.

4. The learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the challenge against the proceedings initiated by the Bank under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act was initiated by the respondents as if they were seeking a remedy under OTS. But the interference in commercial OTS matters is impermissible, and successive challenges are barred in view of dismissal of S.A.No.446 of 2022 as early as on 14.06.2024 by Ext.R1A order passed by the Tribunal. The learned counsel would argue that the direction given by the learned Single Judge is totally against the precedents that are already settled by the Apex Court regarding interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in recovery proceedings. In fact, the direction given by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment is a direction that would fall under the purview of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, though the O.P.(DRT) was filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Against Ext.P7 order of the Tribunal, the respondents have an equal and efficacious remedy under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. When, by Ext.P6 judgment, the Division Bench of this Court found that interference in commercial OTS matters is impermissible, the learned Single Judge committed an error, by effectively stalling statutory recovery proceedings arising from such failed OTS, which was contradictory in nature. By relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in State of West Bengal v. Shivananda Pathak [(1998) 5 SCC 513], the learned counsel submitted that if a judgment is overruled by the higher court, the judicial discipline requires that the Judge whose judgment is overruled must submit to that judgment. He cannot, in the same proceedings or in collateral proceedings between the same parties, rewrite the overruled judgment. As far as the challenge against Ext.P7 order of the Tribunal is concerned, the learned counsel relied on the judgment of this Court in Union Bank of India, Kottayam, v. M/s Suwique Traders [2025 (4) KLT 455] to argue that when an equal and efficacious remedy is available before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, the writ petition is not maintainable.

5. The learned counsel for the respondents would argue that the respondents have made substantial payments after entering into a joint compromise between the parties. The learned counsel supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge and further submitted that even if this Court inclines to interfere with the said order, direction may be given to the Tribunal to dispose of the S.A. in a time-bound manner.

6. For the purpose of reminding ourselves of the position of law applicable to the point in dispute, it would be appropriate to extract some of the judgments on the point, including the judgments which this Court referred to in the judgment dated 23.07.2025 in W.A.No.1571 of 2025.

7. In Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], the Apex Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain a writ petition only under exceptional circumstances and that it is a self-imposed restraint by the High Court. The four exceptional circumstances such as, where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, were re iterated in paragraph 6 of the said judgment by relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax and Others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal [(2014) 1 SCC 603].

8. In South Indian Bank Ltd. (M/s.) v. Naveen Mathew Philip [(2023) 17 SCC 311], after discussing the various judgments on the point as to circumstances in which the High Court can interfere with matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act, it is held by the Apex Court as under:

                  “Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi - judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Art.226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute”.

9. In PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank [(2024) 6 SCC 579] the Apex Court held that it is more than a settled legal position of law that in matters arising out of RDB Act and SARFAESI Act, the High Court should not entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution, particularly when an alternative statutory remedy is available.

10. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Jasmin K. v. State Bank of India [2024 (3) KHC 266] reiterated the position of law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments.

11. From the judgments quoted above, it is clear that unless the four exceptional circumstances mentioned by the Apex Court in Mathew K.C. [(2018) 3 SCC 85], the respondents cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, though the respondents filed the Original Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as if the relief sought is by exercising supervisory jurisdiction, the relief No.(ii) would show that it is of the nature that can be granted by exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The reliefs sought by the respondents are matters to be decided by the Debts Recovery Tribunal in the securitisation application filed by the respondents challenging the recovery proceedings initiated by the Bank.

12. In State Bank of India v. M/s. Kinship Services (India) (P) Ltd. [2013 (4) KHC 21], a Division Bench of this Court, considered an appeal filed against an interim order passed by a learned Single Judge staying confirmation of sale till further orders in respect of one item of property which is sought to be sold in an auction scheduled under SARFAESI proceedings. By relying on an unreported judgment of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.6 of 2009 in the case of State of M.P. v. Sanjay Keralker dated 05.01.2009, the Division Bench held that the nature of the interim relief granted by the learned Single Judge is nothing but a discretion exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

13. In Sreedhar K. v. M/s Raus Constructions Pvt. Ltd. [(2023) 11 SCC 169], the Apex Court, while considering the requirement of deposit of 25% of the debt due before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal to avail the statutory remedy of appeal, held thus:

                  “6. At the outset, it is required to be noted that what was challenged before the High Court by the borrower in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was the judgment and order passed by the DRT-I. Against the judgment and order passed by the DRT-I dismissing the application, the borrower had a statutory remedy available by way of appeal before the DRAT. If the borrower would have preferred an appeal before the DRAT, he would have been required  to  deposit  25%  of  the  debt  due.  To circumvent the provision of appeal before the DRAT and the pre-deposit, the borrower straightway preferred the writ petition before the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. Therefore, in view of alternative statutory remedy available by way of appeal before the DRAT, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India challenging the judgment and order passed by the DRT- I. By entertaining the writ petition straightway under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order passed by the DRT-I, the High Court has allowed/permitted the borrower to circumvent the provision of appeal before the DRAT under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act."

14. In Narayan Chandra Ghosh v. Uco Bank [(2011) 4 SCC 548], while considering the question as to whether Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal has the jurisdiction to exempt a person preferring an appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act from making any predeposit in terms of the said provision, the Apex Court held thus:

                  “8. S.18(1) of the Act confers a statutory right on a person aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under S.17 of the Act to prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. However, the right conferred under S.18(1) is subject to the condition laid down in the second proviso thereto. The second proviso postulates that no appeal shall be entertained unless the borrower has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal fifty per cent of the amount of debt due from him, as claimed by the secured creditors or determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less. However, under the third proviso to the sub-section, the Appellate Tribunal has the power to reduce the amount, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, to not less than twenty - five per cent of the debt, referred to in the second proviso. Thus, there is an absolute bar to entertainment of an appeal under S.18 of the Act unless the condition precedent, as stipulated, is fulfilled. Unless the borrower makes, with the Appellate Tribunal, a pre-deposit of fifty per cent of the debt due from him or determined, an appeal under the said provision cannot be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal. The language of the said proviso is clear and admits of no ambiguity. It is well - settled that when a Statute confers a right of appeal, while granting the right, the Legislature can impose conditions for the exercise of such right, so long as the conditions are not so onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions, rendering the right almost illusory. Bearing in mind the object of the Act, the conditions hedged in the said proviso cannot be said to be onerous. Thus, we hold that the requirement of pre - deposit under sub-section (1) of S.18 of the Act is mandatory and there is no reason whatsoever for not giving full effect to the provisions contained in S.18 of the Act. In that view of the matter, no court, much less the Appellate Tribunal, a creature of the Act itself, can refuse to give full effect to the provisions of the Statute. We have no hesitation in holding that deposit under the second proviso to S.18(1) of the Act being a condition precedent for preferring an appeal under the said Section, the Appellate Tribunal had erred in law in entertaining the appeal without directing the appellant to comply with the said mandatory requirement.

                  9. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant that as the amount of debt due had not been determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, appeal could be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal without insisting on pre-deposit, is equally fallacious. Under the second proviso to sub-section (1) of S.18 of the Act the amount of fifty per cent, which is required to be deposited by the borrower, is computed either with reference to the debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors or as determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, whichever is less. Obviously, where the amount of debt is yet to be determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the borrower, while preferring appeal, would be liable to deposit fifty per cent of the debt due from him as claimed by the secured creditors. Therefore, the condition of pre-deposit being mandatory, a complete waiver of deposit by the appellant with the Appellate Tribunal, was beyond the provisions of the Act, as is evident from the second and third proviso to the said Section. At best, the Appellate Tribunal could have, after recording the reasons, reduced the amount of deposit of fifty per cent to an amount not less than twenty-five per cent of the debt referred to in the second proviso. We are convinced that the order of the Appellate Tribunal, entertaining appellant's appeal without insisting on pre-deposit was clearly unsustainable and, therefore, the decision of the High Court in setting aside the same cannot be flawed”.

15. A Division Bench of this Court, in both of us are parties in M/s Suwique Traders [2025 (4) KLT 455], while considering the above issue, by considering the relevant provisions under the SARFAESI Act and also relying on the decision in Narayan Chandra Ghosh [(2011) 4 SCC 548] held thus:

                  “20. When complete waiver of pre-deposit is beyond the provisions of Section 18(1) of the SARFAESI Act, it cannot be contended that, a person aggrieved by any order made by the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17, can prefer an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal, within the time limit specified in Section 18(1), along with an application for complete waiver of pre-deposit under the second proviso to Section 18(1), after remitting only the fee provided under Section 18(1), since the Appellate Tribunal cannot grant complete waiver of pre-deposit, which is beyond the scope of the provisions contained in the second and third provisos to Section 18(1). In that view of the matter, in an appeal filed under Section 18 of the Act, which is accompanied by an application invoking the provisions of the third proviso to Section 18(1) for waiver of pre-deposit, as stipulated in the second proviso to Section 18(1), the appellant has to deposit with the Appellate Tribunal twenty-five per cent of the debt referred to in the second proviso to Section 18(1). The Appellate Tribunal cannot entertain, i.e., give judicial consideration of an appeal filed under Section 18 and the interlocutory application filed under the third proviso to Section 18(1) for waiver of predeposit, as stipulated in the second proviso to Section 18(1), unless the appellant has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal twenty-five per cent of the debt referred to in the second proviso to Section 18(1). Therefore, we find absolutely no merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents- petitioners that the respondents are required to remit only the prescribed fee as provided under Section 18(1) of the Act, at the time of preferring Ext.P2 appeal and the question of deposit with the Appellate Tribunal the pre-deposit provided under the second proviso to Section 18(1) arises only on an order being passed by the Appellate Tribunal on the application for waiver”.

16. The facts of the present appeal have to be analysed keeping in mind the above legal principles. We have carefully verified the materials placed on record and also appreciated the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel on both sides. From the  materials  placed  on  record,  we  notice  that  the  legal proceedings, on the loans availed by the respondents which were later converted as NPA, arose as early as in the year 2022 and the 1st appellant Bank took steps under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act to take possession of the secured asset by filing petition under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Kollam. Challenging the possession notices issued, the respondents and some other persons filed S.A.No.446 of 2022 before the Tribunal, which ended in dismissal by Ext.R1A order dated 14.06.2024. After the dismissal of S.A.No.446 of 2022, some original applications were came up for consideration before the Tribunal, and they ended in a compromise between the appellants and the respondents by way of an OTS for Rs.55 Crores. But the said OTS proposal was cancelled by the Bank on 01.07.2025, citing the reason of failure of the respondents to adhere to the agreed terms. The Bank again mooted the recovery proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, leading to the issuance of a possession notice by the Advocate Commissioner.

17. The writ petition filed by the respondents under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the cancellation of the OTS, ended in dismissal by the judgment dated 22.08.2025, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.29765 of 2025. However, the learned Single Judge directed the Bank to consider a fresh request from the respondents while deferring all recovery proceedings for a period of three weeks. By Ext.P6 judgment dated 27.08.2025, this Court set aside the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge to the extent it directed the appellants to defer the proceedings against the respondents. Later, the respondents approached the Tribunal with S.A.No.598 of 2025, challenging the cancellation of OTS and also filed I.A.No.3615 of 2025 to stay all further proceedings pursuant to the possession notice issued by the Advocate Commissioner. By Ext.P7 order, the Tribunal refused to grant the stay, which is under challenge in O.P.(DRT)No.293 of 2025.

18. From the materials on record, we notice that previously the learned Single Judge passed an order dated 26.09.2025 in the original petition staying the operation of Ext.P7 order dated 16.09.2025 of the Tribunal for a period of one month. Challenging the interim order, the appellants filed W.A.No.2388 of 2025 before this Court. However, on finding that the interim order issued by the learned Single Judge is one issued in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and hence is not appealable under the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, in view of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in John V.O. v. Catholic Syrian Bank and Others [2009 (1) KHC 337], this Court dismissed the writ appeal on the ground of maintainability, however, leaving open the legal and factual contentions raised by both sides. It is the aforesaid original petition is now finally disposed of by the learned Single Judge as per the impugned judgment.

19. When the respondents approached this Court against the OTS cancellation by filing W.P.(C)No.29765 of 2025, the learned Single Judge, while dismissing that writ petition on 22.08.2025, issued a direction to the 1st appellant Bank to consider a fresh request from the respondents while deferring all recovery proceedings for a period of three weeks.

20. The learned counsel for the appellants pointed out that in a similar situation as that of the instant case, in the judgment dated 23.07.2025 in W.A.No.1571 of 2025, this Court set aside a similar direction of the learned Single Judge deferring coercive steps against the 1st respondent therein till a decision is taken by the Tribunal in the stay petition, on a finding that if no interim relief has been granted by the Tribunal, the remedy available to the 1st respondents in that case is to challenge the same before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act. In the judgment dated 23.07.2025 in W.A.No.1571 of 2025, this Court found force in the contention of the appellants therein that it is to avoid depositing of minimum of 25% of the debt as provided under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, the 1st respondent therein approached this Court with the original petition. It was also held by this Court that the direction in the nature of deferring coercive steps against the respondents therein till a decision is taken by the Debts Recovery Tribunal is the one that can be passed only under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

21. In the instant case, as noticed by this Court in Ext.P6 judgment, the respondents had already initiated proceedings against the steps taken by the Bank to recover the debt from the secured asset by filing S.A. before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. If no interim stay was granted by the Tribunal, the remedy available to the respondents is to challenge the same before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act.

22. In the light of the above judgments, it is clear that the direction given by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment to defer all the coercive proceedings against the respondents till a fresh decision is taken by the Tribunal in I.A.No.3615 of 2025 in S.A.No.598 of 2025 will clearly fall the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and not under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the learned Single Judge ought not to have issued such a direction in the impugned judgment. Though the learned counsel for the appellants vehemently submitted about the judicial discipline, by relying on the judgment of the Apex Court in Shivananda Pathak [(1998) 5 SCC 513], we are not entering into those aspects, since the same is unwarranted for the purpose of deciding the present writ appeal. The upshot of the above discussion is that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside to the extent it directs the 1st appellant Bank to defer the coercive proceedings against the respondents.

                  In the result, this writ appeal is allowed by interfering with the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge to the extent it directs the 1st appellant Bank to defer all coercive proceedings against the respondents, and the said direction is set aside.