1. This second appeal under Section 100 of C.P.C is filed aggrieved against the judgment and decree, dated 26.07.2011, in A.S.No.18 of 2007 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Piler, in confirming the judgment and decree, dated 08.05.2007, in O.S.No.161 of 2001 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Piler.

2. The appellant herein is the defendant and the respondent herein is the plaintiff in O.S.No.161 of 2001 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Piler.

3. The plaintiff initiated action in O.S.No.161 of 2001 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Piler, with a prayer to direct the defendant to execute a registered sale deed in pursuance of the suit agreement and deliver of plaint schedule property to the plaintiff and if the defendant fails to execute the same, the court may execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff on behalf of the defendant and permit the plaintiff to take possession of the plaint schedule property through process of law and for costs of the suit.

4. The learned Junior Civil Judge, Piler, decreed the suit against the defendant with costs. Felt aggrieved of the same, the unsuccessful defendant in the above said suit filed A.S.No.18 of 2007 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Piler. The Senior Civil Judge, Piler, dismissed the appeal suit, by confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved thereby, the defendant in the suit approached this Court by way of second appeal.

5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the second appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit.

6. The case of the plaintiff, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.161 of 2001, is as follows:

                  The defendant herein agreed to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs.50,000/-. The plaintiff has accepted the said offer and agreed to purchase the same, and in part performance of the contract, the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs.20,000/- as advance and the defendant has received the same and executed an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff on 17.09.1998. The plaintiff pleaded that as per the terms and conditions of the agreement of sale, the plaintiff has to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs.30,000/- within three years from the date of agreement of sale i.e. 17.09.1998, and the defendant has to execute a regular registered sale deed in her favour. The plaintiff further pleaded that she is always ready and willing to perform her part of the contract and she requested the defendant several times to receive the balance of the sale consideration amount, to execute a regular registered sale deed, and for which the defendant is postponing the same on some pretext or the other. The plaintiff further pleaded that she got issued a registered legal notice to the defendant on 27.07.2001, asking the defendant to be present before the Sub-Registrar’s Office, Piler, on 30.07.2001, for the purpose of receiving the balance of sale consideration, but on receipt of the said notice also, the defendant did not turn up before the Sub-Registrar’s Office, Piler, as such, the plaintiff is constrained to file the present suit.

7. The defendant filed written statement before the trial Court. The brief averments in the written statement are as follows:

                  The defendant borrowed a sum of Rs.10,000/- from the plaintiff, and to that effect the plaintiff insisted her to execute the sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.50,000/-, when the defendant was in a very great need of money for getting better from her right ear and also for undergoing an operation. The defendant pleaded that she never agreed for registering the plaint schedule property in favour of the plaintiff and also the plaintiff had also never agreed to purchase the suit schedule property. The defendant further pleaded that the plaintiff had issued a notice to her on 21.07.2001 and in which the plaintiff’s counsel directed the defendant to attend before the Sub- Registrar’s Office, Piler, on 30.07.2001, for executing the suit schedule property in favour of the plaintiff after receiving the balance of sale consideration of Rs.30,000/-, but on 30.07.2001, the defendant waited till 5.00 p.m., in the Sub-Registrar’s Office and the plaintiff did not turn up. The defendant further pleaded that she has no obligation to register the suit schedule house property in favour of the plaintiff and no consideration was passed pertaining to the sale agreement, moreover, the plaintiff is none other than the sister-in-law of the defendant and taking advantage of the relationship, with a view to knock away or grab the suit schedule house property, the plaintiff at the instance of her husband, filed the present suit with false and untenable allegations, as such, she prayed to dismiss the suit with costs.

8. On the basis of above pleadings, the learned Junior Civil Judge, Piler, framed the following issues for trial:

                  1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for specific performance of an agreement dated 17.09.1998?

                  2) Whether the suit agreement dated 19.09.1998 is nominal one? and

                  3) To what relief?

9. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiff, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-3 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and no document was marked.

10. The learned Junior Civil Judge, Piler, after conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, decreed the suit with costs. Felt aggrieved thereby, the unsuccessful defendant filed the appeal suit in A.S.No.18 of 2007, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Piler, wherein the following point came up for consideration:

                  1) Whether the decree and judgment dated 08.05.2007 in O.S.No.161 of 2001 on the file of the Junior Civil Judge, Piler, can be set aside as prayed for?

11. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Piler, i.e., the first appellate Judge, after hearing the arguments, answered the point, as above, against the defendant and dismissed the appeal suit filed by the defendant. Felt aggrieved of the same, the defendant in O.S.No.161 of 2001 filed the present second appeal before this Court.

12. On hearing both side counsels at the time of admission of the second appeal 21.11.2011, the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad framed the following substantial questions of law:

                  1) Whether the Courts below erred in not considering Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 before exercising their jurisdiction for granting specific relief?

                  2) Whether the Courts below erred in not examining the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract as required under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?

                  3) Whether the Courts below are right in ordering the equitable relief of specific performance in favour of the respondent, who has not come to the Court with clean hands?

                  On 19.11.2025, after hearing both side counsels, this Court framed the following additional substantial question of law:

                  1) Whether the Appellate Court committed a grievous error in not appreciating the evidence adduced by the appellant in proper perspective vis a vis the evidence of the respondent’s evidence?

13. Heard Sri V.R.N.Prashanth, learned counsel representing M/s. Indus Law Firm appearing for the appellant and Sri Vallepu Reddy Nikhil Ganesh, learned counsel for the respondent.

14. The law is well settled that under Section 100 of CPC, High Court cannot interfere with findings of fact arrived at by first appellate Court, which is final Court of facts, except in such cases where such findings were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, or its settled position on the basis of the pronouncement made by the Apex Court or based upon inadmissible evidence or without evidence.

                  In the case of Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh(AIR 1993 SC 398), the Apex Court held as follows:

                  “The High Court was certainly entitled to go into the question as to whether the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court which was the final Court of fact were vitiated in the eye of law on account of non-consideration of admissible evidence of vital nature.”

                  In the case of Kondira Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar(AIR 1999 SC 471), the Apex Court held as follows:

                  “The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the First Appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.”

15. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the First Appellate Court, without complying with the requirements under Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, dismissed the appeal and therefore, the matter may be remanded to the First Appellate Court for fresh disposal of the first appeal. As seen from the judgment of the First Appellate Court, the evidence of the appellant and other witnesses was discussed by the First Appellate Judge in its judgment by giving reasons and confirmed the judgment of the trial Court.

16. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a judgment in B.V.Nagesh and Another Vs. H.V.Sreenivasa Murthy((2010) 13 Supreme Court Cases 530), wherein the Apex Court held as follows:

                  “4. How regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate Court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order XLI of C.P.C. deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate Court shall state:

                  a) the points for determination;

                  b) the decision thereon;

                  c) reasons for the decision; and -

                  d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled.”

17. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a judgment in G.Amalorpavam and Others Vs. R.C.Diocese of Madurai and Others ((2006) 3 Supreme Court Cases 224) , wherein the Apex Court held as follows:

                  “9. ……Where the appellate court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come to any conclusion and its findings are supported by reasons even though the point has not been framed by the appellate Court there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and the judgment is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of a point of determination.

                  11. The view was reiterated in Santosh Hazari v. Purshottam Tiwari (Deceased) by Lrs. (2001 (3) SCC 179). In para 15 it was held with reference to Girijanandini Devi's case (supra) as follows:

                  “The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial court is an easier one. The appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary (AIR 1967 SC 1124)). We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles.”

18. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a judgment in K.Sudhakar Vs P.Subba Raja Kumari and Others(2025 SCC OnLine AP 482), wherein the Apex Court held as follows:

                  “25. It is well settled that in a first appeal, the first appellate court is duty bound to examine all the aspects and first appellate court has to scrutinize the oral and documentary evidence on record. The first appeal is a valuable right of the appellant and therein all questions of facts and law decided by the trial court are open for reconsideration. Therefore, the first appellate court is required to address itself to all the issues and decide the case by giving reasons. The court of first appeal must record its findings only after dealing with all issues of law as well as fact and with the evidence, oral as well as documentary, led by the parties. The judgment of the first appellate court must display conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons on all issues and contentions.”

19. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a judgment in Vinod Kumar Vs. Gangadhar((2015) 1 Supreme Court Cases 391), wherein the Apex Court held as follows:

                  “19. Being the first appellate court, it was the duty of the High Court to have decided the first appeal keeping in view the scope and powers conferred on it under Section 96 read with Order 41 Rule 31 CPC mentioned above. It was unfortunately not done, thereby, resulting in causing prejudice to the appellant whose valuable right to prosecute in the first appeal on facts and law was adversely affected which, in turn, deprived him of a hearing in the appeal in accordance with law.”

20. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a judgment in United Engineers and Contractors Vs. Secretary to Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others((2015) 1 Supreme Court Cases 391), wherein the Apex Court held as follows:

                  “10. This Court has considered the scope of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC in H.Siddiqui V. A.Ramalingam and held as under:

                  18. The said provisions provide guidelines for the Appellate court as to how the court has to proceed and decide the case. The provisions should be read in such a way as to require that the various particulars mentioned therein should be taken into consideration. Thus, it must be evident from the judgment of the Appellate court that the court has properly appreciated the facts/evidence, applied its mind and decided the case considering the material on record. It would amount to substantial compliance of the said provisions if the Appellate court''s judgment is based on the independent assessment of the relevant evidence on all important aspect of the matter and the findings of the Appellate court are well founded and quite convincing. It is mandatory for the Appellate court to independently assess the evidence of the parties and consider the relevant points which arise for adjudication and the bearing of the evidence on those points. Being the final court of fact, the first Appellate court must not record mere general expression of concurrence with the trial court judgment rather it must give reasons for its decision on each point independently to that of the trial court. Thus, the entire evidence must be considered and discussed in detail. Such exercise should be done after formulating the points for consideration in terms of the said provisions and the court must proceed in adherence to the requirements of the said statutory provisions.”

                  The ratio laid down in the aforesaid case laws are not in dispute. Admittedly, in the case at hand, the execution of Ex.A-1 agreement of sale is not at all disputed by the appellant. The contention of the appellant as narrated in the written statement as well as in her evidence in chief examination affidavit as D.W.1 is that she executed Ex.A-1 agreement in favour of the plaintiff, but she pleaded that she has only borrowed Rs.10,000/- from the plaintiff to meet her urgent medical treatment and not taken up any amount of Rs.20,000/- towards advance and in view of urgent necessities, she executed Ex.A-1 agreement in favour of the plaintiff as demanded by her. In the evidence, as

                  D.W.1 in cross-examination, she admits that the attestors in Ex.A-1 are her son, daughter, and her mother is also one of the attestors to Ex.A-1. But to prove the defence put forth by the defendant that she borrowed Rs.10,000/- from the plaintiff and the plaintiff obtained her signature on the stamp paper, she did not venture to examine her own family members viz., the son, the daughter and the mother of the appellant. The appellant also failed to prove that on the demand made by the plaintiff only, she executed Ex.A-1 agreement.

21. In a case of Girja Nandini and Ors. Vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhury(AIR 1967 SCC 1124), wherein the Apex Court held as follows:

                  “The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial Court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law the whole case is therein open for hearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must therefore, reflects its conscious, application of mind and record findings supported by reasons on all issues arising along with the contentions put forth and pressed by the parties for decision of the Appellate Court. The task of the Appellate Court affirming the findings of the trial Court is an easier one. The Appellate Court agreed with the view of the trial Court need not re-state the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court: expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court, decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice”

22. In a case of Nafees Ahmad and another Vs. Soinuddin and others(2025 Live Law SC 458), the Apex Court held as follows:

                  " 12. The provisions of Rule 31 should therefore be reasonably construed and should be  held to require the various particulars to be mentioned in the judgment only when the appellant has actually raised certain points for determination by the Appellate Court, and not when no such points are raised.

                  13. We must also look into the provisions of Rule 30 of Order 41 for the purpose of fortifying our interpretation of Rule 31. Order 41 Rule 30 CPC reads thus:

                  “30. Judgment when and where pronounced.─ (1) The Appellate Court, after hearing the parties or their pleaders and referring to any part of the proceedings, whether on appeal or in the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, to which reference may be considered necessary, shall pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once or on some future day of which notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.

                  (2) Where a written judgment is to be pronounced, it shall be sufficient if the points for determination, the decision thereon and the final order passed in the appeal are read out and it shall not be necessary for the Court to read out the whole judgment, but a copy of the whole judgment shall be made available for the perusal of the parties or their pleaders immediately after the judgment in pronounced.”

                  14. Thus, this Rule does not make it incumbent on the Appellate Court to refer to any part of the proceedings in the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred. The Appellate Court can refer, after hearing the parties and their pleaders, to any part of these proceedings to which reference be considered necessary. It is in the discretion of the Appellate Court to refer to the proceedings. It is competent to pronounce judgment after hearing what the parties or their pleaders submit to it for consideration."

                  In the case at hand, by discussing the evidence of the appellant and each witness of the appellant, the First Appellate Court has rightly dismissed the appeal. The Appellate Court, agreeing with the view of the trial Court, need not restate the effect of evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice. In the case at hand, no doubt, the First Appellate Court has only framed one point for determination to decide the first appeal; it does not mean that the entire judgment of the First Appellate Court is vitiated. The Court has to evaluate the evidence of witnesses depending upon the facts and circumstances and admissions of the party in each case in a first appeal and it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

23. A suit for specific performance has been filed by the plaintiff in the year 2001, the trial Court, after full-fledged trial and on hearing both sides, decreed the suit on 08.05.2007. The defendant has filed the first appeal in the year 2007 and the First Appellate Court dismissed the first appeal on 26.07.2011, on merits, against which the second appeal is filed in the year 2011. After a lapse of twenty four (24) years from the date of institution of the suit, now it is not open to the appellant to contend in the second appeal proceedings, which was instituted in the year 2011, to remand the matter in the year 2005, even though the First Appellate Court has not framed many points for determination, the First Appellate Court discussed the evidence of the appellant and the witnesses of the appellant and pronounced a reasoned judgment. The respondent/plaintiff filed the suit in the year 2001 and the contention of the appellant herein is that without framing the points for determination to decide the first appeal, the First Appellate Court dismissed the first appeal. The law is well settled that “a fault of the Court should not harm any litigant, who came to the Court seeking justice.” Admittedly, in the present case, the First Appellate Court has considered the entire evidence on record and discussed the same in detail and dismissed the first appeal, therefore, though many points for determination to decide the first appeal have not been framed by the First Appellate Court, there is a substantial compliance with the provisions of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and the said judgment of the First Appellate Court is not in any manner vitiated by the absence of points for determination.

24. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the Courts below erred in not considering Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, before exercising their jurisdiction for granting the main relief of specific performance of agreement of sale.

25. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a judgment in Jayakantham and Others Vs. Abaykumar((2017) 5 Supreme Court Cases 178), wherein the Apex Court held as follows:

                  “7. ………..

                  “Section 20 (2). The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance-

                  (a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or

                  (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff;

                  (c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance.”

                  8. However, explanation 1 stipulates that the mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, will not constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b). Moreover, explanation 2 requires that the issue as to whether the performance of a contract involves hardship on the defendant has to be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract, except where the hardship has been caused from an act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract.

                  9. The precedent on the subject is elucidated below :

                  9.1. In Parakunnan Veetill Joseph's Son Mathew v. Nedumbara Kuruvila's Son and Ors [1987 Supp SCC 340] ,this Court held that :

                  “14. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preserves judicial discretion of Courts as to decreeing specific performance. The Court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances of the case. The Court is not bound to grant specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. The motive behind the litigation should also enter into the judicial verdict. The Court should take care to see that it is not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage to the plaintiff…”

                  9.2. A similar view was adopted by this Court in Sardar Singh v. Smt. Krishna Devi and another [(1994) 4 SCC 18] :

                  “…14. Section 20(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief, merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. The grant of relief of specific performance is discretionary. The circumstances specified in Section 20 are only illustrative and not exhaustive. The court would take into consideration the circumstances in each case, the conduct of the parties and the respective interest under the contract.”

                  9.3. Reiterating the position in K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd [(1999) 5 SCC 77],this Court held thus :

                  “…29. Performance of the contract involving some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee while non-performance involving no such hardship on the plaintiff, is one of the circumstances in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. The doctrine of comparative hardship has been thus statutorily recognized in India. However, mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature , shall not constitute an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendant or unforeseeable hardship on the defendant. The principle underlying Section 20 has been summed up by this Court in Lourdu Mari David v. Louis Chinnaya Arogiaswamy by stating that the decree for specific performance is in the discretion of the Court but the discretion should not be used arbitrarily; the discretion should be exercised on sound principles of law capable of correction by an appellate court.”

                  9.4. These principles were followed by this Court in A.C. Arulappan v. Smt. Ahalya Naik [(2001) 6 SCC 600], with the following observations :

                  “…..7. The jurisdiction to decree specific relief is discretionary and the court can consider various circumstances to decide whether such relief is to be granted. Merely because it is lawful to grant specific relief, the court need not grant the order for specific relief; but this discretion shall not be exercised in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner. Certain circumstances have been mentioned in Section 20(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as to under what circumstances the court shall exercise such discretion. If under the terms of the contract the plaintiff gets an unfair advantage over the defendant, the court may not exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiff. So also, specific relief may not be granted if the defendant would be put to undue hardship which he did not foresee at the time of agreement. If it is inequitable to grant specific relief, then also the court would desist from granting a decree to the plaintiff.”

                  “…..15. Granting of specific performance is an equitable relief, though the same is now governed by the statutory provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. These equitable principles are nicely incorporated in Section 20 of the Act. While granting a decree for specific performance, these salutary guidelines shall be in the forefront of the mind of the court…..”

                  9.5. A Bench of three Judges of this Court considered the position in Nirmala Anand Vs. Advent Corporation (P) Ltd. and Ors.[(2002) 8 SCC 146], and held thus :

                  “ 6. It is true that grant of decree of specific performance lies in the discretion of the court and it is also well settled that it is not always necessary to grant specific performance simply for the reason that it is legal to do so. It is further well settled that the court in its discretion can impose any reasonable condition including payment of an additional amount by one party to the other while granting or refusing decree of specific performance. Whether the purchaser shall be directed to pay an additional amount to the seller or converse would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a case. Ordinarily, the plaintiff is not to be denied the relief of specific performance only on account of the phenomenal increase of price during the pendency of litigation. That may be, in a given case, one of the considerations besides many others to be taken into consideration for refusing the decree of specific performance. As a general rule, it cannot be held that ordinarily the plaintiff cannot be allowed to have, for her alone, the entire benefit of phenomenal increase of the value of the property during the pendency of the litigation. While balancing the equities, one of the considerations to be kept in view is as to who is the defaulting party. It is also to be borne in mind whether a party is trying to take undue advantage over the other as also the hardship that may be caused to the defendant by directing specific performance. There may be other circumstances on which parties may not have any control. The totality of the circumstances is required to be seen.”

                  In the case at hand, the trial Court having seen the conduct of the appellant in suppressing the material facts and on appreciation of the entire evidence on record granted the main relief of specific performance. The law is well settled that “the jurisdiction to grant a decree of specific performance is discretionary and the said discretion of the Court is not arbitrary, but it is sound and reasonable to be guided by judicial principles.” In the case at hand, the defendant admitted in her evidence that the signature in Ex.A-1 belongs to her and she also admits the execution of Ex.A-1 agreement in favour of the plaintiff and also admits that all the three (03) attestors to Ex.A-1 are her son, daughter, and mother. The appellant specifically pleaded that she borrowed only an amount of Rs.10,000/- from the plaintiff for her urgent medical need and to that effect, the plaintiff had insisted to execute a sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.50,000/-, in view of her urgent need for money, she executed Ex.A-1 agreement of sale. In the written statement also, the appellant pleaded that she borrowed a sum of Rs.10,000/- from the plaintiff and to that effect, the plaintiff had insisted to execute a sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.50,000/-, in view of her urgent need of money to get treatment for her right ear, she executed an agreement. She further pleaded that she had never agreed to register the schedule property in favour of the plaintiff and also that the plaintiff never agreed to purchase the suit schedule property. She further pleaded that the plaintiff issued a notice to the defendant on 21.07.2001, in which the plaintiff’s counsel directed the defendant to attend before the Sub-Registrar Office, Piler, on 30.07.2001, and execute the sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff after receiving the balance sale consideration of Rs.30,000/-. She waited on 30.07.2001 till 5.00 p.m. before the Sub-Registrar, but the plaintiff did not turn up. It is not at all the case of the appellant that she is ready and willing to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, though she is ready and willing to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, the plaintiff did not come forward to pay the balance sale consideration and also did not come forward to obtain the sale deed. It is also not the case of the appellant that she did not execute Ex.A-1 agreement in favour of the plaintiff.

26. As seen from the evidence of the defendant/D.W.1, she admitted in her evidence in cross-examination that the signatures on Ex.A-1 as attestors belong to her son and daughter, and her mother is also one of the witnesses to the Ex.A-1 transaction. She further admits that she, her son, her daughter, and her mother are attestors to Ex.A-1. As per the own admissions of the appellant, all the three (03) witnesses in Ex.A-1 agreement of sale are none other than her son, daughter, and mother respectively. Moreover, the execution of Ex.A-1 agreement is admitted by the appellant, but the contention of the appellant is that it is a nominal agreement and she borrowed Rs.10,000/- only from the plaintiff in need of money for her medical treatment. The appellant herein failed to prove that Ex.A-1 is only a nominal document. On the other hand, the plaintiff examined the scribe of Ex.A-1 as P.W.2; his evidence goes to show that he has been a document writer at Piler since 1997, and on 17.09.1998, the plaintiff, defendant, and the witnesses who attested the document approached him and asked him to prepare an agreement of sale, for which they made a contract to purchase the house for a sum of Rs.50,000/- by the plaintiff from the defendant. The defendant received a sum of Rs.20,000/-, and the balance of the sale consideration had to be paid within three (03) years from the date of the contract.

27. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that from the date of the contract, she is ready to pay the balance sale consideration to the defendant, but the defendant did not come forward to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff to receive the remaining balance sale consideration of Rs.30,000/-, and that she issued a legal notice under Ex.A-2 dated 21.07.2001, within the three (03) year period as stipulated in Ex.A-1 agreement of sale, which was fixed by both parties to the contract. Moreover, the issuance of the legal notice by the plaintiff is undisputed by the appellant. The appellant contended that she issued a reply notice to the said Ex.A-2 legal notice, but the fact remains that the said reply notice was not produced by the appellant either before the trial Court or before the First Appellate Court. The defendant relied on the evidence of D.W.2 and D.W.3. As per the evidence of D.W.2 and D.W.3, they conducted a panchayat for the settlement of the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant. It is not the case of the appellant that mediation was conducted by D.W.2 and D.W.3 between the appellant and the plaintiff. The appellant did not even refer to the names of D.W.2 and D.W.3 in her written statement, or in her evidence in chief affidavit, and also did not state anything about the alleged mediation held by D.W.2 and D.W.3 between the defendant and the plaintiff.

28. The execution of Ex.A-1 agreement of sale is undisputed by the appellant. The plaintiff specifically pleaded in the plaint and also in her evidence that from the date of the agreement, she is ready to perform her part of the contract, i.e., to pay the remaining balance of the sale consideration within the time limit fixed by both parties to the contract, and though she issued a legal notice to the appellant, having received the same, the appellant failed to receive the balance sale consideration and to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff was constrained to file the suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale before the trial Court. As stated supra, the execution of Ex.A-1 agreement of sale is undisputed by the appellant. It is also undisputed by the appellant that all the witnesses to Ex.A-1 agreement of sale are her son, daughter, and mother.

29. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a judgment in A.C.Arulappan Vs. Smt. Ahalya Naik((2001) 6 Supreme Court Cases 600). The facts in the aforesaid case law are that in the agreement itself, it was mentioned that the property was subject to two (02) mortgages. Therefore, the facts and circumstances in that case law are different to the present case.

30. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a judgment in Nanjappan Vs. Ramaswamy and another((2015) 14 Supreme Court Cases 341). In the case at hand, the intention of the alienation of the property by the appellant and receipt of Rs.20,000/- towards advance is disputed by the defendant. It is not the case of the defendant that she is ready to execute a sale deed, but the plaintiff did not come forward to receive the balance sale consideration. In her evidence, the defendant admits that the signature shown in Ex.A-1 belongs to her and that she executed the Ex.A-1 agreement of sale, and the witnesses to Ex.A-1 agreement of sale are none other than her son, daughter, and mother respectively. On appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned trial Judge decreed the suit by granting the main relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale by exercising its discretion judiciously. The First Appellate Court also, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, confirmed the finding given by the learned trial Judge by giving cogent reasons in its judgment.

31. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the prices of the immovable properties have increased abnormally; therefore, if the relief of specific performance is granted, it will cause great hardship to the appellant. The appellant relied on the evidence of the Panchayat Secretary/D.W.4. In his evidence in chief examination, D.W.4 admitted that at present, i.e., in the year 2007, the house of the defendant is valued at about Rs.3,50,000/-. In his evidence in cross-examination, he admitted that during the year 1998-99, the market value of the house of the defendant was Rs.4,760/- as per the revision register. The date of the Ex.A-1 contract of sale is 07.09.1998, and the total agreed sale consideration as per Ex.A-1 agreement of sale is Rs.50,000/-. The appellant herein received an advance sale consideration of Rs.20,000/- on 07.09.1998 and enjoyed the said money for about twenty seven (27) years. The plaintiff, to prove her case, produced the original agreement of sale and got it exhibited as Ex.A-1. To prove her readiness and willingness, the plaintiff relied on Ex.A-2 legal notice dated 21.07.2000, which was said to have been issued by the plaintiff. Later, she instituted a suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale in the year 2001, and there are no laches on the part of the plaintiff to perform her part of the contract as per the terms and conditions in Ex.A-1 agreement of sale. The plaintiff paid an amount of Rs.20,000/- towards advance sale consideration on 07.09.1998. Even as per the admissions of the Panchayat Secretary/D.W.4, the market value of the house of the defendant was Rs.4,760/- as per the revision register. Admittedly, the defendant enjoyed the money of Rs.20,000/- from 1998 onwards until the year 2025. Moreover, the appellant herein admitted the execution of the agreement of sale and further admits that all the witnesses to Ex.A-1 agreement of sale are her son, daughter, and mother respectively. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court holds that the plaintiff herein is entitled to the main relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale.

32. On appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned trial Judge as well as the learned First Appellate Judge arrived at concurrent findings that the plaintiff is entitled to the main relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 17.09.1998. The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But, it is not an absolute rule that some of the well recognized exceptions is whether:

                  1. The Courts below ignored the material evidence or acted on no evidence, or

                  2. The Courts have drawn wrong inference from the proved facts by applying the law erroneously, or

                  3. The Courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof.

                  The present case does not come under the ambit of the aforesaid circumstances as stated supra.

33. In the case at hand, on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned trial Judge decreed the suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff and on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record on all issues decided by the trial Court as required under Section 96 of C.P.C., the learned first appellate Judge rightly dismissed the first appeal. In the light of the material on record and upon earnest consideration now, it is manifest that the substantial questions of law including the additional substantial question of law raised in the course of hearing in the second appeal on behalf of the appellant did not arise or remain for consideration. This Court is satisfied that this second appeal did not involve any substantial question of law for determination.

34. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed, confirming the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court. Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed. Each party do bear their own costs in the second appeal.