Moushumi Bhattacharya, J.

1. The Writ Appeal arises out of an order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 07.11.2025 in W.P.No.16559 of 2025 filed by the respondent No.1 herein. The Writ Petition was filed for a Writ of Mandamus against the respondent No.2/The Indian Oil Corporation Limited (‘IOCL’) with reference to proceedings dated 06.06.2025 by which IOCL upheld the cancellation of the Letter of Acceptance (‘LoA’) dated 20.02.2025 issued to the writ petitioner. The appellant herein was awarded a Work Order on 18.08.2025 after cancellation of the LoA issued in favour of the writ petitioner.

2. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition by upholding the cancellation of the LoA/Contract being in violation of an earlier order passed by another learned Single Judge on 07.05.2025. The order dated 07.05.2025 was passed in a Writ Petition filed by the respondent No.1 herein (W.P.No.15034 of 2025). By the impugned order dated 07.11.2025, the learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition and set aside the Speaking Order passed by IOCL on 06.06.2025 and directed IOCL to take necessary action for permitting the writ petitioner to continue with its contractual obligations as per the LoA and Work Order.

3. The appellant, who was awarded the work on 18.08.2025, is aggrieved by the impugned order and has challenged the same in the present Appeal.

4. We have heard learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 (writ petitioner) and learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent No.2/IOCL.

5. The appellant and IOCL assail the impugned order on the ground that the learned Single Judge reinstated the writ petitioner solely on the earlier order dated 07.05.2025. Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant and Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent No.2/IOCL submit that the earlier order disposed of the Writ Petition filed by the respondent No.1 by directing IOCL to consider the grievance of the writ petitioner as expressed in its representation dated 01.04.2025 and pass an appropriate order within a specific time frame after providing an opportunity of personal hearing to the writ petitioner. It is also submitted that the learned Single Judge re-read the conditions in the tender documents in favour of the writ petitioner which a Writ Court cannot be permitted to do. Counsel refer to several documents showing that the writ petitioner admitted to the delay in complying with the terms of the tender.

6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner/the respondent No.1 herein seeks to sustain the impugned order on the ground that IOCL acted in haste in passing the Speaking Order dated 06.06.2025 which was in violation of the orders of status-quo granted in the first round of litigation. Senior Counsel lays emphasis on the order dated 07.05.2025 to urge that the learned Single Judge had opined on the action of IOCL being arbitrary and that such opinion could not be disturbed by IOCL by way of the Speaking Order dated 06.06.2025. In essence, Senior Counsel submits that IOCL reiterated its earlier decision dated 01.04.2025 in cancelling the LoA issued in favour of the writ petitioner.

7. We have considered the oral as well as written submissions made on behalf of the parties and considered the relevant material which have been placed on record.

8. A brief timeline of relevant events is required to be given for understanding the effect of the two rounds of litigation initiated by the writ petitioner/respondent No.1 herein.

               i. IOCL issued the LoA to the writ petitioner by email dated 20.02.2025. This was confirmed by an e-mail on 21.02.2025.

               ii. The writ petitioner wrote back to the IOCL on 03.03.2025 that it applied for clearance of its Barge from Kakinada Port.

               iii. IOCL issued the Work Order to the writ petitioner on 12.03.2025 for transporting white and black oil bunker supply to coastal and foreign run vessels stationed at Vizag Port through tanker Barges.

               iv. IOCL sent an e-mail on 21.02.2025 requesting to arrange initial deposit within 13 days of LoA dated 20.02.2025 and stating that the Barge had to be placed within 30 days from the LoA i.e., by 21.03.2025.

               v. IOCL once again sent another e-mail to the writ petitioner on 21.03.2025 stating that IOCL has to position the Barge within 30 days from the LoA i.e., by 21.03.2025 failing which the LoA would be liable for cancellation.

               vi. On 22.03.2025, the writ petitioner stated that it had resubmitted its application for clearance.

               vii. On 28.03.2025, the writ petitioner sent an e-mail informing IOCL that its Barge had arrived at Vizag Port.

               viii. On 29.03.2025, the writ petitioner sent an e-mail informing IOCL that the survey of its Barge at Vizag Port was completed.

               ix. On 01.04.2025, the writ petitioner updated IOCL about the status of the Barge. The e-mail sent by IOCL cancelling the LoA was also received by the writ petitioner.

               x. The writ petitioner filed W.P.No.15034 of 2025 on 07.05.2025 challenging IOCL’s e-mail dated 01.04.2025 and 21.02.2025.

               xi. The Writ Petition was disposed of by an order dated 07.05.2025 directing IOCL to consider the grievance of the writ petitioner as stated in the writ petitioner’s representation dated 01.04.2025 and reconsider the impugned decision by providing an opportunity of personal hearing to the writ petitioner and pass appropriate orders within a stipulated time frame. The Court restrained the respondents therein from taking coercive steps against the writ petitioner and its Barge till IOCL passed appropriate orders on the writ petitioner’s representation.

               xii. IOCL passed a Speaking Order on 06.06.2025 after giving a personal hearing to the writ petitioner. IOCL upheld cancellation of the LoA issued to the writ petitioner.

               xiii. The writ petitioner filed W.P.No.16559 of 2025 on 01.07.2025 and obtained an interim order of status-quo from a learned Single Judge of this Court.

               xiv. The interim order granted earlier was extended by a subsequent order dated 18.07.2025. The interim order was again extended on 06.08.2025 till 11.08.2025.

               xv. IOCL issued the Work Order to the appellant on 18.08.2025.

               xvi. The Writ Petition was finally disposed of by the impugned order on 07.11.2025.

9. It is necessary to refer to the order dated 07.05.2025 passed by a learned Single Judge in the first Writ Petition/WP.No.15034 of 2025, since all the parties have extensively referred to the said order. The impugned order dated 07.11.2025 also relies on the said order in cancelling IOCL’s Speaking Order by which cancellation of the LoA issued to the writ petitioner was upheld.

10. The first Writ Petition was filed against the e-mail communication of IOCL’s dated 01.04.2025 cancelling the LoA issued to the writ petitioner and for allowing the writ petitioner to complete the contract work as per the LoA dated 20.02.2025. The learned Single Judge disposed of the Writ Petition by directing IOCL to consider the grievance of the writ petitioner as put forth in its representation dated 01.04.2025 after providing an opportunity of personal hearing to the writ petitioner within a specified time frame.

11. However, the order dealt with the merits of the dispute in detail and opined, inter alia, that although the LoA was issued to the writ petitioner on 20.02.2025, the Work Order was only issued on 12.03.2025 and admittedly the writ petitioner could hence only commence work thereafter. The learned Single Judge further opined that the action of IOCL in cancelling the Work Order on the ground of the writ petitioner failing to offer the Barge for inspection before the due date i.e., on 21.03.2025, was arbitrary and unreasonable. The order dated 07.05.2025 further records that the cancellation was against the principles of natural justice since the petitioner was not provided an opportunity of personal hearing.

12. Notably and notwithstanding the aforesaid opinion, the learned Single Judge directed IOCL to consider the grievance raised by the writ petitioner in the representation and come to a decision thereon within the time frame fixed by the Court. The writ petitioner was protected from coercive steps till IOCL arrived at a decision.

13. The second Writ Petition/WP.No.16559 of 2025, which was filed against the Speaking Order of IOCL dated 06.06.2025, was allowed by the learned Single Judge essentially on the premise that the cancellation of the writ petitioner’s LoA was upheld in disregard of the opinion expressed by the Court in the order dated 07.05.2025. In paragraph 12 of the impugned order, the learned Single Judge notes that IOCL’s action of cancelling the Contract on the very same ground of delay “… is blatant violation of the order of this Court.” IOCL was accordingly directed to take consequential action for permitting the writ petitioner to continue with its contractual obligations as per the LoA and Work Order as expediously as possible. IOCL was directed to consider the writ petitioner’s representation and arrive at a decision after due compliance of the principles of natural justice.

14. The Speaking Order dated 06.06.2025 was passed pursuant to the order dated 07.05.2025. The writ petitioner has not raised any complaint with regard to not being heard by IOCL. The Speaking Order elaborately deals with each of the grounds raised by the writ petitioner in his representation by way of a tabulated statement accompanied by the IOCL’s response. The Speaking Order also deals with the writ petitioner’s contention that the Barge-readiness within 30 days i.e., by 21.03.2025 as unreasonable. IOCL’s response to the aforesaid grievance by stating that the tender terms cannot be tinkered with and the condition was in line with the tender specifications. The Speaking Order states that the writ petitioner was bound by the tender conditions and also admitted to the delay in placing the Barge by 21.03.2025 i.e., 30 days of LoA. IOCL accordingly upheld the direction of the LoA cancellation by way of the Speaking Order.

15. Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner/the respondent No.1 herein has strenuously argued that the Speaking Order should be set aside as being contrary to the opinion expressed by the Court in the first round of litigation i.e., in the order dated 07.05.2025. We disagree with this argument.

16. The order dated 07.05.2025 contained several opinions but culminated in a direction on IOCL to consider the grievance raised by the writ petitioner. Once the Writ Petition was disposed of in the manner that it was, it would be unreasonable of a party to presume that the decision of IOCL would go in its favour or be in line with the views expressed in the order dated 07.05.2025. The presumption could only arise if the Court had interfered with IOCL’s e-mail dated 01.04.2025, by which the LoA issued to the writ petitioner was cancelled. The Writ Petition was however disposed of merely by directing IOCL to revisit the matter and consider the writ petitioner’s representation within a specific time frame.

17. In this context, we must point out that when a Writ Petition is disposed of by a Court with a direction on the concerned authority to consider a representation and pass a reasoned order, the said authority is invited to arrive at a decision based on an independent application of mind. Indeed, it would be an exercise in futility if the authority is directed to decide on the controversy but within the stranglehold of the Court’s observations. In other words, a direction on the authority to decide on a representation presumes that the authority would apply its mind on the issue under consideration without being tethered to the views expressed by the Court. The views may be relevant only to the extent of opening a legal proposition or the law relevant to the subject for the authority to consider for arriving at the decision. Weighing down the concerned authority with the Court’s opinions results in duplication of the decision-making process and is antithetical to the direction itself. The litigant is forced to travel down multiple paths only to find itself back to the starting point.

18. In that sense, the premise of the writ petitioner’s argument that IOCL committed an error in reiterating its earlier view on cancellation of the LoA is patently incorrect. We reiterate that IOCL could not be put within any form of strictures to decide the issue in a particular way. That would only amount to replicating the Court’s views which became observations simipliciter once IOCL was directed to arrive at a fresh decision.

19. Therefore, the reason given in the IOCL’s Speaking Order being in violation of the order passed in the earlier order dated 07.05.2025 is, with respect, erroneous. In essence, the Speaking Order of IOCL dated 06.06.2025 erased the order dated 07.05.2025 to the extent of the opinions/observations contained therein. The Speaking Order constitutes a new cause of action for the purpose of the second Writ Petition/WP.No.16559 of 2025. Thus, harking back to the order dated 07.05.2025 was entirely misplaced and irrelevant.

20. We now come to the merits of the matter. Clause 14 (17)(d) of the Notice Inviting Tender issued by IOCL provides that the “…bidder undertakes to position the offered Barge ready in all aspects along with required licences within 30 days of issuance of LoI/LoA at Vizag Port.” Clause B(4) of the Special Conditions of Contract further provides that IOCL reserves the right to cancel the LoA/LoI if the party fails to get the Barge inspected by IOCL and get ready in all aspects within 30 days of issuance of LoI. The undertaking given by the writ petitioner (Bidder) provides that the Bidder will place the Barge along with the licences and documents within 30 days of issuing the LoA/LoI failing with IOCL reserves the right to cancel of the LoA/LoI. The LoA issued by IOCL on 20.02.2025 provides that all the tender documents and conditions stipulated therein form part of the Work Order/Contract. IOCL’s e-mail dated 21.02.2025 attaching the LoA categorically stipulates that the Barge needs to be placed within 30 days of the LoA.

21. All the above documents categorically reflect that placing the Barge along with required licences within 30 days of issuance of LoA was an essential condition of the tender document which was accepted by the petitioner without demur. The writ petitioner also received communications from IOCL with regard to the stipulated condition without raising any objection at any point of time. The condition of placing the Barge within 30 days of the LoA is intrinsically linked to the performance of the work, namely, for Bunker supply of oil through tanker Barges to foreign/coastal run sea vessels.

22. It is undisputed that the writ petitioner did not place the Barge within 30 days of the LoA i.e., by 21.03.2025. The LoA was issued on 20.02.2025. This would be evident from the e-mail sent by the writ petitioner on 28.03.2025 stating that the writ petitioner’s Barge arrived at Visakhapatnam Port and berthed today i.e., on 28.03.2025 and is ready for procedural inspections. This was followed by the writ petitioner’s e-mail on 29.03.2025 stating that the survey of its Barge at Visakhapatnam Port was completed. In the proceedings of personal hearing held, the writ petitioner’s oral submissions recorded in the proceedings dated 29.05.2025 before the IOCL specifically states the following:

               “3. That Shri Tummalapalli Venkata Ramakrishna further submits that their barge was ready in all respects by 28.03.2025 however as per the LOA they were required to place the barge by 21st March 2025.

               4. That Shri Tummalapalli Venkata Ramakrishna submits that they have been delayed by 06 (six) days in placing the barge ready in all respects as per the tender requirements and that the delay of 06 (six) days be condoned by the competent authority.”

23. Hence, there is little doubt factually that the writ petitioner failed to place the Barge within 30 days of LoA i.e., by 21.03.2025. The writ petitioner’s contention, as expressed by Senior Counsel, that the Barge was ready by 28.03.2025, is hence of no consequence. The writ petitioner failed to comply with the tender condition as on 21.03.2025.

24. The argument of the writ petitioner, as accepted by the learned Single Judge, in respect of the Work Order being the deciding factor is also not acceptable. The argument is completely inconsistent with the Tender conditions set by IOCL and accepted by the writ petitioner without any objection. The specific condition in the Tender Notice i.e., Clause 14(17)(d) stipulates that the Bidder shall offer the Barge ready along with the required licences within 30 days of issuance of LoI/LoA at Vizag Port. IOCL’s right of cancelling the LoA/LoI on the Bidder failing to fulfil the aforesaid stipulation is reflected in Clause B(4) of the Special Conditions of Contract. The Bidder’s undertaking also reflects the same stipulation, i.e., 30 days of issuance of LoA/LoI failing which IOCL reserves right to cancellation of LoA/LoI. The Tender document does not contain any clause which mentions “30 days from the Work Order”. The document does not substitute or replace “LoA/LoI” with “Work Order”. Therefore, reading 30 days from issuance of the Work Order would be inconsistent with the Tender document and would read a term into the Tender conditions which was conspicuously absent.

25. It is admitted that the tender conditions were immutable and remain so till today. We hence disagree with the view of the learned Single Judge in respect of treating the Work Order issued on 12.03.2025 as the starting point for the calculation of 30 days.

26. Judicial Review of decisions taken by authorities in support of Conditions of Tender operates within extremely narrow confines. The consensus arrived at by the Courts is that Courts should not interfere with the decisions of the author of the tender document since the concerned authority is best suited to decide the said issue. The Courts in judicial review should not meddle with such decisions unless the decision is demonstrably arbitrary or reflects favouritism or the operation of extraneous factors in the decision-making process: Noble Resources v. State of Orissa ((2006) 10 SCC 236).

27. It is equally well settled that the process of decision-making forms the fulcrum of the judicial review and not the decision itself. The scope of interference is even more curtailed in contractual matters which involve interpretation of the Conditions of the Tender documents. Courts should hold back from expressing their opinion on matters of interpretation of Tender conditions since they are un-equipped to second-guess the suitability of the tenderer: Agmatel India (P) Limited v. Resoursys Telecom ((2022) 5 SCC 362).

28. Judicial Review of administrative action aims to prevent arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable action on the part of persons and authorities and to keep bias and mala fides at bay. Courts should be mindful of the fact that evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions and the decision with regard to the best person for the job should be left to the tender-issuing authority. Courts should not interfere even on a procedural aberration or error in assessment unless there is a clear breach of the principles of natural justice or the decision-making process is vitiated by mala fides: Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa ((2007) 14 SCC 517). Courts should also not find fault with every decision with a magnifying glass in its hands and should only restrict itself to examining whether the decision-making process complies with the procedure contemplated by the tender conditions: N.G. Projects Limited v. Vinod Kumar Jain ((2022) 6 SCC 127). In fact, in N.G. Projects Limited (supra), the Supreme Court held that if the Court finds that the Tender has been granted in a mala fide manner, the Court should relegate the parties to seek damages for the wrongful exclusion rather than injunct the execution of the contract.

29. It is nobody’s case that the tender process was not conducted in a transparent manner or in accordance with the Tender terms and conditions. The writ petitioner did not challenge the terms of the tender conditions including the condition of the Barge being made ready within 30 days of the LoA/LoI. Hence, the Speaking Order dated 06.06.2025 justifiably rejected the writ petitioner’s objection as an afterthought. Most important, the writ petitioner proceeds on the basis of the Work Order being the starting point of the 30 days which is completely incongruous to the tender terms. The impugned order dated 07.11.2025 erroneously accepted the said condition, thus, importing a term in the tender document which was not there in the first place. The self-imposed limits of writ jurisdiction does not permit the Court to incorporate a new term in the tender document or to alter the terms in a manner suitable to only one party in the contract.

30. The above reasons persuade the Court to interfere with the impugned order.

31. W.A.No.1276 of 2025, along with all connected applications, is accordingly allowed and disposed of by setting aside the order dated 07.11.2025 in W.P.No.16559 of 2025.