Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, J.

1. The present intra-court appeal under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 assails the order dated 01.11.2019 passed in W.P.(c) No.32246/2013 whereby the Writ Petition filed by the appellants herein were dismissed.

2. Heard on I.A. No.3/2021 which is an application for deletion of 5th and 8th respondents from the array of cause title. For the reasons stated in the application, the 5th and 8th respondents stands deleted. The Registry is directed to delete the names of respondents 5 and 8 before issuance of the certified copy of this order.

3. Heard on C.M.Application No.2/2021. This is an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

4. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that there occurred a delay of 430 days in preferring this appeal as they were under the impression that the case was pending before this Court and due to Covid-19 pandemic situation, they were not able to enquire the same. Later, during the month of January 2021, the appellants came to know the fact that the impugned judgment was passed on 01.11.2019. Later, they applied for a certified copy of the impugned judgment on 27.01.2021 and received the certified copy on 28.01.2021.

5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in respect of the delay aspect has rendered several judgments which are reproduced below:

                  5.1     The learned Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpon. Ltd. Vs. K. Thangappan and another reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as under:

                  6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports . Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.

                  5.2     The Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Ram Mohan Raja Vs. State of T.N. and others RePorted in (2007) 9 SCC 78 has held as under :

                  11. So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hard- and fast rule can be laid down and it will depend on the facts of each case. In the present case, the facts stare at the face of it that on 8-10-1996 an order was passed by the Collector in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court, rejecting the application of the writ petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease. The writ petitioner sat tight over the matter and did not challenge the same up to 2003. This on the face of it appears to be very serious. A person who can sit tight for such a long time for no justifiable reason, cannot be given any benefit.

                  5.3     The Supreme Court in the case of Nadia Distt. Primary School Council Vs. Sristidhar Biswas and others reported in (2007) 12 SCC 779 has held as under :

                  11. In the present case, the panel was prepared in 1980 and the petitioners approached the court in 1989 after the decision in Dibakar Pal. Such persons should not be given any benefit by the court when they allowed more than nine years to elapse. Delay is very significant in matters of granting relief and courts cannot come to the rescue of the persons who are not vigilant of their rights. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court condoning the delay of nine years cannot be countenanced.

                  5.4     The Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Lal Vs. State of Haryana and others reported in (1997) 6 SCC 538 has held as under :

                  18. That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the delay disentitles the party to the discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution.

                  5.5     The Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Dass Vs. Union of India reported in (2007) 9 SCC 274 has held as under :

                  6. Normally, in the case of belated approach writ petition has to be dismissed. Delay or laches is one of the factors to be borne in mind by the High Courts when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.

6. In view of the aforesaid legal pronunciation by the Hon’ble Apex Court, we find no justification to grant any indulgence to the appellants against the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, as in the application seeking condonation of delay, no plausible explanation has been put forth by the appellants for such delay. Therefore, the present appeal suffers from a delay of 430 days in approaching this Court against the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. Hence, the delay condonation petition is liable to be dismissed.

                  In view of the aforesaid pronunciation of law and the fact that the delay has not been properly explained, C.M.Appl.No.2/2021 seeking condonation of delay is hereby rejected.

                  As a consequence, the Writ Appeal also dismissed.