Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. The petitioner herein is the wife of one Dilshad E. K. ('detenu' for the sake of brevity) and her challenge in this Writ Petition is directed against Ext.P1 order of detention dated 27.08.2025 passed by the 2nd respondent under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity). The said order stands confirmed by the Government, vide order dated 01.11.2025, and the detenu has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months with effect from the date of detention.

2. The records reveal that on 26.07.2025, a proposal was submitted by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Kozhikode City, seeking initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the KAA(P) Act before the jurisdictional authority, the 2nd respondent. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known goonda' as defined under Section 2(o)(ii) of the KAA(P) Act.

3. Altogether, five cases in which the detenu got involved have been considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing Ext.P1 detention order. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.385/2025 of Nallalam Police Station, alleging commission of the offence punishable under Section 22(c) of the NDPS Act.

4. We heard Smt. Mehnaz P. Mohammed, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

5. Relying on the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another, [1991 (1) SCC 128], the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in cases wherein the detenu is in judicial custody, in connection with the last prejudicial activity, a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed only on satisfaction of the triple test mentioned in the said decision by the Supreme Court. According to the counsel, as the impugned order was passed while the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, it was incumbent upon the authority to satisfy itself that it has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable material placed before it that, there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that on being so released, he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity. According to the counsel, though in Ext.P1 order, it is mentioned that the detenu was undergoing judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, the possibility of the detenu being released on bail is not properly considered. The learned counsel submitted that there is an unreasonable  delay  in  mooting  the  proposal  for  initiation  of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act as well as in passing the impugned order of detention, and the said delay will certainly snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention. The learned counsel further submitted that in one of the cases considered by the jurisdictional authority, the detenu was acquitted subsequent to the detention order and hence, in the changed circumstances, Ext.P1 order is liable to be set aside.

6. In response, the learned Government Pleader submitted that Ext.P1 detention order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the Government Pleader, the detention order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after being fully satisfied that the same is the only way to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities. It was further contended that the jurisdictional authority was fully aware of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity, and it was on being satisfied that there is every chance that the detenu be released on bail, and if so released, he would in all probability indulge in criminal activities further, the order of detenion was passed. According to him, therefore, the order of detention will legally sustain irrespective of the fact that the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity while the impugned order was passed. According to the  Government  Pleader, there  is  no unreasonable delay either in mooting the proposal or in passing the detention order and hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention is snapped cannot be sustained.

7. From the rival contentions raised, it is gatherable that the main question that revolves around this Writ Petition is whether an order of detention under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act can be validly passed against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. While answering the said question, it is to be noted that, through a series of judicial pronouncements rendered by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court, it is well settled that there is no legal impediment in passing an order of detention against a person who is under judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity. However, an order of detention against a person who is in judicial custody in connection with the last prejudicial activity cannot be passed in a causal manner. Undisputedly, an order of detention under the KAA(P) Act is a drastic measure against a citizen as it heavily impacts his personal as well as his fundamental rights. When an effective and alternative remedy exists to prevent a person from repeating criminal activities, resorting to preventive detention is neither warranted nor permissible. When a detenu is in jail in connection with the last prejudicial activity, obviously, there is no imminent possibility of being involved in criminal activities. Therefore, before passing a detention order in respect of a person who is in jail, the concerned authority must satisfy itself that there is a real possibility that the detenu is on bail, and further, if released on bail, the material on record reveals that he will indulge in prejudicial activity if not detained. The circumstances that necessitate the passing of such an order must be reflected in the order itself.

8. In Kamarunnissa’s case (cited supra), the Supreme Court made it clear that a detention order under preventive detention laws can be validly passed even in the case of a person in custody (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable materials placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) that on being so released he would in probability indulged in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is essential to detain him to prevent him from doing so. If the authority passes an order after recording its satisfaction in this regard, such an order would be valid.

9. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Veeramani v. The State of Tamil Nadu [1994 (2) SCC 337] and in Union of India v. Paul Manickam [2003 (8) SCC 342].

10. Keeping in mind the above proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court, while reverting to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.385/2025 of Nallalam Police Station, alleging commission of the offence punishable under Section 22(c) of the NDPS Act. The detenu was arrested on 18.06.2025, and since then, he has been under judicial custody. The impugned order was passed on 27.08.2025, while the detenu was under judicial custody.

11. In Ext.P1 detention order, it is specifically stated that at the time of passing the said order, the detenu was under judicial custody in connection with the case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity. Therefore, it is decipherable that the detaining authority was fully cognizant of the fact that the detenu was in custody at the time when it passed Ext.P1 order.

12. Moreover, in the impugned order, it is clearly mentioned that all the proceedings already initiated under the ordinary criminal law against the detenu, including proceedings under Section 126 of BNSS, did not yield any result, and the accused is involved in criminal activities again, disregarding the bail conditions imposed in the earlier cases. Similarly, in Ext. P1 order, it is further recorded that even though the detenu has not filed a bail application, his antecedents indicate that, if released on bail, he is likely to engage in criminal activities again.

13. We do agree that the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that “detenu is likely to be released on bail”. Dealing with a similar situation, the Supreme Court in Union of India and another vs. Dimple Happy Dhakad ( 2019 KHC 6662), after considering the dictum laid down in Kamarunissa (cited supra) in paragraph 35 of the judgment, observed as follows;

                  “in the light of the well settled principles, we have to see, in the present case, whether there was awareness in the mind of the detaining authority that detenu is in custody and he had reason to believe that detenu is likely to be released on bail and if so released, he would continue to indulge in prejudicial activities. In the present case, the detention orders dated 17.05.2019 record the awareness of the detaining authority that (i) the detenu is in custody, (ii) that the bail application filed by the detenus have been rejected by the court. Of course, in the detention order, the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that the “detenu is likely to be released. It cannot be said that the detaining authority has not applied its mind merely on the ground that in the detention orders, it is not expressly stated as to the “detenu’s likelihood of being released on bail” and if so released, he is likely to indulge in the same prejudicial activities.But the detaining authority has clearly recorded  the  antecedents  of  the  detenu  and  its satisfaction that the detenus, Happy Dhakad and Nisar Aliyar, have the high propensity to commit such offences in the future.”

14. Keeping in mind the above principles laid down by the Supreme Court while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that, in the impugned order, it is specifically recorded that although the detenu has not preferred any application seeking bail, his antecedents show that if he is released on bail, he would be involved in further criminal activities. The satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu is already in custody and he is likely to be released on bail, and on being so released, he is likely to indulge in prejudicial activity, is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, and normally, the subjective satisfaction is not to be interfered with. The impugned order reflects that there is a proper application of mind and, based on the materials available on record, the detaining authority subjectively satisfied that there is a reason to believe that there is a possibility of the detenu being released on bail and that, on so released, the detenu will in all probability indulge in prejudicial activities undermining the bail conditions. Therefore, merely because of the reason that the detaining authority has not specifically recorded that “the detenu is likely to be released on bail”, it cannot be said that the impugned order lacks satisfaction of the detaining authority regarding the chance of the detenu being released on bail.

15. Now, while coming to the contention of the petitioner regarding the delay that occurred in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the detention order, first of all, it is to be noted that, as already stated, the detenu was arrested in connection with the last prejudicial activity on 18.06.2025. Subsequently, it was on 26.07.2025, the sponsoring authority mooted the proposal for action under the KAA(P) Act. Later, it was on 27.08.2025, the detention order was passed.

Evidently, the proposal was forwarded, and the detention order was passed while the detenu was under judicial custody. Since the detenu was in jail, there was no basis for any apprehension regarding imminent repetition of criminal activities by him. Therefore, the minimum delay that occurred in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the order is liable to be discarded, and it could not be said that the said delay is sufficient to snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention.

16. Another contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, in one of the cases considered by the jurisdictional authority, the detenu was acquitted subsequent to the issuance of the detention order, and therefore, in the changed circumstances, Ext. P1 order is liable to be set aside. While considering this contention, it is to be noted that no documents whatsoever have been produced by the petitioner to show that the detenu has in fact been acquitted. Even assuming that the detenu was acquitted after the issuance of the detention order, it cannot be said that the said case ought not to have been considered by the jurisdictional authority, particularly since there is no material to show that the acquittal was an honourable one. Moreover, the jurisdiction exercised under the KAA(P) Act is one based on suspicion. Therefore, an acquittal in a case after the issuance of the detention order has little significance, especially when it is not established that such acquittal was honourable. Furthermore, even if the said case were to be excluded from consideration, there are four other qualifying cases sufficient to bring the detenu within the threshold required to classify him as a "known goonda." Accordingly, the above contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner also fails.

In the result, we have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner has not made out any ground for interference. Hence, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.