1. The petitioners in W.P(C) No.7161 of 2013 have filed this intra-court appeal, seeking to challenge the judgment dated 26.05.2025 of a learned Single Judge of this Court.

2. The 1st appellant is stated to be a Charitable Trust, and the 2nd appellant is one of the Trustees. The Trust is running a school having affiliation with the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE). The Government proposed to acquire around 732 Acres of land for setting up Technocity under the Technopark. Pursuant to certain representations made, not to include some of the properties in the acquisition steps, Ext.P3 order was issued, granting permission for the acquisition of 507 Acres alone for the purpose noted above. Ext.P4 is the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act” for short), followed by the notification under Section 6(1) of the Act at Ext.P5. The appellants contend that it was during the pendency of an application submitted, seeking an exemption from the acquisition steps, that all the afore proceedings were issued. Ultimately, by Ext.P13, the 1st respondent sought to reject the prayer for exemption by the appellants. In a writ petition filed against Ext.P13 order, a learned Single Judge of this Court, by Ext.P15 judgment in W.P(C) No.32628 of 2010, noticing that a different treatment has been effected with respect to a similarly situated institution, set aside Ext.P13, directing fresh consideration. The Government Order referred to by this Court while rendering Ext.P15 judgment as above is the one at Ext.P16 dated 04.05.2011. The afore order is one in respect of a prayer made by the Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum, the Government deciding to exempt the properties concerned from the land acquisition proceedings for Technocity. The appellants contend that in spite of the afore direction, Ext.P17 has been issued by the Government refusing to extend any exemption mainly on account of the stand taken by the Technopark to the effect that if the benefit of exemption is extended, the adjoining acquired properties would remain as isolated parcels of land detrimental to the project itself. The Government also took note of the fact that possession has already been handed over to the Technopark, the transfer of registry has been effected, and basic tax has also been paid by Technopark with respect to the properties in question.

3. It is seeking to challenge Ext.P17 issued by the Government as above that W.P(C) No.7161 of 2013 was instituted. A learned Single Judge of this Court held that if the exemption is extended to the properties in question, it would result in formation of isolated parcels of land in the project area; this being a question of fact does not require any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, that the reasons stated for rejecting the claim in Ext.P17 order, especially with reference to the exemption granted to Latin Arch Diocese of Thiruvananthapuram, cannot be termed to be irrational or perverse, that the properties sought to be exempted from acquisition is not the playground of the school as contended and therefore, dismissed the writ petition.

4. It is seeking to challenge the afore judgment, that this intra-court appeal is presented.

5. Heard Sri.K.T.Thomas, the learned counsel for the appellants, as well as Smt.Rashmi K.V., the learned Standing Counsel for the 5th respondent and the learned Special Government Pleader, Smt.Sudhadevi.

6. On 12.08.2025, considering the contention raised before us that in spite of an award being passed, no possession was taken, even on the face of the Mahazar produced by the learned Government Pleader, which shows that the possession was taken on 12.08.2010, we appointed an Advocate Commissioner to report as to the “present status, the nature and lie of the property”. The Advocate Commissioner has filed a detailed report dated 25.08.2025, also with reference to the additional six points required to be reported by the appellants herein. A perusal of the said report would show that the disputed property, having an area of 51 Ares, is lying on the southern side of the appellants’ property, sharing a common boundary on one side. With respect to the properties in question, the Advocate Commissioner has also produced Annexure C6 sketch. She has reported that the disputed property is planted mainly with “rubber trees and few other trees, plants, and shrubs” and all the trees are “marked and numbered”. The Advocate Commissioner has also reported that no construction, development, or project activity was seen on the disputed land; the land remains unused except for the rubber trees. A brief history with respect to the school run by the Trust is also provided by the Advocate Commissioner. The Advocate Commissioner has further reported that certain nearby properties have been exempted from acquisition.

7. We notice from the pleadings in the writ petition that the school in question does have a playground. It contends that the existing playground is required for further developmental activities and that the disputed property requires to be developed as a new playground. It is for this reason that the prayer for exemption has been made. Although it was contended before us that the disputed property had been used as a playground, the Advocate Commissioner’s report clearly shows that the property in question was only a rubber plantation. The school thus admittedly has another playground. The school is stated to have 9000 students, and merely because there is a plan for development by the construction of additional buildings in the “existing playground”, the appellants cannot contend that the disputed property requires to be exempted from land acquisition.

8. Furthermore, we notice that as early as on 12.08.2010 itself, the possession was handed over to the Technopark. The fact that the standing trees in the disputed property are numbered has been specifically noted in the Advocate Commissioner's report. The appellant never had a case at any point of time that the disputed property had standing trees, whether it be rubber trees or other trees, numbered by them. With reference to the afore, we also notice the report dated 27.10.2025 of the 6th respondent produced before us, as per which it has been reported that it is the Technopark, which numbered the standing trees in the property in question. When that be so, the fact that the Technopark had been remitting tax with respect to the property from 2011 onwards gains significance to prove its possession.

9. Sri.Thomas would also rely on the judgments of the Apex Court in Hari Ram and Another v. State of Haryana and Others [(2010) 3 SCC 621], Sham Lal and Others v. State of Punjab and Others [(2013) 14 SCC 393] and Krishan Chander and Another v. State of Haryana and Others [(2019) 9 SCC 292] in support of the contentions urged by him, noticed as above. Hari Ram (supra) considered the question as to withdrawal from acquisition under Section 48 of the Act, on the ground of discrimination alleged. The Apex Court found that the power to withdraw from acquisition under the Act is not restricted by any condition, except that the power should be exercised before possession is taken. The Apex Court also found that the State action in treating various similarly situated land owners differently, cannot be countenanced. Sham Lal (supra) is also rendered with reference to the principles laid down in Hari Ram (supra), holding that the quality of construction, while exercising the power to grant exemption, is irrelevant or extraneous. In Krishan Chander (supra), the Apex Court considered the issue with reference to the relevant precedents and held that discrimination cannot be permitted while exercising the power to grant an exemption from acquisition.

10. As regards the principles laid down in the afore judgments, there is no quarrel. The question for consideration before us is as to whether the appellants have succeeded in their attempt in contending that there is discrimination in exercising the power for exclusion from acquisition. The afore contention has been raised essentially with respect to Annexure A1 with reference to the exemption provided to Asian Business School and with reference to the exemption provided for Modern Public School. Regarding the afore contention, the Advocate Commissioner has categorically reported that the said properties are lying away from the disputed property. A perusal of Annexure A1 order with reference to the exemption granted to Asian School of Business would also show that they have been operating from Technopark Campus since 2005 onwards, and their continuance was also mooted by Technopark being an Educational institution having great value to the Technocity Project. The order also shows that the exemption is being extended for the purpose of the teaching facility noticed therein. As against this, we note that the appellants’ school stated to have 9000 students, was functioning before the acquisition, and even after the acquisition, it is functioning with the same facilities, and there is no case for the appellants that on account of the acquisition, any of the facilities provided to the students had to be sacrificed. The contention raised in the writ petition is essentially to the effect that the property in question would be required for a “proposed playground” as and when the present playground is used for constructing an additional building. From this, it is clear that the school already has a playground, and even now, the same playground is used.

11. In such circumstances, we are of the opinion that the appellants have failed to prove their allegations as regards discrimination, while providing for exemption from the acquisition proceedings.

12. We are therefore of the opinion that the findings contained in Ext.P17 cannot be fault with in any manner. Although the appellants contended that a different treatment was extended to other institutions, the Advocate Commissioner has categorically reported that those properties are located at distances of 3 km and 2.5 km, respectively, from the disputed properties. It is with respect to this, we notice the contention taken by the 5th respondent, as well as the State, that if an exemption is allowed, the adjoining properties would remain as isolated land parcels. This contention appears to be the correct position with reference to Annexure C6 sketch produced along with the Advocate Commissioner’s report.

                  In the result, we find no reason to entertain this intra-court appeal, and the same would stand dismissed.