Jobin Sebastian, J.

1. This writ petition is directed against Ext.P4 order of externment dated 10.09.2025, passed against the petitioner by the 2nd respondent, invoking Section 15(1)(a) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P) Act for the sake of brevity]. By the said order, the petitioner was interdicted from entering the limits of the Revenue District Palakkad for a period of six months from the date of the receipt of the order.

2. For passing the externment order, the competent authority considered four cases in which the petitioner was involved. Out of the said cases, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity, which was considered by the judicial authority for passing Ext.P4 order is Crime No.364/2025 of Walayar Police Station, registered alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 126(2) and 115(2) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short “BNS”).

3. Heard Sri. Navaneeth.N.Nath, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order impugned by way of this writ petition has been passed on improper application of mind and without arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the counsel, there is an unreasonable delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the order of externment after the date of the last prejudicial activity. The learned counsel pointed out that the said long delay in submitting the proposal and in passing the externment order will certainly snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of the externment. On these premises, the learned counsel urged to set aside the impugned order.

5. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader submitted that there is no unreasonable delay in passing the Ext.P4 order of externment. According to him, some minimal delay is inevitable while passing an order, especially when it is the duty of the authority to ensure adherence to the natural justice principles while passing such an order. According to him, the authority needs a reasonable time to collect the details of the cases in which the petitioner was involved, and therefore, the minimum delay in submitting the proposal is quite natural, and the same is only negligible.

6. We have considered the rival contentions and perused the records. The records show that the petitioner was classified as a “known rowdy”, as provided under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act. As evident from the records, it was after considering his recurrent involvement in criminal activities that the sponsoring authority had recommended for initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act against the petitioner. Admittedly, the case registered against the petitioner with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.364/2025 of Walayar Police Station, registered alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 126(2) and 115(2) of BNS and he was arrayed as the sole accused in the said case. The incident that led to the registration of the said case occurred on 29.04.2025. The petitioner was arrested in the said case on 31.05.2025, and released on bail on the same day. Notably, it was thereafter, on 22.08.2025, the proposal for initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act was initiated against him. Virtually, there is a delay of around four months in forwarding the proposal after the date of commission of the last prejudicial activity.

7. While considering the contention of the petitioner, regarding the delay that occurred in submitting the proposal and in passing the order, it cannot be ignored that an order under Section 15 of the KAA(P)Act has a significant impact on the personal right of an individual. So such an order could not be passed in a casual manner; instead, it can only be passed on credible materials after arriving at the requisite objective and subjective satisfaction. However, there exists no inflexible rule requiring that an externment order has to be passed within a specific time frame following the last prejudicial activity. However, when there is undue delay in forwarding the proposal and passing the externment order, the same would undermine its validity, particularly when no convincing or plausible explanation is offered for the delay.

8. Keeping in mind the above settled principles, while coming to the facts in the present case, it can be seen that, as already stated, there is a delay of around four months in mooting the proposal after the date of commission of the last prejudicial activity. The said delay assumes significance, particularly since the petitioner got bail after two days of the commission of the said act. The said delay cannot be justified by saying that the same was necessary for observing natural justice principles. The assertion that additional time was needed to gather the details of the crimes before forwarding the proposal lacks credibility. In the case at hand, only four cases formed the basis for proposing and issuing the externment order. The details of those cases were readily available and could have been obtained without delay, given the technological upgradation attained by the Law Enforcement Authority. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the delay in mooting the proposal is unreasonable and unjustifiable. If the Superintendent of Police was having bona fide apprehension regarding the repetition of anti-social activities by the petitioner, definitely, he would have acted swiftly and with great alacrity in submitting the proposal immediately after the last prejudicial activity. Therefore, we are of the view that the delay in forwarding the proposal will certainly snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of the impugned order.

9. Moreover, from the submissions made by the learned Government Pleader and the memo filed by him, it is discernible that on 31.10.2025, the petitioner was convicted in one of the cases registered against him and presently he is undergoing a sentence in jail. Evidently, the petitioner was convicted after the issuance of Ext.P4 externment order. As the petitioner is undergoing a sentence in jail, in pursuance of the conviction passed against him in a case, an externment order is not at all necessary.

Resultantly, Ext.P4 order is set aside, and the petition stands allowed.