(Prayer: This petition is filed under section 528 of BNSS to call for the records relating to the FIR in Crime NO. 93 of 2026 on the file of the 1st Respondent and quash the same and pass such further or other orders as this Honble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case and thus render Justice.)

1. This petition has been filed to quash the FIR registered in Crime No.93 of 2026 on the file of the first respondent.

2. The case of the prosecution is that the accused are the partners of M/s Arulmurugan Promoters and they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding dated 17.12.2021 with the second respondent in order to development and sale of plots situated in Ramamurthy Nagar Phase I and II, Pazhanthandalam Village, Kundrathur Taluk, Kancheepuram District. As per the MOU, the defacto complainant was empowered to market and sell the plots and certain amounts were paid by him towards advance sale consideration. Thereafter, the accused violated the terms and conditions and sold out the plots. On registration of the complaint the first respondent registered the FIR in crime No.93 of 2026 for the offences alleged under section 61(2), 296(b), 316(2), 318(4), 351(2) and section 3(5) of the BNSS. To quash the FIR the present petition has been filed.

3. Though notice was served and name was printed in the cause list there is no appearance on the side of the second respondent.

4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Advocate appearing for the first respondent.

5. On a perusal of records reveal that dispute arose between parties in relating to the accounting of sale proceeds, developer charges and performance of obligations under memorandum of understanding. According to the defacto complainant the petitioners have violated the terms specified in the MOU. Therefore, the defacto complainant invoked arbitration proceedings and approached this Court under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act seeking interim injunction against the petitioners. Thereafter, both parties agreed for appointment of sole arbitrator and arbitral proceedings commenced in Arb.Case No.02 of 2025. In the said Arbitration case the defacto complainant filed I.A.Nos 1 and 2 of 2025 seeking injunction restraining the petitioners from dealing with any of the remaining plots and also seeking a direction to furnish security for a sum of Rs.12,81,75,895/- After elaborate hearing and consideration of the rival claims, the learned Sole Arbitrator by order dated 02.09.2025 dismissed the application seeking security and granted only a limited injunction restraining alienation of 40,000 sq.ft out of the remaining extent while specifically permitted the petitioners to deal with the remaining 95,453 sq.ft .

6. Aggrieved over the same the defacto complainant preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of this Court and the same was dismissed in Arbitration Appeal in A.No.36 of 2025 on 28.09.2025 and confirmed the order passed by the arbitrator. Subsequently the defacto complainant lodged the present complaint with the false allegations. The entire dispute between the parties is that the accused violated the terms and conditions as per the MOU dated 17.12.2021 and sold out the plots. That apart the arbitration proceedings is pending. The allegations lodged against the accused are there was between parties in relating to the accounting of sale proceeds, developer charges and performance of obligations falling within the jurisdiction of the learned Arbitrator and it cannot be constitute as criminal offence as lodged by the defacto complainant. For the above said allegations now the first respondent registered the FIR in crime No.93 of 2026 for the offences alleged under section 61(2), 296(b), 316(2), 318(4), 351(2) and section 3(5) of the BNSS.

7. In this regard it would be relevant to refer the following Judgments

                   7.1. Judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Inder Chand Bagri Vs Jagadish prasad Bagri and Another reported in (2025) Scc Online SC 2529 and the relevant portion is extracted hereunder:

                   17. The contents of the complaint would have to be read in light of the ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC and the law settled by this Court through various judicial dicta. On perusal of the complaint dated 19.09.2013, it is noted that the complainnant/respondent No.1 has filed the said complaint invoking Sections 406/420 of the IPC. For case of reference, the aforesaid Sections are extracted as under:

                   “ 406. Punished for Criminal breach of trust.- Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extent to three years, or with fine, or with both.

                   420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property; Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to delivery any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security shall be punished with imprisonment or either description for a term which may extent to seven years m and shall also be liable to fine.:

                   18. In Inder Moham Goswami Vs. State of Uttaranchal (2007) 12 SCC (20080 1 SCC ( Crl) 259( “ Inder Mohan Goswami”), while dealing with Section 420 of the IPC, this court observed thus:

                   42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is manifest that in the definition there are two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced t odo. In the first class of acts he may be induced fradulently or dishonesly to deliver property to any person. The second class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducement must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mer failure to subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention to break the promise from the beginning:.

                   19. In the light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, we find that the complainant/respondent No.1 has failed to make out a case that satisfied the basic ingredients of the offence under section 420 of the IPC. WE fail to understand as to how the allegations against the appellant-accused herein could be brought with the scope and ambit of the aforesaid section. On a bare perusal of the complaint, we do not find that the offence of cheating as defined under section 420 of the IPC is made out at all and we do not find that there is any cheating and dishonest inducement to deliver any property of a valuable security involved in the instance case.

                   20. It is settled law that for establishing the offence of cheating, the complainant/respondent no.1 was required to show that the appellant-accused had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making a promise of representation of not fulfilling the partnership agreement. Such a culpable intention right at the beginning cannot be presumed but has to be made with cogent facts. In the factso f the present case, there is clear absence of material on record to attribute any dishonest and fraudulent intention to the appellant-accused at the time of creation of partnership agreement. WE must hasten to add that there is no allegation in the complaint indicating wither expressly or impliedly any intentional deception or fraudulent. dishonest intention on the part of the appellantaccused right from the time of formation of the partnership deed. Nothing has been said on what the misrepresentation were and how the appellant-accused intentionally deceived the complainant/respondent No.1 Mere allegations that the appellant-accused dishonestly induced the complaint/respondent No.1 to part with the property of the partnership firm and subsequently sold the property to a third party does not satisfy the test of dishonest inducement to deliver a property or part with a valuable security as enshrined under Section 420 of the IPC

                   21. On perusal of the allegations contained in the complaint, in the light of the ingredients of Section 406 of the IPC, read in the context of Section 405 of the IPC, we again failed to see how an ofence of criminal breach of trust can be made out. It is trite law that every act of breach of trust may not result in the penal offence unless there is evidence of a manipulating act of fraudulent misappropriation of a property entrusted to him. In the case of criminal breach of trust, if a person comes into possession of the property and receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts it to its own use against the terms of intention or not and whether such retention involves criminal breach of trust or only civil liability would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case.

                   7.2 Judgment rendered by the Bomaby High Court in the case of Tejas Shah and others VS. T he state of Maharashtra and the relevant portion is extracted hereunder:

                   45. The said company has converted a purely civilcommercial dispute into a criminal case solely because civil remedies are time consuming and because criminal prosecution may lead to a quick settlement, as it amounts to applying pressure on the accused.

8. The above Judgments squarely applies to the case on hand. Since the defacto complainant failed to prove the offence is of criminal and also there is no essential ingredients to attract the offence under section 406 and 420 of IPC. If it is the offence of breach of trust as defined under sections 405 and 406 of IPC he ought to have proved the same. Therefore, there is a distinction between the Criminal Breach of Trust and violation of the agreement. For breach of trust criminal intention is necessary. Thus in this case there is no criminal breach of trust.

9. Considering the aforesaid facts and concluding that the subject matter of the impugned FIR is a civil dispute inter se between the petitioner and Respondent No.2, continuation of the criminal proceedings would be an abuse of process of law .

10. In view of the above facts, this Criminal Original Petition stands allowed and the FIR in Crime No. 93 of 2026 registered by the first respondent police is hereby quashed as against the petitioners. Consequently the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.