(Prayer: To Set aside the order passed by the III Additional Sessions Judge, Puducherry in M.P.No.2/2026 in Crl.A.No.98 of 2026 dated 13.07.2026 on the file of the III Additional Sessions Judge at Puducherry and call for the records and set aside the same and by the petitioner and pass any other order or direction as this Honourable Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.)
1. This Criminal Revision Case has been filed by the Revision Petitioner, challenging the order dated 13.07.2026 passed in M.P.No.2 of 2026 in Crl.A.No.98 of 2026 by the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, Puducherry, and seeking to set aside the same and consequently restore the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate (Mahila Court), Puducherry, in M.P.No.1 of 2026 in D.V.C.No.8 of 2026.
2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present Revision are that the Revision Petitioner is an aged widow, aged about 73 years, and the wife of late Jayapal. It is her case that, as she and her husband had no biological children, they had adopted the first Respondent as their son and brought him up, provided him education and now he has secured a permanent job in government enterprises. Thereafter arranged his marriage with the second Respondent.
3. It is the further case of the Revision Petitioner that her husband, during his lifetime, had executed a Will in favour of the first Respondent in respect of the property in which the residential house is situated, while specifically protecting the life interest and right of residence of the Revision Petitioner during her lifetime. The Revision Petitioner claims that she had been residing in the said premises for several decades and that, after the death of her husband on 09.06.2023, she continued to reside therein.
4. According to the Revision Petitioner, subsequently, disputes arose between her and the Respondents and, on 30.12.2024, the second Respondent allegedly picked up a quarrel with her and assaulted her, pursuant to which a complaint was lodged and a case came to be registered in Crime No.7 of 2025.
5. It is also the case of the Revision Petitioner that she was thereafter dispossessed from the residential premises and was compelled to take shelter in the house of a relative. She further alleges that certain gold jewels belonging to her were taken away. Claiming that she was an aggrieved person who had been residing in a shared household and that she was entitled to the protection of her right of residence under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, she instituted D.V.C.No.8 of 2026 before the learned Judicial Magistrate (Mahila Court), Puducherry.
6. The learned Magistrate, upon consideration of the materials placed before the Court, found that the relationship between the parties and the domestic relationship were prima facie established and that the premises in question constituted a shared household. The learned Magistrate further found that the Revision Petitioner had been residing in the said premises and was subsequently driven out and, therefore, was entitled to protection of her right of residence under Sections 17 and 19 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
7. The learned Magistrate accordingly granted a Residence Order in favour of the Revision Petitioner and also granted a Protection Order directing that the Revision Petitioner should not cause disturbance to the Respondents and that the Respondents should also not cause any disturbance to the Revision Petitioner while she resides in the shared household. The jurisdictional police were also directed to assist the Revision Petitioner in the implementation of the order, as and when required.
8. Aggrieved by the said order, the Respondents preferred an appeal before the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, Puducherry. In M.P.No.2 of 2026, the learned Appellate Court, by order dated 13.07.2026, granted interim stay of the order of the learned Magistrate, subject to the condition that the first Appellant/first Respondent herein should pay a sum of Rs.15,000/- per month to the Revision Petitioner towards house rent, enabling her to secure alternative accommodation pending disposal of the appeal.
9. The Revision Petitioner is aggrieved by the said order and contends that the direction to pay a sum of Rs.15,000/- per month towards alternative accommodation does not adequately protect her statutory right of residence, particularly when she has been residing in the disputed premises for several decades and is now an aged widow without independent support.
10. This Court heard the learned counsel appearing for the Revision Petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the Respondents and perused the materials available on record.
11. The learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner submitted that the Revision Petitioner is aged about 73 years and is an old widow who has been residing in the disputed premises for several decades. It is submitted that the first Respondent was adopted and brought up by the Revision Petitioner and her late husband and that the Revision Petitioner had reasonably expected the first Respondent to take care of her during her old age.
12. It is further submitted that the learned Magistrate, after considering the materials available on record, had found that the parties had shared a domestic relationship and that the premises constituted a shared household. The learned counsel submitted that the order of the learned Magistrate was passed keeping in view the statutory protection available to an aggrieved woman under the Domestic Violence Act and that the learned Appellate Court ought not to have stayed the operation of the Residence Order merely by directing payment of Rs.15,000/- per month towards alternative accommodation.
13. The learned counsel further submitted that the Revision Petitioner has no independent support system and is dependent upon others for her day-to-day requirements. It is submitted that directing her to secure alternative accommodation would cause serious hardship and would virtually defeat the very purpose of the Residence Order granted by the learned Magistrate.
14. The learned counsel also submitted that the 1st Respondent, being person who was brought up and supported by the Revision Petitioner and her late husband, have a corresponding responsibility to ensure her safety, food, clothing, medical requirements and other basic necessities during her old age. It is therefore prayed that the order of the learned Appellate Court be stayed and the Residence Order passed by the learned Magistrate be restored and implemented.
15. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the Respondents submitted that serious disputes relating to title and possession of the property are pending before the competent Civil Court and that the Revision Petitioner had also approached the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Tribunal. It is therefore submitted that the proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act should not be permitted to be used for indirectly deciding the title to the property.
16. This Court has considered the rival submissions.
17. At the outset, it is necessary to observe that the proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are intended to provide immediate and effective protection to an aggrieved woman against domestic violence and to secure the statutory rights available to her under the Act. The determination of the ultimate title to the property is not the subject matter of the present proceedings.
18. In the present case, the learned Magistrate, upon consideration of the materials placed before the Court, has recorded a prima facie finding that the Revision Petitioner and the first Respondent were in a domestic relationship and that the disputed premises constituted a shared household. The learned Magistrate has also taken note of the materials relating to the alleged incident dated 30.12.2024 and the registration of the criminal case pursuant to the complaint lodged by the Revision Petitioner.
19. This Court is conscious of the fact that there are civil proceedings between the parties concerning the property and that the Respondents have raised contentions regarding title and possession. However, the pendency of such proceedings, by itself, cannot be treated as a ground to deprive an aggrieved woman of the protection available to her under the Domestic Violence Act, particularly at the interim stage. The question of title can be adjudicated by the competent Civil Court in the appropriate proceedings.
20. The material placed before this Court indicates that the Revision Petitioner is a woman aged about 73 years and that she had been residing in the disputed premises for a considerable length of time. She is presently stated to be residing with a relative after being dispossessed from the premises. The fact that the learned Magistrate had found a prima facie right of residence in her favour assumes considerable significance while considering the order of interim stay granted by the learned Appellate Court.
21. This Court is also of the view that merely directing payment of Rs.15,000/- per month towards alternative accommodation, in the circumstances of the present case, may not by itself afford adequate protection to the Revision Petitioner. The right of residence granted by the learned Magistrate cannot be rendered illusory merely because there are disputes between the parties concerning the property.
22. In this regard, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kamalakant Mishra v. Additional Collector and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2077, assumes considerable significance. In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the plight of a senior citizen whose son had taken possession of the properties belonging to the senior citizen and had not permitted him to reside therein. The Supreme Court noticed that the High Court had interfered with the order passed by the Maintenance Tribunal directing the son's eviction, inter alia, on an erroneous understanding of the status of the parties.
23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while restoring the order of the Tribunal, emphasised the beneficial character of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and observed that the legislative framework was enacted to address the plight of older persons and to secure their care and protection. The Court held that, being a welfare legislation, the provisions of the Act must be construed liberally so as to advance its beneficent purpose. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that the Tribunal is well within its powers to order eviction of a child or relative from the property of a senior citizen when there is a breach of the obligation to maintain the senior citizen.
24. Significantly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that the son, despite being financially stable, had acted in breach of his statutory obligations by not permitting the senior citizen to reside in his properties, thereby frustrating the very object of the legislation. The High Court's interference was consequently set aside. The relevant paragraphs are extracted as under:
“6. The High Court in allowing the appeal has proceeded on the presumption that the respondent is also a senior citizen as per section 2(h) of the Act, as his date of birth is 04.07.1964. It observed that the Tribunal could not have allowed appellant's complaint since it was made against another senior citizen. This in our view is erroneous. The record shows that the appellant had moved an application before the Tribunal on 12.07.2023 and at that point in time, the respondent's age was 59 years. Relevant date for consideration would be the date of filing the application before the Tribunal.
7. The framework of the Act clearly notes that the law was enacted to address the plight of older persons, for their care and protection. Being a welfare legislation, its provisions must be construed liberally so as to advance its beneficent purpose. This Court on several occasions has observed that the Tribunal is well within its powers to order eviction of a child or a relative from the property of a senior citizen, when there is a breach of the obligation to maintain the senior citizen.2 In the present case, despite being financially stable, the respondent has acted in breach of his statutory obligations in not allowing the appellant to reside in the properties owned by him, thereby frustrating the very object of the Act. High Court fell in error in allowing the writ petition on a completely untenable ground.
8. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed.”
25. The principle emerging from Kamalakant Mishra (supra) is that the protective legislation concerning senior citizens cannot be interpreted in a manner which permits an aged parent to be deprived of the security and dignity of residence while the dispute remains pending. Though the said decision arose under the Senior Citizens Act, the underlying principle concerning protection of the residence and welfare of an aged parent is relevant to the humanitarian and protective approach required in the present case.
26. A similar approach was adopted by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Smt. Sumantra Bai Mehra v. Smt. Parvati Mehra @ Rinki Mehra, Miscellaneous Petition No.4895 of 2024, decided on 14.10.2024, reported at Neutral Citation No.2024:MPHC-JBP:63228. In that case, the petitioner, a 73- year-old widow, had alleged that she was forcibly thrown out of her house by her daughter-in-law and sought restoration of possession under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The Maintenance Officer had directed restoration of possession, which was subsequently interfered with by the appellate authorities. The High Court set aside those orders and directed restoration of possession to the aged mother-in-law.
27. The Madhya Pradesh High Court, after considering the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District, held that "maintenance" under Section 2(b) of the Senior Citizens Act includes food, clothing, residence and medical attendance and treatment. The Court further observed that where an aged owner of a house has been thrown out, the power to secure residence to the senior citizen necessarily includes the power to restore possession where such restoration is required to give meaningful effect to the welfare legislation.
28. More importantly, in Sumantra Bai Mehra (supra), the High Court specifically dealt with the situation of a mother-in-law who had been thrown out of the house and observed, in substance, that an owner of a house cannot be thrown out of her own residence in such a manner and that the protective provisions of the Senior Citizens Act must be given a meaningful interpretation so as to secure residence to an aged person. The Court ultimately directed that possession of the property be restored to the petitioner, while also recognising the competing rights of the daughter-in-law. The relevant paragraphs are extracted as under:
“33.The respondent is directed to give possession to the owner of the property i.e. mother-in-law. As the daughter-in-law is also having a right and share in the property of her husband coupled with the fact that she is entitled for shared household in her matrimonial house and having a right to reside in her matrimonial house (as in the present case she is already residing there), therefore, she may not be evicted from the house in question. As far as the right of the owner is concerned, mother-in-law is the owner of property. She is having full right and for possession of property, she cannot be evicted or thrown out of the property the manner in which it has been done in the present case.”
29. This Court is also conscious that the present proceedings arise under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Section 17 of the said Act recognises the right of every woman in a domestic relationship to reside in the shared household, irrespective of whether she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. Section 19 further empowers the Magistrate to pass appropriate residence orders in the circumstances contemplated under the Act.
30. The statutory scheme therefore makes it clear that the immediate protection of residence and safety is distinct from the ultimate adjudication of proprietary rights. Consequently, the pendency of civil proceedings or competing claims of title cannot, at the interim stage, by itself obliterate the protection which the learned Magistrate has found necessary to grant to the Revision Petitioner.
31. There is also a human dimension to the dispute which this Court cannot lose sight of. The Revision Petitioner is stated to be an aged widow who, having no biological children, had adopted the first Respondent and brought him up as her own son. The relationship between the parties, therefore, is not merely a relationship arising out of a legal or property dispute. At this stage, without expressing any final opinion on the rival allegations, the Court expects the parties to remember the human relationship that has existed between them.
32. A house may be a subject matter of litigation, but for an aged woman who has spent several decades of her life therein, it also represents her sense of security, dignity and belonging. Equally, for a person who was brought up as a son by the Revision Petitioner, the responsibilities arising from such a relationship cannot be viewed merely through the prism of competing claims over property.
33. In this context, the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai, (1987) 2 SCC 278 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 329 : AIR 1987 SC 1100, are of considerable relevance. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a parent who is unable to maintain himself or herself can claim maintenance from a son or daughter and observed that a daughter does not cease to be a daughter merely because she is married. The Court further emphasised that Indian society casts a duty upon children to maintain their parents when they are unable to maintain themselves and that it is also their duty to look after their parents when they become old and infirm. The relevant paragraphs are extracted here under:
“6. There can be no doubt that it is the moral obligation of a son or a daughter to maintain his or her parents. It is not desirable that even though a son or a daughter has sufficient means, his or her parents would starve. Apart from any law, the Indian society casts a duty on the children of a person to maintain their parents if they are not in a position to maintain themselves. It is also their duty to look after their parents when they become old and infirm.
12. We are unable to accept the contention of the appellant that a married daughter has no obligation to maintain her parents even if they are unable to maintain themselves. It has been rightly pointed out by the High Court that a daughter after her marriage does not cease to be a daughter of the father or mother. It has been earlier noticed that it is the moral obligation of the children to maintain their parents. In case the contention of the appellant that the daughter has no liability whatsoever to maintain her parents is accepted, parents having no son but only daughters and unable to maintain themselves, would go destitute, if the daughters even though they have sufficient means refuse to maintain their parents”
34. The principle stated in Vijaya Manohar Arbat (supra) is particularly relevant to the present case, not for the purpose of finally determining any statutory maintenance claim, but for recognising the larger obligation of children towards aged and infirm parents. The Court cannot remain oblivious to the fact that the Revision Petitioner claims to have adopted and brought up the first Respondent as her own son and is now, at the age of 73 years, seeking protection and care from the very family which she states she nurtured.
35. The said principle finds further support from the judgment of the Madras High Court in S. Rajan v. R. Srinivasan and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine Mad 3052 : (2025) 2 LW 289. The Court, while considering the protective object of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, referred to the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijaya Manohar Arbat (supra) that Indian society casts a duty upon children to maintain and look after their parents when they become old and infirm.
36. The learned Court in the case of S. Rajan (supra) further emphasised that the Senior Citizens Act is a beneficial legislation which requires liberal construction and that its object is not confined merely to providing a monetary amount by way of maintenance. The Court observed that the legislation contemplates not merely basic amenities but also the basic physical needs of senior citizens and that "love and care" are contemplated under the various provisions of the Act. The relevant paragraphs are extracted as under:
“70. The Writ Court further made a findings that the children defending their case merely on the ground that they are willing to provide food and shelter, cannot be considered as a ground for the purpose of sustaining the Settlement Deed executed by the senior citizen. The requirement of the provisions are to be complied in its real spirit and in the event of any doubt, the Authority Competent is empowered to cancel the Settlement Deed or Gift Deed, as the case may be, in order to protect the normal life of senior citizen. The possibility of maintaining the senior citizen in the context of strained relationship is to be looked into. Therefore, mere statement or affidavit filed before the Courts stating that the son or daughter will maintain the senior citizen would be insufficient and the Courts in application of its mind has to consider the practicality of the issues as a whole for the purpose of declaring the document as null and void. The striking balance require that the life and dignity of the senior citizen is protected. That being so, the best option for the authorities and the Courts are to annul the settlement or gift deed rather than believing such statements made after arising of the disputes and when the parties are in strained relationship. Therefore, the approach of the Writ Court is balanced and in consonance with the legislative intent and spirit of the Act. When the right to life and dignity is a basic and constitutional right, the Courts cannot adopt a midway path, which may result in miscarriage of justice.”
37. This Court finds the above principle to be of considerable assistance in the present case. The direction for payment of Rs.15,000/- per month cannot be treated as an exhaustive discharge of the responsibilities towards an aged woman who requires not only financial assistance but also food, clothing, security, medical care, emotional support and a dignified place to reside.
38. This Court is not, at this interlocutory stage, adjudicating upon any independent statutory liability of the Respondents under Section 125 Cr.P.C. or any other enactment. However, the principle that an aged and infirm parent should not be left without care and basic sustenance is a principle which cannot be ignored while considering the interim protection to be afforded to the Revision Petitioner.
39. The Court is therefore of the view that, apart from the statutory right of residence claimed by the Revision Petitioner, the circumstances placed before the Court call for an approach that protects her dignity, safety and basic needs during the pendency of the proceedings. The Court expects the Respondents, particularly the first Respondent who is stated to have been adopted and brought up by the Revision Petitioner and her late husband, to discharge the responsibilities expected of a son towards an aged mother.
40. This Court is conscious that the Respondents have their own version of the dispute and that allegations have been made against the Revision Petitioner. Those allegations will have to be considered at the appropriate stage upon the basis of the evidence. At this stage, however, the Court cannot permit an aged woman to remain without a secure residence or basic care merely because the parties are litigating their respective claims.
41. Considering the age of the Revision Petitioner, her status as an aged widow of 73 years, the prima facie finding recorded by the learned Magistrate regarding the domestic relationship and shared household, and the fact that she is presently out of the premises, this Court is of the view that the balance of convenience lies in favour of protecting her immediate right to reside in the shared household, subject to the final orders to be passed in the proceedings.
42. This Court also takes note of the fact that the Revision Petitioner has been residing in the premises for several decades and that the dispute is essentially between an aged woman and the members of the family whom she claims to have brought up as her own. In such circumstances, the welfare, safety and dignity of the aged Revision Petitioner require due consideration while exercising the jurisdiction of this Court.
43. The decisions referred to above, demonstrate that protective legislation concerning senior citizens cannot be reduced to a mere monetary arrangement when the very residence and physical security of an aged person are in issue. The relief granted must be meaningful and capable of protecting the person whom the legislation seeks to protect
44. In view of the above circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the order dated 13.07.2026 passed by the learned III Additional District and Sessions Judge, Puducherry, in M.P.No.2 of 2026 in Crl.A.No.98 of 2026 is liable to be stayed pending disposal of the present Criminal Revision Case.
45. Accordingly, there shall be an interim stay of the effect and operation of the impugned order dated 13.07.2026 passed in M.P.No.2 of 2026 in Crl.A.No.98 of 2026 by the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, Puducherry till further orders of this Court.
46. Consequently, the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate (Mahila Court), Puducherry, in M.P.No.1 of 2026 in D.V.C.No.8 of 2026, insofar as it grants the Revision Petitioner a right of residence in the shared household and protection from disturbance, shall stand restored and shall be implemented forthwith, subject to the following directions:
i. The District Magistrate, Puducherry, and the Senior Superintendent of Police, Puducherry, shall take necessary and effective steps to facilitate the safe restoration of the Revision Petitioner to the residential premises in question and ensure that she is able to resume her residence therein without obstruction.
ii. The jurisdictional police shall extend necessary assistance to the Revision Petitioner for her safe entry into and peaceful residence in the said premises and shall ensure that no law and order issue arises during the process of restoration.
iii. The Respondents shall not create any obstruction, hindrance or disturbance to the peaceful residence of the Revision Petitioner in the shared household and shall not, either directly or indirectly, prevent her from accessing or using the residential portion of the premises in which she was residing.
iv. The first Respondent, who is the adopted son of the petitioner, shall continue to pay a sum of Rs.15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand only) per month to the Revision Petitioner towards her maintenance, in terms of the direction already made by the learned Appellate Court as he is in government job. The said amount shall be paid on or before the 15th day of every succeeding month, commencing from the month of October 2026 until further orders of this Court.
v. The Respondents shall be responsible for ensuring the safety and security of the Revision Petitioner while she resides in the shared household and shall not subject her to any form of physical, verbal, emotional or economic abuse.
vi. Having regard to the advanced age of the Revision Petitioner, the Respondents shall ensure that she is provided with adequate food three times a day, proper clothing and the basic necessities required for her day-to-day living.
vii. The Respondents shall also take reasonable care of the Revision Petitioner as an aged member of the family and shall ensure that her essential medical needs, medicines and other immediate requirements are attended to, having regard to her actual medical condition and requirements.
viii. The Respondents shall not dispossess the Revision Petitioner from the shared household or interfere with her right of residence.
ix. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the above directions and to ascertain the well-being of the Revision Petitioner, the jurisdictional police shall depute one Police Constable, preferably along with one Woman Police Constable, to visit the residence every day and ascertain from the Revision Petitioner whether she is residing peacefully and comfortably and whether she has been provided with food, clothing, safety and other basic necessities.
x. The said Police Constable and Woman Police Constable shall submit a brief daily compliance report to the jurisdictional higher police authority regarding the condition of the Revision Petitioner and the implementation of the directions issued by this Court. A consolidated compliance report, together with the daily reports, shall be placed before this Court on the next date of hearing by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Puducherry.
xi. The jurisdictional police shall, in the event of receiving any complaint from the Revision Petitioner regarding obstruction, threat, assault, neglect or any other form of domestic violence, immediately take appropriate action in accordance with law and place the same before the concerned higher police authority.
47. The above directions are issued keeping in view the age and vulnerability of the Revision Petitioner and shall not be construed as conferring any title or proprietary right upon her over the disputed property. The question of title, ownership, validity of the Will, sale deed, settlement deed or any other document relating to the property is expressly left open for adjudication by the competent Court.
48. In the meantime, the learned counsel appearing for the Respondents is granted two weeks' time to file their counter affidavit in the present Criminal Revision Case. The learned counsel appearing for the Revision Petitioner is granted one week thereafter to file rejoinder affidavit.
49. The learned counsel appearing for both parties are expected to advise their respective parties to maintain peace and dignity and to avoid any confrontation in the residence. The Respondents shall bear in mind that the Revision Petitioner is an aged woman and that the dispute is between persons who have shared a close family relationship for several decades. The Court expects the parties to make every possible effort to resolve their differences amicably, without subjecting the aged Revision Petitioner to further hardship, humiliation or emotional distress.
50. It is made clear that the above directions are interim in nature and are intended to protect the safety, dignity and statutory right of residence of the Revision Petitioner pending disposal of the present Revision. Nothing contained in this order shall be construed as an adjudication upon the title or ownership of the disputed property, and the rights and contentions of both parties in the pending civil proceedings and Domestic Violence proceedings are left open.
51. The Registry is directed to communicate a copy of this order forthwith to the District Magistrate, Puducherry, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Puducherry, and the jurisdictional Police Station for immediate compliance.
52. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Puducherry, shall ensure that the above directions are implemented in letter and spirit and that the compliance report is placed before this Court on the next date of hearing.
53. Post the Criminal Revision Case on 29.10.2026 for filing of counter affidavit, rejoinder affidavit and for perusal of the compliance report.
54. Let a copy of this order be furnished to Mr. Alexander Antony, learned Government Advocate, Puducherry, and Mr. M. V. Ramachandra Murthy, Incharge of the State Public Prosecutor’s Office, Puducherry, for information and necessary compliance of the order by the District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police.
