1. This writ petition has been filed challenging Ext.P17 Award in I.D.No.47/2018 on the file of the Labour Court, Ernakulam. I.D.No.47/2018 was registered upon an application filed by the petitioner under Section 2A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1947 Act’). The petitioner approached the Labour Court, Ernakulam, contending inter alia that he was appointed by the 1st respondent Company as ‘Supervisor-Technical’ through Ext.P1 appointment order, on 11.08.2011. According to the petitioner, though he was designated as ‘Supervisor-Technical’, he was actually functioning as a Boiler Operator and his duties were mainly skilled technical jobs and not supervisory in character. According to the petitioner, though he had sincerely and diligently served the Company, the management terminated him from the services of the Company through an order dated 08.11.2017. It is stated that the termination was on the allegation that the relationship of the petitioner with the staff and the management was unsatisfactory. According to the petitioner, the order of termination is  grossly  illegal  and  unsustainable  in  law  and  amounted  to retrenchment. It is alleged that the petitioner was victimised and the act of the management amounted to an unfair labour practice.

2. The management entered appearance before the Labour Court and contended that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief as he does not fall within the definition of a ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the 1947 Act. It was contended that the statement of the petitioner that he was not working in any supervisory cadre is clearly false. It was contended that the petitioner did not have any licence, which is mandatory for a Boiler Operator and therefore, his case that he was actually working as a Boiler Operator is completely false. It was submitted that the Company was forced to terminate the services of the petitioner on account of his misbehaviour towards the staff and the management. It is submitted that the petitioner was paid all his dues, including gratuity, at the time of his termination. However, since the petitioner refused to accept the amount, the same was remitted to his bank account.

3. The petitioner filed a rejoinder to the written statement of the management reiterating the contentions taken in the Claim Statement.

4. On consideration of the issues, the Labour Court proceeded to frame the following points for consideration:-

                  a) Whether the applicant is a “workman” as defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act?

                  b) Whether the termination from employment of the applicant by the management vide order dated 08.11.2017 is legally valid?

                  c) Whether the applicant is entitled to an order of reinstatement in service with full back wages and consequential benefits?

                  d) Reliefs and costs?

5. The Labour Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, concluded that the petitioner did not fall within the definition of ‘workman’ under the 1947 Act and therefore proceeded to hold that he was not entitled to any relief in the matter. It is this award of the Labour Court which is challenged by the petitioner in this writ petition.

6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the finding of the Labour Court that the petitioner was not a workman is clearly untenable. The learned counsel referred to the definition of ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the 1947 Act. He also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Srinibas Goradia v. Arvind Kumar Sahu and Others, (2026) 4 SCC 697 to contend that the designation given to a person at the time of his appointment or later should not be the guiding factor to determine as to whether he was a workman under the 1947 Act. The learned counsel placed specific reliance on paragraphs 22 to 37 of the said judgment to contend that the conclusion of the Labour Court in the facts and circumstances of this case cannot be justified.

7. The learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, on the other hand, contends that the findings of the Labour Court are not perverse or irrational, warranting interference at the hands of this Court in a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that on a thorough analysis of the oral and documentary evidence placed before the Labour Court, it concluded that the petitioner does not fall within the definition of ‘workman' under the 1947 Act. The learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prem Sagar T. v. M/s. Standard Vacuum Oil Company, Madras and others, AIR 1965 SC 111, and the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in Parayil Kunhiraman Nair v. Sasikumar K, 2024 KHC 7017, to contend that it is only when there has been patent perversity resulting in manifest failure of justice or where natural justice is violated that the orders of the Labour Court will be interfered with in a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.

8. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent, I am of the view that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in the writ petition. A perusal of Ext.P17 award would show that the Labour Court has meticulously analysed the oral and documentary evidence placed before it to conclude that the petitioner does not fall within the definition of a ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) of the 1947 Act. The Labour Court perused the appointment letter issued to the petitioner, the confirmation letter issued to the petitioner, the pay slip issued to the petitioner, and the evidence tendered by the petitioner himself, including his resume, experience certificate, and several other documents signed by the petitioner while in the service of the Company, to conclude that the petitioner cannot be described as a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the 1947 Act. The contention of the petitioner that though he was appointed as a Supervisor-Technical, he was working as a Boiler Operator was not accepted primarily on the ground that the petitioner did not have a Boiler Operator license. The Labour Court also concluded that there were other persons holding a Boiler license who were working in the Company at the relevant time. The Labour Court also considered the earlier employment history of the petitioner and the fact that the petitioner was drawing the highest salary amongst the staff. The Labour Court also found that the petitioner had recommended leave applications, signed various documents, such as service report, daily production report, etc., to conclude that the petitioner was not a workman as defined in Section 2(s) of the 1947 Act. It is true that the Supreme Court in Srinibas Goradia (supra) has analysed several of the earlier judgments on the point and has held that the question as to whether an employee is a workman or not would depend on a realistic consideration of the principal nature of work performed by the employee and that incidental trapping of supervisory work does not make an employee the supervisor. It has also been held that the designation or nomenclature is not the guiding consideration. In the facts of the present case, from the documents relied on by the Labour Court and the evidence of the petitioner in cross-examination, it is clear that the petitioner was performing duties of a supervisory nature.

9. As observed by this Court in Parayil Kunhiraman Nair (supra), this Court will interfere with the factual findings of the Labour Court only if it concludes that the findings of the Labour Court are perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. In the facts of this case, it is very clear that the Labour Court has considered the issue in the right perspective. In other words, there is no illegality, irrationality, or procedural impropriety in the order of the Labour Court warranting interference at the hands of this Court in a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court will be loath to undertake a re-appreciation of facts unless this Court were to conclude that the factual findings of the Labour Court are perverse and unsupported by the evidence on record. This is clearly not the case here.

The writ petition fails, and it is accordingly dismissed.