1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the learned Counsel appearing for both the parties.

2. By this Writ Petition, the petitioner seek to quash and set aside the judgment and order dated 01.08.2023 passed by the Special Judge, Special Court for Differently-abled Persons, Senior Citizens and Marginalized Sections of Society, Nagpur, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 167 of 2020. By the impugned judgment, the Lower Appellate Court partly allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree dated 28.07.2020 passed by the learned Judge, Small Cause Court, Nagpur, in Regular Civil Suit No. 205 of 2010, and dismissed the counter-claim of the respondent.

3. The factual matrix arising from the petition, in a nutshell, is that the petitioners are the owners of a three-storeyed building bearing Nagpur Municipal Corporation House No. 227, and the respondent is a tenant of the petitioners in respect of the suit property. The petitioners, being the original plaintiffs, filed Regular Civil Suit No. 205 of 2010 against the respondent before the Small Causes Court, Nagpur, seeking recovery of possession and mesne profits under Section 16(1)(g) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, as well as on the ground of default in payment of rent since August 2009. Thereafter, the respondent paid the arrears of monthly rent up to May 2010 but contested the eviction vide his reply dated 16.06.2010.

4. The respondent subsequently filed a counter-claim against the petitioners and sought possession of part of the original tenanted premises. According to the counter claim, a portion of the tenanted premises was surrendered at the request of the original land lord. The learned Trial Court, by its judgment and decree dated 28.07.2020, decreed the suit of the petitioners and dismissed the counter-claim of the respondent. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent preferred a Regular Civil Appeal before the Special Judge, Special Court for Differently-Abled Persons, Senior Citizens and Marginalized Section of Society, Nagpur, which came to be allowed vide judgment dated 01.08.2023, thereby setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court. The said judgment dated 01.08.2023 is impugned herein.

5. I have heard Mr. Sunil Manohar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Masood Shareef, learned Counsel for the petitioners, and Mr. Darasingh Sindhu, learned Counsel for the respondent.

6. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submits that the Lower Appellate Court failed to consider that the petitioners not only pleaded but also conclusively proved their bona fide need and requirement, which warranted eviction of the respondent. Furthermore, it is submitted that despite there being no pleadings or evidence adduced by the respondent to that effect, the Appellate Court erroneously observed that the respondent has no other alternative accommodation for his business.

7. He further submits that the respondent, in his cross-examination, explicitly admitted that he is presently residing at Ekdanta Apartment, Zenda Chowk, Nagpur. Hence, there is no question of any hardship or suffering being caused to the respondent in the event of his eviction from the suit property. It is submitted that the Appellate Court failed to appreciate the genuine need of the petitioners to extend their residential accommodation, considering the growing needs of petitioner No. 2 and his sons, as well as for the expansion of their business.

8. Lastly, he submits that the Appellate Court failed to consider the settled legal position that the prerogative to decide the need of the premises of their own property lies entirely with the landlord, and the Court cannot dictate to the landlord the manner in which he should enjoy the premises owned by him. Thus, the Appellate Court's observation that the present premises of the petitioners are sufficient for their use is perverse and contrary to the settled position of law.

9. Learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments to buttress his submissions:

                   i. Murlidhar Aggarwal through his Lrs Atul Kumar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan through Lrs. And others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 915;

                   ii. Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. v. Vimalabai Prabhulal and others, (2005) 8 SCC 252;

                   iii. Kanahaiya Lal Arya v. Md. Ehshan and others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 432;

                   iv. Rajani Manohar Kuntha v. Parshuram Chunilal Kanojiya, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 3155;

                   v. Meenal Ekanth Kshirsagar v. Traders & Agencies and Anr., (1996) 5 SCC 344;

                   vi. Chotumal Bahiramal Sindho v. Baburao Vinayak Mohadkar Through Lrs and others, 2009 SCC OnLine Bom 355;

                   vii. Harbans Singh v. Anand Tyagi, R.C. Rev. No. 304 of 2018;

                   viii. Mohinder Singh v. Satish Chander Sikka, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6371;

                   ix. Sundarabai and others v. Omprakash, 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 4093.

10. Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned judgment. He submits that the eviction petition was substantially projected on an alleged bona fide need for "Micro Pro Software Solution Pvt. Ltd." and residential expansion, yet the petitioners deliberately withheld primary corporate records. Furthermore, PW-1 admitted that the said company business owns a 2000 sq. ft. building at Mangalam, Khare Town, Dharampeth, and operates from three different locations, which completely negates any genuine or pressing necessity.

11. Learned Counsel for respondent submits that the petitioners failed to discharge the statutory burden under Section 16(1)(g) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, as no business documents, electricity bills, or educational records for the sons were placed on record. Conversely, the admission that the nephew resides at Chhindwara wholly demolishes the pleaded residential requirement.

12. Learned Counsel further submits that the company is a distinct juristic entity with six directors and independent assets. The mere directorship of petitioner No. 1 cannot convert the company's requirement into the personal bona fide need of the landlord under Section 16(1)(g) of the Act.

13. Learned Counsel additionally submits that the suit premises are admittedly residential, and Section 30 of the Act creates an absolute statutory bar against converting residential premises to commercial use, thereby precluding the Court from granting an eviction decree that would result in a statutory breach.

14. Lastly, learned Counsel submits that the ground of non-user under Section 16(1)(n) of the Act was neither specifically pleaded nor proved for the continuous statutory period of six months immediately preceding the institution of the suit. The photographic evidence introduced through PW-2 is entirely uncreditworthy, given the lack of bills, specific dates, or laboratory records.

15. Learned Counsel seeks to draw support from the following decisions:

                   i. D.N. Sanghavi & Sons v. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das, AIR 1974 SC 1026;

                   ii. K.M. Basheer v. Lona Chackola, MANU/KE/0976/2002;

                   iii. Pascal Lazarous Lobo v. K. Sundara Shetty, 1984 Supreme (Kar) 92;

                   iv. C.R. Shaikh v. Lilabai D. Rohida, 1981 Mh.L.J. 437;

                   v. Vasant Mahadeo Gujar and others v. Baitulla Ismail Shaikh & others., MANU/MH/1859/2015;

                   vi. Tarachand Hassaram Shamdasani v. Durgashankar G. Shroff and others, MANU/MH/1050/2002;

                   vii. Narendra Gulabrao Zade v. Shiocharan Ghashiram Gupta, MANU/MH/1308/2010;

                   viii. Jain Supari Centre & others v. Shri Rameshlal Motilal Hasoriya and others, 2022 Supreme (Bom) 971;

                   ix. Dr. T.S. Subramanian (deceased) by Lrs. v. The Andhra Bank Ltd., AIR 1989 SC 1420;

                   x. Writ Petition No. 3734 of 2023, (Smt. Kalpana Wd/o Renukadas Rajurkar and another v. Shiv S/o Harikisan Agrawal).

16. I have gone through the record of the matter with the able assistance of the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties as also gone through the record and the various judgments filed by them in support of their respective contention. The Trial Court, while decreeing the suit in favor of the petitioner landlord herein has framed points regarding the defendant/tenants being in arrears of rent. The said point is also framed by the Lower Appellate Court at the time of deciding the appeal. Both the Courts have decided in favor of the tenant, i.e. the respondent herein. There was no challenge to said finding of the Trial Court by petitioner. Even if the Trial Court answered the point of arrears of rent in favor of a tenant; the landlord, i.e., the petitioner herein, did not choose to challenge the same. It goes on without saying, therefore, that the landlord has accepted the finding of both the Courts that the respondent tenant is not in arrears of rent.

17. In the factual backdrop, now only two grounds remain for termination of tenancy. First is regarding the bona fide need of the landlord, i.e., the original plaintiff/petitioner herein, and whether the tenancy can be terminated for non-user of the suit premises as per Section 16 (1) (n) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act.

18. The Trial Court while answering point No. 2, which pertained to bona fide need, has considered the number of persons/members in the family of the plaintiffs and their respective needs. It has also considered that the defendant/tenant is admittedly not residing in the said premises. A glaring admission in the cross-examination regarding the tenant using the said premises as a guest house has also been considered. From the judgment of the Trial Court, and more particularly paragraph Nos. 25, 26, 27, and 28, the Trial Court, in my considered opinion, has appreciated the evidence of the parties in its correct perspective. Thereafter, while answering issue No. 3, which pertained to greater hardship, it has answered the said issue in favor of the landlord that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if the decree of eviction is not passed. While answering issue No. 4 regarding non-user, it has considered that from the evidence on record, it can be very well said that the defendant tenant has locked the suit premises.

19. I have also gone through the judgment of the Appellate Court. The judgment frames points regarding the various grounds pressed into eviction. As far as ground of non user of premises, it has non-suited the landlord, i.e. the petitioner herein, on a ground that the plaint does not have the details as required. However, it has not correctly appreciated the glaring admission in the cross-examination of the defendant tenant that he is using the same as a guest house. The said admission was clear enough that the defendant tenant was not using the premises for the purpose for which it was let and was in fact using it as a guest house. If the defendant comes up with a case that he is using the premises only for the same purpose for which it was let, it was for the defendant to prove the same, which in the present case admittedly has not been done. While disturbing the ground of bona fide need, the Appellate Court has stated the well settled principle of law that it is for the tenant to rebut the presumption regarding the bona fides and reasonableness of the need of the landlord. It has also stated the settled proposition of law that the said bona fide need would relate back to the date of the suit and the subsequent events can be taken into consideration for moulding the relief only when such events are of such a nature and dimension as to completely eclipse the need and make it to lose its significance altogether.

20. However, in paragraph No. 44 of the judgment, the Appellate Court has recorded a finding which is factually incorrect in as much as regarding the avocation of his sons. It has also recorded a finding which is contrary to record that the witness admitted that his nephew Aditya Dhage was residing at his native place at Chhindwara, M.P. Furthermore, the erroneous approach of the Appellate Court continues in paragraph No. 45, where it records that the plaintiff No. 2, i.e. the witness, could not clearly show as to for how many days his sister Smt. Sunita Dhage used to come at Nagpur with her husband and children. In my considered opinion, it is none of the business of the Appellate Court or any Court for that matter to doubt the genuineness and bona fides of the landlord when he says that his sister along with her family frequently visits her maternal home. In my considered opinion, the Appellate Court has transgressed the jurisdiction and rendering the said finding perverse in law.

21. Furthermore, in paragraph No. 46 of the judgment, the Appellate Court has again recorded a factually incorrect finding about presence of six rooms on the ground floor. In fact, there are admittedly three rooms on the ground floor, which fact can be seen from the plaint as also from the narration of facts in the said judgment itself. The Lower Appellate Court has incorrectly taken into consideration the user of the said rooms available on the ground floor and the first floor and its usage. In my considered opinion, it is not for the Court to gauge the needs of the landlord and his family members. The incorrect or an erroneous approach of the Appellate Court is also continued in paragraph No. 47, where it records that it was for the plaintiff to lead with clarity regarding the directors of the said private limited company as to whether they are only family members or outsiders. This observation and the finding thereon in my considered opinion is also incorrect.

22. The Lower Appellate Court lost sight of the fact that it was the specific defence of the defendant-tenant that the need of the private limited company is being pressed by the plaintiff No. 2 as one of the directors. It was, therefore, in my considered opinion, for the defendant/tenant to prove regarding the remaining directors as to whether they are the family members or otherwise. Apart from this, the observation also is outside the scope and domain of the inquiry to be held by the Court in landlord-tenant matters. It is a well settled principle of law that the Court cannot be a judge to test the bona fides or reasonableness of the landlord and would only non suit him if there is total arbitrariness or unreasonableness in the said need. Normally, the Court cannot put a dictat over the need of the landlord and, therefore, the observations of the Appellate Court are totally unwarranted. Thus, the conclusions drawn by the Court in paragraph Nos. 48 and 49 of the judgment regarding the absence of a specific averment in the plaint for eviction are totally uncalled for.

23. Furthermore, as can be seen from paragraph No. 50 of the judgment, the Appellate Court has observed that the defendant-tenant has filed on record documents to show that M/s Micro Pro Software Solutions Private Limited was never the tenant of the building as claimed, as some third person is shown as a tenant. It has further went on to record that on the basis of these documents, it appears that the landlord want to take benefit of his relationship with the person who owns such another building. This also, in my considered opinion, is outside the purview of the scope of the Lower Appellate Court. Even if assuming that the landlord owns certain other premises or he is showing that he occupies the premises on rent cannot be an aspect to doubt the bona fide need of the landlord of he needing his own premises.

24. Another factor which has weighed with the Appellate Court to non suit the landlord is a sale deed dated 06.02.2020. By way of said sale deed, the private limited company has purchased a premises as mentioned therein. However, the Lower Appellate Court lost sight of the fact that admittedly, the conveyance was executed during the pendency of the appeal and could not have been pleaded in the initial plaint itself.

25. If the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court, which has sought to interfere is perused on these well laid principles, I am afraid the same is unsustainable. As discussed by me supra, the Lower Appellate Court has chosen to non-suit the plaintiff on such grounds which either are contrary to the well settled proposition of law or either are factually incorrect.

26. As can be seen from paragraph No. 55 of the judgment, another ground to non suit the petitioner tenant is the suppression of the facts by the plaintiff No. 2 that it is not his solely owned business, but is a business of a private limited company. However, this can also not take the case of the tenant further, inasmuch as that would not be decisive. If the defendant comes up with a case (which is not in the present matter) that the said business was not the solely owned business of the plaintiff No. 2, it was for the said defendant to prove. Casting of burden of the same on the plaintiff is totally uncalled for.

27. Even if the aspect regarding the fact that the need of a private limited company is different from that of its director is accepted for a moment, there is no cross-examination, much less any relevant one, regarding the fact that the personal need of the family members of the plaintiffs is not bona fide. Even though much emphasis has been laid by the Counsel for the respondents that the premises was sought to be vacated for business purpose of a private limited company by one of the directors, but the fact remains that there is nothing on record to show or doubt the bona fide of the need of the family members of the plaintiffs landlords. The the parameters or the standards with which the Appellate Court has chosen to disturb a well reasoned judgment of the Trial Court is totally contrary to the propositions of law as enunciated in the above paragraphs. A Court cannot be a judge to assess the needs of the landlord, and it is the sole prerogative of the landlord to do the same. Various factors would come into play while gauging and assessing the said need, and, as has been rightly canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, it is not for the Court to undertake such exercise. Such an exercise precisely seems to be done by the Appellate Court, which is totally uncalled for.

28. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has also placed reliance on judgment of Muralidhar Aggarwal (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, after taking into consideration the entire case law, as recorded in paragraph No. 25, that the bona fide requirement for occupation of the landlord has to be liberally construed and even the requirements of the family members would be covered. Judgment of Sait Nagjee Purushottam and Company Limited (supra) and judgment of Kanhaiya Lal Arya (supra) and judgment of Rajani Manohar Kuntha (supra), are placed on record to submit that landlord is the best judge to decide which of his property should be vacated for satisfying his particular need. As far as judgment of Sait Nagjee Purushottam referred supra, reliance has been placed on paragraph Nos. 4, 5, and 8 to show that the landlord is the best judge to decide the suitability of the premises. The relevant portion in the said judgment is reproduced for the sake of brevity.

                   “4. ……………………...It is always the prerogative of the landlord that if he requires the premises in question for his bona fide use for expansion of business this is no ground to say that the landlords are already having their business at Chennai and Hyderabad therefore, it is not genuine need. It is not the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature of the business and the place of business. However, the trial court held in favour of the appellant tenant. But the appellate court as well as the High Court after scrutinising the evidence on record, reversed the finding of the trial court and held that the need of establishing the business at Calicut by the landlords cannot be said to be lacking in bona fides.

                   5. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in fact this plea of either starting business or expanding it at Calicut is nothing but a sham and it was also pointed out that some of the sons have multifarious activities and are already established in some other business and one of the sons i.e. Respondent 9 had already gone to the United States of America and he has settled there. Therefore, the need is not bona fide. We fail to appreciate that when two sons are there and if they want to expand their business at Calicut then it cannot be said that the need is a sham one. It is not possible for the landlords and their sons to wait till the disposal of the case. They have to do something in life and they cannot wait till the appellant is evicted from the premises in question. It is common experience that landlord-tenant disputes in our country take a long time and one cannot wait indefinitely for resolution of such litigation. If they want to expand their business then it cannot be said that the need is not bona fide. It is alleged that one of the sons of the landlords has settled in the USA. That does not detract from the fact that the other sons of the landlords want to expand their business at Calicut. Indian economy is going global and it is not unlikely that prodigal sons can return back to the motherland. He can always come back and start his business at Calicut. On this ground we cannot deny the eviction to the landlords.”

29. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has rightly relied on a judgment of Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar (supra), Chotumal Balhiramal Sindho (supra), and Harbans Singh (supra). In all these three judgments, the Hon’ble Apex Court as also the respective High Courts have clearly stated that even if it would have been better for the landlord to put all facts on record, however, omission to put such facts on record cannot be regarded as sufficient for disentitling the landlord from claiming a decree of eviction if otherwise he is able to prove that the said premises is reasonably required for his occupation. The said fact was not material and relevant, as has been stated by this Court in the judgment of Chhotumal referred supra.

30. By placing reliance on an earlier judgment of Gaya Prasad versus Pradeep Srivastava, reported in AIR 2001 Supreme Court 803, it is stated by this Court that the acquisition of the premises during the pendency of suit would be of no consequence. It can only be of any relevance if, by acquiring the new premises, the entire requirement of the landlord for which the suit for possession was filed is completely eclipsed. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, the argument regarding non-disclosure of material facts is completely devoid of merits. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has also rightly placed reliance on judgment of Mohinder Singh (supra), and more particularly, paragraph No. 14 thereof, to canvas a proposition that sale or purchase of property is not an impediment to seek eviction. I am in complete agreement with the contentions canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. He has also placed on record judgment of this Court in Sundarabai versus Om Prakash (supra), wherein this Court, by taking into consideration the entire case law in that regard has stated that it is for the tenant to establish hardship if the decree of eviction is passed. Furthermore, this Court also held that the term "personal use and occupation" includes the use for entire family and family members.

31. While assailing these judgments and supporting the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court, the learned Counsel for the respondent argued that as far as bona fide need is considered, the Trial Court had gravely erred in decreeing the suit on the said ground of bona fide need. He submits that assuming for the sake of argument that it was the bona fide need, the same need was of the private limited company of which the plaintiff No. 2 was one of the directors. He submits that the need of the private limited company cannot be a need of one of its directors since said private limited company is a separate entity than its directors. For this proposition, he places reliance on a judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court reported in AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1026, D. N. Sanghavi & Sons vs. Ambalal Das. However, in the said matter, the question which fell for consideration of the Hon’ble Apex Court was regarding the interpretation of the term "his business" occurring in Section 12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act. In the background of the said provision wherein a specific term "his business" fell for interpretation, the Hon’ble Apex Court stated that the bona fide need of a company cannot be a ground by the landlord to seek eviction of a tenant. In the said judgment an English case namely Tunstall vs. Steigmann (1962) 2 ER 417, is also been referred on which emphasis was laid. However, in the said matter, the landlady transferred her business to an incorporated company. In the backdrop of that fact and more particularly interpreting Section 31 (g) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927, the Supreme Court held the business of the incorporated company was not the business of the landlord, the company being a distinct legal person different from the landlord. Thus, in the said case of D. N. Sanghavi and Sons (supra), the dispute was regarding a partnership business which cannot be equated with a private limited company incorporated under the Companies Act. Further, in the English case referred to supra, the landlady concerned transferred her business to an incorporated company. The observation of the Supreme Court, are in that context and therefore, would not take the case of the respondent any forward.

32. Learned Counsel for the respondent has also relied on a judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala, K. M. Basheer vs. Lona Chackola in support of his submission. In the said matter, the question was whether need for occupation of a registered private limited company in which the landlord is a director is the bona fide need of the landlord for his occupation. In the said judgment, Hon’ble Kerala High Court, stated that it is a well-settled law that company is a separate entity and once it is incorporated, it is entirely different from the persons who are shareholders of the company. The proposition in the said judgment cannot be disputed. However, in the said matter, there was an interplay between the partnership firm and a private incorporated company.

33. As far as the next judgment relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondents of the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court reported in 1984 Supreme (KAR 92), Pascual Lazarous Logo vs. K. Sundara Shetty (supra), the same principle is reiterated. Thus, in nutshell, it is the submission of learned Counsel for the respondent that even if meaningful interpretation is given to the plaint, the need was of a company and, therefore, the said need cannot be a need of the director.

34. However, if the written statement of the respondent is perused, the said defence was not specifically raised by the defendant in the written statement. A perusal of the plaint would reveal that in paragraph No. 8 of the same, it is specifically pleaded that the second floor premises in occupation and possession of the plaintiff No. 2 is getting insufficient looking to the nature of the business. Thus, the bona fide need of the plaintiff No. 2 was pressed. If the written statement is perused, paragraph No. 8 only denies the said bona fide need. However, there is no specific averment or defence raised that since the plaintiff No. 2 is a director of a private limited company, and it is the need of the private limited company and not the plaintiff No. 2 in his personal capacity, the same cannot be a ground to seek eviction. Even though there is exhaustive cross-examination on this point of the plaintiff No. 2, however, there are no such pleadings to that effect. It is a settled principle of law that evidence of which there is no foundation laid in the pleadings cannot be relied on or looked into. Even if the cross-examination is considered, the said cross-examination only elucidates that the plaintiff No. 2 is one of the director of the company. There is no such suggestion that, in fact, under the garb of the business of the said private limited company, the plaintiff No. 2 has filed the present suit in his personal capacity and not as a director of the said company, and therefore, the same is not maintainable.

35. The next judgment relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondent is of this Court reported in 1981 MHLJ, 437, C. R. Shaikh (supra). The said judgment speaks about a landlord making out a case of non user for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit. The proposition in the judgment is well-settled. However, in the present matter, there is admission is cross examination which shows that the defendant/tenant/respondent was not using the same.

36. The next judgment on which reliance is placed is of this Court reported in Vasant Dhondiram Gujar (supra). It speaks about the suppression by landlords in their plaint seeking eviction. In my considered opinion, much has been said about suppression, but there is no such suppression as alleged. In the said case before this Court, there were several premises being owned by the landlord and therefore this Court has non suited him. Here, this is not the case. Another judgment pressed into service by the learned Counsel for the respondents is Tarachand Shyamdasani (supra). In the said judgment, there was some construction which according to the landlord was illegal and therefore, the facts being totally different, cannot take the case of the respondent any further.

37. Much emphasis has been laid over a judgment by the respondent passed by this Court in Jain Supari Centre (supra), to state that it is a statutory duty of the Court to make an inquiry into the extent of the landlord's need and the possibility of the partial eviction even if the bona fide need is found to be reasonable and bona fide. The learned Counsel for the respondent, by taking me through the said judgment, states that even if the Court comes to a conclusion that the landlord has been able to prove the bona fide need, the statute casts a duty upon the Court, to make an inquiry to the extent of need of the landlord. It is the submission of the learned Counsel for the respondent that no such exercise has been done, and therefore, the judgment of the Appellate Court is just and proper.

38. I have gone through the said judgment. The said judgment, turns on the facts of the case. In the present case, the Trial Court, in my considered opinion, has duly appreciated the evidence on record in the light of the fact that there were glaring cross-examinations as to the ownership of the tenant of various properties. Furthermore, it was also brought on record that the tenant is no more requiring the premises and is using the same for a purpose of guest house and even not residing there. It is thus not the mandate of the law that in every case that the Court, even if comes to a conclusion regarding the bona fide need of the landlord, has to make an inquiry as contemplated under Section 16(2) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act.

39. As far as rest of the judgment reported in 1989 Supreme Court 1420, Dr. T. S. Subramanian (supra), is also on the same premise regarding partial eviction.

40. In my considered opinion, the judgment, if tested on the well set propositions of law as stated supra, cannot be cannot be sustained. The findings in the said judgment, as discussed supra, are perverse and contrary to the well-settled law by the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court from time to time. In that view of the matter, the petition needs to be allowed. Hence, the following order :

                   ORDER

                   i) The Writ Petition is allowed.

                   ii) The judgment dated 01.08.2023, in Regular Civil Appeal No. 167/2020, passed by the Hon’ble Special Court for Differently-Abled Persons, Senior Citizens and Marginalized Section of Society, Nagpur, is quashed and set aside.

                   iii) The judgment of the Trial Court dated 28.07.2020, in Regular Civil Suit No. 205/2010, passed by the Judge, Small Causes Court, Nagpur, is restored.

41. The Writ Petition is disposed of in the above terms. No order as to costs.

LATER ON

After the pronouncement of the Judgment Mr. Darasingh, learned Counsel for the respondent prays for stay to the effect and operation of the impugned judgment so as to enable him to approach the Hon’ble Apex Court.

Mr. Masood Shareef, learned Counsel for the petitioners strongly objects the prayer.

However, looking to the facts that it is a landlord-tenant matter and the tenant is in possession of the premises, the effect and operation of the impugned judgment is stayed for a further period of eight weeks from today.