Common Order:

1. Heard Sri Srinivas Polavarapu, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, in W.P. No.9569 of 2012; Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, in W.P. No.2602 of 2019; Sri H. Rakesh Kumar, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 4; Sri G. Madhusudan Reddy, the learned Standing Counsel for the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (for short, "the GHMC") appearing for respondent Nos.5 to 7; and Ms. Tejaswini Mereddy, learned Standing Counsel for Hyderabad Metro Rail Project (for short, "the HMRL") appearing for respondent No. 8. Perused the record.

2. Both the writ petitions relate to adjoining premises at Chikkadpally, Hyderabad, namely Premises Nos.1-8-522/34 and 1- 8-522/34/A, which are the subject matter of W.P.No.9569 of 2012, and Premises No.1-8-522/35, which is the subject matter of W.P.No.2602 of 2019. In both cases, the respondents require a portion of the premises for widening the road from Narayanaguda Junction to Musheerabad Junction. In both cases, they treat the land as Government land on the strength of the entries in the Town Survey Land Register (for short, "the TSLR") and propose to take the affected portion on payment of ex-gratia, instead of acquiring it and paying compensation. As the facts are closely connected and the questions of law are common, both the writ petitions were heard together and are disposed of by this common order.

3. In W.P.No.9569 of 2012, the petitioners question the action of the respondents in treating the property bearing Premises Nos.1- 8-522/34 and 1-8-522/34/A, consisting of ground and first floors and admeasuring 96.83 square yards, as Government land, and in seeking to take it for road widening without paying compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, "the 1894 Act"). They seek a consequential direction to the respondents to acquire the property and pay compensation in accordance with law.

4. In W.P.No.2602 of 2019, the petitioner questions the action of the respondents in treating the property bearing Premises No.1- 8-522/35, comprising Shop Nos.1, 4 and 5 and part of the first floor, as Government property on the basis of the TSLR entries, and in proposing to take the affected portion on payment of ex- gratia, without acquiring it under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, "the 2013 Act"), which came into force on 01.01.2014. He seeks a direction restraining the respondents from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the property except in accordance with law.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

5. The case of the petitioners in W.P.No.9569 of 2012 is that their predecessors-in-interest purchased Plot Nos.2 and 3 in Sy.Nos.37 to 39 of Lingampally Village from one Gouri Shankar Dubey under a registered sale deed dated 04.11.1966. In the year 1968, the owners obtained building permission from the then Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and constructed a building of ground and first floors. The building was assigned Municipal Nos.1-8-522/34 and 1-8-522/34/A and was assessed to property tax. The petitioners claim that they and their predecessors have been in open and continuous possession of the property ever since.

6. The road from Narayanaguda Junction to Musheerabad Junction was proposed to be widened to 100 feet in terms of the approved Master Plan and Road Development Plan. By letter dated 18.10.2007, the 6th respondent sent a requisition to the 7th respondent for acquisition, under the 1894 Act, of an extent of 59.11 square yards out of the petitioners' premises, described in the requisition as Premises No.1-8-522/34/5/2. According to the petitioners, a notice under Section 5-A of the 1894 Act was issued to them in November, 2007, and they filed their objections.

7. On verification of the town survey records, the 7th respondent, by letter dated 30.05.2009, returned the requisition. It was stated that the property falls in T.S.No.53, Block-B, Ward No.188, that Column No.20 of the TSLR classifies it as "G", that is, Government land, and that acquisition proceedings could not, therefore, be taken up. The acquisition was not pursued thereafter.

8. By communication dated 04.07.2011, the GHMC informed the petitioners of the classification in the TSLR and called upon them to produce their title deeds and other documents in support of their claim of private ownership. By representation dated 07.07.2011, the petitioners asserted their private title and requested the authorities not to take their property without acquisition and payment of compensation. The petitioners state that they enclosed their title documents to the representation. The GHMC states that they did not.

9. By G.O.Ms.No.708, Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department, dated 13.06.2011, as amended by G.O.Rt.No.1428 dated 09.11.2011, the Government constituted a Committee to determine the ex-gratia payable to occupants of properties classified as Government land who produce documentary evidence in support of their claims. The GHMC offered ex-gratia to the petitioners for the affected portion. The petitioners declined the offer and insisted on payment of compensation for the land as private land. W.P.No.9569 of 2012 was then filed.

10. W.P.No.2602 of 2019 relates to the adjoining Premises No.1- 8-522/35. In respect of this property also, the respondents, relying on the TSLR, proposed to take the affected portion on payment of ex-gratia under the Government Orders applicable to Government land, and not by acquisition under the 2013 Act. The petitioner disputes that the property is Government property and has approached this Court for protection of his possession and for a direction to acquire the property in accordance with law before taking possession.

11. The Revenue authorities rely on the town survey conducted between 1964 and 1971 under the Andhra Pradesh Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923 (for short, "the Survey Act"), and on the final notification under Section 13 of that Act published in A.P. Gazette No.13 dated 28.02.1977. They contend that the TSLR entries have attained finality and that, since no suit was filed under Section 14 of the Survey Act, the petitioners cannot question those entries now. It is in this background that the submissions of the parties are to be noticed.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS:

12. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners derive title through their predecessors-in-interest under registered sale deeds executed by Gouri Shankar Dubey, that the building was constructed in 1968 with the permission of the municipal authority, and that the property has been assessed to property tax and has been in the possession of the petitioners and their predecessors for several decades. The respondents, it was urged, cannot disregard registered documents, long possession and municipal records merely by relying on a later entry in the TSLR.

13. It was submitted that the respondents themselves first treated the property as private property and set the 1894 Act in motion. A notice under Section 5-A was issued in November, 2007, proposing to acquire about 59.11 square yards, and the petitioners filed their objections. Instead of completing the acquisition and determining compensation, the respondents dropped the proceedings on the ground that the land is shown as Government land in the TSLR, and offered only ex-gratia. The State, it was contended, cannot take private property for a public purpose merely by describing the amount payable as ex-gratia.

14. It was contended that the stand of the respondents that the land is Government land rests only on the TSLR entry and is contrary to the other records. The Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55 and the Pahani Patrikas for the year 1960-61 and the later years show the survey numbers as private patta land and record the names of private pattadars. Reliance was placed on Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District v. D. Narsing Rao ((2015) 3 SCC 695), where the Hon'ble Supreme Court described the Khasra Pahani as the basic record-of-rights prepared for the year 1954-55, the entries in which are presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. Reliance was also placed on Shikharchand Jain v. Digamber Jain Praband Karini Sabha ((1974) 1 SCC 675) on the presumption attached to entries in a record-of- rights.

15. It was submitted that even the TSLR extract relied upon by the respondents does not establish Government ownership. Column No.20 carries the letter "G", while Column No.23 carries the name of Gouri Shankar Dubey, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners. According to the petitioners, when the entries are read as a whole, the letter "G" refers to Gouri Shankar Dubey and not to the Government. In any event, it was urged, an entry in the TSLR does not by itself confer a title. Reliance was placed on Hyderabad Potteries Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector, Hyderabad District (2001 (3) ALD 600 (DB)), State of Andhra Pradesh v. Prameela Modi (2005 (4) ALD 105 (DB) : 2005 (3) ALT 379 (DB)) and State of Telangana v. Kamal Kishore Agarwal (2023 SCC OnLine TS 252), where it was held that a TSLR entry does not by itself confer title unless supported by other material and that the Government cannot unilaterally and conclusively determine title on the basis of such entries.

16. It was further submitted that the petitioners had produced their title documents along with the representation dated 07.07.2011, and that the averment in the counter-affidavit to the contrary is incorrect. The respondents, being the acquiring authorities, could not themselves decide a disputed question of title on the basis of a TSLR entry and thereby deny compensation. Reliance was placed on State of Andhra Pradesh v. Pratap Karan ((2016) 2 SCC 82) and on Kamal Kishore Agarwal (supra) for the proposition that revenue and mutation entries do not by themselves establish title.

17. It was contended that, for several decades, the Government never asserted any right over the property and never initiated any proceeding treating the petitioners or their predecessors as unauthorised occupants. The TSLR entries were made without notice to the predecessors of the petitioners, and the finality of the survey proceedings cannot be mechanically used against persons who had no effective opportunity to contest them. Prameela Modi (supra) was relied upon in this regard.

18. Learned Senior Counsel finally submitted that the claim of the petitioners rests not on a single entry but on a chain of documents, namely the registered sale deeds, the building permission, the municipal assessment records, the Khasra Pahani and the Pahani Patrikas, coupled with long possession, and that the TSLR cannot be the sole basis for declaring the property to be Government land. The petitioners pray that the action of the respondents in dropping the acquisition proceedings and in treating their property as Government land be declared illegal, that the respondents, particularly the GHMC, be directed to acquire the affected portion under the 2013 Act and pay the compensation payable thereunder instead of ex-gratia, and that the respondents be restrained from interfering with their possession except in accordance with law.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NOS.1 TO 4:

19. The learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue, relying on the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent Nos.1 to 4, submitted that the subject property falls in T.S.No.53, Block- B, Ward No.188 of Lingampally Village, that Column No.10 of the TSLR records the classification as "Paiga", and that Column No.20 records it as "G", that is, Government. It was contended that the State Government is the absolute owner and possessor of the property and that the petitioners have no right or title over it.

20. It was submitted that town survey operations were conducted in the urban areas of Hyderabad and Secunderabad between 1964 and 1971 under the Survey Act. Notifications under Section 6(1) of that Act were issued inviting all interested persons to participate in the survey. The survey authorities physically verified title and possession. Individual notices under Section 9(2) were issued to the persons found in possession to submit their claims and objections, and, in respect of Government lands, notices were issued to the then Tahsildar, Hyderabad Urban Taluk. After considering the objections, the Final Check Officer passed orders, against which the aggrieved parties had a right of appeal.

21. It was submitted that, on completion of the survey, the final notification under Section 13 of the Survey Act was published in A.P. Gazette No.13 dated 28.02.1977, and the TSLR entries relating to Ward No.188, Lingampally Village, thereby attained finality. Any person aggrieved was required to institute a suit under Section 14 of the Survey Act within three years from the date of publication of the notification. As neither the petitioners nor their predecessors filed such a suit, the petitioners are precluded from questioning the entries now, and their challenge is belated.

22. It was therefore contended that, once the property is recorded as Government land in the final TSLR, the petitioners cannot claim compensation for the land as private patta land and, at best, their claim can be confined to the value of the structures, subject to their entitlement under law. The learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable and prayed for its dismissal.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NOS.5 TO 7:

23. The learned Standing Counsel for the GHMC, relying on the counter-affidavit filed by the 6th respondent on behalf of respondent Nos.5 to 7, submitted that the 6th respondent, by letter dated 18.10.2007, sent a requisition to the 7th respondent for acquisition of 59.11 square yards in Premises No.1-8-522/34/5/2, under the 1894 Act, for widening the existing road to 100 feet in terms of the approved Master Plan and Road Development Plan. On verification with reference to the town survey records and on physical inspection, the 7th respondent, by letter dated 30.05.2009, returned the proposal stating that the property falls in T.S.No.53, Block-B, Ward No.188 and is classified as "G", Government land, in Column No.20 of the TSLR, and that acquisition proceedings could not, therefore, be initiated.

24. It was submitted that, since the land was required for road widening in public interest, the GHMC issued the communication dated 04.07.2011 calling upon the petitioners to produce their title deeds. The petitioners did not furnish the documents and only submitted a representation asserting that the land is private patta land. In the absence of documentary proof of private title, it was contended, the authorities were justified in proceeding on the basis of the TSLR. It was further submitted that the respondents have not sought to dispossess the petitioners or demolish their property without due process of law, and that the other properties affected by the road widening were taken only after completing acquisition proceedings and paying compensation for land and structures under the 1894 Act.

25. It was submitted that, if the property were treated as private land and acquisition proceedings were initiated, the title documents of the claimants would be verified at the stage of passing the award, and, in the event of rival claims, the matter could be referred to the competent Civil Court under Section 30 of the 1894 Act. However, as the property is recorded as Government land in the TSLR, the question of acquiring it and paying compensation for the land does not arise. The GHMC offered ex- gratia for the affected portion, which the petitioners declined, insisting on compensation at the market value applicable to private land.

26. It was lastly submitted that, under G.O.Ms.No.708 dated 13.06.2011, as amended by G.O.Rt.No.1428 dated 09.11.2011, a Committee has been constituted to determine ex-gratia in respect of properties classified as Government land where the occupants produce documentary evidence in support of their claims, and that, subject to verification, such persons may be paid ex-gratia and compensation for structures for the portion affected. The petitioners, it was urged, ought to produce their title documents before respondent Nos.6 and 7 for placing them before the Committee, and ought to cooperate with the GHMC in widening the road in public interest.

POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION:

27. On the pleadings, the material on record and the submissions made, the following points arise for consideration:

               (i) Whether the writ petitions are maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when the title to the subject properties is disputed by the respondents?

               (ii) Whether the entries in the TSLR, and the notification under Section 13 of the Survey Act, are conclusive of the title of the Government to the subject properties, and whether the petitioners, not having instituted a suit under Section 14 of the Survey Act, are precluded from resisting the action of the respondents?

               (iii) Whether, when the petitioners have set up a claim of private title on the basis of a registered sale deed, the Khasra Pahani, the Pahani Patrikas, municipal building permission, property tax assessment and long possession, the respondents could themselves decide that the subject properties are Government land and, on that basis, drop the acquisition proceedings?

               (iv) Whether the respondents can take over the portions of the subject properties required for road widening by offering ex-gratia under G.O.Ms.No.708 dated 13.06.2011, without acquiring them and paying compensation under the 2013 Act?

               (v) To what relief are the petitioners entitled? ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:

28. The points are closely connected and are taken up in that order. At the outset, it is necessary to state what this Court is not deciding. This Court is not deciding whether the petitioners, or the State, own the land. That is a question of title which depends on the history of the land and on documents whose genuineness and effect have not been tested by evidence. What this Court is called upon to decide is whether the respondents may, on the material on which they rely, treat the land as their own and take it for a public road without acquisition and without payment of compensation.

(i) Whether the writ petitions are maintainable when the title to the subject properties is in dispute

29. The Revenue authorities contend that the writ petitions are not maintainable, since the petitioners in substance seek to question the TSLR entries and to establish title, which cannot be done under Article 226 of the Constitution.

30. Article 300-A of the Constitution provides that "No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." The petitioners complain of a threatened deprivation of their property by executive action which, according to them, is not backed by law. Whether a proposed action of the State to take possession of property is supported by authority of law is a question which this Court is bound to examine under Article 226. The fact that the State disputes the title of the petitioners does not alter the nature of the complaint. What is under challenge is the reliance placed by the respondents on their own assertion of title to dispense with acquisition.

31. The objection would have force if the petitioners had asked this Court to declare their title on disputed evidence. They have not done so, and this Court does not propose to do so. Points (ii) to (iv) can be answered on the documents whose existence is not in dispute and on the stand taken by the respondents in their counter-affidavits, without resolving any disputed question of fact. Point (i) is, therefore, answered by holding that the writ petitions are maintainable, and that this Court will confine itself to the legality of the action of the respondents, without adjudicating title.

(ii) Whether the TSLR entries and the notification under Section 13 of the Survey Act are conclusive of the title of the Government, and whether Section 14 of that Act bars the petitioners

32. The Survey Act provides for the survey of lands and the settlement of boundary disputes. Sections 13 and 14 of the Survey Act, on which the Revenue authorities rely, read as follows:

               "13. Completion of demarcation to be notified.--When the survey of any land or boundary which has been notified under section 5 has been completed in accordance with the orders passed under section 9, 10 or 11, the survey officer shall notify the fact in the district gazette and a copy of such notification shall be posted in the village chavadi, if any, of the village to which the survey relates; unless the survey so notified is modified by a decree of a civil court under the provisions of section 14, the record of the survey shall be conclusive proof that the boundaries determined and recorded therein have been correctly determined and recorded:

               Provided that in the case of land or boundary situated in the territories specified in sub-section (1) of section 3 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (Central Act 37 of 1956) until a District Gazette is published for the districts in the said territories, a notification as required by this section shall be published in the Telangana Gazette in lieu of publication in the District Gazette.

               14. Institution of a suit in civil court within three years to establish rights claimed in respect of the boundary of the property surveyed.--Any person deeming himself aggrieved by the determination of any boundary under section 9, 10 or 11 may, subject to the provisions of Parts II and III of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, institute a suit within three years from the date of the notification under section 13 to set aside or modify the said determination and the survey shall, if necessary, be altered in accordance with the final decree in the suit and the alteration, if any, shall be noted in the record."

33. The finality which Section 13 attaches is to the record of the survey, and, on the terms of the provision, to the correctness of the boundaries determined and recorded therein, subject to the result of a suit under Section 14. Section 14 enables a person who is deprived of a right to immovable property by the survey to institute a suit to establish that right. A survey conducted to determine and record boundaries is not an adjudication of title between the State and a private person. The classification noted in the TSLR records the understanding of the survey officer at the time of the survey. It does not create a title where none existed, nor does it extinguish a title which did exist.

34. This position is well settled. In Sogra Begum v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2002 (1) ALD 131 (DB)), a Division Bench of this Court held as follows:

               "14. ... It is thus clear that an entry in TSLR itself cannot be the conclusive proof of title or lack of it, and the decision either to grant or refuse permission cannot be taken solely on the basis of an entry made in TSLR. It may be one of the factors that may have to be taken into consideration along with the other material available on record. An entry made in TSLR per se could not create any doubt or cloud on the right, title and interest of a person in respect of any land."

35. To the same effect is the decision in Hyderabad Potteries (supra), where it was held that an entry in the TSLR cannot by itself be treated as conclusive proof of title or of lack of title. The Supreme Court has consistently held that entries in revenue records serve a fiscal purpose and do not by themselves confer or extinguish title. In Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner ((2007) 6 SCC 186), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:

               "9. There is an additional reason as to why we need not interfere with that order under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is well settled that an entry in Revenue Records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in Record of Rights. It is settled law that entries in the Revenue Records or Jamabandi have only 'fiscal purpose' i.e. payment of land-revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. So far as title to the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent Civil Court (vide Jattu Ram v. Hakam Singh and Ors., AIR 1994 SC 1653)."

36. The entries relied upon in the present case show why such caution is necessary. Column No.10 of the TSLR records the classification as "Paiga", and Column No.20 records the letter "G". According to the petitioners, Column No.23 records the name of their predecessor-in-interest, Gouri Shankar Dubey. The petitioners read the letter "G" as referring to him, while the respondents read it as "Government". This Court does not need to decide which reading is correct. It is enough to notice that the register, read as a whole, does not speak with the clarity required to treat it as a declaration of the title of the State, and that its very meaning is in dispute.

37. The contention based on Section 14 does not advance the case of the respondents. The period prescribed in Section 14 governs a suit to establish a right against the survey record. It does not, by itself, vest in the State a title which the State did not otherwise have, nor does it authorise the State to take possession of property held by a private person for decades. The petitioners are not seeking alteration of the TSLR in these writ petitions. They resist a deprivation of their property founded on it. Further, the counter-affidavits refer to notices under Section 9(2) of the Survey Act only in general terms. No material has been placed before this Court to show that notice was served on the predecessors of the petitioners in respect of this property, or that the claim made by them was adjudicated upon by the competent authority.

38. It is also relevant that the survey did not disturb the possession of the petitioners. For about three decades after the notification dated 28.02.1977, the municipal authority continued to assess the building to property tax, and the respondents do not claim to have taken any step during that period to treat the petitioners as unauthorised occupants. The occasion for the petitioners to resist arose only when the respondents, requiring the land for the road, relied upon the TSLR to deny compensation.

39. Point (ii) is, therefore, answered by holding that the TSLR entries and the notification under Section 13 of the Survey Act are not conclusive of the title of the Government to the subject properties, and that the absence of a suit under Section 14 of the Survey Act does not preclude the petitioners from resisting the deprivation of their property otherwise than in accordance with law.

(iii) Whether the respondents could themselves decide that the subject properties are Government land and drop the acquisition proceedings

40. Against the TSLR entry, the petitioners rely on a registered sale deed dated 04.11.1966, the Khasra Pahani for the year 1954- 55 and the Pahani Patrikas for the later years recording the land as private patta land, the building permission granted by the municipal authority in 1968, the municipal assessment and payment of property tax, and long possession.

41. On the evidentiary value of the Khasra Pahani, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in D. Narsing Rao (supra) observed as follows:

               "13. Consequent to the merger of Hyderabad State with India in 1948 the jagirs were abolished by the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1358 Fasli. 'Khasra pahani' is the basic record-of-rights prepared by the Board of Revenue Andhra Pradesh in the year 1954-1955. It was gazetted under Regulation 4 of the A.P. (Telangana Area Record- of-Rights in Land Regulation, 1358 F. As per Regulation 13 any entry in the said record-of-rights shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. The said Regulation of 1358 F was in vogue till it was repealed by the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971, which came into force on 15-8-1978. In the 2nd Edn. (1997) of The Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar (at p. 1053) 'Khasra' is described as follows:

               'Khasra. --Khasra is a register recording the incidents of a tenure and is a historical record. Khasra would serve the purpose of a deed of title, when there is no other title deed.'"

42. In Shikharchand Jain (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, dealing with Khasra entries under a different statute, held as follows:

               "4. It is now to be seen whether the first appellate Court's finding really falls within the grip of Section 100(1)(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In his written statement Shikharchand has admitted Smt. Rajrani's ownership of the land. But he has pleaded that he has become the owner of the land on account of the adverse possession for more than 12 years from 1937. The burden of proving the acquisition of ownership by adverse possession lay on him. The Khasra entries from 1937-38 to 1941-42 and 1943- 44 to 1951-52 are all in favour of Smt. Rajrani. They show that she was in possession over the land during those years. Khasra is a record of right according to Section 45(2) of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1917. Section 80(3) of that Act provides that entries in a record of right shall be presumed to be correct unless the contrary is shown. This provision raises a presumption of correctness of the aforesaid Khasra entries..."

43. Though the statutory framework in Shikharchand Jain (supra) is different, the principle that an entry in a record-of-rights carries a presumption of correctness, and cannot be disregarded without due consideration, is of assistance. This Court is not holding that the documents relied upon by the petitioners prove their title. Their genuineness and effect have not been tested by evidence. However, taken together, they disclose a bona fide and substantial claim of private title, and not a frivolous or speculative one. The counter-affidavits, as placed before this Court, do not dispute that the building was constructed with municipal permission and has been assessed to property tax.

44. On the other hand, the respondents rely only on the TSLR entry. No grant, vesting order, resumption order, earlier acquisition or other document showing that the land vested in or was acquired by the Government has been placed before this Court. The classification "Paiga" may indicate that the land once formed part of a Paigah estate. Whether, on the abolition of jagirs, the land vested in the State free of private rights, or whether private patta rights had come into existence and survived, as the Khasra Pahani of 1954-55 is said to show, is a question of title and history which requires evidence. It is not answered by the TSLR entry.

45. Where the Government and a person in long possession are in bona fide dispute over title, the Government cannot decide the dispute for itself and act upon its own decision. In Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao ((1982) 2 SCC 134), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the summary remedy of eviction under the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905, is not available to the Government where the occupant raises a bona fide dispute of title, and that such a dispute must be decided by the ordinary courts. The relevant passage reads as follows:

               9. The view of the Division Bench that the summary remedy provided for by Section 6 cannot be resorted to unless the alleged encroachment is of "a very recent origin", cannot be stretched too far. That was also the view taken by the learned Single Judge himself in another case which is reported in Meharunnissa Begum v. State of A.P. [(1970) 1 Andh LT 88] which was affirmed by a Division Bench [Meherunnissa Begum v. Govt. of A.P.AIR 1971 AP 382 : (1971) 1 Andh LT 292 : ILR 1972 AP 44] . It is not the duration, short or long, of encroachment that is conclusive of the question whether the summary remedy prescribed by the Act can be put into operation for evicting a person. What is relevant for the decision of that question is more the nature of the property on which the encroachment is alleged to have been committed and the consideration whether the claim of the occupant is bona fide.

Facts which raise a bona fide dispute of title between the Government and the occupant must be adjudicated upon by the ordinary courts of law. The Government cannot decide such questions unilaterally in its own favour and evict any person summarily on the basis of such decision. But duration of occupation is relevant in the sense that a person who is in occupation of a property openly for an appreciable length of time can be taken, prima facie, to have a bona fide claim to the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law.

46. The same principle was reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Padmavati Devi (1995 Supp (2) SCC 290), where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that summary proceedings under the land revenue law are not appropriate where there is a bona fide dispute of title, which must be decided in a civil court. The relevant passage reads as follows:

               "6. As noticed earlier Section 91 of the Act prescribes a summary procedure for eviction of a person who is found to be in unauthorised occupation of Government land. The said provisions cannot be invoked in a case where the person in occupation raises bona fide dispute about his right to remain in occupation over the land. Dealing with similar provisions contained in Section 6 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1945, this Court in Govt. of A.P. v. Thummala Krishna Rao [(1982) 2 SCC 134 : (1982) 3 SCR 500] has laid down that the summary remedy for eviction provided by Section 6 of the said Act could be resorted to by the Government only against persons who are in unauthorised occupation of any land which is the property of the Government and if the person in occupation has a bona fide claim to litigate he could not be ejected save by the due process of law and that the summary remedy prescribed by Section 6 was not the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated questions of title. For the same reasons, it can be said that summary remedy available under Section 91 of the Act is not the legal process which is suited for adjudication of complicated questions of title where the person sought to be evicted as an unauthorised occupant makes a bona fide claim regarding his right to be in possession. In such a case the proper course is to have the matter adjudicated by the ordinary courts of law."

47. The principle applies with greater force to the present case. Here, the respondents did not even resort to a statutory summary procedure. The 7th respondent, by letter dated 30.05.2009, concluded that the land is Government land by looking only at the TSLR, without notice to the petitioners, and, on that basis, gave up the acquisition. The call for documents came two years later, and no order considering the representation dated 07.07.2011 and the documents relied upon by the petitioners has been placed before this Court. In effect, the authority which needed the land decided for itself that it need not pay for it. That is not permissible.

48. Point (iii) is, therefore, answered by holding that the respondents could not, on the basis of the TSLR entry alone and without any process known to law, decide that the subject properties are Government land, and that the decision to drop the acquisition on that basis cannot be sustained.

(iv) Whether the respondents can take over the affected portions by offering ex-gratia, without acquisition and compensation under the 2013 Act

49. Under Article 300-A of the Constitution, a person can be deprived of property only by authority of law, that is, by a law made by a competent legislature, and not by executive action alone. For the compulsory taking of land for a public purpose, the law is the 2013 Act. It provides for the determination of compensation by the Collector under Sections 26 to 30 read with the First Schedule, for payment before possession under Section 38, and for the resolution of disputes, including disputes as to the persons entitled to compensation, under Sections 64, 76 and 77.

50. In Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh ((2020) 2 SCC 569), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the State could not deprive a citizen of property without the sanction of law, and directed payment of compensation on par with acquisition. The relevant passage reads as follows:

               "12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right 2 in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300 A, can be inferred in that Article.

               12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai4, wherein this Court held that:

               "6. ... Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of "eminent domain" may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid."

               (emphasis supplied)

               12.4 In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, this Court held that:

               "21. If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed."

               (emphasis supplied)

               12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., this Court recognized the right to property as a basic human right in the following words:

               "30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. "Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist" was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed, the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists."

               (emphasis supplied)

               12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat,7 this Court held as follows:

               "48. ...In other words, Article 300A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation."

               (emphasis supplied)

               12.7. In this case, the appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law, and depriving her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967.

               12.8. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her predecessors had "orally" consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant of her property by the State.

               12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors. wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution.

               12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi- faceted dimension.

51. This was followed in Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of Himachal Pradesh ((2022) 7 SCC 508), which also concerned land used for a road without acquisition. In Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah ((2024) 10 SCC 533), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the right under Article 300-A includes a set of procedural sub-rights, including the right to be heard and the right to fair compensation, and that a compulsory taking of property which does not follow the procedure laid down by law is invalid, even where a power to acquire exists. The relevant passage reads as follows:

               30. What then are these sub-rights or strands of this swadeshi constitutional fabric constituting the right to property? Seven such sub-rights can be identified, albeit non-exhaustive. These are:

               i) duty of the State to inform the person that it intends to acquire his property - the right to notice,

               ii) the duty of the State to hear objections to the acquisition - the right to be heard,

               iii) the duty of the State to inform the person of its decision to acquire - the right to a reasoned decision,

               iv) the duty of the State to demonstrate that the acquisition is for public purpose - the duty to acquire only for public purpose,

               v) the duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate - the right of restitution or fair compensation,

               vi) the duty of the State to conduct the process of acquisition efficiently and within prescribed timelines of the proceedings - the right to an efficient and expeditious process, and

               vii) final conclusion of the proceedings leading to vesting - the right of conclusion.

               31. These seven rights are foundational components of a law that is tune with Article 300A, and the absence of one of these or some of them would render the law susceptible to challenge. The judgment of this Court in K.T. Plantations (supra)13 declares that the law envisaged under Article 300A must be in line with the overarching principles of rule of law, and must be just, fair, and reasonable. It is, of course, precedentially sound to describe some of these sub- rights as 'procedural', a nomenclature that often tends to undermine the inherent worth of these safeguards. These seven sub-rights may be procedures, but they do constitute the real content of the right to property under Article 300A, non- compliance of these will amount to violation of the right, being without the authority of law.

52. The ex-gratia scheme under G.O.Ms.No.708 dated 13.06.2011 is an executive measure. It is designed for occupants of land which is Government land, and it proceeds on the footing that the land belongs to the Government. To apply it to property the title to which is bona fide disputed is to decide that dispute against the occupant by an executive act. An executive order cannot take the place of the statute. Ex-gratia is a payment made as a matter of grace; it is not a determination of compensation under law. The refusal of the petitioners to accept ex-gratia is not, therefore, a waiver of their right to compensation.

53. The stand of the GHMC itself points to the correct course. It is stated in its counter-affidavit that, if acquisition were taken up, the title documents of the claimants would be verified at the stage of the award and rival claims would be referred under Section 30 of the 1894 Act. Under the 2013 Act, the corresponding provisions are Sections 76 and 77, which read as follows:

               76. Dispute as to apportionment. -- When the amount of compensation has been settled, if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the same or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Collector may refer such disputes to the Authority.

               77. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Authority. --

               (1) On making an award under section 30, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay it to them by depositing the amount in their bank accounts unless prevented by someone or more of the contingencies mentioned in sub- section (2).

               (2) If the person entitled to compensation shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Authority to which a reference under section 64 would be submitted:

               Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount:

               Provided further that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under sub-section (1) of section 64:

Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto.

54. These provisions permit the Collector to proceed with the acquisition, determine the compensation, refer any dispute as to the persons entitled to it, and deposit the compensation with the Authority pending the decision of that dispute. The public purpose is thus not held up, and the claim of the State to the land is fully preserved. If it is ultimately found that the land belongs to the Government, the compensation for the land will not be paid to the petitioners.

55. The public interest in widening the road is not in doubt, and the submission of the GHMC that the petitioners should cooperate is well founded. But the public interest in a wider road does not dispense with the law. It is to be served by acquisition in accordance with the 2013 Act, not by treating disputed private property as Government land.

56. Point (iv) is, therefore, answered by holding that the respondents cannot take over the affected portions of the subject properties by offering ex-gratia under G.O.Ms.No.708 dated 13.06.2011, and that, if the affected portions are required, they must be acquired and compensation determined and paid in accordance with the 2013 Act.

(v) To what relief are the petitioners entitled

57. On the respondents' own showing, the steps taken in the year 2007 under the 1894 Act did not result in an award and were given up in the year 2009. Any acquisition now undertaken must, therefore, conform to the 2013 Act. If any notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act was in fact published and is held to subsist, the determination of compensation would, in any event, be governed by the 2013 Act in terms of Section 24(1)(a) thereof. It is not necessary to decide which of the two situations obtains, since the result, so far as compensation is concerned, is the same.

58. The relief must balance the rights of the petitioners under Article 300-A with the public interest in the road and the claim of the State to the land. Considerable time has passed since the requisition of the year 2007, and the respondents must first decide whether the affected portions are still required. If they are required, they must be acquired under the 2013 Act. The claim of the State to the land must be placed before the Collector and, if the rival claims persist, dealt with under Sections 76 and 77 of the 2013 Act. The petitioners must produce their documents and cooperate. Until the procedure in law is followed, the possession of the petitioners cannot be disturbed. No declaration of title is to be made in favour of either side.

59. These considerations apply equally to W.P.No.2602 of 2019, where the respondents, on the same basis, propose to take the affected portion of Premises No.1-8-522/35 on payment of ex- gratia. Point (v) is answered accordingly, and the relief is set out in the Result.

CONCLUSION:

60. For the foregoing reasons, the points for consideration are answered as follows:

               (a) On point (i), the writ petitions are maintainable. This Court has examined only the legality of the action of the respondents and has not adjudicated title.

               (b) On point (ii), the TSLR entries and the notification under Section 13 of the Survey Act are not conclusive of the title of the Government, and the absence of a suit under Section 14 of that Act does not preclude the petitioners from resisting the deprivation of their property otherwise than in accordance with law.

               (c) On point (iii), the respondents could not, on the basis of the TSLR entry alone, themselves decide that the subject properties are Government land and drop the acquisition on that basis, in the face of the bona fide and substantial claim of title set up by the petitioners.

               (d) On point (iv), the respondents cannot take over the affected portions by offering ex-gratia under G.O.Ms.No.708 dated 13.06.2011. If the affected portions are required, they must be acquired and compensation determined and paid under the 2013 Act.

               (e) On point (v), the petitioners are entitled to the reliefs set out below.

RESULT:

61. In the result, both the writ petitions are allowed. The action of the respondents in treating the subject properties as Government land solely on the basis of the TSLR entries, in dropping the acquisition proceedings on that basis, and in proposing to take the affected portions on payment of ex-gratia, is declared illegal and is set aside. The following directions are issued:

               (a) Respondent Nos.5 to 7 shall, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, decide whether the affected portions of the subject properties are still required for widening the road from Narayanaguda Junction to Musheerabad Junction.

               (b) If the affected portions are required, the competent authority shall initiate proceedings for their acquisition under the 2013 Act and complete them in accordance with that Act, and shall determine the compensation payable for the land and the structures.

               (c) The claim of the State to the land shall be placed before the Collector in the acquisition proceedings. If there is any dispute as to the persons entitled to the compensation for the land, the Collector shall deal with it under Section 76 of the 2013 Act and shall deposit the compensation in the manner provided under Section 77 of that Act, and the compensation shall abide by the result of that dispute.

               (d) The petitioners shall produce their title documents and other relevant material before the Collector within four weeks from the date of receipt of notice in the acquisition proceedings, and shall cooperate in their verification.

               (e) The respondents shall not dispossess the petitioners from, or interfere with their possession and enjoyment of, the affected portions of the subject properties, except after taking possession in accordance with the 2013 Act.

               (f) If respondent Nos.5 to 7 decide that the affected portions are not required, the respondents shall not interfere with the possession of the petitioners on the basis of the TSLR entries, except in accordance with law. It is open to the State to establish its claim of title in proceedings competent in law.

               (g) Nothing in this order shall be construed as an adjudication of title to the subject properties in favour of either party. All contentions of the parties on title are left open.

62. There shall be no order as to costs.

Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this writ petitions shall stand closed.