1. Heard Mr. R. M. Sharma, who has appeared online, Mr. Madhurendra Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent no. 6 and Ms. Divya, learned counsel for the respondent no. 5.
2. The present appeal has been filed with a reported delay of 218 days. IA/10840/2025 has been filed for condoning the delay of reported delay of 218 days, whereas the prayer made in the delay condonation application is for condoning the delay of only 6 days. The only reason given is that the son of the appellant was running with high fever due to a viral infection, as such the delay was caused on account of the ailment of the son of the appellant.
3. We have perused the OPD Card and the same does not in any way substantiate the plea of condoning the delay of 218 days. The explanation given is unconvincing.
4. Apart from this what we find is that the complaint was filed in the year 2014 and it went unattended on several occasions as recorded in the order dated 26.09.2024. Consequently the complaint came to be dismissed for non- prosecution after having heard the counsel for the respondents.
5. As noted above the present appeal has been filed with a delay of 218 days, we do not find any reason to calculate the delay at only 6 days as stated by the appellant. The date of the impugned order is 26.09.2024 and the appeal has been filed on 25.07.2025. The prescribed period for filing the appeal is 30 days and the time taken in obtaining the certified copies is reported to be 54 days. Consequently the office has correctly reported that after deducting the aforesaid period the appeal is delayed by 218 days. There is no cogent explanation or plausible reason, more in the background when the appellant is stated to be a practicing lawyer.
6. We had adjourned the matter on 19.09.2025 and then issued notice on the delay condonation application on 18.11.2025, to which a reply has been filed by the opposite party nos. 5 and 6, urging that there is no explanation, much less a valid explanation by the appellant. We had heard Mr. Madhurendra Kumar, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 6 and Ms. Divya, advocate for the opposite party no.5.
7. Having perused the reply filed on behalf of the respondents and having considered the submissions raised we find no reason to condone the delay in the absence of any valid explanation. The explanation given is only an excuse as enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of Sheo Raj Singh & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr., (2023) 10 SCC 531 paragraphs 30 to 32, whereof are as follows:
"30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial.
31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.
32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication."
8. Even otherwise, the appeal had been prosecuted in a very careless manner. We see no reason to exercise our appellate jurisdiction for interfering with the impugned order which does not suffer from any infirmity.
9. Apart from this the only relief prayed for is in respect of the dismissal of the review application on 01.05.2025 without questioning the order dated 26.09.2024. For the said reason also we find no merit in the appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.
