Narsing Rao Nandikonda, J.

1. Heard Mr. M. Vijaya Kumar Goud, learned counsel for appearing for the appellant and learned Government Pleader for Services-I appearing for the respondents. Perused the entire material on record.

2. This Writ Appeal is filed under Section 15 of the Letters of Patent against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Review Petition No.1 of 2025 in Writ Petition No.5483 of 2020.

3. The appellant herein, who has been working as an NMR/Gangman with respondent Nos.2 to 5 since 1991, originally filed Writ Petition No.5483 of 2020 seeking a direction to the respondents to extend the benefit of minimum time scale of pay in terms of G.O.Rt.No.360, dated 27.04.2011, and to pay the arrears of minimum time scale of pay from the date of issuance of the said G.O., together with all consequential benefits.

4. The learned Single Judge, after hearing the learned counsel for both parties and upon consideration of the rival contentions and the material available on record, allowed the writ petition. The learned Single Judge observed that the Government, under G.O.Rt.No.360, dated 27.04.2011, had extended the benefit of minimum time scale of pay to individuals who had been appointed as NMRs prior to 25.11.1993 and were continuing as on the date of issuance of the said G.O. Admittedly, the appellant was appointed in the year 1991 and was continuing in service as on the date of issuance of the said G.O. and thereafter, the learned Single Judge held that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of minimum time scale of pay under G.O.Rt.No.360, dated 27.04.2011.

5. Having considered the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents, the learned Single Judge directed the respondents to extend the benefit under G.O.Rt.No.360, dated 27.04.2011, to the appellant from the date of issuance of the said G.O., or from the date of his eligibility, or from the date of his representation, whichever was earlier and to pay the arrears of minimum time scale of pay.

6. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents filed Review Petition No.1 of 2025 under Order XLVII Rule 1 r/w. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking review of the order dated 29.08.2024 passed in W.P.No.5483 of 2020. The main contention raised in the review petition was that the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of time scale of pay as he was not a regular employee and had been engaged on a piecemeal basis, as and when his services were required for maintenance of roads. It was further contended that the learned Single Judge had erroneously applied the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Others v. Jagjit Singh and Others ((2017) 1 SCC 148), as the appellant’s engagement was not in the nature of regular employment and was based on the availability of work.

7. The review petition was heard by the learned Single Judge. During the course of hearing, the review petitioners confined their request to modification of the direction contained in the order dated 29.08.2024 insofar as the benefit of G.O.Rt.No.360, dated 27.04.2011, was directed to be extended from the date of issuance of the G.O. The review petitioners sought that the benefit be extended either from the date of filing of the writ petition or from the date of the interim order passed by this Court. The said contention was opposed by the learned counsel for the appellant, who contended that the benefit ought to be extended from the date of issuance of the G.O.

8. The learned Single Judge, upon consideration of the rival contentions, noticed that the appellant had not made any representation after issuance of G.O.Rt.No.360, dated 27.04.2011, and that the writ petition had been filed only on 10.03.2020, nearly nine years after issuance of the said G.O. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge modified paragraph 7 of the order dated 29.08.2024 and directed the respondents to extend the benefit of G.O.Rt.No.360, dated 27.04.2011, to the appellant from the date of filing of the writ petition and to pay the arrears of minimum time scale of pay within a period of four months.

9. Aggrieved by the said order passed in review, the present Writ Appeal has been filed on the grounds that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that Review jurisdiction is extremely limited and can be exercised only when there exists an error apparent on the face of the record and that the impugned order amounts to re-hearing of the matter, which is impermissible in law.

10. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that, once the Government had issued G.O.Rt.No.360, dated 27.04.2011, the benefit contemplated therein was required to be extended from the date of issuance of the said G.O. and that the learned Single Judge, without assigning cogent reasons, had modified the original order by restricting the benefit to the date of filing of the writ petition. It was also contended that no specific representation was required for seeking the implementation of payment of Minimum Time scales as per the said G.O., as non-implementation of payment of Equal pay for Equal work amounts to violation of Human rights.

11. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the appellant was not a front sitter, as he is going on making the representations both in oral and writing, and had also approached this Court seeking regularization of his services. It was therefore contended that the appellant had been consistently pursuing his claim and that the respondents could not take advantage of the alleged delay in filing the writ petition.

12. It was also contended that the learned Single Judge had failed to properly apply the principle of equal pay for equal work, though reliance had been placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Others v. Jagjit Singh and Others (1st cited supra). The appellant had been working for eight hours a day and was therefore entitled to the benefit of the minimum time scale of pay.

13. Admittedly, the appellant originally approached this Court seeking a writ of mandamus declaring the action of respondent Nos.2 to 5 in not extending the benefit of minimum time scale of pay to him in terms of G.O.Rt.No.360, dated 27.04.2011, as illegal and arbitrary.

14. It is pertinent to note that G.O.Ms.No.212, dated 22.04.1994, dealt with regularization and absorption of daily wage/NMR employees and also contemplated consolidated pay in respect of employees who were not eligible for regularization. Pursuant thereto, the Government formulated a scheme for regularization of the services of persons appointed on daily wage/NMR or consolidated pay and continuing as on the date of commencement of the relevant scheme, subject to fulfillment of the prescribed conditions.

15. However, the grievance of the appellant in the writ petition was not with regard to regularization of his services. His specific grievance was that he had not been extended the benefit of minimum time scale of pay contemplated under G.O.Rt.No.360, dated 27.04.2011.

16. For the sake of convenience, the relevant portion of G.O.Rt.No.360, dated 27.04.2011, may be extracted.

               “In the circumstances reported by the Engineer-in-chief (R&B) Admn., & NH, Hyderabad in his letter read above, Government hereby accorded permission to the Engineer-in-chief (R&B) Admn., & NH, Hyderabad to allowing the minimum time scales i.e., (Basic +DA) without any other benefits as per the RPD 2010 to the individuals who are appointed prior to 25-11-1993 as NMR basis and continuing till date, is agreed from the perspective date i.e., from the date of issue of order subject to meeting the additional expenditure with in the budget provisions of the Department and extension of minimum time scale, of Rs.17,95,236/- (Rs.1,65,34,800-47,39,564) in respect of all the employees working on NMR basis whose services not come under the purview of regularization.”

On a perusal thereof, it is evident that, at the request of the Engineer-in-Chief, R&B, Administration and NH, Hyderabad, the Government accorded permission for allowing minimum time scale, namely, basic pay plus DA, without any other benefits, as per RPS-2010, to individuals appointed prior to 25.11.1993 on NMR basis and continuing as on the date of issuance of the order, subject to the conditions stipulated therein.

17. The learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition, directed the respondents to extend the benefit of G.O.Rt.No.360 to the appellant from the date of issuance of the said G.O., or from the date of his eligibility, or from the date of his representation, whichever was earlier, and to pay the arrears of minimum time scale of pay.

18. It was further observed that, insofar as the payment of arrears from the date of issuance of the G.O. was concerned, if the appellant had made any representation prior to filing of the writ petition, he could submit a fresh representation along with a copy of the earlier representation and seek payment of arrears from the date of the said G.O.

19. In the review proceedings, however, the learned Single Judge modified the said direction and directed the respondents to extend the benefit of G.O.Rt.No.360 to the appellant from the date of filing of the writ petition and to pay the arrears of minimum time scale of pay accordingly.

20. On a careful consideration of the matter, the principal question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether the learned Single Judge was justified in modifying the operative portion of the original order in exercise of review jurisdiction.

21. The scope of review jurisdiction is limited. A review cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise and an order can be reviewed only on the grounds recognized under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, including discovery of new and important matter or evidence, an error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason recognized in law.

22. In the present case, the learned Single Judge, while exercising review jurisdiction, did not reconsider the entitlement of the appellant to the benefit of G.O.Rt.No.360, dated 27.04.2011. The modification was confined to the date from which the benefit was required to be extended. The learned Single Judge took into consideration the fact that the appellant had not made any representation after issuance of the said G.O. and had approached this Court only in the year 2020, nearly nine years after issuance of the said G.O., and accordingly modified the earlier direction.

23. The contention of the appellant that the said G.O. itself contemplated extension of the benefit from the date of its issuance has been considered. However, the learned Single Judge, while exercising review jurisdiction, took into consideration the absence of a representation and the delay in approaching this Court and restricted the monetary benefit to the date of filing of the writ petition.

24. Having regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against an order passed in review jurisdiction, and upon perusal of the operative portion of the order passed in Review Petition No.1 of 2025, we do not find any error apparent on the face of the record or any other ground warranting interference with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Consequently, the Writ Appeal is liable to be dismissed.

25. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.