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CDJ 2026 TSHC 1064 My Notes print Preview print print
Court : High Court for the State of Telangana
Case No : CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1176 of 2017
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
Parties : The State of Telangana, rep. by the Public Prosecutor, High Court at Hyderabad Versus Mamidi Jagjeevan Ram
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: Public Prosecutor (TG). For the Respondent: - - - -
Date of Judgment : 05-10-2026
Head Note :-
IPC - Sections 304-A, 338, 337 & 279 -
Judgment :-

1. This Criminal Appeal has been filed by the State, aggrieved by the Judgment dated 17.01.2017 passed by the learned III Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Warangal, in C.C.No.93 of 2013, whereby the learned Magistrate acquitted the respondent/accused of the offences punishable under Sections 304-A, 338, 337 and 279 of IPC.

02. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 29.01.2013, at about 9.30 p.m., PWs.1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 and deceased D1 to D7 were proceeding in the TATA ACE Auto bearing No.AP 36 TV 1546 belonging to PW.8 towards Inavolu village. When they reached Punnelu Cross Road at about 10.30 p.m. and were crossing the road, the accused, who was driving the lorry bearing No. AP 24 X 5757 from Khammam towards Warangal, drove the lorry in a rash and negligent manner at high speed and dashed against the TATA ACE Auto. Due to the impact, the lorry turned turtle, and the occupants of the auto sustained severe injuries. Deceased D1 to D3 died on the spot. Subsequently, deceased D4 to D7, who were shifted to the hospital, succumbed to their injuries.

03. Heard Sri M.Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant/State. There is no representation for the respondent/accused. Hence, respondent/accused is treated as heard. Perused the material on record.

04. The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that the learned Magistrate, without properly appreciating the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, erroneously acquitted the respondent/accused. He contended that the prosecution had established its case beyond reasonable doubt and proved the commission of the alleged offences by the respondent/accused. He further submitted that the learned trial Court ought to have seen that PWs.1, 2, 4 and 6 to 9 had clearly stated that the accused, who was present in the Court hall, was the driver of the said lorry which caused the accident. Merely because no identification parade was held, it does not in any way affect the evidence of the injured eye witnesses, and nothing substantial had been brought on record to show that these witnesses were speaking falsehood. Their evidence is cogent, trustworthy and reliable. He further submitted that the ingredients of the offences under Sections 304-A, 338, 337 and 279 of the IPC are attracted to the facts of the present case. According to him, the learned Magistrate failed to properly consider the statutory ingredients of the said offences and the evidence adduced by the prosecution in support thereof. Therefore, the impugned Judgment is contrary to the evidence on record and the settled principles of law and is liable to be set aside. Consequently, he prayed that the respondent/accused be convicted of the alleged offences.

05. Having considered the rival submissions of the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor and upon perusal of the impugned Judgment passed by the learned Magistrate, it is evident that, on behalf of the prosecution, PWs.1 to 33 were examined and Exs.P1 to P31 were marked. On behalf of the defence, Ex.D1 and D2 were marked. Upon a comprehensive appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned Magistrate rightly arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution had miserably failed to establish the guilt of the respondent-accused beyond reasonable doubt.

06. Further, the learned Magistrate recorded cogent and wellreasoned findings in the impugned Judgment. The learned Magistrate observed, on a perusal of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, that the driver of the crime vehicle, i.e., the lorry, had fled from the scene after the accident. None of the witnesses had an opportunity to see the accused at the relevant time of the accident. The witnesses, i.e., PWs.1, 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8, did not state the descriptive particulars of the accused to establish that he was the driver who drove the lorry on the date of the accident. He further observed that the Investigating Officer ought to have conducted a Test Identification Parade, which would have strengthened the case of the prosecution. If the witnesses had prior acquaintance with the accused, identification of the accused for the first time before the Court at the time of trial would have been sufficient. However, in the instant case, the driver was an unknown person, and no Test Identification Parade was conducted by the Investigating Officer to enable the eye witnesses to identify the accused. When the accused was a stranger to the witnesses, conducting a Test Identification Parade by the Investigating Officer would have strengthened the case of the prosecution.

07. In cases of acquittal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another ((2022) 8 Supreme Court Cases 536), held that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellant Court has to consider whether the trial Court’s view can be termed as a 1  possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal.

08. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh ((2008) 10 Supreme Court Cases 450) the Hon’ble Supreme Court after referring to several Judgments regarding the settled principles of law and the powers of appellate Court in reversing the order of acquittal, held at para 70, as follows:

               “70. In the light of the above, the High Court and other appellate Courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of Judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal.”

               1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal if it has “very substantial and compelling reasons” for doing so.

               A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have “very substantial and compelling reasons” to discard the trial court’s decision. “Very substantial and compelling reasons” exist when:

               i) The trial court’s conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong:

               ii) The trial court’s decision was based on an erroneous view of law;

               iii) The trial court’s judgment is likely to result in “grave miscarriage of justice”;

               iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal;

               v) The trial court’s judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable;

               vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc.

               vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.

               2. The appellate court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial court.

               3. If two reasonable views can be reached one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction the High Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused.”

09. For the foregoing reasons as well as the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Judgments cited supra, the learned Magistrate has rightly acquitted the respondent/accused for the offences punishable under Section under Sections 304-A, 338, 337 and 279 of IPC. Hence, this Court does not find any grounds to interfere with the well reasoned Judgment of the learned Magistrate.

10. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous Petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed.

 
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