(Prayer: Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to to issue a writ, order, or direction more particularly in the nature of writ of mandamus declaring the proceedings letter No.105/2017, dated 19.12.2017 of the 3rd respondent and proceedings Letter No.F.No.01/PROP/AP/General, dated 16.11.2016 cf the 4th respondent is as arbitrary, illegal, colourable exercise of power and to quash or set aside the same and to issue a consequential direction to the 3rd respondent to receive and register the documents in the respect of the lands situated in Survey No.611/2b (old Survey No.611) of Kallur Village, Kurnool and to pass

IA NO: 1 OF 2018

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to suspend the proceedings direct the 3rd respondent, to receive and register the documents in respect of the lands in Survey No.611/2b (old Survey No.611) of Kallur Village, Kurnool by suspending the proceedings letter No.105/2017, dated 19.12.2017 issued by the 3rd respondent and to pass

Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased topleased to issue an appropriate Writ, Order or Direction, more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus, declaring the proceedings Lr.No.E8/2394/2019 dated Nil.01.2019 of the 2nd Respondent, and the proceedings Rc.No.B/16/ 16 dated 30.01.2019 issued by the 3rd Respondent, as arbitrary, illegal, violation of principles of natural justice and opposed to Article 300-A of Constitution of India and colorable exercise of power and quash or set aside the same and to issue a consequential direction to the Respondents 2 to 5 not to interfere with the plots which are in possession of the petitioners in Sy.No.611/2B (old Sy.No.611) of Kallur Village and Mandal, Kurnool District

IA NO: 1 OF 2019

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to vacate the interim order passed in I.A.No. 1 of 2019 in WP No. 1405/2019 dated 15-02-2019

IA NO: 1 OF 2026

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased may be pleased to vacate the Interim order dated. 15.02.2019 passed in l.A No 1 of 2019 in WP No 1405 of 2019 and dismiss the above Writ Petition with exemplary costs and pass

IA NO: 2 OF 2026

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased May be pleased to grant Leave and consider the lA No 1 of 2026 Vacate Stay Petition filed in WP No.1405 of 2019 in the equity of justice and interest of Waqf and pass)

Common Order

1. Both these writ petitions have been filed by the same petitioners and the issue involved in these writ petitions is identical. Hence, I feel it appropriate to decide the issue involved in these writ petitions by way of a common order by taking W.P.No.14107 of 2018 as leading case.

2. W.P.No.14107 of 2018 came to be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking the following prayer:

                  “…to issue a writ, order, or direction more particularly in the nature of writ of mandamus declaring the proceedings letter No.105/2017, dated 19.12.2017 of the 3rd respondent and proceedings Letter No.F.No.01/PROP/AP/General, dated 16.11.2016 cf the 4th respondent is as arbitrary, illegal, colourable exercise of power and to quash or set aside the same and to issue a consequential direction to the 3rd respondent to receive and register the documents in the respect of the lands situated in Survey No.611/2b (old Survey No.611) of Kallur Village, Kurnool and to pass…”

3. W.P.No.1405 of 2019 came to be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking the following prayer:

                  “…to issue an appropriate Writ, Order or Direction, more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus, declaring the proceedings Lr.No.E8/2394/2019 dated Nil.01.2019 of the 2nd Respondent, and the proceedings Rc.No.B/16/ 16 dated 30.01.2019 issued by the 3rd Respondent, as arbitrary, illegal, violation of principles of natural justice and opposed to Article 300-A of Constitution of India and colorable exercise of power and quash or set aside the same and to issue a consequential direction to the Respondents 2 to 5 not to interfere with the plots which are in possession of the petitioners in Sy.No.611/2B (old Sy.No.611) of Kallur Village and Mandal, Kurnool District…”

4. It is the case of the petitioners that their great grandfather ‘Perugu Narayana Reddy‘ owns the land admeasuring Acs.17.43 cents situated in Sy.No.611 of Kallur village and mandal, Kurnool district having purchased the same by way of a registered sale deed in the year 1950. Out of the said land, an extent of Acs.2.25 cents was sold to one Erukala Giddaiah, as such, the land to an extent of Acs.15.18 cents remained with the petitioners‘ grandfather. After his demise in the year 1984, the subject lands devolved upon petitioners‘ father ‘Perugu Shankar Reddy‘ and after his demise in the year 2016, the petitioners became the absolute owners and possessors of the same.

5. It is the case of the petitioners that during the lifetime of their grandfather, the 4th respondent filed a suit before the Court of Principal Subordinate Judge, Kurnool bearing O.S.No.24 of 1969 seeking recovery of possession by directing the defendants therein to deliver possession of the land admeasuring Acs.44.85 cents situated in Sy.No.611, arraigning the petitioners‘ grandfather as 7th defendant. The Court below, after a full-fledged trial, dismissed the said suit vide judgment and decree dated 16.03.1970 by holding that the suit schedule property is not a wakf property. The said judgment and decree attained finality as no appeal has been preferred as against the said judgment and decree. Ever since, the petitioners‘ grandfather and father have been in possession of the same.

6. While the matter stood thus, subsequent to the death of petitioners‘ father in the year 2016, when the petitioners presented documents pertaining to the subject property for registration before the 3rd respondent on 18.12.2017, their request was rejected vide the impugned letter dated 19.12.2017, informing the petitioners that the land situated in Sy.No.611 of Kallur village cannot be registered as it is notified as wakf properties as per letter No.F.No.01/PROT/AP/General, dated 16.11.2016 addressed by the 4th respondent and as per gazette No.3160/43/A, dated 16.11.2016.

7. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners filed W.P.No.14107 of 2018. Pending the said writ petition, basing on a complaint dated 26.12.2018 submitted by one Mohammad Ismail (respondent No.4 in W.P.No.1405 of 2019), the 2nd respondent, without verifying the facts and without conducting enquiry, vide letter dated Nil.01.2019 bearing No.E8/2394/2019, instructed the Tahsildar, Kallur mandal, to fence around the subject property by affixing name boards, so that no encroacher can enter the said land to occupy the same. Pursuant to the said letter, the Tahsidlar, Kallur mandal addressed a letter to the Station house officer, III Town police station, Kurnool vide RC.B/16/2016, dated 30.01.2019, requesting to provide police protection during survey and to arrange fencing. Challenging the said letters addressed by the 2nd respondent and the Tahsildar, Kallur mandal, the petitioners filed W.P.No.1405 of 2019.

7. The 4th respondent – waqf board filed a detailed counter affidavit stating that the property situated in T.D.No.3622 in Sy.No.611 of Kallur village and mandal admeasuring Acs.44.85 cents belongs to Jali Bag Mosque, Kurnool as per the gazette published in A.P. Gazette (Part.II), dated 24.10.1963, Sl.No.3160 read with Addendum notification dated 20.03.1975. As per Section 6 of the Waqf Act, 1995, once a property has been notified as wakf, either the interested or aggrieved party has to challenge the entries in the gazette notification within a period of one year, else, it would be barred by limitation. In the case on hand, neither the petitioners nor their predecessors challenged the gazette notification.

8. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that the judgment and decree dated 16.03.1970 passed by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Kurnool in O.S.No.24 of 1969 is not in dispute, however, it is contended that the petitioners have to prove by producing succession certificate that they are the successors or heirs of Perugu Narayna Reddy, who was the 7th defendant in the said suit. It is further stated that even prior to filing of O.S.No.24 of 1969, a gazette notification dated 24.10.1963 was published showing that the subject property is a wakf property, but, due to some omissions, an addendum notification was issued on 20.03.1975; it is settled law that an addendum notification dates back to the original notification by simply correcting the entries thereon which was in existence earlier. The petitioners‘ grandfather purchased the subject property from the person who has no title in respect of the same to alienate. It is further stated in the counter affidavit that a statutory remedy is available under Section 83(2) of the Waqf Act, 1995 as per which, the petitioner has to file a petition before the Waqf Tribunal, where basing on the factual aspects and evidence, the title would be decided. Hence, requested to dismiss the writ petition.

9. The 3rd respondent has also filed a counter affidavit wherein it is stated that the land in Sy.No.611 of Kallur village and mandal, Kurnool district is included in the list of prohibited properties for registration under Section 22-A of the Registration Act, as per the letter dated 16.11.2016 addressed to the Commissioner and Inspector General of Registration and Stamps. In view of the law laid down by the full bench judgment of this Court in W.A.No.343 of 2015 and batch, dated 23.12.2015, if the petitioners have any grievance, they have to approach the Commissioner, Endowments for deletion of the subject property from the list of prohibited properties under Section 22-A of the Registration Act. Hence, requested to dismiss the writ petition.

10. Heard Sri. O. Manoher Reddy, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri. M. Chinnapa Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners; Sri. P. Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 4th respondent and learned Assistant Government Pleader for Stamps and Registration.

11. During the course of hearing, Sri. O. Manoher Reddy, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, reiterated the facts that led to filing of the writ petition; he further brought to the notice of this Court that in the year 1972, an application for approval of layout of house sites in Sy.No.611 of Kallur village was approved by the Kallur Grampanchayat in accordance with XVI (2) of Section 217 of A.P. Grampanchayat Act, 1964. Further, an application submitted by one Shivaiah for grant of inam patta was also approved and the then Inam Deputy Tahsildar granted inam patta to him; thus, the subject land is a private land. He further contended that the judgment and decree dated 16.03.1970 in O.S.No.24 of 1969 became final. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that earlier, when the petitioners‘ father presented documents pertaining to the subject property for registration, he was informed vide letter bearing Ref.No.D5/4154/95, dated 16.11.1995 by the District Collector, Kurnool district that the land in Sy.No.611/2 of Kallur village is a wakf property and registration of the said land will be subject to clearance from the wakf board. Challenging the said letter, the petitioners‘ father filed W.P.No.3140 of 1996, wherein, this Court, vide order dated 15.12.2004 held that there is no validity for issuing the proceedings dated 16.11.1995; further, directed the registering authority to entertain and register any document presented for registration of land in Sy.No.611 of the subject village.

12. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the petitioners and their predecessors are in continuous possession of the subject land from the year 1950. Once the Civil Court has categorically held that the wakf board cannot recover possession of the property and the petitioners are exercising right of ownership, the claim of the 4th respondent that the subject property is a wakf property by virtue of addendum notification issued in the year 1975 is untenable. Once the suit is dismissed and as no steps have been taken by the 4th respondent by filing an appeal, it cannot by any stretch be stated that the wakf board has right over the same. Hence, requested to allow these writ petitions.

13. On the other hand, Sri. P. Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 4th respondent contends that as per RSR, the land admeasuring Acs.44.85 cents in Sy.No.611 of Kallur village and mandal belongs to the manager of Jali Bag Masjid and as per the service inam register covering T.D.No.3622, the said land is shown as Religious Endowment land which belongs to Jali Bag Masjid. Even as per the survey conducted by the Survey Commissioner under Section 4 of the Waqf Act, 1954 on 23.04.1956, the land to an extent of Acs.44.85 cents belongs to Jali Masjid. Thereafter, a gazette under Section 5 of the Act was published on 24.10.1963 wherein, the name of the Mutawalli was mentioned, but, inadvertently, the survey numbers and extents of land were not mentioned; as such, an addendum notification was published on 20.03.1975 covering the land situated in Sy.No.611 to an extent of Acs.44.85 cents.

14. Learned Senior Counsel for the 4th respondent further contends that the suit filed for recovery of possession vide O.S.No.24 of 1969 was dismissed on 16.03.1970 and on a keen perusal of the relevant portion would disclose that though waqf board lost its title, the petitioners‘ predecessors did not file any suit for declaration till date. Mere dismissal of a suit filed for recovery of possession cannot give a right in favour of the petitioners or their ancestors. Learned Senior Counsel further contended that when the cloud is cast on the title over the subject property, the only remedy available to the petitioners is to file a suit for declaration of title before the Waqf Tribunal. If the petitioners or their ancestors are very much aggrieved, they ought to have challenged the publication of the addendum notification dated 20.03.1975 under Section 5 of the Act. The suit was decreed based on the material available at the relevant point of time, a subsequent property founded notification dated 20.03.1975 is a new document giving rise to a fresh cause of action for a declaration.

15. In reply to the submission of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that ryotwari pattas for the lands situated in the same survey number were granted to one Sivaiah, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents argued that even if a ryotwari patta has been granted in favour of a third party, such grant does not affect or defeat the rights of the religious or charitable institution to which the inam was originally granted. Learned Senior Counsel, while concluding his arguments, contended that the petitioners, without working out their remedies, have straightway approached this Court with unclean hands, as such, they are not entitled to any relief as sought in the writ petition and that the writ petition is not maintainable. Hence, requested to dismiss the writ petition.

16. Perused the entire material available on record. It is the case of the petitioners that their grandfather purchased Acs.17.43 cents in Sy.No.611 of Kallur Village in the year 1950 under a registered sale deed dated 15.06.1950 and that the property subsequently devolved upon them; that their family has been in possession of the property and rely upon the judgment and decree dated 16.03.1970 in O.S.No.24 of 1969, whereby the Court below held that the property was not wakf property. Further, the petitioners rely upon the order dated 15.12.2004 in W.P.No.3140 of 1996 filed by petitioners‘ father, wherein this Court directed the registering authority to entertain documents relating to the subject land. On the other hand, the respondents contend that the subject land is wakf property belonging to Jali Bag Mosque and that the same was notified in the Gazette in 1963, with an addendum notification issued in the year 1975 specifically covering Sy.No.611. They contend that neither the petitioners nor their predecessors challenged the said notifications within the prescribed period. It is further contended that mere dismissal of the earlier suit does not confer title upon the petitioners and that, in view of the disputed title, they have to avail the remedy before the Waqf Tribunal.

17. Before delving into the matter, admittedly, the 4th respondent – Waqf Board filed O.S.No.24 of 1969 before the Court below, seeking a decree in its favour for possession, directing the defendants to deliver possession of the suit property admeasuring Acs.44.85 cents in Sy.No.611, by declaring it as wakf. Admittedly, the petitioners‘ grandfather by name ‘Perugu Narayana Reddy‘ was arrayed as 7th defendant in the said suit. It was contended by the respondent board in the said suit that the suit schedule property was granted for maintenance, up-keeping and service to the mosque called ‘Jali Bagh Masjid‘ and therefore, it is wakf property belonging to the public Muslim religious and charitable institution and is in-alienable. Defendant Nos.1 to 3 and 5 to 12 contested the suit by filing their written statements, denying the averments of the respondent board. The Court below, in its judgment and decree dated 16.03.1970 observed that the respondent board, who has to discharge the burden that the suit schedule property is a wakf property has not placed any material evidence on record except the gazette notification dated 24.10.1963, which also is not a conclusive proof, because no enquiry was made before publishing the same; the Court below further observed that though the suit property is alleged to be a wakf property, the gazette dated 24.10.1963 does not show any property as belonging to it; that the publication in the gazette cannot be held to be conclusive valid and binding on the defendants; observing thus, the Court below held that the suit schedule property is not a wakf property. The addendum notification dated 20.03.1975, by way of which the land in Sy.No.611 was included, was issued subsequent to the judgment and decree dated 16.03.1970 in O.S.No.24 of 1969, wherein the Civil Court had categorically held that the subject property was not wakf property. Thus, the subsequent issuance of the addendum notification, after the said finding had been recorded by the competent Civil Court, appears to be a subsequent development and cannot be relied upon so as to disconcert the effect of the judgment and decree which had already attained finality.

18. Admittedly, the 4th respondent being a party to the suit, is aware of the findings in Civil Suit, in respect of the property to an extent of Acs.44.85 cents situated in Sy.No.611 of Kallur village and mandal. Despite suffering a decree, whether it is appropriate on the part of the 4th respondent to communicate the letter dated 16.11.2016 bearing F.No.01/Prot/AP/Genl/2016 to include the land in Sy.No.611 of Kallur village and mandal in the list of prohibited properties, the answer should be an emphatic aNo‘. Undisputedly, the judgment and decree in O.S.No.24 of 1969 on the file of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Kurnool to which the respondent board is a party, operates as res judicata.

19. This Court in Y.Nagasubbamma Vs State of Andhra Pradesh (2024 Supreme (AP) 1069) considered the applicability of the principle of ‘Res Judicata‘ to the writ petitions and concluded that Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to the writ petitions. It was held thus:

                  9. Finality of judgment puts an end to the judicial process. The doctrine of res judicata is based on three Roman maxims:

                  (1) “Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa” (no man should be vexed twice for the same cause).

                  (2) “Interest republicaeut sit finislitium” (it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to a litigation).

                  (3) “Re judicata pro veritateoccipitur” (judicial decision must be accepted as correct).

                  10. In Virudhunagar Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. Vs. Government of Madras, (AIR 1968 SC 1196) the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that res judicata will apply in writ petitions also. As per Section 11 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, when the matter has been directly and substantially in issue in a former Page 4 of 11 suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, the decree in former suit would be res judicata between the plaintiff and defendant or between the co-plaintiff and co-defendant.

20. In P. Bandopadhya Vs. Union of India, ((2019) 13 SCC 42) the Hon‘ble Apex Court held thus:

                  “8.11. The decision in S.V. Vasaikar v. Union of India, 2003 SCC Online Bom 171 : (2003) 2 Mah. L.J. 691 : (2003) 4 Bom. C.R. 79 was not challenged before the Supreme Court, and has since attained finality. Therefore, the relief sought by the appellants before the High Court was barred by the principle of res judicata.

                  Reference can be made to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Direct Recruit Class-II Engg. Officers' Assn. Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 339 : AIR 1990 SC 1607 wherein Sharma, J., on behalf of the five-Judge Bench, held: (SCC pp. 740-741, Para 35)

                  “35.........It is well established that the principles of res judicata are applicable to writ petitions. The relief prayed for on behalf of the petitioner in the present case is the same as he would have, in the event of his success, obtained in the earlier writ petition before the High Court. The petitioner in reply contended that since the special leave petition before this Court was dismissed in limine without giving any reason, the order cannot be relied upon for a plea of res judicata. The answer is that it is not the order of this Court dismissing the special leave petition which is being relied upon; the plea of res judicata has been pressed on the basis of the High Court's judgment which became final after the dismissal of the special leave petition. In similar situation a Constitution Bench of this Court in Daryao v. State of U.P. (1962) 1 SCR 574 : AIR 1961 SC 1457 held that where the High Court dismisses a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution after hearing the matter on the merits, a subsequent petition in the Supreme Court under Article 32 on the same facts and for the same reliefs filed by the same parties will be barred by the general principle of res judicata. The binding character of judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction is in essence a part of the rule of law on which the administration of justice, so much emphasised by the Constitution, is founded and a judgment of the High Court under Article 226 passed after a hearing on the merits must bind the parties till set aside in appeal as provided by the Constitution and cannot be permitted to be circumvented by a petition under Article 32.”

                  Albeit the decision of the Constitution Bench was in the context of a writ petition filed under Article 32, it would apply with greater force to bar a Page 5 of 11 writ petition filed under Article 226, like the one filed by the present appellants, by the operation of the principle of res judicata.

21. The Hon‘ble Apex Court in K.Ethirajanv. Lakshmi ((2003) 10 SCC 578),) held that:

                  “20. The argument that the principle of res judicata cannot apply because in the previous suit only a part of the property was involved when in the subsequent suit the whole property is the subject-matter, cannot be accepted. The principle of res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is attracted where issues directly and substantially involved between the same parties in the previous and subsequent suit are the same, maybe, in the previous suit only a part of the property was involved when in the subsequent suit, the whole property is the subject-matter.also considered the applicability res judicata.

22. In Sarojav Chinnusamy (dead) by LRs. and another ((2007) 8 SCC 15.) the Hon‘ble Apex Court held as follows:

                  In this connection, reference can be made to a decision of the Madras High Court in Arukkani Ammal v. Guruswamy which was also relied on by the first appellate court. The Madras High Court in that decision observed as follows: (LW p. 708, para 1)

                  “It is also difficult to appreciate the view taken by the District Munsif that ex parte decree cannot be considered to be ‘full decree on merits‘. A decree which is passed ex parte is as good and effective as a decree passed after contest. Before the ex parte decree is passed, the court has to hold that the averments in the plaint and the claim in the suit have been proved. It is, therefore, difficult to endorse the observation made by the Principal District Munsif that such a decree cannot be considered to be a decree passed on merits. It is undoubtedly a decree which is passed without contest; but it is only after the merits of the claim of the plaintiff have been proved to the satisfaction of the trial court, that an occasion to pass an ex parte decree can arise.” (emphasis supplied)

                  16. We are in full agreement with this view of the Madras High Court holding that a decree which is passed ex parte is as good and effective as a decree passed after contest. A similar view has also been expressed by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in BramhanandRai v. Dy. Director of Consolidation.”

23. Thus, a conspectus of the above expressions, even an ex parte decree, would operate as res judicata. Even if the earlier decision is wrong, it still operates as res judicata.

24. In Mohan Lal Goenka v. Benoy Krishna Mukherjee ((AIR 1953 SC 65),) the Apex Court categorically held that the correctness or otherwise of a decision has no bearing on the question whether or not it operates as res judicata.

25. A Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Sanjay G. Khemuka (Dr.) v. State of Maharashtra (2004 SCC OnLine Bom 204), by relying upon Mohan Lal Goenka case (Supra) observed as follows:

                  39. At this stage, we want to express that it is not-necessary that the decision rendered by the Competent Court should be legally sound and sustainable in law. Even the erroneous orders or decisions in the earlier case or proceedings operate as res judicata. The Apex Court laid down proposition of law in this regard way back in 1953 in case of Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee, (1952) 2 SCC 648 : AIR 1953 SC 65. In Paragraph 23 of its Judgment, the Apex Court has observed thus:”

                  ‘There is ample authority for the proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as ‘res judicata‘ between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as ‘res judicta‘. A decision in the previous execution case between the parties that the matter was not within the competence of the executing Court even though erroneous, is binding on the parties.‘

26. The Hon‘ble Apex Court in R. Unnikrishnan v. V.K. Mahanudevan ((2014) 4 SCC 434), observed as follows:

                  23. In Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy [(1970) 1 SCC 613] this Court held that for the application of the rule of res judicata, the court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment.

27. Thus, given the categorical findings in the civil litigation in O.S.No.24 of 1969, the communication made by respondent No.4 concerning Ac.44.85 cents in Sy.No.611 of Kallur village and mandal, is hit by the principle of ‘Res Judicata’, and hence the communication dated 16.11.2016 of the 4th respondent and the subsequent letter addressed by the 3rd respondent dated 19.12.2017, are liable to be set aside. Even otherwise, earlier, when a similar letter was communicated to the petitioners‘ father stating that registration of documents pertaining to the subject property cannot be entertained, W.P.No.3140 of 1996 was filed wherein, this Court, vide order dated 15.12.2004, observed as under:

                  “When the suit filed by the Wakf Board through its Regional Officer was dismissed, unilaterally it cannot be presumed that the land in question is wakf property. There is also no statutory notification as per the rules framed under the Registration Act, so as to direct the registering authority, prohibiting registration of the land in question. In that view of the matter, the first respondent, by merely addressing a letter, cannot declare unilaterally that the said land is a wakf property and at the same time, the registering authority cannot refuse registration, based on such letter addressed by the first respondent. In the decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the case of S. Nagi Reddy Vs. Joint Sub Registrar-I, Registration and Stamps, Tirupathi, this Court has held that the Sub Registrar being the statutory authority cannot refuse to register a document at the dictation of an extraneous authority. So far registration of a document is concerned, the authority concerned shall consider whether the document presented for registration is in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act, or not. But, by taking into account the letter addressed by the first respondent, the registering authority cannot refuse to register any document…”

28. The contention of learned Senior Counsel for the 4th respondent that the petitioners shall approach the Wakf Tribunal and get the dispute resolved regarding the Title, as it is the proper remedy, has no merit, because of Sections 6(1) and Sec 7(5) of the Waqf Act, 1995 (for short ‘the Act‘). Section 6 of the Act envisages disputes regarding auqaf. Section 6(1), which is relevant is extracted herewith:

                  6. Disputes regarding auqaf.”(1) If any question arises whether a particular property specified as waqf property in the list of auqaf is waqf property or not or whether a waqf specified in such list is a Shia waqf or Sunni waqf, the Board or the mutawalli of the waqf or any person aggrieved may institute a suit in a Tribunal for the decision of the question and the decision of the Tribunal in respect of such matter shall be final:

29. Section 7 of the Act deals with the power of the Tribunal to determine the disputes regarding auqaf. Section 7(1) and (5) of the Act, relevant, is extracted:

                  1) If, after the commencement of this Act, any question or dispute arises, whether a particular property specified as waqf property in a list of auqaf is waqf property or not, or whether a waqf specified in such list is a Shia waqf or a Sunni waqf, the Board or the mutawalli of the waqf, or any person aggrieved by the publication of the list of auqaf under section therein, may apply to the Tribunal having jurisdiction in relation to such property, for the decision of the question and the decision of the Tribunal thereon shall be final:

                  …(5) The Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to determine any matter which is the subject-matter of any suit or proceeding instituted or commenced in a civil court under sub-section (1) of section 6, before the commencement of the Act or which is the subject-matter of any appeal from the decree passed before such commencement in any such suit or proceeding or of any application for revision or review arising out of such suit, proceeding or appeal, as the case may be.”

30 While section 6 outlines parties to approach the tribunal vis-a-vis a dispute regarding property, Section 7 prescribes jurisdiction of the Tribunal to adjudicate the issue. However, an exception is carved out by way of Section 7(5) of the Act, qua the jurisdiction. Once the Civil Court adjudicates the dispute, and it becomes final, relegating the petitioner to the Tribunal is a futile exercise and, in fact, the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction.

31. No doubt, the property right is no longer a Fundamental Right under Part III of the Constitution of India. The property right is now recognised as a Constitutional Right under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Since the right of the petitioner under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India is infringed, the petitioner can certainly maintain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

32. In Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of H.P., ((2022) 7 SCC 508,) the Hon‘ble Apex Court traced the recognition of the right to property observed as follows:

                  “13. While the right to property is no longer a fundamental right [“Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978”], it is pertinent to note that at the time of dispossession of the subject land, this right was still included in Part III of the Constitution. The right against deprivation of property unless in accordance with procedure established by law, continues to be a constitutional right under Article 300-A.

                  14. It is the cardinal principle of the rule of law, that nobody can be deprived of liberty or property without due process, or authorisation of law. The recognition of this dates back to the 1700s to the decision of the King's Bench in Entick v. Carrington [Entick v. Carrington, 1765 EWHC (KB) J98 : 95 ER 807] and by this Court in Wazir Chand v. State of H.P. [Wazir Chand v. State of H.P., (1955) 1 SCR 408 : AIR 1954 SC 415] Further, in several judgments, this Court has repeatedly held that rather than enjoying a wider bandwidth of lenience, the State often has a higher responsibility in demonstrating that it has acted within the confines of legality, and therefore, not tarnished the basic principle of the rule of law.

                  15. When it comes to the subject of private property, this Court has upheld the high threshold of legality that must be met, to dispossess an individual of their property, and even more so when done by the State.”

33. In the case at hand, the petitioners‘ grandfather purchased the subject land under a registered document dated 15.06.1950. Respondent No.4, having suffered a decree in the civil proceedings, as seen from the material available on record, never exercised the right over the property till sending the communication to the concerned authority. The communication to include the land, in question, in the prohibited list under Section 22-A(1)(c ) of the Registration Act, in the considered opinion of this Court, would create an unwarranted litigation and results in infringement of the right of the petitioners under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Hence, the writ petition is maintainable.

34. It is very unfortunate that without understanding the purport of the judgment in Vinjamury Rajagopla Chary’s case, respondent No.4, while communicating the list of properties, included the subject land situated in Sy.No.611 of Kallur village and mandal, despite the Civil Court judgment.

35. In fact, in Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary’s case, the Full Bench of the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh framed the points for consideration as follows:

                  “1. What are the prerequisites that are to be satisfied for applying any one or more of clauses (a) to (e) of Section 22-A(1) of the Registration Act to any document dealing with alienation or transfer by way of sale, agreement of sale, gift, exchange or lease, etc. in respect of immovable property presented for registration?

                  2. Under what circumstances, the act of the Registering Authority concerned (District Registrar or Sub-Registrar) in refusing from registration of the aforementioned document/s by applying any one or more of the prohibitory clauses (a) to (e) under Section 22-A(1) of the Registration Act can be said to be justified?

                  In paragraph-5 of the judgment, it was observed as follows:

                  “5. Before we look at and consider Section 22-A of Registration Act, it would be necessary and relevant to make a brief reference to the six judgments of different learned Judges dealing with Section 22-A, to which our attention was specifically invited to, so as to understand the exact nature of controversy and factual matrix against which the questions were framed and addressed therein, to enable us to frame and address the questions, covering the field of operation of this provision. The six judgments are:

                  T.Yedukondalu Vs. State of A.P. (2011 SCC OnLine P 179 : AIR 2011 AP 132).

                  Dr.DinakarMogili Vs. State of A.P. (2011 SCC OnLine AP 488 : 2011 (6) ALD 502)

                  Guntur City House Construction Co-operative Society Ltd., Guntur Vs. Tahsildar ((2012 SCC OnLine AP 20 : 2012 (2) ALD 332).

                  Raavi Satish Vs. State of A.P. (2012 SCC OnLIne AP 856 : 2013 (1) ALT 774).

                  Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary Vs. State of A.P. (2015 SCC OnLineHyd 407: 2016 (2) ALD 236)

                  C.Radhakrishnama Naidu Vs. State of A.P. (2015 SCC OnLineHyd 198 : 2015 (4) ALT 1)

                  15. After considering each of the clauses of Section 22-A (1) (a) to (e) of the Act and the Government instructions regarding communication and notification, the reference is ordered as follows:

                  “36. We, thus, summarize our conclusions and issue directions as follows:

                  (i) The authorities mentioned in the guidelines, which are obliged to prepare lists of properties covered by clauses (a) to (d), to be sent to the registering authorities under the provisions of Registration Act, shall clearly indicate the relevant clause under which each property is classified.

                  (ii) Insofar as clause (a) is concerned, the concerned District Collectors shall also indicate the statute under which a transaction and its registration is prohibited. Further in respect of the properties covered under clause (b), they shall clearly indicate which of the Governments own the property.

                  (iii) Insofar as paragraphs (3) and (4) in the Guidelines, covering properties under clause (c) and (d) are concerned, the authorities contemplated therein shall also forward to the registering authorities, along with lists, the extracts of registers/gazette if the property is covered by either endowment or wakf, and declarations/orders made under the provisions of Ceiling Acts if the property is covered under clause (d).

                  (iv) The authorities forwarding the lists of properties/lands to the registering authority shall also upload the same to the website of both the Governments, namely igrs.ap.gov.in of the State of Andhra Pradesh and registration.telangana.gov.in of the State of Telangana. If there is any change in the website, the State Governments shall indicate the same to all concerned, may be by issuing a press note or an advertisement in prominent daily news papers.

                  (v) No notification, contemplated by sub-section (2) of Section 22A, is necessary with respect to the properties falling under clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 22-A.

                  (vi) The properties covered under clause (e) of Section 22-A shall be notified in the official gazette of the State Governments and shall be forwarded, along with the list of properties, and a copy of the relevant notification/gazette, to the concerned registering authorities under the provisions of Registration Act and shall also place the said notification/gazette on the aforementioned websites of both the State Governments. The Registering authorities shall make available a copy of the Notification/Gazette on an application made by an aggrieved party.

                  (vii) The registering authorities would be justified in refusing registration of documents in respect of the properties covered by clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 22-A provided the authorities contemplated under the guidelines, as aforementioned, have communicated the lists of properties prohibited under these clauses.

                  (viii) The concerned authorities, which are obliged to furnish the lists of properties covered by clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 22-A, and the concerned Registering Officers shall follow the guidelines scrupulously.

                  (ix) It is open to the parties to a document, if the relevant property/land finds place in the list of properties covered by clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section

                  (1) of Section 22-A, to apply for its deletion from the list or modification thereof, to the concerned authorities as provided for in the guidelines. The concerned authorities are obliged to consider the request in proper perspective and pass appropriate order within six weeks from the date of receipt of the application and make its copy available to the concerned party.

                  (x) The redressal mechanism under Section 22-A(4) shall be before the Committees to be constituted by respective State Governments as directed in paragraph-35.1 above. The State Governments shall constitute such committees within eight weeks from the date of pronouncement of this judgment. (xi) Apart from the redressal mechanism, it is also open to an aggrieved person to approach appropriate forum including Civil Court for either seeking appropriate declaration or deletion of his property/land from the list of prohibited properties or for any other appropriate relief.

                  (xi) The directions issued by learned single Judges in six judgments referred to above or any other judgments dealing with the provisions of Section 22-A, if are inconsistent with the observations made or directions issued in this judgment, it is made clear that the observations made and directions issued in this judgment shall prevail and would be binding on the parties including the registering authorities under the Registration Act or Government officials or the officials under the Endowments Act, Wakf Act and Ceiling Acts. (emphasis is mine)

                  (xii) If the party concerned seeks extracts of the list/register/gazette of properties covered by clauses (a) to (e) of Section 22-A (1), received by the registering officer on the basis of which he refused registration, it shall be furnished within 10 days from the date of an application made by the aggrieved party.

                  (xiii) Registering officer shall not act and refuse registration of a document in respect of any property furnished to him directly by any authority/officer other than the officers/authorities mentioned in the Guidelines.

                  (xiv) Mere registration of a document shall not confer title on the vendee/alienee, if the property is otherwise covered by clauses (a) to (e), but did not find place in the lists furnished by the concerned authorities to the registering officers. In such cases, the only remedy available to the authorities under clauses (a) to (e) of sub section (1) of Section 22-A is to approach appropriate forums for appropriate relief.

36. The Direction No.(xii) in the Full Bench judgment would discern that the directions issued by learned single Judges in six judgments, referred in the judgment, or any other judgments dealing with the provisions of Section 22-A, if it is inconsistent with the observations made or directions issued, the observations made and directions issued in the judgment (full bench) shall prevail and would be binding on the parties, including the registering authorities under the Registration Act or Government officials or the officials under the Endowments Act, Wakf Act and Ceiling Acts. The judgment, in the considered opinion of this court, does not empower the authorities to reopen the disputes already settled.

37. It is pertinent to mention here that after the judgment in Rajagopala Chary’s case, the State authorities, be it Endowments, Wakf, etc., communicated the list of properties to the Commissioner Stamps and Registration to include the properties belonged to the respective institutions, despite the earlier litigation attained finality, in the list of Prohibited Properties under Section 22-A of the Registration Act, 1908 and thereby opened a pandaro‘s box. Thus, communicating the properties to include in the list of prohibited properties under Section 22-A of the Registration Act, is not only illegal and arbitrary but also misuses the powers vested in it.

38. However, as discussed supra, respondent No.4, despite suffering Civil Court decree in O.S.No.24 of 1969, communicated the list of properties including the Acs.44.85 cents in Survey No.611 of Kallur village and mandal, purportedly, acting upon the ratio in Vinjamury Rajagopala Chari‘s case. In fact, respondent No.4, being an instrumentality of the State, created unwanted litigation. The indifference on the part of the Wakf Board forced the petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction.

39. It is a settled principle of law that a judgment rendered by the Court will be set aside by the appellate Court alone. The operation of the judgment, in certain circumstances, will be wiped out by making legislation. At no stretch of imagination, respondent No.4, being the executive, can be allowed to overturn the judgment rendered by a competent Civil Court. Respondent No.4 neither sat over the judgment of the Civil Court nor overturned the judgment of the Civil Court, which admittedly attained finality.

40. The Hon‘ble Apex Court in Union of India v. K.M. Shankarappa (2001 (1) SCC 582), considered the challenge to the vires of the provisions Cinematograph Act, 1952, and also considered the aspect of whether the executive can sit over the judgment of the Court, observed as follows:

                  7. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel. The Government has chosen to establish a quasi-judicial body which has been given the powers, inter alia, to decide the effect of the film on the public. Once a quasi-judicial body like the Appellate Tribunal, consisting of a retired Judge of a High Court or a person qualified to be a Judge of a High Court and other experts in the field, gives its decision that decision would be final and binding so far as the executive and the Government is concerned. To permit the executive to review and/or revise that decision would amount to interference with the exercise of judicial functions by a quasi-judicial Board. It would amount to subjecting the decision of a quasi-judicial body to the scrutiny of the executive. Under our Constitution the position is reverse. The executive has to obey judicial orders. Thus, Section 6(1) is a travesty of the rule of law which is one of the basic structures of the Constitution. The legislature may, in certain cases, overrule or nullify a judicial or executive decision by enacting an appropriate legislation. However, without enacting an appropriate legislation, the executive or the legislature cannot set at naught a judicial order. The executive cannot sit in an appeal or review or revise a judicial order. …”

41. Thus, in the guise of protecting the waqf properties, despite suffering a judgment of the Civil Court dated 16.03.1970 which has admittedly attained finality, the impugned communication dated 16.11.2016 of the 4th respondent is nothing but to defeat the legitimate rights of the petitioners over the subject property and also to create another round of litigation. Thus, W.P.No.14107 of 2018 deserves to be allowed.

42. In view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, W.P.No.1405 of 2019 also deserves to be allowed.

43. In the result, these writ petitions are allowed and the impugned proceedings bearing No.F.No.01/PROP/AP/General/2016, dated 16.11.2016 of the Waqf Board, consequential letter addressed by the Sub-Registrar, Kallur, Kurnool district bearing Lr.No.105/2017, dated 19.12.2017 including the letter addressed by the Collector and District Magistrate, Kurnool bearing Lr.No.E8/2394/2019, dated Nil.01.2019 are hereby set-aside. In view of the foregoing discussion, the 2nd respondent is directed to denotify the subject property from the list of prohibited properties under Section 22 – A of the Registration Act, 1908.

44. Accordingly, with the above direction, these writ petitions are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

Consequently, Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in these Petitions shall stand closed.