logo

This Product is Licensed to ,

Change Font Style & Size  Show / Hide

24

  •            

 
CDJ 2026 MHC 7269 My Notes print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Judicature at Madras
Case No : C.M.P. Nos. 19959, 23043, 22914, 22916, 22918, 22933, 22938, 22945, 22974, 22977, 22995, 22996, 22998, 23038, 23039, 23001, 23020, 23023, 23024, 23036, 23025, 22992, 22920, 22923, 97062, 22925, 23046, 23045, 22982, 22980, 23040 & 23042 of 2026 & TCA. SR. Nos. 78455, 92254, 103637, 111163, 111246, 118467, 120333, 52568, 59570, 72002, 78852, 90666, 92803, 93265, 97264, 97356, 97914, 99014, 103642, 94427, 94488, 111878, 92801, 102116, 91804, 111802, 112782, 93390, 95332, 97839 of 2026
Judges: THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SUSHRUT ARVIND DHARMADHIKARI & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G. ARUL MURUGAN
Parties : The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax Central Circle 2 (1) Chennai Versus T.S. Kumarasamy
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: D. Prabhu Mukunth Arun Kumar, Senior Standing Counsel. For the Respondent: ------.
Date of Judgment : 07-10-2026
Head Note :-
Income-tax Act, 1961 - Section 260A -
Judgment :-

(Prayer in C.M.P.No.19959 of 2026: Petition under Order IV Rule 9(4) of the Appellate Side Rules to condone the delay of 781 days in representing the tax case appeal.

In T.C.A.No.120333 of 2026 : Appeal filed under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 against the order dated 7.7.2023 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal “C” Bench, Chennai, in ITA No.876/CHNY/2022.)

Common Judgment

Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari, CJ.

1. For the sake of convenience, we are referring to the asseverations contained in C.M.P.No.19959 of 2026, as the lead case.

2. In support of the prayer seeking condonation of delay of 781 days in re-presenting the appeal, all that has been stated in the affidavit filed in C.M.P.No.19959 of 2026 is as below:

                     “3. I submit that the appeal papers were returned by the Registry on 20.01.2024 for correcting certain defects in filing the above appeal. The Tax Case Appeal ought to have been represented on or before 30.01.2024. However, the Tax Case Appeal was represented only on 21.03.2026, thereby causing a delay of 781 days.

                     ...

                     12. I submit that apart from the above appeals, several other appeals in different cases had to be filed simultaneously to meet the limitation in those cases. In total, around 530 appeals were filed by me after the filing of the above appeals..... Many of these cases also involved voluminous records and there were many connected appeals also arising out of the same ITAT order and each had to be prepared and filed separately. Again, considerably time was required to rectify the returned appeals, compile the necessary documents and complete the filing process. This additional workload combined with the procedural requirements, contributed to the delay in representing the above 31 appeals.”

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the delay in re-presentation does not attract the provisions of the Limitation Act and, therefore, a lenient view be taken considering the fact that the department is on appeal. He further submitted that in government appeals, liberal view is to be taken and delay caused by the Standing Counsel is to be condoned.

4. It is no doubt true that application seeking condonation of delay in re-presentation is not subject to the rigorous tests which are usually applied in excusing the delay in a petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court need not issue notice to the respondent while considering such application and such application has to be considered based on the reasons assigned in the affidavit filed in support thereof by the petitioner.

5. In the case at hand, the explanation offered by the petitioner for the extraordinary delay of 781 days in re-presenting the Tax Case Appeal, attributing it primarily to administrative workload, the simultaneous filing of approximately 530 other appeals, and the voluminous nature of records, is entirely vague, generalized and legally unconvincing. It is a well-settled proposition of law that while dealing with applications for condonation of delay, the Court must look for a reasonable, plausible and bona fide explanation covering the entire period of delay rather than routine administrative excuses. The petitioner has failed to provide a dayto- day or even a coherent month-to-month accounting of the inaction between 30.01.2024 and 21.03.2026, relying instead on generic assertions of professional busyness and procedural encumbrance. Systemic workload or the prioritizing of other matters cannot serve as a carte blanche to bypass statutory timelines or override the valuable rights accrued to the opposing party due to lapse of time. Hence, to say the least, the delay remains fundamentally unexplained.

6. In as much as learned counsel for the Department contented that in government appeals liberal view is to be taken, we are inclined to refer to certain decisions of the Supreme Court, wherein it is held that the period of limitation is required to be explained by the State and it does not stand on any exalted position.

                     (i) In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. V. Bherulal((2020) 10 SCC 654), it was found that the appeal filed by the State was with delay of 663 days. The cause shown for inordinate delay in that case was due to unavailability of documents and the process of arranging documents and also a reference to bureaucratic process works. In the aforesaid factual context, the Supreme Court, observed as below:

                     "3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the Government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government (Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107). This position is more than elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 563, where the Court observed as under:

                     "27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

                     28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

                     29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural redtape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

                     30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay."

                     Eight years hence the judgment is still unheeded!"

                     [emphasis supplied]

                     (ii) In another decision in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd((2021) 6 SCC 460), also, in the factual context of long delay of 75 days, the explanation was found to be short of any sufficient cause. The explanation in the aforesaid case was noted in para 67 of the said judgment as below:

                     "67. That apart, on the facts of this appeal, there is a long delay of 75 days beyond the period of 60 days provided by the Commercial Courts Act. Despite the fact that a certified copy of the District Court's judgment was obtained by the respondent on 27.04.2019, the appeal was filed only on 09.09.2019, the explanation for delay being:

                     ‘2. That, the certified copy of the order dated 01/04/2013 was received by the appellant on 27/04/2019. Thereafter the matter was placed before the CGM purchase MPPKVVCL for the compliance of the order. The same was then sent to the law officer, MPPKVVCL for opinion.

                     3. That after taking opinion for appeal and approval of the concerned authorities, the officer-in-charge was appointed vide order dated 23/07/2019.

                     4. That, thereafter due to bulky records of the case and for procurement of the necessary documents some delay has been caused however, the appeal has been prepared and filed to pursuant to the same and further delay.

                     5. That due to the aforesaid procedural approval and since the appellant is a public entity formed under the Energy department of the State Government, the delay caused in filing the appeal is bonafide and which deserve[s] to be condoned.’”

However the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not satisfied with the cause shown on the above lines and it was held as below:

                     "66. This explanation falls woefully short of making out any sufficient cause. This appeal is therefore allowed and the condonation of delay is set aside on this score also."

                     [emphasis supplied]

                     (iii) In a recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shivamma v. Karnataka Housing Board(2025 INSC 1104), it is observed thus:

                     “261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.

                     262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a Stateauthority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.”

                     [emphasis supplied]

7. One more vital fact that we would like to place on record is that when the assessees/respondents herein sought to challenge the very same order passed by the Appellate Tribunal with a delay of around 954 days in re-presenting the appeals, by order dated 28.9.2026, we dismissed the same by observing that the asseverations in the affidavits do not impel us to condone the inordinate delay. We see no reason to take a different view in respect of the appeals filed by the department against the same order passed by the Appellate Tribunal.

In the light of the law enunciated by the Supreme Court in the decisions, referred supra, and as the averments in the affidavits filed in support of the applications do not give satisfactory reasons for the delay caused, these applications are dismissed. Consequently, WAs SR are rejected. There shall be no order as to costs.

 
  CDJLawJournal