1. Heard Sri R.Ramabrahmma, learned counsel for the revision petitioner and Sri Avadesh Narayan Sanghi, learned counsel for the respondent.

2. The present revision petition is filed assailing the order dated 27.02.2025 passed by the learned XX Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad (for short, “the Trial Court”), in I.A.No.544 of 2024 in O.S.No.5210 of 2022, whereby the learned Trial Court dismissed the application seeking rejection of the plaint.

3. The revision petitioner is the defendant in the suit in O.S.No.5210 of 2022 filed by the respondent/plaintiff seeking the reliefs of eviction and recovery of arrears of rent amounting to Rs.1,80,000/-, mesne profits at Rs.15,000/- per month and perpetual injunction. Pending adjudication of the suit, the petitioner/defendant filed a petition under Order VII Rule 11(a) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) contending that the genesis of cause of action for filing the suit basing on the alleged tenancy commencing in the last week of March, 2020 itself is fictitious, since the plaintiff alleged in the plaint that the schedule premises were let out to the petitioner/defendant on the last week of March, 2020, however on the said dates, the entire country was in lockdown, and on this ground alone the plaint is liable to be rejected.

4. It is also contended that by resorting to clever drafting of the plaint, the plaintiff cannot create a cause of action for filing the suit when the very commencement of alleged date of tenancy itself is fictitious, the subsequent dates should also be considered in the same context. Therefore, it is contended that the plaint discloses no real or subsisting cause of action and is liable to be rejected.

5. The respondent/plaintiff filed counter affidavit in the said I.A., denying the various allegations leveled against the plaintiff contending that the present application is filed only to drag the case. It was submitted that the petitioner in order to delay the proceedings, filed Tr.O.P.No.164 of 2023 on the file of learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, which was dismissed. Subsequently, Tr.C.M.P.No.70 of 2023 was filed before this Court and the same also was dismissed on 22.04.2024.

6. The respondent/plaintiff contended that the present petition seeking to reject the plaint is filed alleging fictitious cause of action while simultaneously contending that no cause of action arose. These contradictory assertions show that the matter in issue is a triable issue. Hence, unless full-fledged trial is conducted on merits, the question of considering the cause of action or limitation does not arise. Therefore, contended that the petition is liable to be dismissed.

7. The learned Trial Court while relying upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuldeep Singh Patania v/s. Bikram Singh Jaryal ((2017) 5 SCC 345), observed that determination of whether a valid tenancy was created and whether the claim of the plaintiff is genuine or not involves disputed questions of facts. Therefore, considering that the claim of tenancy, and arrears of rent, is matters requiring adjudication through a full-fledged trial, the learned Trial Court dismissed the petition.

8. Aggrieved thereby, the present CRP is filed.

9. Sri Ramabrahmma, learned counsel for the revision petitioner, contended that the suit is barred by limitation and that no cause of action arose for filing the suit. It was submitted that, according to the averments in the plaint, the revision petitioner was inducted into possession of the suit schedule premises in the last week of March, 2020, which is based on assumptions and presumptions and is fictitious and not a real date. Therefore, the respondent/plaintiff had no cause of action on the alleged date for filing the suit.

10. Learned counsel further contended that the learned Trial Court ought to have considered the admission made by the plaintiff in paragraph 2 of the plaint that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the petitioner/defendant was facing several personal as well as financial problems and had approached in the last week of March, 2020, requesting the plaintiff to let out the first floor. Learned counsel further submitted that, in paragraph 12 of the plaint, while referring to the cause of action, the plaintiff had specifically pleaded that the cause of action arose for filing the suit when the plaintiff inducted the defendant as a tenant in the ‘A’ schedule property in the last week of March, 2020, during covid-19 nationwide lockdown period. It was contended that, once the plaintiff had made such admissions in paragraph 12 of the plaint, the learned Trial Court ought to have rejected the plaint at the threshold itself.

11. In support of his contentions, learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dahiben v/s. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (AIR 2020 SC 3310) to contend that the learned Trial Court must remember that if on a meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint, it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise the power under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X of CPC. Therefore, contended to set aside the order passed by the learned Trial Court and allow the CRP by rejecting the plaint.

12. On the other hand, Sri Avadesh Narayan Sanghi, learned counsel for the respondent, contended that the revision petitioner is indulging in multiplicity of litigation by filing one case or the other and that the revision petitioner has suppressed the fact of filing transfer petitions before the learned Trial Court as well as this Court. Learned counsel submitted that the revision petitioner is a tenant and is only attempting to drag on the proceedings as much as possible, so as to continue to occupy the property belonging to the respondent without making any payment.

13. It is averred that the revision petitioner has not stated anywhere as to the legal right under which he entered into possession of the subject property. It was stated that the revision petitioner does not possess any document, except the alleged unregistered and tampered Memorandum of Understanding dated 22.09.2013, to establish that the petitioner has any right, title, or interest over the subject property. Even assuming that a Memorandum of Understanding existed between the parties, such a document would not by itself entitle the defendant to take possession of the property as it is well settled by the Courts that an unregistered document cannot confer any legal right to claim possession of immovable property where registration of such document is required by law. In the present case, there is no registered document in favour of the revision petitioner that would confer upon him any legal right to enter into or continue in possession of the subject property. Therefore, it is contended that the grounds raised by the revision petitioner involve disputed questions of fact and law, which can be adjudicated only during the course of trial.

14. It is further contended that the primary issue of entering into schedule property by the revision petitioner during pandemic Covid-19 is a question of fact and that the same can be considered only upon conducting trial and by adducing evidence. It is submitted that unless and until such trial is conducted, the respondent would be put to serious prejudice and loss. It is also submitted that without conducting such a trial, none of the issues raised by the revision petitioner can be effectively determined at the present stage. Therefore, learned counsel prayed to dismissed the Civil Revision Petition

15. I have given my earnest consideration to the submissions made and perused the record.

16. On perusal of the record, it is seen that the main allegation of the revision petitioner is that the alleged tenancy could not have commenced in the last week of March, 2020, as the entire country was under a nationwide lockdown on account of the COVID-19 pandemic.

17. It is well-settled law that, while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, the Court is required to confine its examination to the averments contained in the plaint and the documents relied upon by the plaintiff. The defence of the defendant cannot be taken into consideration at this stage. At the same time, the plaint has to be read as a whole and not by isolating a particular averment and the question as to whether the plaint discloses a cause of action has to be determined from a meaningful reading of the plaint, as a whole.

18. In the present case, the plaint contains specific averments with regard to the alleged tenancy, induction of the revision petitioner into possession, arrears of rent, and the subsequent events giving rise to the institution of the suit. Whether those averments are true or false, and whether the alleged tenancy was in fact created in the last week of March, 2020, are matters which can be established only upon appreciation of evidence. The contention that the date of commencement of tenancy is fictitious, because of the lockdown therefore calls for adjudication on the factual foundation of the plaintiff's case.

19. Similarly, the Memorandum of Understanding dated 22.09.2013, relied upon by the parties, raise questions regarding its existence, nature, validity, registration, and legal effect. Further, the questions whether the revision petitioner was inducted as a tenant, whether a valid tenancy was created and the circumstances of his entry into possession are all matters which require consideration on the basis of pleadings and evidence. These issues are connected with the respective claims of the parties and cannot be decided summarily.

20. Further, the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner in Dahiben’s case (supra) reiterates the settled principle that a plaint may be rejected where clever drafting creates only an illusion of a cause of action. However, in the present case, the plaint contains specific averments which, if taken as pleaded, disclose a cause of action. The revision petitioner seeks to disprove those averments by relying upon circumstances relating to the alleged date of induction into possession and the existence and effect of the Memorandum of Understanding. Such an exercise would necessarily require adjudication upon disputed questions of fact and cannot be undertaken at the stage of considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.

21. The learned Trial Court has therefore rightly held that the questions relating to the alleged tenancy, the nature of possession, the respective rights of the parties and the genuineness of their claims are triable issues involving mixed questions of fact and law. The fact that the revision petitioner filed the written statement and thereafter pursued transfer proceedings before filing the application under Order VII Rule 11 is also a relevant circumstance in considering the respondent’s contention regarding delay in the proceedings.

22. In view of the above, this Court finds no perversity or jurisdictional error in the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the issues raised by the revision petitioner are triable issues and cannot be decided at the stage of considering the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC is well reasoned and does not warrant interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

23. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

Consequently, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.