Anil K. Narendran, J.

The appellant in W.A.No.619 of 2026 has filed this review petition invoking the provisions under Order XLVII, Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking review of the judgment of this Court dated 25.03.2026 in that writ appeal, which was one filed by the petitioner-appellant invoking the provisions under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, challenging the judgment dated 16.02.2026 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026, which was one filed by the petitioner-appellant invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking the following reliefs;

                  “(1) direct all banks to address summonses seeking litigant’s financial data with due diligence, seeking clarification on ambiguity, honouring privacy, relevant laws and judicial precedents;

                  (2) direct all registry staff of all courts in High Court’s territorial jurisdiction to strictly follow verification protocols and ensure that non-vakalath counsel do not “act or plead” in Court, honouring Order III Rule 4 of CPC;

                  (3) direct the respondent-bank to pay compensation to the petitioner, if this Hon’ble Court finds it just and reasonable, any amount at Court’s discretion, for the aforementioned constitutional violations of privacy breach and resulting mental agony, resulting physical agony and professional damage.”

2. In the said writ petition, the Manager, South Indian Bank Ltd., Aluva Branch was arrayed as the sole respondent. The petitioner-appellant is arrayed as the respondent in O.P.No.344 of 2023 filed by his wife, Padma G., before the Family Court, Aluva. The said original petition along with connected matters, i.e., O.P.Nos.356 and 359 of 2023 and M.C.No.69 of 2023, are now pending before the Family Court, Aluva, for joint trial. The grievance of the petitioner-appellant is that in the matrimonial case pending before the Family Court, Aluva, his wife obtained a summons from the said court to the respondent herein, who is the Manager of South Indian Bank Ltd., Aluva, to provide his account details. According to the petitioner, the Bank provided his account details in violation of his right to privacy. Though account details sought for were for a period of three years, the Bank furnished account statement for a period of 11 years to the Family Court. Along with the writ petition, the petitioner has placed on record Ext.P1 list of witnesses filed by the petitioner in O.P.No.344 of 2023, with the endorsements made by the Family Court; Exts.P2 and P3 summons issued by the Family Court in O.P.No.344 of 2023; Ext.P4 deposition of the Manager, South Indian Bank Ltd., Aluva, who was examined as PW7 in O.P.No.344 of 2023; Ext.P5 reply dated 03.10.2025 obtained by the petitioner from the State Public Information Officer, Family Court, Aluva, under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005, based on his application dated 11.09.2025; Ext.P6 certified copy of B Diary proceedings in O.P.No.344 of 2023; Ext.P7 reply dated 13.05.2025 of the Branch Operations Manager of South Indian Bank Ltd., Aluva Branch, to the request dated 24.04.2025 made by the petitioner under the provisions of the Right to Information Act, 2005; Ext.P8 reply dated 27.11.2025 received from the Public Information Officer of this Court to the request dated 28.10.2025 made by the petitioner; and Ext.P9 medical certificate dated 16.12.2021 issued to the petitioner.

3. Before the learned Single Judge, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent Bank that the Bank provided the account details, which were required by the Family Court in the summons. If the petitioner has any complaint regarding the issuance of summons, he should have agitated the same before the Family Court itself. The petitioner has filed a complaint before the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Ernakulam, alleging deficiency in service and claiming compensation from the Bank. After referring to Ext.P3 summons, it was pointed out that the account details of the petitioner from the year 2015 onwards were sought by the Family Court. The learned Single Judge by the judgment dated 16.02.2026 dismissed W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026. Paragraph 4 of that judgment reads thus;

                  “4. It is seen from the records as well as the averments in the Writ Petition that the Petitioner's grievance is regarding the furnishing of his account details by the Bank before the Family Court pursuant to the summons issued by the Family Court. In such case, it was for the Petitioner to approach either the Family Court or the Appellate Court challenging the issuance of the summons. When the Court summons details from the Bank, the Bank is bound to provide the same. The Bank cannot refuse to provide the account details on the ground that it would violate the right to privacy of the Petitioner. Even though the learned Standing Counsel for the Respondent pointed out that a case is filed before the Consumer Commission, the same is not disclosed in the Writ Petition. Prayer No.3 relates to the claim of compensation which the Petitioner has already claimed before the Consumer Commission. This Court, sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot consider the prayers of the Petitioner. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is dismissed.”

4. In W.A.No.619 of 2026, the appellant, who appeared in person, contended that the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition without properly appreciating the legal and factual contentions raised by the appellant-petitioner and therefore, the impugned judgment dated 16.02.2026 of the learned Single Judge is liable to be set aside. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that valid reasons have been stated by the learned Single Judge in the judgment to dismiss W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge, which is neither perverse nor patently illegal, warrants no interference in an intra-court appeal.

5. After considering the rival contentions, this Court, by the judgment dated 25.03.2026, dismissed W.A.No.619 of 2026, on a finding that there are absolutely no grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment dated 16.02.2026 of the learned Single Judge, whereby W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026 filed by the appellant was dismissed, declining the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

6. Seeking review of the judgment dated 25.03.2026, in W.A.No.619 of 2026, the petitioner-appellant has filed this review petition, invoking the provisions under Order XLVII, Rule 1 and Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Along with I.A.No.1 of 2026, the petitioner produced certified copy of the version filed by the Manager, South Indian Bank Limited in C.C.No.1596 of 2025 on the file of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Ernakulam.

7. On 31.08.2026, we heard arguments of the petitioner, who appeared in person, and the learned counsel for South Indian Bank Ltd., for the respondent. The petitioner has also submitted a written argument note dated 31.08.2026.

8. The petitioner-appellant, who appeared in person, contended that, as pointed out in the memorandum of review petition, there is error apparent on the face of record warranting

review of the judgment of this Court dated 25.03.2026 in W.A.No.619 of 2026. The findings made by this Court in the judgment sought to be reviewed regarding absence of pleadings, suppression of material facts, absence of proper parties in the party array are incorrect, so also the finding in the said judgment that the petitioner-appellant had approached this Court in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026, with ‘soiled hands’. The petitioner contended further that the procedural defects and irregularities, if any, in the writ petition, which are curable in nature, should not be allowed to defeat his substantive rights. A hyper technical view on pleadings should be avoided by courts, especially when the party is not a legally trained person.

9. The learned counsel for the South Indian Bank Limited, for the respondent, contended that none of the grounds raised in this review petition comes within the purview of Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore, no interference is warranted in the judgment dated 25.03.2026 in W.A.No.619 of 2026.

10. Section 114 of the Code deals with review. As per Section 114, subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved, (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order, and the court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.

11. Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code deals with application for review of judgment. As per sub-rule (1) of Rule 1, any person considering himself aggrieved (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred; (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order. As per sub-rule (2) of Rule 1, a party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the appellate court the case on which he applies for the review. As per the Explanation, the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.

12. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd v. Government of Andhra Pradesh [AIR 1964 SC 1372], the Apex Court held that review is, by no means, an appeal in disguise, whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for correcting patent errors.

13. In Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1980) 2 SCC 167], the Apex Court held that, if the view adopted by the Court in the original judgment is a possible view, having regard to what the record states, it is difficult to hold that there is error apparent on the face of the record.

14. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715] the Apex Court, in the context of the power of review under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, held that a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be 'reheard and corrected'. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'.

15. Later, in Lily Thomas v. Union of India [(2006) 3 SCC 224], the Apex Court reiterated that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review.

16. In Anantha Reddy N. v. Anshu Kathuria [(2013) 15 SCC 534], the Apex Court held that the review jurisdiction is extremely limited and unless there is a mistake apparent on the face of the record, the order/judgment does not call for review. A mistake apparent on record means that the mistake is self- evident, needs no search and stares at its face. Surely, review jurisdiction is not an appeal in disguise. The review does not permit rehearing of the matter on merits.

17. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions referred to supra, the review jurisdiction under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code is very limited, and unless there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, the judgment does not call for review. Further, whilst exercising such power of review, this Court cannot be oblivious to the provisions of Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code, and the limits within which the courts can exercise the power of review, which have been well settled in a catena of decisions.

18. The first relief sought for in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026 was an order directing all banks to address summonses seeking litigant’s financial data with due diligence, seeking clarification on ambiguity, honouring privacy, relevant laws and judicial precedents. In the judgment sought to be reviewed, this Court found that in the absence of proper parties in the party array, the appellant-petitioner is not legally entitled to consideration of the first relief sought for in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026, in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Paragraphs 12 to 14 of the judgment read thus;

                  “12. The first relief sought for in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026 is an order directing all banks to address summonses seeking litigant’s financial data with due diligence, seeking clarification on ambiguity, honouring privacy, relevant laws and judicial precedents. The sole respondent in this writ petition is the Manager, South Indian Bank Ltd., Aluva Branch.

                  13. Rule 148 of the Rules of the High Court of Kerala, 1971 deals with addition of parties. As per Rule 148, all persons directly affected shall be made parties to the petition. Where such persons are numerous, one or more of them may with the permission of the court on application made for the purpose, be impleaded on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so affected; but notice of the original petition shall, on admission, be given to all such persons either by personal service or by public advertisement as the Court in each case may direct. As per the first proviso to Rule 148, where the State Government is a party, the Secretary to the Government Department concerned shall be arrayed as party representing the Government. As per the second proviso to Rule 148, if the subject-matter of the petition relates to two or more Government Departments or, if the petition is of such a nature, the disposal of which warrants information from two or more Government Departments, the Chief Secretary to Government and the Secretaries to those Government Departments shall be made as party representing the Government.

                  14. In the absence of proper parties in the party array, the appellant-petitioner is not legally entitled for consideration of the first relief sought for in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026, in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

19. The sole respondent in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026 was the Manager, South Indian Bank Limited, Aluva Branch. The argument of the petitioner, who appeared in person, was that though the Manager, South Indian Bank Limited, Aluva Branch, was arrayed as the sole respondent in the writ petition, in the ‘Note’ to paragraph 1 of the statement of facts of the writ petition, it is stated as follows;

                  “Note: Hon’ble Supreme Court is termed as SC, Hon’ble High Court of Kerala as HC, Hon’ble Family Court, Aluva, as FC, Account Statements as Acc statements, Exhibit as Ext., Respondent as Bank or Respondent-Bank, mostly from now on.” (underline supplied)

                  The further argument of the petitioner was that the procedural defects and irregularities, if any, in the writ petition, which are curable in nature, should not be allowed to defeat his substantive rights. In support of the said argument, the petitioner would place reliance on the decision of a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh [(2006) 1 SCC 75].

20. In Uday Shankar Triyar [(2006) 1 SCC 75], the Three-Judge Bench held that non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a handmaiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well-recognised exceptions to this principle are:

                  (i) where the statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequence of non-compliance;

                  (ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it;

                  (iii) where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous;

                  (iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the court;

                  (v) in case of memorandum of appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appellant.

21. In Uday Shankar Triyar [(2006) 1 SCC 75], the Three-Judge Bench observed that, it is now well settled that any defect in signing the memorandum of appeal or any defect in the authority of the person signing the memorandum of appeal, or the omission to file the vakalatnama executed by the appellant, along with the appeal, will not invalidate the memorandum of appeal, if such omission or defect is not deliberate and the signing of the memorandum of appeal or the presentation thereof before the appellate court was with the knowledge and authority of the appellant. Such omission or defect being one relatable to procedure, can subsequently be corrected. Paragraph 15 of the said decision reads thus;

                  “15. It is, thus, now well settled that any defect in signing the memorandum of appeal or any defect in the authority of the person signing the memorandum of appeal, or the omission to file the vakalatnama executed by the appellant, along with the appeal, will not invalidate the memorandum of appeal, if such omission or defect is not deliberate and the signing of the memorandum of appeal or the presentation thereof before the appellate court was with the knowledge and authority of the appellant. Such omission or defect being one relatable to procedure, can subsequently be corrected. It is the duty of the office to verify whether the memorandum of appeal was signed by the appellant or his authorised agent or pleader holding appropriate vakalatnama. If the office does not point out such defect and the appeal is accepted and proceeded with, it cannot be rejected at the hearing of the appeal merely by reason of such defect, without giving an opportunity to the appellant to rectify it. The requirement that the appeal should be signed by the appellant or his pleader (duly authorised by a vakalatnama executed by the appellant) is, no doubt, mandatory. But it does not mean that non-compliance should result in automatic rejection of the appeal without giving an opportunity to the appellant to rectify the defect. If and when the defect is noticed or pointed out, the court should, either on an application by the appellant or suo motu, permit the appellant to rectify the defect by either signing the memorandum of appeal or by furnishing the vakalatnama. It should also be kept in view that if the pleader signing the memorandum of appeal has appeared for the party in the trial court, then he need not present a fresh vakalatnama along with the memorandum of appeal, as the vakalatnama in his favour filed in the trial court will be sufficient authority to sign and present the memorandum of appeal having regard to Rule 4(2) of Order III CPC, read with Explanation (c) thereto. In such an event, a mere memo referring to the authority given to him in the trial court may be sufficient. However, filing a fresh vakalatnama with the memo of appeal will always be convenient to facilitate the processing of the appeal by the office.”

22. In the instant case, as already noticed in the judgment sought to be reviewed, though the first relief sought for in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026 was an order directing all banks to address summonses seeking litigant’s financial data with due diligence, seeking clarification on ambiguity, honouring privacy, relevant laws and judicial precedents, proper parties were not arrayed as respondents in the party array. Therefore, in the judgment sought to be reviewed, this Court found that in the absence of proper parties in the party array, the appellant- petitioner is not legally entitled to consideration of the first relief sought for in that writ petition, in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

23. The petitioner-appellant, placing reliance on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court dated 10.02.2023 in O.P.(FC)No.352 of 2020 – Shiju Joy v. Nisha [2023 KHC OnLine 2890] argued that this Court can issue directions even in a case in which necessary parties are not arrayed as the respondents. On the above argument of the petitioner-appellant, we notice that, the directions issued by a Division Bench of this Court in O.P.(FC)No.352 of 2020 directing the Registry of this Court to accept transfer petitions filed under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and Section 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, arising out of Family Court matters by accepting Form No.8 as an annexure, without insisting the petition/application filed before the Family Court, was one issue in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and not in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

24. The second relief sought for in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026 was an order directing all registry staff of all courts in the High Court’s territorial jurisdiction to strictly follow verification protocols and ensure that non-vakalath counsel do not act or plead in court, honouring Order III Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In the judgment sought to be reviewed, this Court noticed that the statement of facts and grounds in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026 do not contain any pleadings and grounds in support of the aforesaid relief sought for, invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Taking note of the law on the point, in the judgment sought to be reviewed, this Court concluded that, in the absence of proper pleadings in W.P.(C)No. 5856 of 2026, in support of the second relief, the appellant-petitioner is not legally entitled to consideration of such a relief by this Court in exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Paragraphs 7 to 11 of the judgment read thus;

                  “7. As already noticed hereinbefore, the second relief sought for in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026 is an order directing all registry staff of all courts in the High Court’s territorial jurisdiction to strictly follow verification protocols and ensure that non-vakalath counsel do not act or plead in court, honouring Order III Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The statement of facts and grounds in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026 do not contain any pleadings and grounds in support of the aforesaid relief sought for, invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

                  8. In Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana [(1988) 4 SCC 534] the Apex Court held that, when a point which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not entertain the point. The Apex Court held further that there is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and a writ petition or a counter affidavit. While in a pleading, i.e., a plaint or a written statement, the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition or in the counter affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it.

                  9. In M/s.Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [(1998) 4 SCC 387] the Apex Court was dealing with a case arising out of the proceedings initiated for the acquisition of land for M/s.Larsen and Toubro Ltd. under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Apex Court noticed that, in the absence of any allegation that Rule 3 of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 had not been complied with and there being no particulars in respect of non- compliance of Rule 4 also, it is difficult to see as to how the High Court could have reached the finding that statutory requirements contained in these Rules were not fulfilled before issuance of notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. High Court did not give any reason as to how it reached the conclusion that Rules 3 and 4 had not been complied with in the face of the record of the case. Rather, it returned a finding which is unsustainable that it was "not possible on the basis of the material on record to hold that there was compliance with Rules 3 and 4". The Apex Court held that, it is not enough to allege that a particular Rule or any provision has not been complied. It is a requirement of good pleading to give details, i.e., particulars as to why it is alleged that there is non compliance with a statutory requirement. Ordinarily, no notice can be taken on such an allegation which is devoid of any particulars. No issue can be raised on a plea, the foundation of which is lacking. Even where rule nisi is issued, it is not always for the department to justify its action when the court finds that a plea has been advanced without any substance, though ordinarily department may have to place its full cards before the court. On the facts of the case, the Apex Court found that the State has more than justified its stand that there has been compliance not only with Rule 4 but with Rule 3 as well, though there was no challenge to Rule 3 and the averments regarding non compliance with Rule 4 were sketchy and without any particulars whatsoever. High Court was, therefore, not right in quashing the acquisition proceedings.

                  10. In Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2011) 7 SCC 639] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that, it is a settled proposition of law that a party has to plead its case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate the averments made in the petition and in case the pleadings are not complete the Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question(s) in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is settled legal proposition that as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted. Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The object and purpose of pleadings and issues is to ensure that the litigants come to trial with all issues clearly defined and to prevent cases being expanded or grounds being shifted during trial. If any factual or legal issue, despite having merit, has not been raised by the parties, the court should not decide the same as the opposite counsel does not have a fair opportunity to answer the line of reasoning adopted in that regard. Such a judgment may be violative of the principles of natural justice.

                  11. Viewed in the light of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, conclusion is irresistible that in the absence of proper pleadings in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026, in support of the second relief, the appellant-petitioner is not legally entitled for consideration of such a relief by this Court in exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

25. The petitioner-appellant, placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma (since dead) by LRs [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3846] argued that a hyper technical view of pleading should be avoided, especially when the petitioner is not a legally trained person.

26. In Mallavva [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3846], one of the issues that came up for consideration before a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court was amendment of plaint at the stage of first appeal. The Two-Judge Bench observed that the rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of rules of procedure. The court always gives relief to amend the pleading of the party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide or that by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which cannot be compensated for by an order of cost.

27. In the instant case, as already noticed in the judgment sought to be reviewed, though the second relief sought for in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026, was an order directing all registry staff of all courts in the High Court’s territorial jurisdiction to strictly follow verification protocols and ensure that non-vakalath counsel do not act or plead in court, honouring Order III Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the statement of facts and grounds in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026 do not contain any pleadings and grounds in support of the aforesaid relief sought for, invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. When the statement of facts and grounds in the writ petition do not contain any pleadings whatsoever in support of the second relief sought for in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026, the petitioner cannot make out a case in support of that relief, by way of an amendment of the pleadings at the appellate stage.

28. The third relief sought for in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026 was an order directing the respondent-bank [sic: respondent] to pay compensation to the petitioner, if this Court finds it just and reasonable, any amount at the Court’s discretion, for the constitutional violations of privacy breach and resulting in mental and physical agony and professional damage. In the judgment sought to be reviewed, this Court noticed that though the third relief is sought against South Indian Bank Ltd., the Bank is not arrayed as a respondent in the writ petition. The third relief for payment of compensation is sought for in connection with the proceedings before the Family Court, Aluva in O.P.No.344 of 2023, which is one filed by the wife of the appellant-petitioner. When the grievance of the appellant-petitioner was regarding furnishing of his account details by the Bank before the Family Court, pursuant to the summons issued by the said court, as noticed by the learned Single Judge, the appellant-petitioner has to approach either the Family Court or the Appellate Court challenging the issuance of summons. When the court summons account details, the Bank is bound to provide the same, and the Bank cannot refuse to provide the same on the ground that it would violate the right to privacy of the petitioner. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the judgment read thus;

                  “15. The third relief sought for in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026 is an order directing the respondent-bank [Sic:respondent] to pay compensation to the petitioner, if this Hon’ble Court finds it just and reasonable, any amount at Court’s discretion, for the aforementioned constitutional violations of privacy breach and resulting mental agony, resulting physical agony and professional damage. Though the third relief is sought against South Indian Bank Ltd., the Bank is not arrayed as a respondent in the writ petition. The third relief for payment of compensation is sought for in connection with the proceedings before the Family Court, Aluva in O.P.No.344 of 2023, which is one filed by the wife of the appellant-petitioner.

                  16. In the impugned judgment dated 16.02.2026, the learned Single Judge noticed that the grievance of the appellant-petitioner is regarding furnishing of his account details by the Bank before the Family Court, pursuant to the summons issued by the said court. In such a case, it was for the petitioner to approach either the Family Court or the Appellate Court challenging the issuance of summons. When the court summons account details, the Bank is bound to provide the same. The Bank cannot refuse to provide the account details on the ground that it would violate the right to privacy of the petitioner.”

29. In the judgment sought to be reviewed, this Court noticed that the appellant has chosen to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, by filing W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026, with unclean hands, suppressing material facts from the notice of this Court. Therefore, this Court, deprecated in the strongest words, the conduct of the appellant-petitioner in invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with ‘soiled hands’, suppressing material facts from the notice of this Court. Paragraphs 17 to 24 of the judgment read thus;

                  “17. Before the learned Single Judge, the learned counsel for South Indian Bank Ltd., for the respondent, pointed out that the appellant-petitioner had approached the Consumer Commission claiming compensation, which is not disclosed in W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026. The learned Single Judge found that, sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court cannot consider the prayers made by the petitioner.

                  18. During the course of arguments, it has come out that the orders passed by the Family Court allowing summons to witness was under challenge before a Division Bench of this Court in an O.P.(FC), invoking the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which ended in dismissal.

                  19. We notice that the order dated 12.06.2025 of the Family Court, Aluva in I.A.Nos.3, 4 and 5 of 2025 in O.P.No.344 of 2023 and the order dated 19.08.2025 in I.A.No.9 of 2025 in O.P.No.344 of 2023, which was one filed seeking review of the order dated 12.06.2025 in I.A.Nos.3 and 4 of 2025, were under challenge in O.P.(FC)No.570 of 2025 filed by the appellant herein. The said original petition ended in dismissal by the judgment dated 06.10.2025. R.P.No.1412 of 2025 filed by the appellant herein seeking review of the said judgment dated 06.10.2025 also ended in dismissal by the order dated 27.10.2025. The appellant has chosen to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by filing W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026, with unclean hands, suppressing material facts from the notice of this Court.

                  20. As stated by Scrutton, L.J, in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners [(1917) 1 K.B. 486], an applicant who does not come with candid facts and ‘clean breast’ cannot hold a writ of the court with ‘soiled hands’. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, manoeuvring or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction.

                  21. In Prestige Lights Limited v. State Bank of India [(2007) 8 SCC 449] the Apex Court reiterated that a prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. Therefore, in exercising extraordinary power, a writ court will indeed bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppress relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the court, the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter. This rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible.

                  22. In Prestige Lights Limited [(2007) 8 SCC 449] the Apex Court held further that, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court is exercising discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction. Over and above, a Court of Law is also a Court of Equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that when a party approaches a High Court, he must place all the facts before the court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant or twisted facts have been placed before the court, the writ court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into merits of the matter.

                  23. We deprecate in the strongest words, the conduct of the appellant-petitioner in invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with ‘soiled hands’, suppressing material facts from the notice of this Court.

                  24. In the above circumstances, we find absolutely no grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment dated 16.02.2026 of the learned Single Judge, whereby W.P.(C)No.5856 of 2026 filed by the appellant-petitioner was dismissed, declining the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

30. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions referred to hereinbefore at paragraphs 12 to 16, unless there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, the judgment does not call for review, in exercise of the review jurisdiction under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code. Further, whilst exercising such power of review, this Court cannot be oblivious to the provisions of Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code, and the limits within which the courts can exercise the power of review, which have been well settled in a catena of decisions.

31. Viewed in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions referred to above, none of the grounds raised in this review petition falls within the ambit and scope of Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code.

In the above circumstances, this review petition fails, and the same is accordingly dismissed.