Common Order:

1. Heard Sri Velagapudi Srinivas, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in two writ petitions, and Sri M.Srikanth, learned Standing Counsel for TGIIC, appearing on behalf of the respondents. With the consent of the learned counsel on either side, the writ petitions are taken up together for final disposal.

2.  The subject matter of both the writ petitions is the very same extent of land situated in Sy.Nos.284 and 286 of Kundanapalli Village, Ramagundam Mandal, Karimnagar District, acquired for establishment of an Industrial Park/Auto Nagar. The acquiring authority is common, the petitioners are the same set of persons, and the questions of law arising for determination are interconnected. The two writ petitions are, therefore, being heard together and disposed of by this common order.

3.  In W.P.No.36120 of 2014 assails Award No.06/2013-14 in Proc.No.B/198/2011 dated 11.02.2014 passed by the respondent No.1, and seeks a declaration that the award is void, illegal and contrary to the statutory provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, ‘the Act of 2013’), with a consequential direction to the respondent No.1 to pass a fresh award applying Sections 24 and 26 to 30 of the Act of 2013.

4.  In W.P.No.15783 of 2015 assails the fresh survey notices dated 06.05.2015 and 28.05.2015 issued by the respondent No.1 in File No.B/198/2011, and seeks a declaration that the said notices, issued without setting aside the award dated 11.02.2014, are void, illegal and beyond the scope of law and procedure, with a consequential direction restraining the respondent No.1 from conducting a fresh survey or issuing further notices until the award dated 11.02.2014 is set aside.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

5. The petitioners claim to be the owners and possessors of agricultural land in Sy.Nos.284 and 286 of Kundanapalli Village, Ramagundam Mandal, Karimnagar District, to the following extents: petitioner No.1 - Ac.0.30 guntas in Sy.No.286; petitioner No.2 -Ac.0.30 guntas; petitioner No.3 - Ac.1.20 guntas; petitioner No.4 - Ac.1.12 guntas; petitioner No.5 - Ac.2.07 guntas in Sy.No.284; and petitioner No.6 - Ac.2.06 guntas.

6.  Pursuant to a requisition made by the Zonal Manager, APIIC Limited, for acquisition of land to an extent of Ac.21.29 guntas in Sy.Nos.284 and 286 of Kundanapalli Village for establishment of an Industrial Park/Auto Nagar, a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act of 1894’) was issued dated 14.03.2012, followed by a draft declaration under Section 6 issued on dated 05.07.2012.

7.  Certain claimants questioned the enquiry conducted under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 by filing W.P.No.31169 of 2012. The said writ petition is stated to have been allowed on 25.02.2013, setting aside the draft declaration and directing a fresh enquiry under Section 5-A. A fresh enquiry was accordingly conducted on 04.03.2013, and a fresh draft declaration under Section 6 was issued on 06.04.2013 for a reduced extent of Ac.16.23 guntas, by excluding Ac.5.06 guntas belonging to the writ petitioners in W.P.No.31169 of 2012.

8.  The respondent No.1 passed Award No.06/2013-14 in Proc.No.B/198/2011 dated 11.02.2014 for the extent of Ac.16.23 guntas, applying the market value of Rs.3,00,000/- per acre under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. Aggrieved by the award, the petitioners instituted W.P.No.36120 of 2014, seeking to set aside the award and for a direction to the respondent No.1 to pass a fresh award applying Sections 24 and 26 to 30 of the Act of 2013.

9.  During the pendency of the said writ petition, the Joint Collector, Karimnagar, vide letter No.G2/390/2012 dated 24.12.2014, directed the respondent No.1 to pass a re-award under Section 24 of the Act of 2013. In furtherance of that direction, the respondent No.1 was directed, vide Memo No.B/198/2011 dated 13.04.2015, to conduct a field survey of the entire notified extent of Ac.21.29 guntas and to prepare an enjoyers’ list. Notices dated 06.05.2015 and 28.05.2015 were accordingly issued to the pattadars and possessors, including the petitioners, calling upon them to be present at the site on 15.05.2015 and 04.06.2015, respectively.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

10. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the impugned award dated 11.02.2014 was passed after the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 came into force on 01.01.2014. Therefore, the Land Acquisition Officer could not have determined the compensation under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and was required to apply the provisions of the 2013 Act. It is contended that the award, having been passed more than a month after the commencement of the new Act, is contrary to the statutory scheme governing determination of compensation.

11.  It is further contended that the Land Acquisition Officer failed to apply Sections 24 and 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act, which, according to the petitioners, prescribe the manner in which market value, solatium and other components of compensation are to be determined. The determination of compensation at Rs.3,00,000/- per acre under the provisions of the repealed enactment, without applying the statutory parameters under the 2013 Act, has resulted in denial of the benefits to which the petitioners are entitled as landowners.

12.  Learned counsel would further submit that the impugned action of the Land Acquisition Officer, being contrary to the applicable statutory provisions, has adversely affected the valuable legal rights of the petitioners and is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India. It is therefore urged that the impugned award cannot be sustained in law and is liable to be set aside..

13.  Learned counsel for the petitioners would further submit that, without first setting aside or modifying the award dated 11.02.2014, the Land Acquisition Officer could not have issued the impugned notices dated 06.05.2015 and 28.05.2015 proposing a fresh survey of the acquired lands. It is contended that the identification, measurement and demarcation of the acquired land had already been completed in the course of the acquisition proceedings and that a fresh survey, after passing of the award, is not contemplated under the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

14.  It is further contended that the alleged shortage in the physical extent of the acquired land and the alleged encroachments noticed at the time of delivery of possession to the APIIC cannot furnish a basis for reopening the concluded survey proceedings. Learned counsel submits that, out of the total extent of Ac.21.29 guntas in Sy.Nos.284 and 286, an extent of Ac.5-06 guntas had already been deleted pursuant to the subsequent declaration, while an extent of Ac.7-38 guntas remained unclaimed. The petitioners' acquired extent was only Ac.8.25 guntas andtherefore, the alleged deficit could not be attributed to the petitioners' lands without proper determination.

15.  Learned counsel would also submit that the impugned notices do not disclose the statutory provision under which the Land Acquisition Officer proposed to undertake such fresh survey. According to him, the notices were issued nearly one year after the award and only after the petitioners had instituted W.P.No.36120 of 2014 challenging the award. It is therefore contended that the subsequent survey could not be used as a means to alter the extent already determined under the acquisition proceedings or to cure any substantive error in the award.

16.  It is lastly contended that the limited power under Section 13-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors cannot be invoked for reopening the survey or reconsidering matters which had already formed part of the acquisition proceedings. The alleged shortage, according to the learned counsel, does not constitute a mere clerical or arithmetical error capable of correction under the said provision. The impugned notices, therefore, being without statutory authority and issued during the pendency of W.P.No.36120 of 2014, are liable to be set aside.

17.  Reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in The Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation v. Mahesh and others ((2022) 2 SCC 772 ) and on Aahsa Verma and other v. Commissioner Awas Evam Vikas Parishad Uttar Pradesh and others (SCI in civil appeal NOS.990-991 OF 2025; dated 24.01.2025).

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 4 to 5

18. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent No.4 to 5. The averments therein, and the submissions of the learned Standing Counsel for TGIIC founded upon them, may be summarised as follows:

19. The learned counsel appearing for would submit that the land acquisition proceedings were initiated at the requisition of the then APIIC Limited for a public purpose, namely, establishment and development of Auto Nagar, with the object of promoting industries and providing employment. The requisite funds towards the cost of acquisition were deposited by respondent No.5 with the Land Acquisition Officer, and after following the procedure under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Award No.6/2012-13 dated 11.02.2014 was passed determining compensation in respect of the acquired land, together with statutory benefits under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 34 of the said Act.

20.  It is further contended that the allegation of the petitioners that possession of the acquired lands was not taken is incorrect. According to the respondents, possession had already been handed over for the purpose of establishment of Auto Nagar. A possession certificate dated 14.10.2014 was issued by the Tahsildar, Ramagundam, recording handing over of the concerned lands to the Zonal Manager of TSIIC, earlier APIIC. The respondents therefore contend that the acquired lands had already vested in the Government and were thereafter allotted to respondent No.5 for the intended public purpose.

21.  The learned counsel would further contend that the petitioners cannot claim compensation under the Act, 2013 merely on the ground that the award was passed after 01.01.2014. According to the respondents, the acquisition proceedings had been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the enquiry had been completed and the requisite acquisition cost had already been deposited, and therefore there was no lapse or delay attributable to respondent Nos.4 and 5. It is also contended that the award dated 11.02.2014 had attained finality and could not be reopened at the instance of the petitioners.

22.  It is also submitted that the survey notices dated 06.05.2015 and 28.05.2015 issued by the Deputy Inspector of Survey, Peddapalli Division, were only notices for survey and boundary fixation and were not proceedings under the new Land Acquisition Act. Hence, the challenge to the said notices on the ground that they were contrary to the 2013 Act is misconceived. The respondents contend that the petitioners have not established any cause of action against respondent Nos.4 and 5 in respect of the said survey notices.

23.  Lastly, the learned counsel would submit that the writ petition is not maintainable, as the petitioners have an efficacious alternative remedy under the provisions of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli and the A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923 in respect of the survey notices. It is further contended that, insofar as enhancement of compensation is concerned, the petitioners have an alternative statutory remedy of seeking a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. On these grounds, the respondents seek dismissal of the writ petition.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT Nos. 1 to 3 in W.P. 15783 of 2015

24. It is submitted that, subsequent to the passing of the award, when steps were taken to hand over possession of the acquired land to APIIC, the Survey authorities noticed that the extent mentioned in the Sethwar records was not available on the ground and that the actual extent did not tally with the old Tippons. It was also noticed that portions of the land in Sy.Nos.284 and 286 had been encroached upon by the Forest Department and Rajiv Swagruha. As the sub-division records had not been prepared earlier, the entire extent of the two survey numbers was initially taken into consideration on the basis of the Sethwar records for the purpose of acquisition and passing of the award.

25.  Learned counsel would further submit that, pursuant to the directions of the competent authorities, a fresh survey was undertaken by the Survey and Land Records authorities. The survey revealed that, as against the notified extent of Ac.21.29 guntas, only Ac.16.37 guntas was physically available with reference to the Tippon records, out of which Ac.4.07 guntas was found under encroachment by the Forest Department and Rajiv Swagruha, leaving only Ac.12.30 guntas physically available on the ground. There was thus a variation of Ac.4.32 guntas between the extent recorded in the Sethwar and the extent actually found on the ground. Therefore, it became necessary to ascertain from which pattadars or enjoyers the variation and encroached portions were to be accounted for before any revised award could be passed.

26.  It is also submitted that the petitioners had produced registered documents showing their claims over different extents in Sy.Nos.284 and 286. However, the individual possession of the respective pattadars could not be ascertained during the fresh survey, as the pattadars/possessors did not appear at the spot despite notices issued to them. There were also no identifiable boundaries or cultivation on the ground, and the lands were stated to have remained fallow for several decades. In such circumstances, the respondents contend that the individual extents attributable to the respective landowners could not be determined merely on the basis of the existing revenue records for the purpose of passing a revised award.

27.  Learned counsel would further submit that, after the coming into force of the Act, 2013, the competent authorities issued instructions for passing a re-award under Section 24 thereof. Pursuant thereto, a joint inspection was conducted, revised subdivision records were prepared, and the proposal in respect of the physically available extent of Ac.12.30 guntas was approved by the Collector, Karimnagar, with a direction to pass a fresh award in accordance with the 2013 Act. It is, therefore, contended that the respondents have already initiated steps for determining compensation in accordance with the revised survey and the extent actually available on the ground.

28.  It is finally submitted that the original award was passed on 11.02.2014 under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, after its approval by the Collector, Karimnagar, and compensation was computed by taking the market value at Rs.3,00,000/- per acre together with solatium and additional market value as applicable under the said Act. The guidelines for implementation of the 2013 Act were framed only subsequently. Hence, the respondents contend that, in view of the discrepancy between the notified extent and the physical extent available on the ground, as well as the absence of identifiable individual possession, the claim of the petitioners for payment of compensation in respect of their claimed extents cannot be considered until the revised enjoyment survey and identification of the respective pattadars/possessors are completed.

POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION

29. Having heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and having perused the material placed on record, the following points arise for consideration in these writ petitions:

               (i) Whether the Award No.06/2013-14 in Proc.No.B/198/2011 dated 11.02.2014, passed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 after the coming into force of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, is legally sustainable, or whether the compensation was required to be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013?

               (ii) Whether, after passing of the award dated 11.02.2014, the respondents were competent to undertake a fresh survey, sub-division and identification of the physically available extent of the acquired land pursuant to the notices dated 06.05.2015 and 28.05.2015, without first setting aside or modifying the said award?

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

30. Section 24 of the Act of 2013 provides as follows:

               “24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.

               (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894),-

               (a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or

               (b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.”

31. The relevant facts are not in dispute. The acquisition proceedings commenced under the Act of 1894. The original notification under Section 4(1) was issued on 14.03.2012 and, after the subsequent proceedings, a fresh declaration under Section 6 was issued on 06.04.2013 in respect of the reduced extent of Ac.16.23 guntas. However, no award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 had been made before 01.01.2014. The Act of 2013 came into force on 01.01.2014. The award in the present case was made only thereafter, on 11.02.2014. The factual position, therefore, squarely attracts Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013. Clause (b) of Section 24(1) has no application because the condition precedent for its invocation, namely, the existence of an award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 as on 01.01.2014, was admittedly absent.

32.  The fact that the acquisition proceedings had been initiated several years earlier under the Act of 1894 does not alter this conclusion. Parliament has expressly provided the transitional rule to be applied to such pending proceedings. Once the acquisition had not culminated in an award under Section 11 by 01.01.2014, the consequences prescribed by Section 24(1)(a) necessarily followed. The respondents cannot, therefore, derive authority from the mere fact that the acquisition originated under the Act of 1894 to determine compensation by applying the repealed compensation provisions after the commencement of the Act of 2013.

33.  The consequence, therefore, is that the present case falls within clause (a), and not clause (b), of Section 24(1) of the Act of 2013. In The Executive Engineer(supra) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while interpreting Section 24(1)(a), held that the expression “all the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation” is of wide import and includes the period of limitation prescribed under Section 25 of the Act of 2013 for making an award under Section 24(1)(a). The said decision proceeds on the basis that, where no award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 had been made before 01.01.2014, the proceedings are governed by Section 24(1)(a) and the provisions of the Act of 2013 relating to determination of compensation become applicable. Applying the same statutory scheme to the present case, once it is found that no award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 existed as on 01.01.2014, the compensation payable to the petitioners could not have been determined by applying Sections 23 and 34 of the repealed Act of 1894. The determination was required to be undertaken in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Act of 2013, including the provisions governing market value, solatium and interest.

34.  The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent Nos.1 to 3 admits, without qualification, that the award dated 11.02.2014 fixed compensation by applying Section 23(2) solatium at 30%, Section 23(1-A) additional market value, and interest under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. None of the provisions of the Act of 2013 relating to determination of compensation, namely Sections 26 to 30, appears to have been applied. This is precisely the error against which Section 24(1)(a), as construed in The Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project (supra), is directed.

35.  The subsequent letter of the Joint Collector, Karimnagar dated 24.12.2014 assumes relevance in this context. By the said communication, the first respondent was directed to undertake a re-award under Section 24 of the Act of 2013. It is also significant that the respondents themselves do not contend that an award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 existed before 01.01.2014. Their defence essentially proceeds on the basis that the acquisition had commenced under the old enactment and that the compensation amount had been deposited. That circumstance, however, does not answer the statutory question arising under Section 24(1)(a).

36.  Deposit of the acquisition amount cannot validate an award which has been made by applying a compensation law which, by virtue of Section 24(1)(a), was no longer applicable to the determination of compensation. The infirmity in the award is thus not a mere error in computation. It goes to the statutory basis upon which the compensation itself was determined. The defect is consequently substantive and jurisdictional in character insofar as the determination of compensation is concerned.

37.  The right to property guaranteed under Article 300-A of the Constitution, though no longer a fundamental right, remains a constitutional right. The Supreme Court in Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah (2024 INSC 435), has emphasised that the constitutional protection under Article 300-A encompasses, inter alia, the right to notice, the right to be heard, a reasoned decision and the right to restitution or fair compensation, together with an efficient and legally compliant acquisition process.

38.  Compensation is thus not an incidental consequence of acquisition. It forms an integral part of the statutory and constitutional framework by which private property may lawfully be acquired. Where Parliament has prescribed a particular statutory mechanism for determining that compensation, the acquiring authority is bound to comply with it. Consequently, Award No.06/2013-14 in Proc.No.B/198/2011 dated 11.02.2014 cannot be sustained insofar as it determines the compensation payable to the petitioners by applying Sections 23 and 34 of the Act of 1894 instead of the applicable provisions of the Act of 2013

39. The next issue concerns the survey notices dated 06.05.2015 and 28.05.2015. The respondents contend that, after the award and at the stage of taking possession, discrepancies were noticed between the extent reflected in the revenue records and the extent physically available on the ground. It is their specific case that, against the notified extent of Ac.21.29 guntas, only Ac.16.37 guntaswas physically available with reference to the Tippon records, out of which Ac.4.07 guntas was allegedly under encroachment, leaving Ac.12.30 guntas physically available.

40. The respondents further contend that the individual possession of the pattadars could not be satisfactorily identified and that a fresh survey was therefore necessary to ascertain the actual extent attributable to the respective landowners. There can be no dispute with the proposition that, before determining compensation afresh, the competent authority must ascertain the land actually covered by the acquisition, its boundaries, the physical extent available, the persons entitled to compensation and the extent attributable to each claimant.

41.  A survey undertaken for that limited purpose cannot, by itself, be characterised as an impermissible reopening of an award. Once this Court sets aside the compensation determination contained in the award dated 11.02.2014 and directs a fresh determination under Section 24(1)(a) read with Sections 26 to 30 of the Act of 2013, ascertainment of the land and its actual extent becomes an essential preliminary step in the fresh exercise. At the same time, the respondents could not use the subsequent survey as an administrative device to unilaterally alter the extent of land already covered by the acquisition proceedings, or to reduce the entitlement of an identified landowner, without notice, hearing and a reasoned determination.

42.  Section 13-A of the Act of 1894, insofar as relevant, concerns correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes and errors arising from accidental slips or omissions. A substantial reconsideration of the extent of land acquired cannot be converted into a mere correction of an accidental or clerical error. Therefore, if the survey notices are treated as an exercise intended merely to correct or modify the award dated 11.02.2014 under Section 13-A, the respondents could not sustain such exercise outside the statutory limitations governing that power.

43.  The position, however, changes because this Court has now found that the compensation determination in the award dated 11.02.2014 itself is legally unsustainable and requires fresh determination under the Act of 2013. The survey may, therefore, legitimately form part of the fresh determination, but only for the purpose of identifying the actual acquired extent, reconciling the revenue and survey records, identifying the respective pattadars/enjoyers and enabling the competent authority to determine compensation under the Act of 2013. The survey shall not, however, operate as an automatic adjudication that the petitioners have lost any part of the extent standing in their names in the acquisition records.

44.  Any proposed reduction in the extent attributable to an identified pattadar must be preceded by notice, disclosure of the material relied upon, an opportunity to submit objections and documents, and a reasoned determination by the competent authority. The requirement of such procedure is particularly important in view of Article 300-A. The Supreme Court has recognised the right to notice, hearing and a reasoned decision as essential procedural safeguards in proceedings resulting in deprivation of property. Accordingly, the survey notices dated 06.05.2015 and 28.05.2015 cannot be treated as authorising the respondents to alter the compensation entitlement of the petitioners behind their back. Nevertheless, the authorities are entitled to conduct a fresh survey as an integral part of the redetermination directed by this Court.

45.  The record discloses a substantial discrepancy between the extent originally notified, the extent covered by the declaration and award, and the extent subsequently stated to be physically available on the ground. The respondents refer to the notified extent of Ac.21.29 guntas, the extent of Ac.16.23 guntas covered by the award, the alleged encroachment over Ac.4.07 guntas and the ultimate physical availability of Ac.12.30 guntas. These figures themselves demonstrate that the discrepancy cannot be resolved merely by making a mathematical adjustment in the award. It requires reconciliation of the original acquisition records, Sethwar records, Tippon records, revenue records, survey records, registered documents and the physical position on the ground.

46.  The petitioners contend that an extent of Ac.7.38 guntas remained unclaimed and that an extent of Ac.5.06 guntas had already been excluded from the subsequent declaration. They further contend that the deficiency should not be mechanically attributed to the identified pattadars who have produced registered documents. This Court is not inclined, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to conclusively determine disputed questions of fact concerning the precise location and attribution of the alleged shortfall. Such determination requires technical survey and reconciliation of primary records by the competent authorities.

47.  However, the burden cannot be shifted mechanically upon the petitioners merely because a physical discrepancy has subsequently been noticed. If the authorities propose to reduce the extent attributable to any identified pattadar, they must first establish, by reference to the relevant survey and revenue material, the basis for such reduction and communicate the same to the affected person.

48.  Any reduction in the extent of the petitioners' land shall therefore be supported by a specific survey finding and a reasoned determination identifying the parcel, its boundaries and the documentary and physical material upon which the reduction is based

49. Having regard to the conclusions reached above, the appropriate relief is not to annul the entire acquisition proceedings. The acquisition was initiated for a public purpose and the respondents have stated that possession was subsequently taken and the land was handed over for the establishment of the Industrial Park. The defect identified by this Court is confined to the statutory basis upon which compensation was determined. The appropriate course is therefore to set aside the award to that extent and remit the matter to the competent authority for fresh determination of compensation in accordance with the Act of 2013. Such course would also advance the constitutional requirement of an efficient and expeditious acquisition process.

50. The Honourable Supreme Court in Kolkata Municipal Corporation’s case (supra) has recognised an efficient and timebound acquisition process and fair compensation as integral aspects of the constitutional protection under Article 300-A. The petitioners should not be deprived of their statutory entitlement to compensation under the Act of 2013 on account of the error committed by the acquiring authority in applying the compensation regime under the Act of 1894. At the same time, the respondents must be permitted to undertake the factual exercise necessary for correctly identifying the land and the persons entitled to compensation. The balance is therefore achieved by setting aside the compensation determination contained in the award dated 11.02.2014, while preserving the acquisition proceedings and directing the competent authority to undertake a fresh determination in accordance with Section 24(1)(a) read with Sections 26 to 30 of the Act of 2013.

RESULT AND DIRECTIONS

51. Accordingly, the writ petitions are disposed of with followingdirections:

               a) The Award No. 06/2013-14 dated 11.02.2014 passed by the respondent No.1 in Proc. No. B/198/2011 is hereby set asideinsofar as it determines the compensation payable to the petitioners under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

               b) The survey notices dated 06.05.2015 and 28.05.2015 issued in Proc. No. B/198/2011 are quashed. However, the respondent No.1 shall be at liberty to undertake a fresh survey, after due notice to all concerned, as part of the fresh determination directed herein.

               c) The respondent No.1 is directed to pass a fresh award in the said proceedings in accordance with Section 24(1) read with Sections 26 to 30 and the First Schedule of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, within a period of four (4) months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order;

               d) While passing the fresh award, the LAO shall determine the extents of the petitioners' lands on the basis of revenue records and a lawful survey conducted after due notice to the parties, and shall give the petitioners and other claimants a full opportunity of being heard, the question of any shortage of area or alleged encroachment shall be examined and resolved in the said exercise, and any such shortage/encroachment shall first be adjusted against the unclaimed and deleted extents;

               e) Any compensation already paid to any claimant under the impugned award shall be adjusted against the amounts payable under the fresh award;

52. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in these writ petitions shall stand closed.