01. This Criminal Appeal has been filed by the State, aggrieved by the Judgment dated 14.07.2017 passed by the learned Special Judge for Trial of Cases under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act-cum-I Additional Sessions Judge, Warangal, in Sessions Case No.51 of 2016, whereby the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the respondent/accused of the offences punishable under Sections 366 and 354-D of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 11 read with Section 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short ” POCSO Act”).

02. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 26.01.2014, while a programme was being conducted at ZPSS School, Komalla, the accused went there and took photographs of the victim, during which process he became acquainted with her. Thereafter, the victim contacted the accused for obtaining the said photographs and, since then, they used to converse over the phone. During the course of their telephonic conversations, the accused expressed his love for the victim and his intention to marry her. Believing the accused, the victim developed affection for him and fell in love with him. It is further alleged that on 28.12.2015, the victim and the accused decided to get married at Vemulawada. On 30.12.2015, at about 09:00 hours, as usual, the victim went to school. At about 11:30 hours, she informed her school teacher that she was suffering from stomach pain, upon which the teacher permitted her to go home along with other students. After crossing the school gate, the victim separated from the other students and went home. She allegedly took Rs.500/- from her house, proceeded to Ghanpur (Station), and contacted the accused over the phone. Thereafter, the accused took the victim to Hanamkonda and, from there, they proceeded to Vemulawada. As both of them were unmarried, they were allegedly unable to secure accommodation, and therefore stayed at the temple. On 31.12.2015, they went to Hyderabad, but as they were unable to obtain accommodation there as well, they returned to Ghanpur (Station). Thereafter, they purchased a cake, went to Chinna Pendyal, stayed at the house of a relative of the accused, cut the cake, and stayed there. Upon coming to know about the registration of the case, the accused allegedly sent the victim back to her house and absconded from the place. As per the certificate produced by the prosecution, the date of birth of the victim is 06.06.2001. Thus, it is alleged that the accused committed the aforesaid offences.

03. Heard Sri M.Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant/State and Ms. P.Srilatha, learned counsel appearing for Mr. B.Kishtaiah, learned counsel for the respondent/accused and perused the material on record.

04. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that the learned Sessions Judge, without properly appreciating the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, erroneously acquitted the respondent/accused. He contended that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the respondent/accused beyond all reasonable doubt. He further submitted that the findings recorded by the trial Court are erroneous, particularly in view of the evidence of PW.5, who was the In-charge Headmaster of ZPHS, Komalla. PW.5 had clearly deposed that the date of birth certificate of the victim and the extract of the relevant page of the Admissions and Withdrawals Register, containing the entry relating to the victim and reflecting her date of birth, were furnished to the police. According to Exs.P2 and P3, the date of birth of the victim is 06.06.2001. He further contended that the trial Court ought to have taken note of the fact that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses was consistent and that nothing was elicited during their cross-examination to discredit their testimony or to establish that they were deposing falsely. It was further submitted that the respondent/accused had lured the minor victim from the school and taken her away and, therefore, the ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 366 and 354-D of the IPC and Section 11 r/w Section 12 of the POCSO Act, were clearly attracted. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor further contended that the learned Sessions Judge, without properly considering the ingredients of the aforesaid offences and the evidence available on record, erroneously passed the impugned Judgment acquitting the respondent/accused, contrary to the settled principles of law. Therefore, he prayed that the impugned Judgment be set aside and the respondent/accused be convicted for the offences alleged against him.

05. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondentaccused vehemently contended that the learned Sessions Judge, after considering the oral and documentary evidence on record and after hearing the parties, rightly acquitted the respondent-accused for the alleged offences and given specific findings. She further submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the alleged offences against the respondent-accused beyond reasonable doubt.

06. It is further contended that, according to the evidence of PW.5, the victim was admitted into their school in the 6th Class; however, the said fact is not reflected in Ex.P2. It is further contended that the prosecution did not produce the previous Transfer Certificate of PW.1 or the certificate allegedly issued by the hospital authorities and submitted by the victim at the time of her admission into the school. Further, the columns relating to the T.C. number, date, and conduct in Ex.P2 were left blank, and the date of issuance of Ex.P2 was also not mentioned therein. It is further contended that the prosecution did not produce any certificate issued by the Primary School where the victim allegedly studied from Classes I to V. The prosecution also did not subject the victim to an ossification test for determination of her age. Thus, it is contended that the prosecution failed to establish the age of the victim as on the date of the alleged offence.

07. Having considered the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties and upon perusal of the impugned Judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge, it is evident that, on behalf of the prosecution, PWs.1 to PWs.11 were examined, Exs.P1 to P7 and M.O.1 were marked. Upon a comprehensive appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned Sessions Judge rightly arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution had miserably failed to establish the guilt of the respondent-accused beyond reasonable doubt.

08. Further, the learned Sessions Judge has assigned cogent and well-reasoned findings in Paragraph Nos.24 to 27 of the impugned judgment. It was observed that, in order to establish the alleged offences under Sections 366 and 354-D of the IPC and Section 11 read with Section 12 of the POCSO Act, the prosecution is required to prove the essential ingredients constituting the said offences. However, the prosecution failed to place on record any cogent and convincing evidence to establish the same. The learned Sessions Judge further observed that the prosecution had not produced any certificate issued by the Primary School where the victim had studied from 1st Standard to 5th Standard, nor was the victim subjected to an ossification test for determining her age. PW11, the Investigating Officer, categorically deposed that he had no knowledge as to the school in which the victim had studied from 1st Standard onwards. Thus, the prosecution failed to establish the age of the victim as on the date of the alleged occurrence, which is a material aspect in determining the applicability of the provisions of the POCSO Act. Further, the learned Sessions Judge categorically observed that PW1 to PW3 appeared to be interested and tutored witnesses and that their evidence was not corroborative of each other.

09. In cases of acquittal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ravi Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another ((2022) 8 Supreme Court Cases 536), held that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellant Court has to consider whether the trial Court’s view can be termed as a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal.

10. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 Supreme Court Cases 450) the Hon’ble Supreme Court after referring to several Judgments regarding the settled principles of law and the powers of appellate Court in reversing the order of acquittal, held at para 70, as follows:

               “70. In the light of the above, the High Court and other appellate Courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of Judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal.”

               1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal if it has “very substantial and compelling reasons” for doing so.

               A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have “very substantial and compelling reasons” to discard the trial court’s decision. “Very substantial and compelling reasons” exist when:

               i) The trial court’s conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong:

               ii) The trial court’s decision was based on an erroneous view of law;

               iii) The trial court’s judgment is likely to result in “grave miscarriage of justice”;

               iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal;

               v) The trial court’s judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable;

               vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc.

               vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.

               2. The appellate court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial court.

               3. If two reasonable views can be reached one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction the High Courts/appellate courts must rule in favour of the accused.”

11. For the foregoing reasons as well as the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Judgments cited supra, the learned Sessions Judge has rightly acquitted the respondent/accused for the offences punishable under Sections 366 and 354-D of the IPC and Section 11 r/w Section 12 of the POCSO Act. Hence, this Court does not find any grounds to interfere with the well reasoned Judgment of the learned Sessions Judge.

12. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, miscellaneous Petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed.