Common Order:
1. Writ Petition No.29962 of 2011 is filed to issue a Writ of Mandamus declaring the proceedings of respondent No.1 vide No.0087/PD:/IRD/DA-7 dated 26.07.2011 rejecting the appeal and confirming the order of respondent No.2 vide No.328/PD:IRD:/DA-6 dated 21.9.2010 dismissing the petitioner from the bank as arbitrary, illegal and violative of principles of natural justice and consequently, to set aside the same and direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with back wages and with all the attendant benefits.
2. Writ Petition No.4166 of 2012 is filed to issue a Writ of Certiorari calling for records relating to and connected with order 16.01.2012 in Appeal No.36/09/2011-E1 by respondent No.3 (Appellate Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act) dismissing the appeal and confirming the order dated 10.06.2011 in Application No. 48/1/22011-E2 passed by respondent no.2 (Controlling Authority under Payment of Gratuity Act) and to quash the same declaring it as illegal, arbitrary and against the statutory Rules.
3. Heard Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned senior counsel representing Smt Vedula Chitralekha, learned counsel-on-record for petitioner and Sri K.Lakshmi Narayana, learned Standing Counsel for respondents in WPNo.29962 of 2011.
4. Since the parties in both the Writ Petitions are one and the same, and as the issues involved are interconnected, both the matters are heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. For convenience, W.P.No.29962 of 2011 is taken as a lead case insofar as the facts are concerned.
5. The brief facts as averred in the Writ Petition are that the petitioner joined the respondent-Bank as a Farm Representative on 04.12.1978 at Cuddapah Branch and was promoted as Manager, Scale-II, on 01.04.1997; that thereafter the petitioner was re-designated as General Officer in Main Line Banking and posted at Boddam Branch, Srikakulam, and subsequently posted as Incumbent-in-Charge at Udayagiri Branch on 27.05.2006, where he worked until his transfer to Chittoor Branch on 27.05.2008; that during his tenure period from 07.06.2006 to 21.05.2008 at Udayagiri Branch, he was alleged to have abused his official position by sanctioning several loans amounting to Rs.7.00 crores in violation of the Bank’s lending norms and by demanding and accepting illegal gratification from borrowers, besides committing other irregularities.
5.1. It is further averred that the petitioner was placed under suspension from service vide proceedings No.259/PD/DA-6, dated 03.10.2009, and thereafter a major penalty charge-sheet was issued vide proceedings No.276/PD/DA-3, dated 08.12.2009, alleging violation of Regulation 3(i) and Regulation 12 of the Syndicate Bank Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (for brevity, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Regulations, 1976’); that thereafter, a departmental enquiry was conducted, and the Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 13.07.2010 holding the charge as proved.
5.2. It is further averred that after furnishing of the enquiry report, the petitioner has submitted his representation thereto; that thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority, vide proceedings No.328/PD/IRD/DA-6, dated 21.09.2010, imposed the penalty of dismissal from service, which was confirmed by the Appellate Authority vide proceedings No.0087/PD/DA-7, dated 26.07.2011; that, aggrieved by the aforesaid disciplinary proceedings and the orders of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority, the petitioner has filed W.P.No.29962 of 2011.
5.3. It is further averred that following the order of dismissal, the petitioner raised a claim for payment of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972; that the Controlling Authority considered the claim and passed an order directing payment of gratuity and the said order was affirmed by the Appellate Authority; and that challenging the said orders, the respondent-Bank filed W.P.No.4166 of 2012.
6. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the complaints relied upon by the respondent-Bank to substantiate the allegation of illegal gratification were not voluntary complaints of the borrowers; that the complaints were prepared in English and obtained from the borrowers at the instance of one T.Nageshwara Rao, Assistant Manager, Udayagiri Branch, without properly explaining their contents.
6.1. He further submitted that the borrowers concerned subsequently disputed the manner in which their signatures had been obtained; and that, despite the petitioner producing such subsequent letters before the Enquiry Officer, the borrowers were not examined in the enquiry, thereby depriving the petitioner of an opportunity to cross-examine them; that, instead, the enquiry officer observed that the petitioner was required to secure their presence as defence witnesses; and that the burden could not be shifted upon the petitioner to disprove the allegations when the alleged complainants themselves had not been examined by the respondent-Bank.
6.2. He further submitted that the deviations alleged by the respondent- Bank had been brought to the notice of the superior authorities from time to time; that the higher authorities, despite being aware of the manner in which the branch was functioning, had permitted the petitioner to continue and had also fixed business targets for growth of advances; and the respondent- Bank had accepted and was benefited from the business generated during the tenure of the petitioner; that the petitioner had exercised the discretion available to him as Branch Manager with the object of developing the Bank’s business.
6.3. He further submitted that the procedure adopted at the stage of written briefs was contrary to the principles of fairness, as the Presenting Officer and the petitioner were directed to submit their written briefs simultaneously to the enquiry officer, thereby depriving the petitioner of an opportunity to respond to the Management’s final submissions, which is contrary to Regulation 6(18) of the Regulations, 1976.
6.4. He further submitted that the disciplinary authority, instead of independently examining the letters from the borrowers and veracity of the said documents, relied on preliminary enquiry and proceeded to impose the penalty of dismissal vide orders, dated 21.09.2010; that respondent No.1- Appellate Authority also rejected the appeal by order vide orders, dated 26.07.2011, without properly addressing the alleged procedural irregularities and the deficiencies in the evidence, therefore the impugned orders passed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 are liable to be set aside.
7. In support of his contentions, learned senior counsel for the petitioner relied on the following judgments:
a) Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1997 SC 2148):
Wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“It is then contended that the preliminary enquiry was not property conducted and, therefore, the enquiry is vitiated by principles of natural justice. We find no force in the contention. The preliminary enquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after the issue of the charge-sheet. The former action would be to find whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated against the delinquent. After fullfledged enquiry was held, the preliminary enquiry had lost its importance.”
b) P.V. Suryanarayana v. High Court of Telangana (2025 1 ALD 536 (TS) (DB)): Wherein, this Court has held as under:
“This is trite that the legal parameter to adjudge the evidence in Departmental Enquiry is preponderance of probability and not that the charges must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, the parameter which is applicable in criminal cases. Yet, we find force in the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that even in the Departmental Enquiry the initial burden to prove the charge is on the prosecution. If that burden is discharged, onus can be shifted on the delinquent employee.”
c) Nirmala J.Jhala v. State of Gujarat and another (2004 Lab IC 4405):
Wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“In view of above, it is evident that the evidence recorded in preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and opportunity to cross-examine the persons examined in such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be violative of the principles of natural justice.”
d) Bajrang Lal Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (MANU/RH/0802/2015):
Wherein, the High Court of Rajasthan has held as under:
“It is well settled that the purpose behind holding preliminary enquiry is only to take a prima facie view as to whether there can be some substance in the allegations made against employee which may warrant a regular enquiry and that the evidence recorded in preliminary enquiry cannot be used in regular departmental enquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it. And also once regular enquiry is held, preliminary enquiry looses its importance.”
e) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Prakash Singh (2025 INSC 555):
Wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“ Evidence tendered by witnesses must be recorded in the presence of the delinquent employee, he should be given opportunity to cross- examine the witnesses and no document should be relied on by the prosecution without giving copy thereof to the delinquent - all these basic principles of fair play have their root in such Act. In the enquiry, therefore, the contents of the relied-on documents have to be proved by examining a witness having knowledge of the contents of such document and who can depose as regards its authenticity”.
f) D.K. Agarwal v. Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (2021 INSC 535):
Wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“Recording of reasons is a principle of natural justice and every judicial/quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons to be recorded in writing. The person who is adversely affected wants to know as to why his submissions have not been accepted. Giving reasons is all the more necessary because it gives satisfaction to the party against whom a decision is taken. It is a well-known principle that justice should not only be done but should also be seen to be done.”
g) Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1986 SC 995):
The Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“Having regard to the consequences with which the delinquent officer was charged and having regard to the nature of charge and the evidence of hand-writing expert and the absence of opportunity for cross-examination and the conflicting nature of evidence of Chaturbhuj and nature of evidence given by Jiwan Dass, we are of the opinion that the report of the enquiry officer finding the appellant guilty should not have been sustained and the government should not have acted upon it”.
h) In G.Sudhakar Reddy v. State of Telangana (2020 (4) ALD 244(TS)(DB)), a Division Bench of this Court, following the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Allahabad Bank Vs. Krishna Narayan Tewari {(2017) 2 SCC 308} and State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya {(2011) 4 SCC 584} has held that perversity of reasoning of the disciplinary authority is a strong ground to set aside its orders and on ground of perversity, findings in disciplinary proceedings can be interfered with in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”
8. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel for respondent-Bank submitted that the petitioner had sanctioned several loans in violation of the applicable schemes and guidelines of the respondent-Bank, including loans which subsequently became non-performing assets, and had thereby abused his official position to accommodate certain borrowers; that the petitioner had sanctioned a loan of Rs.20.00 lakh without proper appraisal and postsanction safeguards and had, in collusion with the borrower, furnished an incorrect report to the KVIC, in the process of receiving illegal gratification of Rs.80,000/-.
8.1. He further submitted that the petitioner had sanctioned six farm loans in Varkinthapadu Branch which is outside the command area of the concerned branch and released the amount in violation of the prescribed procedure, resulting in a substantial portion of the loan amount being transferred to another individual who had mediated the transaction; that the petitioner had also demanded and accepted illegal gratification from customers for sanctioning credit facilities, thereby committing serious misconduct and acting in a manner unbecoming of an officer of the Bank.
8.2. He further submitted that having regard to the misconduct established against the petitioner, particularly the allegation of acceptance of illegal gratification in the course of his official duties, the petitioner was not entitled to gratuity in view of Section 4(6)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972; that the orders passed by the Controlling and the Appellate Authorities directing payment of gratuity are therefore unsustainable; and that the Writ Petition, being devoid of merits, is liable to be dismissed.
9. Learned Standing Counsel for respondent-Bank finally submitted that the charges against the petitioner were duly established in the departmental enquiry and the disciplinary action taken against him was justified in view of the nature and gravity of the misconduct committed by him. He finally prayed to dismiss WP No.29962 of 2011 and allow WP.No.4166 of 2012.
10. In support of his contentions, learned Standing Counsel for respondent-Bank relied upon the following judgments: a. State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya (2011 4 SCC 584): The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that while exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, the Court does not sit as an appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence or substitute its own view for that of the Enquiry Officer. Interference is justified only where the findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, or where the principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated, or the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide, or based on extraneous considerations.
b. Suresh Pathrella v. Oriental Bank (2006 10 SCC 572):
The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that where misconduct by a bank officer is proved, the mere fact that no financial loss was caused to the Bank cannot, by itself, warrant a lenient view. It was further held that where an officer acts beyond his authority in breach of the applicable regulations, the Court, in exercise of judicial review, would not ordinarily interfere with the disciplinary authority’s decision of removal from service, particularly where the decision is preceded by a duly conducted enquiry, unless the same is vitiated by mala fides or violation of the principles of natural justice causing prejudice to the delinquent officer.
c. Divisional Controller Karnataka State RTC v. M.G. Vittal Rao (2012 1 SCC 442):
The Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“Even if a person stood acquitted by a criminal court, domestic enquiry can be held, the reason being that the standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry and that in a criminal case are altogether different. In a criminal case, standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt while in a domestic enquiry it is the preponderance of probabilities that constitutes the test to be applied.”
d. State Bank of India v. Tarun Kumar Banerjee and Others (2000 8 SCC 12):
The Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“A customer of the Bank need not be involved in a domestic enquiry conducted as such a course would not be conducive to proper banker-customer relationship and, therefore, would not be in the interest of the Bank.
....It is submitted that even if evidence is withheld, the conclusion of the enquiry officer would be correct is a perverse approach. We do not think so. What is stated therein is that when sufficient evidence was produced to conclude one way or the other, the evidence not produced will not be of any significance unless there was such evidence which was withheld would have tilted the evidence adduced in the course of domestic enquiry.
e. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995 6SCC 749):
The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that while exercising judicial review, the court does not act as an appellate authority or re-appreciate the evidence, and the adequacy or reliability of such evidence ordinarily cannot be canvassed. The disciplinary authority is the primary fact-finding authority and has discretion to impose an appropriate penalty having regard to the gravity of the misconduct.
f. Disciplinary Authority cum Regional Manager and Others v. Nikunj Bihari Patnaik (1996 SCC 69):
The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that an officer or employee of a Bank is required to act within the limits of the authority conferred upon him. The absence of actual loss to the Bank, or the fact that certain transactions may have resulted in profit, does not by itself justify acts done beyond such authority. Where an officer repeatedly acts beyond the scope of his authority over a period of time and in numerous transactions, such conduct constitutes misconduct, as permitting such indiscipline would adversely affect the orderly functioning and discipline of the Bank.
g. Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh (2013 112 SCC 372)
The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the scope of judicial review with regard to the quantum of punishment imposed in disciplinary proceedings is extremely limited. The Court does not ordinarily interfere with the penalty imposed by the competent disciplinary authority. Interference of the court is justified only where the punishment imposed is found to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature and gravity of the misconduct. Even where the punishment is found to be shockingly disproportionate, the Court cannot itself prescribe or substitute the penalty.
11. This Court has given its consideration to the rival submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for both the parties and perused the material available on record.
12. The material available on record discloses that the petitioner was issued a charge-sheet vide proceedings No.276/PD/IRD/DA-3, dated 08.12.2009, alleging violation of Regulation 3(i) of the Regulations, 1976, in respect of his conduct during the period from 07.06.2006 to 21.05.2008, when he was working as Branch Manager at Udayagiri Branch. Pursuant thereto, a departmental enquiry was conducted and the Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 13.07.2010, holding the charge against the petitioner as proved. The enquiry report was furnished to the petitioner vide letter No.1909, dated 20.07.2010, and the petitioner submitted his representation thereto. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority, vide proceedings No.328/PD/IRD/DA-6, dated 21.09.2010, imposed the penalty of dismissal from service. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected by the Appellate Authority vide proceedings No.0087/PD/IRD/DA- 7, dated 26.07.2011.
13. It is pertinent to note that the contention of the respondent bank is that the acts of the petitioner amounts to violation of Regulation 3(i) of the Regulations, 1976. In this regard, it is apposite to refer to Regulation 3(i) of Regulations, 1976, which reads as hereunder:-
“Every officer/employee shall, at all times take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interests of the Bank and discharge his duties, with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer.”
14. The contention of the petitioner is that the loans sanctioned by him were sanctioned in the interest of the Bank and with the object of developing its business and that the deviations had been brought to the notice of the higher authorities for approval. However, the material on record discloses that the petitioner had sanctioned the loans in question notwithstanding the absence of approval from the competent authorities. The petitioner does not dispute the factum of sanctioning the loans, but seeks to justify the same on the ground that the transactions were undertaken in good faith and in the interest of the Bank.
15. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nikunj Bihari Patnaik’s case (cited supra). In the present case, the petitioner does not dispute the factum of sanctioning the loans in question, but seeks to justify the same on the ground that the transactions were undertaken in good faith and in the interest of the Bank. Such justification, however, cannot by itself legitimise an act which was admittedly undertaken without the requisite approval of the competent authority. The finding of the Enquiry Officer that such conduct amounted to violation of Regulation 3(i) of the Regulations, 1976, therefore, cannot be said to be without basis.
16. The principal contention of the petitioner is that the borrowers whose complaints were relied upon by the respondent-Bank were not examined in the departmental enquiry and consequently, the petitioner was deprived of an opportunity to cross-examine them. The petitioner further contends that the complaints relied upon by the respondent-Bank were allegedly obtained from the borrowers by force, fraud or without properly explaining their contents to them. In support of his defence, the petitioner relied upon the letter dated 17.05.2010, marked as D.Ex.22, contending that the complaints had not been voluntarily made.
17. Here, it is trite to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Tarun Kumar Banerjee and Others’s case (cited supra), wherein it was held that a customer of the Bank need not be involved in a domestic enquiry conducted as such a course would not be conducive to proper banker customer relationship and, therefore, would not be in the interest of the Bank.
18. Applying the ratio laid down in the above judgment to the case on hand, it is to be held that non-examination of the borrowers, who are said to be complainants, during the course of enquiry, would not render the enquiry proceedings perverse or irregular.
19. Further, in this context, it is relevant to refer to the principles laid down in Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation’s case (cited supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the standard of proof applicable in a departmental enquiry is that of preponderance of probabilities and not that of proof beyond reasonable doubt, as required in a criminal case. Likewise, in State Bank of India v. Tarun Kumar Banerjee, cited supra, it was held that nonproduction of a particular piece of evidence would not, by itself, render the finding of the Enquiry Officer unsustainable where sufficient evidence had otherwise been adduced to arrive at the conclusion, unless the evidence withheld was of such a nature as would have materially affected the conclusion reached.
20. It is further evident that the respondent-Bank did not rest its case solely upon the material collected during the preliminary enquiry. During the departmental enquiry, the respondent bank examined MW1 and MW2 and produced the relevant documents. It is disclosed from the enquiry proceedings that one E.R.L.Swamy, Branch Manager, Udayagiri Branch, was examined as MW2 and that he had accompanied MW1 when the complaints in question were received. Thus, the findings of the Enquiry Officer were not based merely upon the complaints collected during the preliminary enquiry, but upon the evidence and material brought on record during the regular departmental enquiry
21. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon certain decisions holding that material collected during a preliminary enquiry cannot, by itself, be treated as substantive evidence in a regular departmental enquiry, since the delinquent employee had no opportunity to participate in such preliminary proceedings or to cross-examine the persons concerned. However, in the present case, the findings of the Enquiry Officer do not disclose that the petitioner was found guilty solely on the basis of such preliminary-enquiry material. The Enquiry Officer considered the evidence adduced during the regular departmental enquiry along with the surrounding circumstances and ultimately, found the petitioner guilty of the charge.
22. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to the principle laid down by this Court in P.V. Suryanarayana’s case (cited supra). Though the standard of proof in a departmental enquiry is that of preponderance of probabilities, the initial burden of establishing the charge lies upon the Authority and, once such burden is discharged, the onus may shift upon the delinquent employee. In the present case, the respondent-Bank did not merely rely upon the complaints themselves, but placed before the Enquiry Officer supporting circumstances, including the evidence of MW2, who had accompanied MW1 when the complaints in question were received, and the subsequent conduct of the borrowers-G.Rajesh and G.Haribabu. It is borne out from the record that the said borrowers, after obtaining provisional sanctions, have approached the petitioner seeking refund of the amounts paid by them as commission/gratification for such sanctions. These facts coupled with the further fact of their giving complaints to the respondent- Bank against the petitioner constitutes a material circumstance lending support to the allegation that the amounts were paid to the petitioner in connection with the sanctioning of the loans. These material facts when considered along with the evidence of MW1 and MW2 and the other material brought on record during the departmental enquiry, provides corroborative circumstances supporting the finding that the petitioner had accepted illegal gratification. Thus, the finding of the Enquiry Officer cannot be said to be based merely upon the unproved contents of the complaints and the preliminary enquiry report, but it is supported by the surrounding circumstances and the evidence available on record.
23. On consideration of the material as a whole, the Enquiry Officer found that the charge stood established on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. Once the respondent-Bank had placed sufficient material before the Enquiry Officer and discharged the initial burden of establishing the charge, the onus shifted upon the petitioner to substantiate his specific defence that the complaints had been obtained by force, fraud or coercion. Except relying upon D.Ex.22, the petitioner did not place any further material before the Enquiry Officer to establish such defence. Therefore, merely because the borrowers themselves were not examined as witnesses, the findings of the Enquiry Officer cannot, in the facts of the present case, be held to be vitiated.
24. As regards the contention of learned counsel for petitioner that the Presenting Officer and the petitioner were directed to submit their written briefs simultaneously and that the petitioner was thereby deprived of an effective opportunity to respond to the Management’s final submissions has also been considered, it is to be noted that the petitioner has not demonstrated any specific prejudice caused to him on account of such procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner participated throughout the enquiry, was afforded an opportunity to adduce his defence, was furnished with the enquiry report and was permitted to submit his representation before the Disciplinary Authority and therefore, in the absence of demonstrated prejudice, the said contention is unsustainable.
25. The scope of interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in disciplinary matters is limited. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh, B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (cited supra), it is held that while exercising judicial review, court does not ordinarily sit as an appellate authority over the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer or re-appreciate the evidence as if conducting a fresh enquiry and interference is justified where the enquiry is conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice or the applicable statutory regulations, or where the findings are based on no evidence or are perverse.
26. In the instant case, in the light of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered view that the enquiry does not get vitiated in the absence of any of the aforesaid irregularities or illegalities in the procedure adopted during enquiry and further, the petitioner failed to show any perversity in the disciplinary proceedings.
27. The next issue that arises for consideration is with regard to the petitioner’s entitlement to gratuity.
28. The Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, while considering the petitioner’s claim, proceeded on the basis that the enquiry report did not specifically record a finding regarding moral turpitude. The said order was thereafter affirmed by the Appellate Authority in Application No. 48/1/22011-E2 dated 10.06.2011, Appeal No.36/09/2011-E1 dated 16.01.2012.
29. In this regard, it is apposite to refer to Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, and for better appreciation, it is extracted as hereunder:-
“(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), (b) the gratuity payable to an employee (may be wholly or partially forfeited)-
(ii) if the services of such employee have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, Provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of his employment.”
30. The mere finding that an employee has committed misconduct under the service regulations does not, by itself, conclude the question of forfeiture of gratuity under Section 4(6)(b)(ii). The statutory requirements under the Payment of Gratuity Act have to be independently satisfied.
31. In the present case, the misconduct established against the petitioner relates not merely to procedural deviations in the sanctioning of loans, but also to the acceptance of illegal gratification in connection with the discharge of his official duties. Such conduct is intrinsically contrary to the standards of honesty, integrity as expected from a Bank officer and constitutes a serious departure from the accepted norms of ethical conduct. The expression “moral turpitude”, as understood in its ordinary legal sense, refers to an act of baseness, vileness or depravity which is contrary to the accepted standards of honesty, morality and duty owed by one person to another or to society.
32. The acceptance of illegal gratification by a Bank officer in the course of his employment, particularly when connected with the exercise of official authority in sanctioning or facilitating financial transactions, bears the characteristics of such conduct and, therefore, amounts to an offence involving moral turpitude within the meaning of Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Once the said conduct is found to involve moral turpitude and is committed in the course of his employment, Section 4(6)(b)(ii) stands attracted. Consequently, the gratuity payable to the petitioner is liable to be forfeited in terms of the said provision, and the impugned orders passed by the Controlling Authority and the Appellate Authority directing payment of gratuity to the petitioner cannot be sustained.
33. For the foregoing reasons and discussion and in the light of the proposition laid down in the aforesaid judgments, this Court is of the considered opinion that as the misconduct alleged against the petitioner stood established in the departmental enquiry on the basis of preponderance of probabilities, there is no reason to interfere with the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority, which was confirmed by the Appellate Authority.
34. Insofar as the claim relating to gratuity is concerned, having regard to the nature of the misconduct established against the petitioner, the case falls within the ambit of Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Therefore, the orders passed by the Controlling Authority and the Appellate Authority directing payment of gratuity to the petitioner cannot be sustained and the same are accordingly set aside.
35. In the result, W.P.No.29962 of 2011 is dismissed and W.P.No.4166 of 2012 is allowed and the order dated 16.01.2012 passed in Appeal No.36/09/2011-E1 by the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, confirming the order dated 10.06.2011 passed in Application No.48/1/2011-E2 by the Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, is hereby set aside.
36. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. No costs.
