1. The present Writ Petition raises a question which, though apparently arising out of interference with possession of certain residential plots, in substance, concerns the very foundation of the petitioner’s title.

2. Petitioner claims to have acquired rights over a plot forming part of land admeasuring approximately Ac.4.00 in Survey No.261/3 situated at Annaram Village, through a chain of transactions commencing from an auction conducted by the Customs and Central Excise Department in favour of one A. Krishna Murthy. Petitioner contends that Krishna Murthy subsequently dealt with the property through his wife/General Power of Attorney holder, and registered sale deeds came to be executed in favour of petitioner and other purchasers. It is asserted, the purchasers are in peaceful possession and several purchasers have constructed residential structures over the plots.

3. Respondents dispute the very foundation of this claim. Their contention is that the auction in favour of A. Krishna Murthy was itself challenged before this Court in Writ Petition No. 17742 of 2005 and was ultimately, cancelled by order dated 04.04.2012, with the consequence that the auction purchaser acquired no enforceable title capable of being transmitted to subsequent purchasers. The principal question, therefore, is not merely whether petitioner is in possession or whether his sale deed is registered. The real question is whether a person claiming through an auction purchaser whose very source of title has been judicially annulled can acquire and assert a title superior to that of his vendor.

4. Initially, petitioner arrayed only nine respondents as parties wherein official respondents and unofficial respondents have been made a party. Subsequently, Respondents 10 to 24 are impleaded as per this Court order dated 03.12.2025 in I.A.No.3 of 2023. Likewise, in place of Respondents 2 and 3, Stressed Assets Stabilization Fund (SASF) are substituted with Respondent No.2 (Omkara Assets Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd) as per Court order dated 22.8.2025 in I.A.No.1 of 2025.

5. This Court, at the time of admission, passed interim order dated 28.04.2022 directing respondents not to disturb the possession of petitioner over the subject plots. However, Respondents 2 and 3 filed their Vacate Stay Petition. Since the matter was heard finally instead of deciding I.A.No.2 of 2025, this Court deems it fit to take up for final disposal with the consent of learned counsel for both the parties.

6. Petitioner asserts that his vendor, A. Krishna Murthy, purchased subject land pursuant to an auction conducted by the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise, Hyderabad-I, and auction was confirmed on 29.08.2006. It is stated, Krishna Murthy thereafter, dealt with the property and various plots were sold through registered sale deeds. The land was subsequently laid out into approximately 105 plots and registered sale deeds were executed in favour of several purchasers. According to him, himself and other purchasers have been in possession and enjoyment of their respective plots and invested substantial amounts in developing the property.

               6.1. Petitioner contends that respondents attempted to interfere with possession by placing a notice board on 15.04.2022 upon the land and that such action is arbitrary and contrary to the principles of natural justice. The purchasers have constructed houses, obtained permissions and electricity connections and have otherwise altered their position. Petitioner additionally questions the enforceability of the mortgage and recovery proceedings and contends that the recovery certificate dated 26.04.2005 was not acted upon within the prescribed period. On these grounds, petitioner seeks protection of possession and contends that the respondents have no subsisting right to interfere with the plots.

7. Per contra, the official respondents have taken a fundamentally different stand. According to them, petitioner’s entire claim is derivative and originates in the auction conducted by the Customs and Central Excise Department in favour of A. Krishna Murthy. The official respondents specifically rely upon the judgment dated 04.04.2012 in Writ Petition No. 17742 of 2005, by which, according to the counteraffidavit, the auction conducted by the Customs and Central Excise Department and the consequential transactions were declared illegal/null and void. Respondents accordingly, contend that after the foundation of Krishna Murthy’s title was removed by a competent Court, neither Krishna Murthy nor any person claiming through him could convey a better title to subsequent purchasers. They invoke the fundamental principle Nemo datquod non habet — no one can give better title than what he has. They further state that petitioner cannot, by relying upon subsequent registered sale deeds, possession or construction, revive a title which had no subsisting legal foundation.

8. Heard Sri G. Allabaksh, learned counsel for Petitioner and Sri V.V.S.N. Raju, learned counsel for Respondents 2 and 3 and Ms. P. Sri Lalitha for Respondents 10 to 13, 18, 20, 22 to 26 and perused the record.

9. There is no serious dispute regarding the broad chain through which petitioner claims. Petitioner’s title is traced to Customs & Central Excise auction. Sri A. Krishna Murthy, the vendor of petitioner purchased Acs. 4-00 of land in Survey No. 261/3 through auction sale conducted by the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise. As the 5th respondent had not paid the dues and as the vendor of petitioner was the highest bidder in the auction and paid Rs.30,50,000/-, the Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise confirmed the sale on 29.08.2006. The vendor of petitioner gave GPA to his wife and se sold the plots through registered Sale Deeds.

10. The official respondents contend that the prayer, as framed, rests on an erroneous assumption of lawful title and possession without acknowledging the fact that the original auction sale through which Petitioner's vendors claimed title was declared as invalid by this Court vide order dated 04.04.2012 in Writ Petition No. 17742 of 2005. The entire sequence of transfers flowing from said auction is tainted by illegality, and no better title than what was lawfully held can be conveyed. The present Petition was filed solely to obstruct valid enforcement action undertaken by Respondents 2 and 3 pursuant to a subsisting mortgage interest created in favour of the lender vide Memorandum of Deposit of Title Deeds dated 31.03.1997. As such, the claims advanced in the Writ Petition are untenable and not maintainable in law.

11. Pursuant to the filing of the instant Writ Petition, this Court granted interim order dated 28.04.2022 restraining Respondents 2 and 3 from proceeding further in respect of the subject property. As a result, the enforcement of the Recovery Certificate issued by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as "DRT") and the lawful recovery proceedings initiated by Respondents have come to a standstill. The said interim order has severely prejudiced Respondents' ability to realize the mortgaged property, which continues to stand in the name of the original borrower. In view of this Court's prior declaration that the Central Excise and Customs Department (hereinafter referred to as "CECD") auction notice dated 04.08.2005 as illegal, Petitioner cannot seek equitable protection under the garb of downstream sale deeds.

12. It is further contended that in the backdrop of mortgage created by the company, namely Jairaj Spinning & Weaving Mills (hereinafter referred to as "borrower company"), in favour IDBI Bank over land admeasuring Acs. 4.00 situated in Survey No 261/3 of Annaram Village, Nasapur Mandal (presently Gummadidal Mandal), Medak District (hereinafter referred to as "said property") as security for credit facilities granted to the borrower company. That upon default and classification of the loan account of the borrower company as Non-performing Asset (hereinafter referred to as "NPA"), the recovery proceedings were initiated, and a Recovery Certificate dated 12.04.2005 was issued by the DRT, Hyderabad. While the borrower continued to remain liable, the subject property was illegally- auctioned by the Department of Central Excise and Customs in disregard of the pre-existing mortgage. Accordingly, IDBI Bank preferred Writ Petition No. 17742 of 2005 to challenge the said auction notice; however, the CECD proceeded with the sale of the said property despite the pending litigation.

13. It was further submitted that this Court vide order dated 04.04.2012, categorically declared the auction as illegal. The subsequent conveyances, i.e. sale deeds relied upon by Petitioner, including those executed in 2018, 2019, and 2022, stem from a defective root title and are contrary to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, the said deeds are not valid, void and illegal, and Petitioner has no right over the said property, and the instant Writ Petition is not maintainable. It was further submitted that Respondents, having remained actively engaged in recovery proceedings before the DRT and having succeeded in challenging the auction of the Department of Central Excise and Customs before this Court, are now lawfully pursuing enforcement. Petitioner's claim of peaceful possession, despite public litigation and a High Court judgment invalidating the foundational auction sale, is untenable. The filing of the instant writ after years of irregular possession is clearly intended to obstruct and frustrate the lawful rights of the secured creditor. Hence, the Petition is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed in limine.

14. It is was further contended that the said property was mortgaged to IDBI Bank by the borrower company through a Memorandum of Deposit of Title Deeds dated 31.03.1997. Upon default, the DRT, Hyderabad, issued a Recovery Certificate dated 26.04.2005 in favour of IDBI Bank. During the pendency of the related writ proceedings, CECD unlawfully auctioned the mortgaged property. However, this Court, by judgment dated 04.04.2012 in Writ Petition No. 17742 of 2005, declared the auction illegal and void and directed the Central Excise Department to refund Rs. 30,75,000/- to the auction purchaser. However, to date, neither has the refund been affected by CECD nor has the invalidated auction been reversed in terms of possession, thereby continuing to obstruct legitimate enforcement by the Answering Respondents and encouraging downstream transactions that have no legal sanctity. This noncompliance has severely prejudiced the Respondents' enforcement efforts and has fostered legally untenable claims over the mortgaged asset.

15. Further, it was submitted that as a direct consequence of the order dated 04.04.2012, the title purportedly acquired by the auction purchaser stood extinguished in law, and no valid or transferable rights could emanate from that transaction. It is a settled legal position that any subsequent sale deriving its root from a void transaction is equally vitiated. Accordingly, all downstream conveyances executed by the auction purchaser on 21.08.2018, 15.10.2018, 25.02.2019 and 25.03.2022 are themselves null and void and confer no enforceable title upon the subsequent purchasers, including Petitioner. It was submitted that the said transactions, though registered, are tainted by the original illegality and are hit by the doctrine of nemo datquod non habet. The purported registrations and possession based on these sale deeds, therefore, cannot override or dilute the rights of the secured creditor under the valid mortgage that predates and survives all such transactions. Hence, Petitioner cannot claim any lawful interest or protection in respect of the subject plots. Petitioner's title is derived from an auction that was declared illegal by Court vide its order dated 04.04.2012. All subsequent sales, including those claimed by Petitioner, are void in law. Respondents are lawfully enforcing their secured rights pursuant to a valid mortgage and Recovery Certificate. Petitioner cannot invoke Article 300-A when the foundational title itself stands vitiated. Hence, no relief can be warranted.

16. It was also submitted that statutory position under Section 26-E of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and Section 31-B of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, grants absolute priority to the secured creditor's right to recover its dues from the secured asset over all other claims, including taxes or government dues. Respondents' secured interest, having been registered and upheld, takes precedence over any unregistered or informal claims of subsequent purchasers. This was upheld by several High Courts, including this Court in State Bank of India v. Union of India (WP No. 20196 of 2019), Gujarat High Court in Bank of Baroda v. State of Gujarat, and Bombay High Court in Axis Bank Ltd v. State of Maharashtra among others. These authorities categorically affirm that a secured creditor has a preferential right over the mortgaged asset, and third parties claiming through void conveyances cannot disturb enforcement actions initiated lawfully by such a creditor.

17. The law makes a fundamental distinction between a person claiming an independent title and a person claiming title through another. Where the title is derivative, the transferee ordinarily cannot acquire a better title than that possessed by his transferor. The rule of nemo datquod non habet the principle is no longer res integra. In Mrs. Umadevi Nambiar v. Thamarasseri Roman Catholic Diocese ((2022) 7 SCC 90), the Supreme Court described the rule as a fundamental principle of the law of transfer of property, namely that no one can confer a better title than what he himself has. The Court specifically held that where the vendors themselves had no title, they had nothing to convey to the subsequent purchaser. The principle was also reiterated in P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar (2023 INSC 1009), wherein the Supreme Court observed that a vendor cannot transfer a title to the vendee better than that which he himself possesses. Significantly, the Court applied the principle where the plaintiff’s vendor had himself been denied title by the competent authority. The Supreme Court in Kavita Kanwar v. Pamela Mehta ((2021) 11 SCC 209), likewise reiterated that no one can convey a better title than what he had, expressly referring to the maxim nemo datquod non habet. The rule is of considerable antiquity and was also recognised by the Apex Court in Morvi Mercantile Bank Ltd. v. Union of India ((1965) 3 SCR 254), where the Supreme Court referred to nemo datquod non habet as the general rule governing transfer of title. The principle has received a particularly clear reaffirmation in the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa (D) through LRs (2026 INSC 705) decided on 14.07.2026.

18. Though the factual matrix of that case is different, the legal principle is directly applicable to the present case. The question before this Court is not whether the petitioner possesses a registered document. The question is what title was actually available with the person from whom the petitioner ultimately derives his title. The petitioner’s vendor, A. Krishna Murthy, derives his alleged title from the auction conducted by the Customs and Central Excise Department and confirmed on 29.8.2006. Respondents have specifically relied upon the order dated 04.04.2012 passed in Writ Petition No. 17742 of 2005 and contend that the said auction was cancelled and declared invalid. Their counter-affidavit specifically records that the High Court declared the auction and subsequent sales illegal, null and void. If the auction sale in favour of Krishna Murthy stood cancelled by a competent Court, the subsequent sale by Krishna Murthy cannot be examined in isolation. The Court cannot sever the subsequent transaction from its source and treat the sale deed in favour of the petitioner as an independent origin of title. The principle stated in Umadevi Nambiar and P. Kishore Kumar stated supra therefore squarely applies. If the vendor had no subsisting transferable title, he could not convey such title to the petitioner. A chain of transactions does not become stronger merely because the number of registered instruments increases.

19. Petitioner places considerable reliance upon the fact that the sale deeds are registered. The submission cannot be accepted in the manner advanced. Registration establishes compliance with the statutory requirements governing registration of the instrument. It does not, by itself, confer upon the transferor a title which he did not possess. In P. Kishore Kumar, stated supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was confronted with a registered sale deed but nevertheless examined the underlying source of the vendor’s title and held that the vendor could not convey a title which he himself did not possess. Registration of the instrument and validity of the title conveyed under the instrument are two different questions. The former cannot automatically establish the latter.

20. The next question is whether petitioner can nevertheless claim protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Section 41 embodies an exception to the ordinary rule where an ostensible owner, with the express or implied consent of the real owner, transfers the property for consideration to a transferee who, after taking reasonable care to ascertain the transferor’s authority, acts in good faith. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that protection cannot be claimed merely by describing oneself as a bona fide purchaser. In Umadevi Nambiar, the Supreme Court considered Section 41 and held that the transferee must establish the statutory requirements, including reasonable care to ascertain the authority of the transferor and good faith. The Court observed that if reasonable care had been exercised, the defect in the authority to sell could have been discovered. In the present case, petitioner has not established that the person from whom he derives title became an ostensible owner with the consent of the true owner in the manner contemplated by Section 41. More importantly, the very auction through which the vendor claimed title was subjected to judicial proceedings. Petitioner therefore, cannot simply rely upon the appearance created by subsequent registered documents.

21. The concept of reasonable care assumes significance in the present case. The Transfer of Property Act defines notice in Section 3 and specifically recognizes circumstances where a person is deemed to have notice because of willful abstention from enquiry or gross negligence. In Umadevi Nambiar, the Supreme Court examined the relationship between Section 41 and the requirement of reasonable care and notice, observing that reasonable enquiry could have revealed the defect in the transferor’s authority. Petitioner claims through a vendor whose title originated in a public auction which itself had become the subject matter of litigation. Therefore, petitioner cannot rely solely upon the fact that a registered sale deed was available. The duty of reasonable enquiry is particularly relevant where the source of title itself is under dispute. The earlier judgment in Writ Petition No. 17742 of 2005 is not a peripheral circumstance. It concerns the very transaction from which Krishna Murthy’s title is claimed to originate. This Court, by order dated 04.04.2012, cancelled the auction conducted by the Customs and Central Excise Department and declared the auction and subsequent sales illegal, null and void. Therefore, petitioner cannot be permitted to approach the present litigation as though his vendor’s title were an undisputed title. The source of his title has already been adjudicated upon.

22. The respondents also rely upon Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The earlier counter-affidavit itself relies upon Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy ((2006) 13 SCC 608), observing that a transfer during pendency of litigation remains subject to the result of the proceedings. In Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy ((2006) 13 SCC 608) , the Supreme Court reiterated that a transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree in the same manner as a party to the litigation. The Court further explained that the doctrine of lis pendens is founded on public policy and that the question of the transferee’s good faith does not defeat the operation of Section 52. Similarly, in Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami ((1972) 2 SCC 200), the Supreme Court explained the object of Section 52 as subjecting dealings with the property under litigation to the authority of the Court dealing with the property. Thus, where a transferee acquires an interest during pending litigation concerning the property, he takes the property subject to the result of such litigation. Petitioner cannot simultaneously contend that he is protected merely because he was a bona fide purchaser if the statutory doctrine of lis pendens is attracted. If parties to litigation were permitted to defeat the ultimate adjudication by successive transfers during the pendency of the proceedings, no litigation concerning immovable property could ever reach a meaningful conclusion.

23. Subsequent purchasers cannot defeat an earlier adjudication. The Court is also required to consider the consequence of permitting petitioner’s argument. Suppose an auction is challenged before a competent Court. During or after such proceedings, the auction purchaser creates a layout and sells hundreds of plots. If each subsequent purchaser is permitted to say “I am not bound because I have a registered sale deed,” the original adjudication would become practically meaningless. The law does not permit such an indirect circumvention of a judicial determination. A subsequent transferee takes his rights subject to the legal position of his transferor and, where applicable, subject to the outcome of the litigation.

24. The Supreme Court in P. Kishore Kumar also referred to the obligation of a purchaser to diligently investigate the title he proposes to acquire. The Court held that the doctrine of caveat emptor places upon the purchaser a duty to investigate the title being purchased. The petitioner cannot simply say that he saw a registered document and therefore had no further obligation. Where title is derived through a complicated chain involving an auction, mortgage, recovery proceedings and pending litigation, the purchaser cannot shut his eyes to the source of title and subsequently plead absolute innocence.

25. Petitioner also relies upon the transaction through which A. Krishna Murthy authorized his wife to deal with the property. The proposition is elementary. A GPA holder derives authority from the principal. The GPA holder cannot possess or convey a proprietary interest greater than that possessed by the principal. Therefore, if the principal possessed no subsisting transferable title, the GPA holder could not create such title merely by executing a sale deed. Petitioner places substantial reliance upon construction of houses, electricity connections, permissions from the Gram Panchayat and other developmental activities. The Court is conscious of the hardship which may be caused to purchasers. Nevertheless, hardship cannot substitute for title. The law cannot recognize “possession + construction = title nor can “registered sale deed + long possession = better title than the vendor possessed”. If the source of title is legally defective, subsequent expenditure does not cure the defect. The affected purchasers may have independent remedies against the persons who sold the property to them, but such remedies cannot transform an invalid root of title into a valid one.

26. Petitioner has relied upon Article 21 and the right to shelter. There can be no dispute that the right to shelter is an important facet of the right to life. However, Article 21 cannot be interpreted as conferring proprietary title over property which the petitioner cannot establish in accordance with law. The constitutional concern regarding shelter may be relevant while considering the manner of enforcement of a lawful order, but it cannot confer title upon a person whose title is derivative and whose source of title has been invalidated. Further the weakness of respondents’ case cannot establish petitioner’s title. Petitioner has also challenged the mortgage and recovery certificate and raised objections concerning limitation. Even assuming that some aspect of the respondents’ recovery proceedings requires examination, that does not automatically establish the petitioner’s title.

27. There is also a serious question regarding the propriety of granting the relief sought in a writ petition. The Supreme Court in M/s Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh ((2021) 6 SCC 771), reiterated the principles governing exercise of Article 226 jurisdiction where an efficacious alternative remedy exists and where the controversy involves disputed factual questions. Admittedly, in the instant case, neither petitioner nor his vendor had not approached DRT challenging the Recovery Certificate dated 12.4.2005 issued by the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Hyderabad.

28. Further, it is settled principle of law in United Bank of India v. Satywati Tondon ((2010) 8 SCC 110) wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned High Courts in entertaining Writ Petitions against the order of DRTs. and the relevant portion of the said judgment is extracted hereunder.

               “ 17. ……..Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.

               18. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad AIR 1969 SC 556, Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1 and HarbanslalSahnia and another v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and others (2003) 2 SCC 107 and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass appropriate interim order.”

29. Petitioner’s title is derivative and traces its origin to A. Krishna Murthy. The title claimed by Krishna Murthy originates in the auction conducted by the Customs and Central Excise Department. The validity of the said auction was challenged in Writ Petition No. 17742 of 2005 and, according to the material placed before this Court, the auction was cancelled/declared invalid by order dated 04.04.2012. A person whose title itself has failed cannot ordinarily convey that title to another. The subsequent registered sale deed does not constitute an independent root of title. The petitioner has not established the statutory ingredients necessary to invoke the protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The subsequent possession, construction, electricity connections and expenditure cannot enlarge the title conveyed. To the extent, the subsequent transactions were effected during pending litigation, the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act operates subject to the terms of the litigation and its ultimate result, as explained in Sanjay Verma and Jayaram Mudaliar. The petition raises substantial questions concerning title and competing rights which cannot appropriately be adjudicated in the present writ proceedings.

30. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered opinion that petitioner has failed to establish a legally-enforceable right warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. Petitioner’s claim being derivative in nature, he cannot claim a title better than that possessed by his vendor. The principle nemo datquod non habet is squarely attracted. The subsequent registered sale deeds cannot, by themselves, create or enlarge the title which was available at the source of the transaction. The fact that petitioner and other purchasers may have been in possession, constructed houses or incurred expenditure cannot, in the circumstances of the case, confer upon them a title superior to that of their vendor. The earlier adjudication concerning the auction, as relied upon by the respondents, assumes foundational significance and cannot be circumvented through subsequent transactions. Consequently, petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought.

31. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed. It is, however, made clear that this order shall not preclude petitioner or other purchasers from availing such remedies as may otherwise be available to them in law against their respective vendors or other persons responsible for the transactions. No costs.

32. Consequently, the miscellaneous Applications, if any shall stand closed.