1. Petitioner, an erstwhile member of the Central Reserve Police Force, invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution questioning the order of dismissal from service dated 04.02.2010, the appellate order dated 20.12.2012, and the revisional order dated 18.12.2015, and seeks reinstatement with consequential benefits.

2. The principal grievance of petitioner is that disciplinary proceedings culminating in his dismissal were conducted in violation of the principles of natural justice and the procedure prescribed under the CRPF Act and Rules. He contends that respondents acted in disregard of the order in Writ Petition No. 3548 of 2008; he was never properly relieved from his earlier place of posting, and initiation of disciplinary proceedings was without jurisdiction.

3. Respondents oppose the Writ Petition and submit that petitioner, after being transferred from 99 RAF/CRPF to 64 Battalion, CRPF, was relieved from his previous unit on 21.02.2008, but failed to report at the transferred unit. Despite repeated directions, he continued to remain absent. A Court of Inquiry was conducted; he was declared a deserter, and thereafter departmental proceedings were initiated. According to respondents, petitioner was repeatedly afforded opportunity to participate in the enquiry but deliberately failed to avail the same.

4. Heard Sri Narinder Pal Singh, learned counsel for petitioner and Sri N. Bhujanga Rao, learned Deputy Solicitor General on behalf of respondents.

5. Learned counsel for petitioner would contend that petitioner was transferred from 99 RAF/CRPF to 64 Battalion, CRPF pursuant to the transfer order dated 05.10.2007. He filed Writ Petition No.3548 of 2008 challenging the transfer. The said Writ Petition was disposed of on 21.02.2008 directing respondents to consider his representation dated 16.02.2008 and communicate the decision taken thereon expeditiously, with a direction that he should not be relieved from the existing station if, as on the date of the judgment, he had not already been relieved.

               5.1. Further, it is contended that respondents nevertheless relieved petitioner and failed to comply with the order of this Court; no valid relieving/movement order was served upon him and he was never struck off the strength of his existing unit. According to him, unless petitioner was properly relieved and taken on the strength of the new unit, respondents could not have proceeded against him for failure to report at the new station. It is also contended that CRPF transfer policy relating to Group-D staff prohibited such transfer except in the circumstances mentioned therein. Learned counsel relies upon the CRPF Directorate General proceedings dated 07.05.2004 and contends that transfer itself was contrary to the applicable policy. It is alleged, departmental enquiry was conducted ex parte and dismissal was contrary to Article 311 of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice.

6. Per contra, learned Deputy Solicitor General would submit that petitioner had already been relieved from 99 RAF on 21.02.2008 at about 0700 hours, whereas the order passed by this Court on the same day was received by the unit concerned subsequently. He relies upon the records indicating that the Court order dated 21.02.2008 was received in the office of 99 BN RAF only on 24.03.2008. Thus, according to him, there was no wilful or deliberate disobedience of the order of this Court. It is further contended, after being relieved, petitioner was required to report at 64 Battalion, CRPF, Lakhipur, Assam after availing the admissible joining time. He failed to report and remained absent without permission.

               6.1. Further, it is contended on behalf of respondents that an inquiry was thereafter, ordered and petitioner was declared a deserter. A memorandum of charges and statement of imputations were sent to his residential address, but he neither submitted his defence nor appeared before the Enquiry Officer. Repeated notices were issued requiring him to participate in the enquiry. Even thereafter, he failed to appear. In that view of the matter the respondents accordingly submit that the enquiry was rightly proceeded with ex parte and that the petitioner cannot complain of denial of natural justice when the opportunity afforded to him was not availed by him.

7. Petitioner, in his Reply Affidavit, denies the averments made in the counter and contends that respondents have wilfully and negligently disobeyed the order dated 21.02.2008 in Writ Petition No. 3548 of 2008. It is his specific case that the said writ petition was filed challenging his transfer from 99 RAF/CRPF to 64 Battalion, CRPF, and this Court, while disposing of the same, directed respondents to consider his representation dated 16.02.2008 and communicate the decision expeditiously, with a further direction that petitioner should not be relieved if, as on the date of the order, he had not already been relieved. It is contended that, notwithstanding the said order, respondents did not permit him to continue at the existing station and informed him that he had been relieved on 21.02.2008 at about 7.00 a.m. Learned counsel disputes the respondents’ assertion that he had already been relieved and specifically contends that no relieving order or movement order was ever served upon him and no acknowledgement or proof of service has been produced. He further contends that respondents never removed him from the strength of his existing unit and that, consequently, the plea that he had been validly relieved before the order of this Court cannot be accepted.

               7.1. Petitioner further contends that his transfer itself was contrary to the CRPF Transfer Policy for Group-D staff, relying upon the CRPF Directorate General proceedings dated 07.05.2004, which, according to him, provided that Group-D staff may not be transferred except on promotion. He therefore, asserts that transfer from 99 RAF/CRPF to 64 Battalion was contrary to respondents’ own instructions. He further states that he was never taken on the strength of 64 Battalion, even on paper, therefore, the Commandant of 64 Battalion had no jurisdiction to initiate departmental proceedings or dismiss him from service on the allegation that he had failed to join the new place of posting. According to the petitioner, the dismissal order itself records that he had not joined duty at 64 Battalion, which, according to him, supports his contention that the transfer had never been effectively implemented. He consequently contends that there was no wilful absence from duty, since the respondents themselves had prevented him from continuing at his existing station while simultaneously failing to validly complete the relieving and joining formalities.

               7.2. Petitioner lastly contends that, in the absence of a valid relieving order, proof of service thereof, removal from the strength of the previous unit and taking him on the strength of the new Battalion, the very foundation for initiating the departmental enquiry was absent. He asserts that the procedure prescribed for conducting the departmental enquiry was not followed, that the dismissal from service was therefore illegal, unconstitutional and violative of Article 311 of the Constitution, and that the respondents could not lawfully punish him for alleged non-joining at a place where, according to him, he had never been validly posted. He further contends that respondents failed to pass or communicate any order on his representation dated 16.02.2008 despite the specific direction of this Court. On these grounds, he seeks setting aside of dismissal order dated 04.02.2010, the appellate order dated 20.12.2012 and the revisional order dated 18.12.2015, together with reinstatement in service at the same station and all consequential benefits including seniority, promotion and financial benefits.

8. In the light of the above rival contentions the point that fall for consideration are:

               i. Whether the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority and affirmed by the appellate and revisional authorities call for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution?

               ii. Whether the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is shockingly disproportionate?

9. Earlier petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 3548 of 2008; it was disposed of on 21.02.2008 directing respondents to consider the representation dated 16.02.2008 and communicate the decision expeditiously, while directing that petitioner should not be relieved if, as on the date of the judgment, he had not already been relieved. The material placed before this Court by respondents indicates that petitioner had already been relieved from 99 RAF on 21.02.2008 at about 07.00 hours. Respondents further state that the order of this Court was received by the unit concerned subsequently. This factual aspect assumes considerable significance. The direction issued by this Court was expressly qualified by the words “if, as on the date of judgment, he is not relieved from the present station.” Therefore, if petitioner had already been relieved before the order came to the knowledge of the authority concerned, the question of deliberate disobedience of the judicial order would not arise. Respondents have also relied upon contemporaneous correspondence to substantiate the date of relieving. In the circumstances, the allegation of willful disobedience of the earlier order of this Court cannot be accepted.

10. It is understood that petitioner has placed substantial reliance upon his grievance regarding transfer. However, the legality of the transfer and the obligation of the petitioner to obey the transfer order are two distinct questions. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. S.L. Abbas ((1993) 4 SCC 357), has held that transfer is an incidence of service and that the choice of the place where an employee is to be posted ordinarily lies within the domain of the competent administrative authority. Interference is warranted only where the transfer is vitiated by mala fides or violation of statutory provisions. Similarly, in B. Varadha Rao v. State of Karnataka ((1986) 4 SCC 131), the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognized transfer as an ordinary incident of service and held that an employee holding a transferable post cannot claim a right to remain at a particular place. Therefore, even assuming that petitioner had a grievance against his transfer, he was required to pursue the same through appropriate legal or departmental remedies. A pending representation, by itself, would not authorize him to disregard the transfer and remain absent.

11. The material placed before this Court shows that petitioner was relieved from his previous unit and was required to report at the transferred unit. Petitioner, admittedly, did not report at the transferred unit. The foundation of the disciplinary proceedings is petitioner’s failure to report for duty after being relieved from his previous unit. Respondents have stated that petitioner was relieved on 21.02.2008 and was required to report at 64 Battalion after availing the admissible joining time. He failed to do so and remained absent without permission. Repeated directions were thereafter, issued requiring him to report for duty. The petitioner has not demonstrated before this Court any order by a competent authority granting him permission to remain away from duty after his relieving.

12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the seriousness of unauthorized absence, particularly in the case of members of disciplined forces. In Mithilesh Singh v. Union of India ((2003) 3 SCC 309), the Supreme Court observed that absence from duty without proper intimation in a disciplined force is a grave matter and upheld removal from service in the circumstances of that case. The Apex Court further held that for employees belonging to a disciplined force (such as armed forced or police), strict adherence to conduct and procedure is imperative. Leaving duty or a station without formal sanction is a serious breach of discipline.

13. The Supreme Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu ((2014) 4 SCC 108), also emphasized that prolonged unauthorized absence coupled with failure to respond to repeated communications from the employer demonstrates indiscipline and that punishment need not be interfered with merely on the ground that a lesser punishment could have been imposed.

14. In this regard, it is germane to extract the relevant portions of the observations of the Disciplinary Authority which was also affirmed by the Appellate and Revisional Authority.

               “ Based on the parawise comments and brief history of the case. DG, CRPF vide office order No.TIX-16/2008-Pers-II dated 10/6/2008 has rejected the representation dated 16/02/2008 submitted by the petitioner being devoid of merit as he has already completed more than the normal tenure of 03 years in 99Bn, RAF/CRPF and his transfer was order as per the policy guidelines governing his cadre in CRPF. Accordingly, the office vide letter No.MV-1/08-64-EC-11 dated 09/11/2008 had again directed individual at his home address to report for duty within 10 days on receipt of above letter failing which disciplinary action would be initiated. But even after clear directions, the individual did not report for duty at 64 Bn, CRPF. Thus the Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Commandant-64 Bn, CRPF vide letter No.W-II- 3/09-64-EC-II dated 19/01/2009 had issued ‘Warrant of Arrest against No.980120013 W/C C.H.Narsing Rao and requested the Superintendent of Police, District, Ranga Reddy (Andhra Pradesh) for apprehension of the accused.

               4. Since, the individual neither reported for duty nor apprehended by civil police, a Court of Inquiry was ordered vide this office order No.IX-07/09-64-EC-II dated 24/02/2009 to enquiry into the circumstances under which No.980120013 W/C C.H. Narsing Rao relieved on transfer from 99 Bn, RAF/CRPF to 64 Bn, CRPF on 21/02/2008 has not reported at 64 Bn. CRPF location and remained absent without any proper permission/sanction from the competent authority. Shri Niraj Kumar Asst Comdt of this Unit conducted the Court of Indquiry and submitted the proceedings vide his Memo No.IX-1/09/-NKS dated 19/05/2009. Agrreing with the findings/opinion of the Court andin exercise of powers conferred upon disciplinary authority/HOO in Rule 31(c) of CRPF Rules, 1955, charged official was declared ‘Deserter’ from the force w.e.f. 02/03/2008(FN) i.e., from the date of his unauthorised absence from duties vide this office order No.IX-07/09-64-EX-II dated 15/07/2009.

               5. The charged official, even after issue of above ‘Desertion’ order neither made any correspondence nor was apprehended by Civil Police. Subsequently, a department enquiry was ordered against him and Memorandum of charges along with statement of articles of charges (Annexure – I), statement of imputation of misconduct/disobedience (Annexure – II) were sent to No.980120013 W/C C.H. Narsing Rao vide Memorandum No.P-VIII-03/09-64-EC-II dated 07/08/2009 through registered post at his home address with direction to appear in person before the disciplinary authority or to submit written statement in his defence within 10 days of receipt of the memorandum.

               6. The charged official neither reported before the disciplinary authority nor sent any representation in his defence, hence on expiry of notice period, it was considered necessary to hold an enquiry into the charges framed against him as provided in the rules. As such Shri A.K.Singh Astt. Comdt. Of this unit was appointed as Enquiry Officer to conduct the DE against No.980120013 W/C C.H. Narsing Rao vide Office order No.P-VIII-03/09-64-EC-II dated 29/08/2009 to enquire into the charges framed against him. The Enquiry Officer has also given intimation about his detailment as EO of departmental enquiry ordered against the delinquent vide his Memo No.GH-1/09-AKS dated 08/09/09 through registered post and asked the charged official for his presence immediately before enquiry officer to attend preliminary hearing. However, he did not report before the Enquiry Officer by the given date and the enquiry was started by the EO on 15/09/2009. Despite repeated directions to the individual to joint duties, even after sufficient time given to defend himself when memorandum/Articles of Charges were sent, threrafter again ample opportunity was given by the Enquiry Officer to the charged official but he did not turn up and there was no option with the EO to start DE proceedings ex-parte.

               7. In the meantime the charged officials submitted a representation dated 29/08/09 in his defence on the memorandum of charges issued vide this office No.PVIII-3/09-64-EX-11 dated 7/08/2009. The representation submitted by the charged official received by this office on 16/10/2009 i.e., after expiry of the notice period. This office vide letter No.P.VIII-3/09-64-EC-II dated 23/10/2009 has forearded the same to the EO with direction to incorporate the same in DE and also directed the charged official to appear before the EO immediately to defend his case. Moreover, the delinquent in his representation dated 29/8/2009 (received on 16/10/2009) had taken plea regarding rejection of his representation dated 16/2/2008 and his relef from 99 Bn RAF termed as illegal, and contrary to the orders of Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated 21/2/2008. However, the fact is that the charged official was already informed of rejection of his representation dated 16/2/2008 vide DG, CRPF order No.TIX-16/2008-Pers-II dated 10/6/2008 clearly stating the grounds, and parawise comments on his representation. Thus, his representation dated 16/2/2008 holds no ground.

               8. Keeping in view of the principles of natural justice, the Enquiry Officer vide letter No.G.II-1/09-AKS dated 3/11/2009 has again sent a letter at his home address with direction to present himself before the Enquiry Officer, but he did not appear before the Enquiry Officer till 6/12/2009. In the absence of any response from the delinquent, the enquiry officer finally submitted his report to the disciplinary authority on 7/12/2009 vide his Memo No.G.II-1/09-AKS dated 7/12/2009 duly proving the charges levelled against the charged official beyond doubt by the EO. Meanwhile, the charged official made a representation dated 15/12/2009 (received by this office on 31/12/2009) wherein he head stated that statement of PWs recorded by the EO in his absence are null and void and in view of the GOI decisions/instruction under Rule-14 of CCS CCA Rules, 1965. This representation is again misleading because he was time and again directed by EO as well as this office regarding DE against him. Moreover, the charged official has not brought out any reason for his wilful absence from the duties and disobedience of orders.

               9. On receipt of DE proceedings from the Enquiry Officer, copies of the findings of Enquiry Officer along with copies of statements of prosecution witnesses prosecution exhibits were sent to the charged official through registered post at his home address vide this office letter No.PVIII-3/09-64-EC-II dated 12/12/2009 by giving 15 days period for submission of his representation alongwith evidences, if any in his defence. But the same was received back in this office undelivered on 20/1/2020 from postal authority with the remarks that “Party absent kept 07 days and returned to the sender”.

               10. The undersigned has carefully and dispassionately examined the DE proceedings submitted by the enquiry officer and found that the DE has been conducted by EO in accordance with the procedural instructions laid down on the subject by Govt Dt Genl.CRPF from time to time and under Rule 27 of CRPF Rules, 1955. E.O conducted the De on day to day basis. The charge official has been given ample opportunity at every stage of enquiry to defend himself. Hence, after careful examination of enquiry proceedings statement of PWs and evidences adduced during the course of DE findings opinion of the enquiry officer and representation submitted by the charged official in his defence. I do agree with the report of EO and found that No.980120013 W/C C.H. Narsing Rao has committed an offence by absenting himself from duty wef. 02/03/2008(FN) without any sufficient cause prior intimation/prior permission from the competent authority. Further it is noticed from the records that, the individual is in habit of making representations to higher authorities instead of joining duty or appearing before Enquiry Officer and misleading to gain time as he was already relieved to this unit from 99 Bn RAF on 21/02/2008(FN). Hence it is the prime responsibility of the individual concerned to report at his new place of posting but he failed to do so even after completion of approximate 02 years. Thus he has also committed an offence of disobedience of orders which is unbecoming of a member of the Force. The offence of absence from duty is a gross misconduct and calls for sever punishment. In this connection Supreme Court Judgement dated 21/02/2006 in the matter of SC Saxena vs. UOI and ANR (2006) SCC L & S 1890 published 2/2007 Swamy’s News held that “A Govt servant cannot disobey a transfer by not reporting at the place of posting and then go to court to ventilate his grievances. It is the his duty to first report for work where he is transferred and make a representation as to what may be his personal problems such tendency of not reporting at place of posting and indulging in litigation needs to curbed.

               11. Therefore after considering all the facts/circumstances and evidence on record I fully agree with the report of the Enquiry Officer and have found that the articles of charges framed against No.980120013 W/C C.H. Narsing Rao have been proved in preponderance of probabilities. I have carefully considered all pros and cons of the case and after careful application of mind have come to the conclusion that No.980120013 W/C C.H. Narsing Rao is not at all a fit person to be retained in service. Therefore in exercise of powers vested in me U/s.11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 read with Rule 27 of CRPF Rules 1955, I hereby pass the following orders against No.980120013 W/C C.H. Narsing Rao.

               a) Penalty of DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE’ upon No.980120013 W/C C.H. Narsing Rao wef 04/02/2010(FN) (i.e., from the date of issue of this order). He is also struck off from the strength of this unit from the same date. His absence from the duty wef 02/03/2008 will be treated as DIES-NON for all purposes.

               b) Dues amount outstanding if any against him will be recovered and adjusted from the amount payable to him and credited into the Govt treasury.

               c) All medals and decorations if any earned by him during the service are hereby forfeited under the provisions of Section 12(1) of CRPF, 1949.

15. The most important challenge of petitioner is that he was denied reasonable opportunity of defence. The material on record, however, does not support this contention. The order of disciplinary authority records that a Court of Inquiry was ordered; petitioner was declared deserter; memorandum of charges and statement of imputations were sent to him; he was required to submit his defence; he was required to appear before the Enquiry Officer; repeated notices were issued; he nevertheless failed to appear before the Enquiry Officer; and the enquiry was thereafter, conducted ex parte. Respondents further state that the enquiry report and relevant material were subsequently sent to petitioner, providing him an opportunity to submit his representation. The communication was returned with the postal endorsement that the party was absent after the article was kept for seven days. Thus, the present case is not the one where respondents proceeded against petitioner without notice. Rather, it is a case where petitioner failed to participate despite opportunities being afforded to him. An employee cannot deliberately abstain from departmental proceedings and thereafter contend that the proceedings were vitiated because they proceeded in his absence. The ex parte nature of an enquiry, by itself, does not render the enquiry illegal where adequate notice and reasonable opportunity had been provided.

16. The law regarding jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 in disciplinary matters is settled. In State of Karnataka v. Umesh ((2022) 6 SCC 563) the Supreme Court reiterated that the High Court does not act as an appellate forum over findings recorded in disciplinary proceedings and should not re-appreciate the evidence. Judicial review is confined to examining, inter alia, compliance with natural justice, observance of statutory procedure, existence of evidence and perversity of the findings. The principle was earlier authoritatively stated in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran ((2015) 2 SCC 610) where the Supreme Court held that the High Court should not re-appreciate evidence, interfere with conclusions reached in a lawful enquiry, examine adequacy or reliability of evidence, correct mere errors of fact, or interfere with punishment unless it shocks the conscience of the Court. The Supreme Court has also repeatedly reiterated these principles in CISF v. Abrar Ali ((2017) 4 SCC 507).

17. The question is whether the disciplinary proceedings suffer from a jurisdictional or procedural defect of such magnitude as to warrant interference. In the present case, no such defect has been established. Respondents invoked Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act, 1949 read with Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955. Petitioner contends that the Commandant had no jurisdiction to impose the punishment. The said contention of petitioner cannot be accepted. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ghulam Mohd. Bhat ((2005) 13 SCC 228), while considering the CRPF Act and Rules, recognised the disciplinary powers available under Section 11 read with Rule 27 and held that removal from service could be imposed under the statutory framework for misconduct involving absence without sanctioned leave. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder:

               “A bare perusal of Section 11 shows that it deals with minor punishment as compared to the major punishments prescribed in the preceding section. It lays down that the Commandant or any other authority or officer, as may be prescribed, may, subject to any rules made under the Act, award any one or more of the punishments to any member of the force who is found guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty, or remissness in the discharge of his duty or of other misconduct in his capacity as a member of the force. According to the High Court the only punishments which can be awarded under this Section are reduction in rank, fine, confinement to quarters and removal from any office of distinction or special emolument in the force. In our opinion, the interpretation is not correct, because the section says that these punishments may be awarded in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal. The use of words 'in lieu of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal', appearing in sub-section (1) of Section 11 before clauses (a) to (e) shows that the authorities mentioned therein are empowered to award punishment of dismissal or suspension to the member of force who is found guilty and in addition to, or in lieu thereof, the punishment mentioned in clause (a) to (e) may also be awarded.

               It may be noted that Section 9 of the Act mentions serious or heinous offences and also prescribes penalty which may be awarded for them. Section 10 deals with less heinous offences and clause (m) thereof shows that absence of a member of the force without leave or without sufficient cause or overstay without sufficient cause, is also mentioned as less heinous offence and for that also a sentence of imprisonment is provided. It is, therefore, clear that Section 11 deals with only those minor punishments which may be awarded in a departmental inquiry and a plain reading thereof makes it quite clear that a punishment of dismissal can certainly be awarded thereunder even if the delinquent is not prosecuted for an offence under Section 9 or Section 10.

               It is fairly well settled position in law that removal is a form of dismissal. This Court in Dr. Dattatraya Mahadev Nadkarni (since deceased by his L.Rs.) v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (AIR 1992 SC 786) explained that removal and dismissal from service stand on the same footing and both bring about termination of service though every termination of service does notamount to removal or dismissal. The only difference between the two is that in the case of dismissal the employee is disqualified from future employment while in the case of removal he is not debarred from getting future employment. Therefore, dismissal has more serious consequences in comparison to removal. In any event, Section 11(1) refers to Rules made under the Act under which action can be taken. Rule 27 is part of Rules made under the Act. Rule 27 clearly permits removal by the competent authority. In the instant case the Commandant who had passed the order of removal was the competent authority to pass the order.

18. The material in the present case indicates that the disciplinary authority exercised power under the statutory framework and that the order was subsequently, subjected to departmental appellate and revisional scrutiny. There is therefore, no sufficient basis to conclude that the disciplinary authority acted wholly without jurisdiction. Further, petitioner seeks to rely upon the alleged invalidity of his declaration as a deserter. However, respondents’ case is not based solely upon the nomenclature employed by the authorities. The substantive allegation is that petitioner was relieved from the previous unit, was required to report at the new unit, failed to do so despite directions and continued to remain absent. The disciplinary proceedings thereafter, provided the petitioner an opportunity to contest the allegations. Thus, even if petitioner disputes the description of his conduct as “desertion”, the Court is not required in writ jurisdiction to undertake a fresh appreciation of the entire evidence as an appellate court. What is relevant is whether the ultimate disciplinary finding is supported by material and whether the prescribed procedure was followed. On the material placed before this Court, the answer is in the affirmative. Petitioner’s failure to participate is particularly significant. Respondents specifically pleaded that notices were sent to him and he neither appeared before the Enquiry Officer nor submitted his defence. Petitioner cannot simultaneously contend that he was denied an opportunity and, at the same time, fail to demonstrate that he had actually availed or attempted to avail the opportunity offered. The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s approach in State of Karnataka v. Umesh reinforces the principle that the High Court’s examination is directed towards procedural fairness and not towards substituting its own assessment for that of the disciplinary authority.

19. The disciplinary process did not end with the original order. Petitioner preferred an Appeal against the dismissal order, which was rejected by the appellate authority on 20.12.2012. He thereafter preferred a revision petition, which was rejected on 18.12.2015.Thus, the petitioner’s case was considered at multiple levels within the departmental hierarchy. The existence of appellate and revisional consideration is relevant in determining whether the disciplinary action was arbitrary or merely the result of an unexamined decision of the original authority. There is no material before this Court to establish that the appellate or revisional authorities acted without jurisdiction or failed to exercise the powers vested in them.

20. The next question is whether the punishment of dismissal is shockingly disproportionate. Petitioner was a member of the CRPF—a disciplined armed force. The obligation of a member of such a force to report for duty and obey lawful orders is fundamental to the functioning of the organization. The Supreme Court in Mithilesh Singh stated supra recognized the gravity of unauthorized absence in a uniformed force. In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu ((2014) 4 SCC 108), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that prolonged unauthorised absence, particularly when accompanied by disregard of repeated communications from the employer, constitutes serious indiscipline and that proportionality does not warrant judicial interference where the punishment is not shockingly disproportionate. More particularly, in Union of India v. Ghulam Mohd. Bhat, the Supreme Court considered the CRPF statutory framework and recognized the competence of the authorities to impose removal for unauthorized absence.

21. The disciplinary authority in the present case was therefore, entitled to take into consideration the special nature of the petitioner’s employment. This Court cannot substitute its own opinion as to the appropriate punishment merely because another punishment may also have been possible. The question is whether the punishment is so disproportionate that it shocks the conscience of the Court. Having regard to the nature of the Force, the failure to report at the transferred unit, continued absence, failure to comply with repeated directions and failure to participate in the disciplinary proceedings, this Court is unable to hold that the punishment falls within that exceptional category.

22. Petitioner also heavily relies upon the CRPF instruction dated 07.05.2004 concerning transfer of Group-D staff. Even assuming that petitioner had a legitimate grievance concerning the transfer policy, that grievance could not automatically authorize him to remain away from duty. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. S.L. Abbas ((1993) 4 SCC 357) has held that transfer is ordinarily an incidence of service and that administrative guidelines relating to transfer do not ordinarily create an enforceable right to remain at a particular place. The petitioner was at liberty to challenge the transfer order or seek modification thereof. What he could not do was simply disregard the administrative order and remain absent. Therefore, the transfer-policy argument does not by itself invalidate the subsequent disciplinary proceedings.

23. Petitioner also alleges violation of Article 311. Article 311, undoubtedly, protects a government servant against dismissal, removal or reduction in rank except in accordance with the constitutional and statutory procedure. But Article 311 does not confer immunity from disciplinary action. The essential question is whether the petitioner was given reasonable opportunity to defend himself. As noticed above, respondents’ material indicates that notices were issued, opportunities were afforded, the petitioner failed to participate and the enquiry was thereafter proceeded with ex parte. Therefore, the mere fact that the enquiry proceeded in the absence of petitioner does not establish violation of Article 311.

24. On an overall consideration of the matter, this Court finds that petitioner has essentially invited this Court to re-examine the factual controversy concerning the date on which he was relieved whether he was required to report at 64 Battalion whether his absence was justified whether he should have been treated as a deserter whether the evidence before the Enquiry Officer was sufficient and whether a lesser punishment ought to have been imposed. Such an exercise would amount to appellate review. The parameters laid down by the Supreme Court as stated supra in do not permit such re-appreciation in proceedings under Article 226. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, petitioner has failed to establish want of jurisdiction; violation of the prescribed procedure; denial of reasonable opportunity; findings based on no evidence; perversity in the findings; consideration of extraneous material; punishment so disproportionate as to shock the conscience of the Court. Respondents have satisfactorily explained that petitioner had already been relieved from his previous unit before the order passed in Writ Petition No. 3548 of 2008 was received by the authority concerned. Hence, wilful disobedience of the said order is not established. Petitioner was required to report at the transferred unit, but failed to do so and remained absent. Petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunities to participate in the departmental proceedings, but failed to avail them. The ex-parte enquiry therefore cannot, merely on that ground, be held illegal. The disciplinary authority acted under the statutory framework contained in the CRPF Act and Rules. The appellate and revisional authorities considered petitioner’s challenge and rejected the same. Petitioner has not demonstrated any such procedural illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error as would justify interference under Article 226. Having regard to the nature of the Force and the misconduct established, the punishment imposed cannot be characterised as shockingly disproportionate.

25. Petitioner failed to establish that the order of dismissal dated 04.02.2010, the appellate order dated 20.12.2012, or the revisional order dated 18.12.2015 suffers from any jurisdictional error, violation of principles of natural justice, breach of the prescribed procedure or perversity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

26. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs.

27. Consequently, the miscellaneous Applications, if any shall stand closed.