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CDJ 2026 BHC 2756 My Notes print Preview print print
Court : High Court of Judicature at Bombay
Case No : Appeal No. 146 of 2026 In Interim Application No. 1658 of 2026
Judges: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. GADKARI & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KAMAL KHATA
Parties : Manjira Properties Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai Versus Rahul H. Bajaj & Another
Appearing Advocates : For the Appellant: Merlin Sam a/w Pankaj Jain i/by PDJ Legal, Advocates. For the Respondents: Sonal a/w Vivek M. Sharma, Anushka Parab & Vaibhav Singh i/by Vivek M. Sharma, Advocates.
Date of Judgment : 06-10-2026
Head Note :-
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order XXI Rule 46, Rule 46A & Rule 46C -

Case Referred:
Food Corporation of India vs. Sukh Deo Prasad reported in - (2009) 5 SCC 665;

Comparative Citation:
2026 BHC-OS 21819,
Judgment :-

Kamal Khata, J.

1) The Appellant is aggrieved by Order dated 17th June 2026 passed in Interim Application No.1658 of 2026 in Execution Application No.1226 of 2016 whereby the Judgement creditor's Application for attachment of debt payable by Respondent No.2 to Respondent No.1 (Judgment Debtor) was allowed.

2) According to learned counsel for the Appellant, Ms. Merlin Sam, the scheme of Garnishee jurisdiction is set out under Order XXI Rule 46, 46A and 46C of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (CPC). The jurisdictional requirement in a Garnishee proceeding is the existence of a clear attachable debt, due or accruing from the Garnishee to the Judgment Debtor. In the present case, she submitted there was no such clear or admitted debt due from Appellant to the Respondent No.2. At best, it was a disputed contractual claim between the Appellant and Respondent No.2. Therefore, it could not have been summarily converted into an attachable debt and directed to be deposited.

                    2.1) She submitted that, the issue as to whether any amount was payable by the Appellant to the Respondent No.2 under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) could not be summarily adjudicated in the present Garnishee proceedings.

                    2.3) According to Ms. Sam, the impugned Order could not have isolated Clause 6 of the MOU and treated the expiry of the MOU and the lapse of 90 days thereafter as an automatically resulting debt; thereby effectively disregarding the Appellant's contractual defense founded under Clause 1.8 of the same MOU.

                    2.4) She submitted that, once the learned single Judge had proceeded on a demurrer that the MOU was genuine, it became a primary and sufficient contractual record to decide whether any clear debt had at all arisen. The MOU and its clauses were required to be read as a whole and in a harmonious manner. The Appellant's defense did not rest on any external arrangement dehors the contract.

                    2.5) Learned counsel submitted that, the money received by the Appellant was a mobilization advance under the MOU in connection with a contemplated land acquisition. Since the Respondent No.2 had failed to take further steps as contemplated under the MOU, the Appellant had a right to forfeit the amount under Clause 1.8 of the MOU as a consequence thereof.

                    2.6) Ms. Sam contended that admittedly there was neither a Demand, a Notice, or invocation of Arbitration against the Appellant seeking refund of the amount. In absence of such demand, there was no crystallized debt at all. In support of her aforesaid contentions, she relied upon the following decisions:

                    1) Food Corporation of India vs. Sukh Deo Prasad reported in (2009) 5 SCC 665;

                    2) NBCC India Ltd. vs. GNC Infra LLP & Anr. reported in (2026) SCC OnLine Del 4720;

3) Ms. Sonal, learned Advocate appearing for the Respondents supported the impugned Order and sought dismissal of the Appeal.

4) We have heard both the learned counsel and perused the record.

5) In Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin reported in (2012) 8 SCC 148, particularly in paragraph 39, the Supreme Court has held that, a party who had ample opportunity to lead evidence before the First Court but failed to do so or elected not to do so, cannot raise a plea regarding evidence in Appeal.

6) Admittedly, the Appellant has received the money from the Respondent No. 2 and no land has been acquired. The MOU is an unregistered document. Order XXI Rule 46 C of the CPC contemplates a trial of disputed questions. The record indicates that, the Appellant had not offered to lead evidence before the trial Court. Having failed to do so, the Appellant cannot raise a plea in the Appeal. In Sailam B.V.B.A. v/s. Helios Jwelery Pvt.Ltd., passed in Appeal (L) No.9162 of 2026, we have followed the view as laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India v/s. Ibrahim Uddin (supra).

7) We find no perversity in the impugned Judgment and accordingly the same does not warrant any interference in Appeal.

8) Since the Appeal concerns this limited issue, we have not delved into other contentions advanced by the Appellants Advocate.

9) In view of the above, the Appeal is dismissed with no orders as to costs.

10) In view of disposal of the Appeal, Interim Application No.1658 of 2026 does not survive and is accordingly disposed off.

 
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