1. This Criminal Appeal is preferred against the impugned Judgment dated 30.07.2014 passed in S.C.No.57 of 2012 by the learned V Additional District and Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court), Rangareddy District at LB Nagar, whereby the appellant- accused was convicted for the offence under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC'), and was sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of five years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of one month.

02. Heard Sri Narayana Gontryala, learned counsel for the appellant-accused and Sri M. Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State. Perused the record.

03.1. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 21.11.2011 at about 10:14 A.M., the defacto complainant/prosecutrix (PW.1), who was then studying in the 2nd year at J.B.R. Engineering College, was present in her classroom writing records. At the relevant time, the accused, who was working as an Assistant Professor in the said college, allegedly telephoned PW.1 and asked her to come to his cabin. Accordingly, she went to his cabin. It is alleged that the accused initially enquired about her assignments and internal marks and thereafter touched her cheeks. Suspecting the accused's improper intentions, PW.1 attempted to leave the cabin and return to her classroom. At that time, the accused allegedly placed his hands on her shoulders and subsequently lowered his hands and touched her buttocks, thereby outraging her modesty.

               03.2. Thereafter, PW.1 informed her cousins, friends, the Vice-Principal, the Head of the Department, and her parents about the incident. Subsequently, she lodged a written complaint, which was registered as a case by the concerned police. During the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer recorded the statements of the witnesses, conducted a panchanama, arrested the accused, and upon completion of the investigation, filed a charge sheet against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code.

04. Upon appearance of the accused before the learned trial Court and on consideration of the material available on record, a charge for the offence punishable under Section 354 of IPC was framed against the accused. The charge was read over and explained to him, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

05. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined PW.1 to PW.11 and marked Exs.P.1 to P.3. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused was examined with regard to the incriminating material appearing against him in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. He denied the said incriminating circumstances and did not adduce any oral or documentary evidence on his behalf.

06. After hearing both sides, the learned trial Court found the accused guilty and was convicted for the offence under Section 354 of IPC, and was sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of five years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default to undergo Simple Imprisonment for a period of one month.

07. Aggrieved thereby, the accused had preferred the present Criminal Appeal.

08.1. Learned counsel for the appellant-accused submitted that there is an unexplained delay of about 48 hours in lodging the FIR. The alleged incident is stated to have occurred on 21.11.2011 at about 10:14 A.M., whereas the FIR was registered only at 12:10 P.M. on 23.11.2011. PW.1, in her cross- examination, admitted that the Police Station could be reached from the place of occurrence by vehicle within about five minutes. Therefore, there was no justification for the delay of 48 hours in setting the criminal law in motion. It was further submitted that Column No.8 of Ex.P3 FIR merely mentions "complainant delay" and does not furnish any explanation whatsoever for such delay. The unexplained delay, according to the learned counsel, casts a serious doubt on the prosecution version. Learned counsel further submitted that there was also a delay in the FIR reaching the learned Magistrate. As evident from the FIR itself, the learned Magistrate received the FIR only at 12:45 P.M. on 24.11.2011, i.e., on the following day. According to the learned counsel, the delay in lodging the FIR coupled with the delay in forwarding the same to the learned Magistrate assumes significance in the facts and circumstances of the case.

               08.2. Learned counsel further submitted that the evidence of PW-1 regarding the circumstances in which the alleged incident is stated to have occurred is inherently improbable. PW-1 admitted in her cross-examination that lab attendants and technicians would ordinarily be present in the laboratory. However, she claimed that none of them was present on the date of the alleged incident. It was contended that, admittedly, the alleged incident took place on a working day and the prosecution has not furnished any reason for the alleged absence of the laboratory staff on that day. Therefore, the version of PW-1 that no lab attendant or technician was present on the relevant day is liable to be viewed with considerable doubt.

               08.3. Learned counsel further submitted that, according to PW-4, PW-1 had given a written complaint on 22.11.2011, which was immediately forwarded to the Principal with a recommendation for termination of the services of the appellant, and consequently the appellant was terminated from the college. However, PW-4, in her cross-examination, denied having stated before the Police the relevant portion of her statement marked as Ex.D-1. It was submitted that, as per Ex.D-1, PW-4 had forwarded the complaint given by PW-1 recommending immediate termination of the appellant and that the appellant was thereafter terminated from the college at her request.

               08.4. Learned counsel further submitted that the Principal of the college is a material witness in the case. According to PW- 1 and PW-4, the first complaint regarding the alleged incident was given to the Principal. The said complaint, which allegedly preceded the complaint lodged before the Police, has not been brought on record by the prosecution. It was contended that the complaint allegedly given to the Principal is a material piece of evidence for appreciating the subsequent complaint lodged with the Police.

               08.5. Learned counsel further submitted that PW-11, who registered the FIR, was specifically questioned in cross- examination as to why the earlier complaint allegedly given to the Principal was not taken into consideration. However, PW-11 merely stated that Ex.P-1 was the only complaint given by PW-1. Thus, there is a material discrepancy between the evidence of PW-4, who speaks about an earlier complaint given to the Principal, and the evidence of PW-11, who claims that there was no earlier complaint. According to the learned counsel, notwithstanding the materiality of the Principal's evidence, the prosecution, without offering any explanation, did not examine the Principal as a witness. An adverse inference under Section 114, Illustration(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, therefore, deserves to be drawn against the prosecution.

               08.6. Learned counsel further submitted that if the alleged incident had in fact occurred, the management of the college would ordinarily have taken appropriate disciplinary action against the appellant. However, admittedly, no departmental enquiry was conducted against the appellant and not even a show-cause notice was issued calling upon him to offer his explanation in respect of the alleged incident. Though the appellant was stated to have been terminated from service, the Investigating Officer did not collect any material to establish that such termination was on account of the alleged incident. According to the learned counsel, the absence of any disciplinary proceedings or contemporaneous material concerning the alleged misconduct creates a serious doubt regarding the prosecution case.

               08.7. Learned counsel further submitted that PW-10, the Investigating Officer, admitted in his cross-examination that he had not seized the mobile phones of PW-1 and the appellant and had not collected their call data. Consequently, there is no independent or objective evidence to establish that, on the date of the alleged incident, the appellant had telephoned PW-1 and called her to his cabin. It was contended that, in the absence of such material, the prosecution version regarding the alleged telephone call remains uncorroborated.

               08.8. Learned counsel further submitted that PW-10 admitted in cross-examination that, while the witnesses had given their statements in Telugu, he had recorded their statements in English, though he admittedly knew Telugu. According to the learned counsel, this circumstance raises doubt as to whether the statements recorded by the Investigating Officer truly and accurately represented the versions given by the witnesses. Therefore, the statements recorded in English cannot, according to the learned counsel, be mechanically treated as the actual statements made by the witnesses.

               08.9. Learned counsel further submitted that the conduct of PW-1 in not informing her father, PW-3, about the alleged incident on the very same day is unnatural. Though the alleged incident is stated to have occurred on 21.11.2011, PW-1 informed her father only on the following day. According to the learned counsel, this delay in communicating the alleged incident to her father assumes significance while assessing the overall credibility of the prosecution version.

               08.10. Learned counsel further submitted that PW-1 had made contradictory statements regarding the preparation of Ex.P- 1 complaint. In the course of cross-examination, she initially stated that she had herself scribed Ex.P-1. However, when the contents of Ex.P-1 were put to her, she denied having scribed the said complaint. Similarly, she denied having stated in Ex.P-1 that PW-4 was on leave on the date of the alleged incident. According to the learned counsel, these material contradictions and inconsistencies affect the credibility of PW-1.

               08.11. Learned counsel further submitted that there is no consistency in the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-9 with regard to the events immediately following the alleged incident. According to PW-1 and PW-2, an oral complaint was given to PW-5, whereas PW-9 stated that the complaint was given to PW- 5. More importantly, the version of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-9 that PW-5 called the appellant to his room and that the appellant tendered an apology is not supported by the evidence of PW-5. Learned counsel, therefore, contended that PW-2 and PW-9 are interested/planted witnesses and that their evidence does not receive independent corroboration from PW-5.

               08.12. Learned counsel further submitted that the credibility of PW-1 is further affected by several circumstances. First, the statement regarding PW-4 being on leave on the date of the alleged incident is not found either in Ex.P-1 or in the statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Further, PW-4 herself did not state in her evidence that she was on leave on the relevant date. Secondly, PW-1's assertion that no laboratory attendants or technicians were present on that day is not supported by any contemporaneous material. Thirdly, the mobile phones of PW-1 and the appellant were not seized and no call detail records were collected to establish the alleged telephone call.

               08.13. Learned counsel further submitted that PW-1 did not mention in her complaint that PW-2 and PW-9 had come to her after the alleged incident and that they had thereafter gone to PW-5. Such omission, according to the learned counsel, assumes significance because PW-2 and PW-9 subsequently introduced these circumstances in their evidence. Likewise, the version of PW-5 that PW-1 came to him along with her cousins is not supported by his earlier statement to the Police, wherein he had not stated that PW-1 had come along with her cousins. These material omissions and improvements, according to the learned counsel, render the testimony of the prosecution witnesses unreliable.

               08.14. Learned counsel further submitted that the prosecution case rests substantially upon the testimony of PW-1, which suffers from material contradictions, omissions and improbabilities. The unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, the delay in forwarding the FIR to the learned Magistrate, the alleged suppression of the first complaint, non-examination of the Principal, absence of departmental proceedings, non-collection of call detail records, discrepancies regarding the presence of laboratory staff, inconsistencies in the evidence of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-9, and the alleged improvements made by the witnesses cumulatively create a reasonable doubt regarding the occurrence itself and the involvement of the appellant. Hence, learned counsel submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 354 IPC beyond reasonable doubt and that the appellant is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt. Therefore, learned counsel prayed that the Criminal Appeal be allowed, the Judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court be set aside, and the appellant/accused be acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 354 IPC.

               08.15. In support of his submission, learned counsel relied upon the Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hemraj and others v. State of Haryana ((2005) 10 SCC 614) wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.7 and 8 that:

               "7. The prosecution case rests on the evidence of PWs 4 and 5 who are related to the deceased and who happened to be chance witnesses. Before scrutinising this evidence and testing its credibility, we have to advert to certain features in the prosecution case which make a dent on the reliability of the prosecution version. They are discussed hereunder: Two days after the incident i.e. on 5-4-1996, the investigation was entrusted to PW 10 Inspector, CIA at the instance of the Superintendent of Police, Jind. PW 10 stated in cross-examination that he inspected the place of occurrence and examined the persons staying near the place of occurrence and recorded the statements of such persons. The names of those five persons were given. Then he added that "from their statements, it was revealed that Hem Raj, Chunnilal and Omprakash were innocent". He further stated that the investigation done by him was verified by DSP. Ultimately he filed the final report showing only Kala as the sole accused. However, as already noticed, all the four accused mentioned in the FIR were committed to Sessions and the Sessions Judge framed charge against all of them under Section 302. PW 10 did not choose to give all the relevant details of his investigation. However, the version of this investigating officer itself casts a cloud on the reliability of the prosecution case as unfolded by PWs 4 and 5 that four accused were involved.

               8. The fact that no independent witness -- though available, was examined and not even an explanation was sought to be given for not examining such witness is a serious infirmity in the prosecution case having regard to the indisputable facts of this case. Amongst the independent witnesses, Kapur Singh was one, who was very much in the know of things from the beginning. Kapur Singh is alleged to have been in the company of PW 5 at a sweet stall and both of them after hearing the cries joined PW 4 at Channi Chowk. He was one of those who kept the deceased on a cot and took the deceased to hospital. He was there in the hospital by the time the first IO, PW 9 went to the hospital. The evidence of the first IO reveals that the place of occurrence was pointed out to him by Kapur Singh. His statement was also recorded, though not immediately but later. The IO admitted that Kapur Singh was the eyewitness to the occurrence. In the FIR, he is referred to as the eyewitness along with PW 5. Kapur Singh was present in the court on 6-10-1997. The Additional Public Prosecutor "gave up" the examination of this witness stating that it was unnecessary. The trial court commented that he was won over by the accused and therefore he was not examined. There is no factual basis for this comment. The approach of the High Court is different. The High Court commented that his examination would only amount to "proliferation" of direct evidence. But, we are unable to endorse this view of the High Court. To put a seal of approval on the prosecution's omission to examine a material witness who is unrelated to the deceased and who is supposed to know every detail of the incident on the ground of "proliferation" of direct evidence is not a correct approach. The corroboration of the testimony of the related witnesses PWs 4 and 5 by a known independent eyewitness could have strengthened the prosecution case, especially when the incident took place in a public place."

               08.16. Further, he relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Allarakha Habib Menon and others v. State of Gujarat ((2024) 9 SCC 546), wherein it was held at Paragraph Nos.17 to 20 that:

               "17. Having carefully sifted through and analysed the evidence of Demistalkumar (PW 12), we find that he did not utter a single word about the presence of the first informant, Mohammad Arif Memon (PW 11) at the scene of occurrence. He claimed to have picked up two weapons used by the accused i.e. one big knife and a gupti and had presented them at the police station around 9.15 p.m. on the very day of the incident. He also stated that he did not submit any report/complaint of the incident because he saw that someone was already sitting at the police station at 9.15 p.m. for giving the report/complaint.

               18. We find it improbable and totally unacceptable that a police constable had seen the incident and had also brought the crime weapons to the police station and yet his statement would not be recorded and the factum of presentation of weapons would not be entered in the daily diary (roznamcha) of the police station. Demistalkumar (PW 12) explained in his cross-examination that he did not give a report about the incident because he noticed the presence of someone at the police station who was sitting there from 9.15 p.m. to give the report. However, as per the record, no report was admittedly presented at the police station by any person from the complainant side. No police personnel deployed at Anand Town Police Station corroborated the version of Demistalkumar (PW 12) that someone had come to the police station at 9.15 p.m. for giving a report of the incident.

               19. Since the Police Constable, Demistalkumar (PW 12) claiming to be an eyewitness to the heinous assault had reported at the police station with the crime weapons, there was no reason whatsoever as to why his statement would not have been recorded immediately on his arrival at the police station. From the circumstances discussed above, a reasonable doubt is created in the mind of the Court that the statement of Demistalkumar (PW 12) would definitely have been recorded in the daily diary (roznamcha) but his version may not have suited the prosecution case and that is why, the daily diary entry was never brought on record. Non-production of the daily diary is a serious omission on part of the prosecution.

               20. There cannot be any doubt that the first version of the incident as narrated by the Police Constable, Demistalkumar (PW 12) would be required to be treated as the FIR and the complaint lodged by Mohammad Arif Memon (PW 11) would be relegated to the category of a statement under Section 161CrPC and nothing beyond that. The same could not have been treated to be the FIR as it would be hit by Section 162CrPC. Evidently thus, the prosecution is guilty of concealing the initial version from the Court and hence, an adverse inference deserves to be drawn against the prosecution on this count."

09. On the other hand, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for the State submitted that the accused had committed a grave offence and that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing the same before the learned trial Court beyond reasonable doubt. He further submitted that the learned trial Court, upon a proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, had rightly convicted and sentenced the accused for the offence under Section 354 of the IPC. It was contended that the impugned Judgment does not suffer from any illegality, irregularity or infirmity warranting interference by this Court. Therefore, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor prayed that the Criminal Appeal be dismissed and the conviction and sentence imposed by the learned trial Court be confirmed.

10. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned counsel for either side and upon perusal of the entire record, it is evident that PW1 is the victim girl, who narrated the incident allegedly occurred on 21.11.2011 after 10:00 A.M. She stated that she lodged Ex.P1-complaint on 23.11.2011 and that she was the scribe of the said complaint. However, during the course of cross-examination, she admitted that she had not mentioned in Ex.P1-complaint that she had informed the incident to her classmates. She further admitted that she had not mentioned in Ex.P1 that she had informed PWs.2 and 9 about the incident and had also not mentioned the role of PWs.2 and 9. When Ex.P1 was confronted to her, she stated that she had not scribed the said complaint. She also admitted that no complaint was lodged on 21.11.2011 or 23.11.2011.

11. PW2, the cousin brother of PW1, PW3, the father of PW1, and PW9, another cousin brother of PW1, deposed that PW1 had informed them about the incident and that thereafter PW1, PWs.2 and 9 went to the college and reported the matter to the Vice-Principal, requesting him to take necessary action against the accused. According to their evidence, the Vice- Principal called the accused to his room, whereupon the accused allegedly apologised. However, during the course of cross- examination, PW2 admitted that he had not stated in his statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on 23.11.2011 that PW1 was weeping while speaking to him over the phone.

12. PW3, in his chief-examination, stated that PW1 had informed the incident to her classmates. However, during cross- examination, he admitted that he had not stated in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. that his daughter had reported the matter to her classmates. He further stated that, during the year 2011, he was working in the CID Cyber Crimes Wing attached to the Economic Offences Wing.

13. PW4, the Head of the Department, deposed that, on coming to know about the incident, the accused was terminated from service. However, during cross-examination, she admitted that no letter or proceedings relating to such termination had been collected by the Investigating Officer.

14. PW5, the Vice-Principal of the college, deposed that on 21.11.2011, PW1, along with her two cousins, approached him and narrated the entire incident and that he advised them to lodge a complaint for taking necessary action against the accused. During cross-examination, PW5 stated that the Principal was the competent authority to receive the complaint. He further admitted that he had not furnished any record or proceedings relating to the alleged incident or the action taken thereon to the police.

15. PW6, a classmate of PW1, deposed that on 21.11.2011, between 10:00 A.M. and 10:30 A.M., the accused telephoned PW1, whereupon she went to meet the accused and, after returning, was weeping and narrated the entire incident to her.

16. PWs.7 and 8, who were the Security Officer and Attender of the college respectively, deposed with regard to the preparation of the crime details form. PWs.10 and 11, the Investigating Officers, deposed regarding the investigation conducted by them and the filing of the charge-sheet. However, during cross-examination, PW10 admitted that he had neither seized nor collected the cell phones of the accused and PW1 for the purpose of verifying whether there had been any communication between them.

17. Thus, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, when considered in its entirety, discloses certain material omissions and inconsistencies with regard to the manner in which the incident was allegedly reported, the persons to whom PW1 initially disclosed the incident, the alleged complaint to the college authorities, and the subsequent action purportedly taken against the accused. The absence of the relevant contemporaneous records and the failure of the Investigating Officer to collect the mobile phones or verify the alleged telephonic communication between the accused and PW1 are also circumstances which require due consideration while appreciating the prosecution evidence.

18. On a careful perusal of the above material, the point that arises for consideration in this Criminal Appeal is whether the prosecution has established, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant-accused committed the offence punishable under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code and whether the Judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned V Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Rangareddy District at L.B. Nagar, in S.C.No.57 of 2012, dated 30.07.2014, warrants interference by this Court or not.

19. The case of the prosecution rests principally upon the testimony of PW.1, the alleged victim, with the evidence of PWs.2 to 6 being relied upon with regard to the events which allegedly transpired immediately after the occurrence. The allegation against the appellant is that, on 21.11.2011 at about 10:14 A.M., he telephoned PW.1, who was then a student of the college where the appellant was working as an Assistant Professor, called her to his cabin, and, after enquiring about her assignments and internal marks, touched her cheeks and thereafter placed his hands on her shoulders and touched her buttocks. There is no dispute that, if the allegation is proved by reliable and cogent evidence, the same would constitute serious misconduct attracting the penal provision invoked by the prosecution. However, the question before this Court is not whether the allegation is serious, but whether the prosecution has proved the occurrence and the involvement of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

20. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden lies entirely upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is not required to prove his innocence. Where the evidence adduced by the prosecution gives rise to reasonable doubt regarding the occurrence or the participation of the accused, such doubt necessarily has to go to the benefit of the accused. In the present case, PW.1 is the principal witness to the alleged occurrence. Her evidence, therefore, requires careful scrutiny. Though she stated that the incident occurred on 21.11.2011 and that she thereafter informed several persons about the incident, the evidence on record discloses material inconsistencies regarding the manner in which the incident was reported and the events immediately following it. PW.1 admitted during cross- examination that Ex.P.1 complaint did not contain reference to her informing her classmates, PW.2 or PW.9 about the alleged incident. She also admitted that the role allegedly played by PWs.2 and 9 was not mentioned in the complaint. Significantly, when Ex.P.1 was confronted to her, she stated that she had not scribed the said complaint, notwithstanding the prosecution case that Ex.P.1 was the complaint lodged by her. These circumstances cannot be treated as merely trivial discrepancies because the complaint constitutes the earliest version relied upon by the prosecution and the omissions relate to the very sequence of events immediately following the alleged occurrence.

21. The evidence of PWs.2, 3 and 9 also does not furnish the required assurance to the testimony of PW.1. PWs.2 and 9, who are stated to be the cousins of PW.1, deposed that PW.1 informed them about the incident and that they accompanied her to the college and approached the Vice-Principal. According to their evidence, the Vice-Principal called the appellant and the appellant allegedly tendered an apology. However, the evidence of PW.5, the Vice-Principal, does not satisfactorily corroborate the aforesaid version in material particulars. Though PW.5 stated that PW.1 approached him along with her two cousins and narrated the incident, no contemporaneous record relating to such complaint or proceedings was furnished by him to the Investigating Officer. More importantly, the alleged apology by the appellant, which assumes significance in the prosecution version concerning the immediate aftermath of the incident, is not established through any independent or contemporaneous material.

22. The evidence of PW.4, the Head of the Department, also requires consideration. PW.4 stated that, on coming to know of the incident, the appellant was terminated from service. However, in cross-examination, she admitted that no letter or proceedings relating to such termination were collected by the Investigating Officer. The prosecution has thus failed to place before the Court any documentary material demonstrating that disciplinary action was in fact initiated against the appellant on account of the alleged incident. Though the absence of departmental proceedings by itself may not demolish a criminal prosecution, in the peculiar facts of the present case, where the prosecution relies upon the subsequent conduct of the college authorities, the non-production of the relevant contemporaneous records assumes significance.

23. Another circumstance which creates doubt relates to the first complaint allegedly made by PW.1. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses indicates that PW.1 had approached the college authorities before lodging the complaint with the police. PW.5 stated that the Principal was the competent authority to receive the complaint. However, the Principal, who would have been a material witness to establish whether any complaint was made to the college authorities, was not examined by the prosecution. Further, no such complaint allegedly submitted to the college authorities was produced before the Court. The evidence of PW.4, as noticed above, also refers to the complaint and the consequential action against the appellant. On the other hand, PW.11, who registered the FIR, stated that Ex.P.1 was the only complaint given by PW.1. Thus, the prosecution evidence leaves an unresolved inconsistency regarding the existence and contents of the alleged earlier complaint. When the principal of the college is available and the evidence on record indicates that such witness would have been in a position to throw light on an important aspect of the prosecution case, non-examination of such witness and non-production of the relevant contemporaneous document assume significance, particularly where the remaining evidence itself suffers from inconsistencies.

24. The delay in setting the criminal law in motion is another circumstance which cannot be completely ignored. The alleged incident took place on 21.11.2011 at about 10:14 A.M., whereas Ex.P.3 FIR came to be registered only on 23.11.2011 at about 12:10 P.M. Thus, there is a delay of approximately two days. PW.1 admitted that the police station could be reached from the place of occurrence within about five minutes by vehicle. Though delay in lodging an FIR in an offence of this nature cannot, by itself, be treated as fatal to the prosecution, such delay assumes significance when the prosecution does not offer a satisfactory explanation and when the evidence otherwise contains material inconsistencies. In the present case, Column No.8 of Ex.P.3 merely records "complainant delay" and does not disclose any specific explanation for the delay. The delay, therefore, becomes a relevant circumstance while assessing the overall reliability of the prosecution version. The prosecution has also not satisfactorily explained the further delay in forwarding the FIR to the learned Magistrate. The FIR shows that the learned Magistrate received it only at about 12:45 P.M. on 24.11.2011. Though such delay, considered independently, may not necessarily vitiate the prosecution case, it assumes significance when considered cumulatively with the unexplained delay in lodging the complaint and the other deficiencies noticed hereinabove.

25. The Judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, including Hemraj and others v. State of Haryana and Allarakha Habib Menon and others v. State of Gujarat, emphasise the importance of examining unexplained omissions, suppression of material circumstances and non- production or non-examination of material evidence while assessing whether the prosecution version inspires confidence. Another material circumstance is the failure of the Investigating Officer to collect objective evidence relating to the alleged telephone call. According to the prosecution, the appellant telephoned PW.1 and called her to his cabin immediately preceding the alleged incident. PW.10, the Investigating Officer, admittedly did not seize the mobile phones of PW.1 or the appellant and did not collect their call detail records.

26. It is true that the prosecution is not required to collect every conceivable piece of evidence in every case. Nevertheless, when the alleged telephone call constitutes the very circumstance by which PW.1 is stated to have been summoned to the appellant's cabin, the failure to collect readily available objective evidence assumes significance, particularly when the oral evidence regarding the surrounding circumstances is itself not free from doubt.

27. The evidence relating to the presence or absence of other persons at the relevant place also creates a circumstance requiring consideration. PW.1 stated that laboratory attendants and technicians would ordinarily be present in the laboratory, but that none of them was present on the relevant day. The alleged incident took place on a working day. The prosecution has not placed any material explaining the absence of such staff or otherwise establishing that no independent person was available in the vicinity.

28. The evidence of PW.6, a classmate of PW.1, is relied upon to establish that PW.1 returned to the classroom weeping after the alleged telephone call and narrated the incident. However, the material circumstances surrounding this version are not consistently reflected in the earliest complaint. PW.1 herself admitted that she had not mentioned in Ex.P.1 the role of PW.6 or the fact of informing her classmates. Similarly, PW.3 stated that PW.1 informed her classmates, but in cross-examination he admitted that he had not stated this fact in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Such omissions, particularly when they relate to the immediate conduct of the victim following the alleged occurrence, require due consideration. The evidence of PW.2 also contains an omission concerning the alleged emotional condition of PW.1 immediately after the occurrence. PW.2 admitted that he had not stated in his Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement that PW.1 was weeping while speaking to him over the telephone. Likewise, the prosecution has not satisfactorily reconciled the different versions of PWs.1, 2, 5 and 9 concerning the manner in which PW.1 first approached the college authorities and the presence and role of her cousins at that stage. These are not isolated discrepancies. They relate to the sequence of events immediately following the alleged incident and consequently bear upon the reliability of the prosecution version as a whole.

29. The Court also finds significance in the evidence concerning Ex.P.1. PW.1 initially stated that she had scribed the complaint, but when the contents of Ex.P.1 were put to her, she denied having scribed it. Such inconsistency regarding the authorship of the first written complaint is material because the prosecution relies upon Ex.P.1 as the earliest recorded version of the occurrence. Further, PW.1 denied having stated certain matters contained in the complaint, including the circumstances concerning PW.4. Thus, the contents of Ex.P.1 cannot be accepted mechanically as an unimpeachable contemporaneous account without reconciling these contradictions in the testimony of its alleged author.

30. It is also relevant that the prosecution did not produce the alleged proceedings of the college authorities relating to the termination of the appellant. PW.4 stated that the appellant was terminated, while admitting that no such proceedings were collected by the Investigating Officer. PW.5 also stated that he did not furnish any record of proceedings to the police. The prosecution case, therefore, lacks contemporaneous documentary corroboration regarding the alleged complaint made to the college authorities, the proceedings said to have followed the complaint and the alleged termination of the appellant.

31. It is well settled that minor discrepancies which do not affect the substratum of the prosecution case may be ignored. However, the discrepancies in the present case cannot, in the considered view of this Court, be characterised as merely minor or peripheral. They concern the delay in lodging the FIR and the absence of a satisfactory explanation therefor; the delay in forwarding the FIR to the learned Magistrate; the existence and suppression/non-production of the alleged first complaint to the college authorities; non-examination of the Principal, who was a material witness; non-production of the alleged college proceedings and termination records; inconsistencies concerning the role and presence of PWs.2 and 9; omissions regarding the alleged informing of classmates and relatives; the inconsistent evidence concerning the preparation and authorship of Ex.P.1; failure to collect the call detail records or mobile phones despite the prosecution case being founded upon the alleged telephone call; and the absence of satisfactory independent or contemporaneous corroboration of the events immediately following the alleged occurrence.

32. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid circumstances assumes importance. Each circumstance, considered in isolation, may not necessarily be sufficient to discard the prosecution case. However, criminal cases are required to be decided on the cumulative assessment of the entire evidence. When the principal testimony is attended by material inconsistencies and the surrounding circumstances do not furnish satisfactory corroboration, the Court cannot sustain a conviction merely on the basis of the seriousness of the allegation. The prosecution was required to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence on record, in considered view of this Court, does not attain that degree of certainty.

33. The learned trial Court, while recording the conviction, appears to have principally relied upon the testimony of PW.1 and the supporting evidence of the other prosecution witnesses. However, the material contradictions, omissions and deficiencies noticed above have not been satisfactorily reconciled. The learned trial Court was also required to consider the effect of the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, the non- examination of the Principal, the non-production of the alleged earlier complaint and college proceedings, and the failure of the Investigating Officer to collect the call records. However, in an appeal against conviction, this Court is required to independently scrutinise the entire evidence on record. On such independent consideration, this Court finds that the prosecution evidence does not inspire such confidence as would justify sustaining the conviction of the appellant.

34. Having regard to the totality of the circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed the offence punishable under Section 354 IPC. The evidence gives rise to a reasonable doubt regarding the occurrence in the manner alleged and the involvement of the appellant therein. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt.

35. Accordingly, this Criminal Appeal is allowed. The Judgment of conviction and sentence dated 30.07.2014 passed by the learned V Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Rangareddy District at L.B. Nagar, in S.C.No.57 of 2012, is hereby set aside. The appellant-accused is acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 354 IPC by extending to him the benefit of reasonable doubt. The fine amount, if any, paid by him shall be refunded to him in accordance with law. The bail bonds, if any, shall stand cancelled.

As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.