1. This criminal appeal is filed by the appellant-complainant aggrieved by the judgment dated 07.06.2018 passed in S.C.No.115 of 2015 by the learned III- Additional District and Sessions Judge at Asifabad. By the said judgment the respondent Nos.2 to 4-A.1 to A.4 were acquitted of the offences under Sections 302 and alternate charge of Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’).
2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the complainant- A. Rajaiah, lodged a complaint before the police alleging that he performed the marriage of his daughter, Prashanthi, with A.1. At the time of marriage, he agreed to give dowry of Rs.7,50,000/- and one tula of gold. However, he initially gave Rs.5,00,000/- in cash and one tula of gold and subsequently paid the balance amount of Rs.2,50,000/-. As there was a delay in paying the balance dowry amount, A.1 demanded interest on the delayed payment and harassed Prashanthi physically and mentally, stating that if he married another woman at that time, he would have got more dowry. He further alleged that about two months prior to the death of Prashanthi, the marriage of younger brother of A.1 was performed, wherein he received substantial dowry, and for that reason also A.1 subjected Prashanthi to harassment. On 22.06.2014, the complainant invited his daughter and A.1 to his house in connection with Mysamma festival, however, they did not go despite his making a phone call and subsequently he came to know from Prashanthi that A.1 was not permitting her to visit her parents' house. At about 11.00 p.m. on the same day, the complainant came to know that Prashanthi had died by hanging. He went to the spot, observed the circumstances, and lodged a report expressing suspicion that A.1 to A.4 have harassed Prashanthi for additional dowry and caused her death. Based on the said report, a case was registered against A.1 to A.4 for the offence punishable under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, and investigation was taken up.
3. The trial Court framed charges against the accused for the offence under Section 302 with alternate charge of Section 304-B of IPC and under Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act (for short the ‘D.P.Act’). To prove the case of prosecution, the prosecution examined Pws.1 to 12, got marked Exs.P.1 to P.25 and MOs.1 and 2 were marked. Basing on the evidence on record, and after hearing both sides, the trial Court acquitted the accused. Aggrieved by the same, the defacto complainant preferred this appeal.
4. Heard Sri Abhilash Ashrith Bobbili, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-defacto complainant, Sri M.Ramachandra Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent-State and Ms.Monica P. Pole, learned counsel representing Sri H.Prahlada Reddy, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.2 to 5-A.1 to A.4.
5. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the learned Sessions Judge erred in disbelieving the evidence of PWs.1, 2 and 4, merely on the ground that they are related and interested witnesses, despite their evidence consistently establishing the demand for dowry and the harassment meted out to the deceased by the accused. He also contended that, at the time of marriage, a dowry of Rs.7,50,000/- and one tula of gold was agreed to be given, out of which Rs.5,00,000/- and one tula of gold were initially given and the balance amount of Rs.2,50,000/- was paid subsequently. As there was a delay in payment of the balance amount, the accused demanded interest on the delayed payment and continued to harass the deceased. It is further contended that, about two months prior to the occurrence, the marriage of the younger brother of A.1 was performed, wherein substantial dowry was received by him and thereafter also the deceased was subjected to harassment.
6. Learned counsel further contended that, on the date of occurrence, A.1 did not permit the deceased to visit her parents' house to attend the Maisamma festival. The deceased died within seven years of her marriage and otherwise than under normal circumstances. The post-mortem certificate, Ex.P.20, and the evidence of PW.9 establish that the cause of death was strangulation, which corroborates the other evidence on record. Therefore, all the ingredients of dowry death were established and the presumption under Section 113-B of IPC ought to have been drawn against the accused. He also contended that the conduct of accused in leaving the scene when PWs.1 and 2 arrived and questioned them regarding the occurrence also raises a strong suspicion about their involvement in the death of the deceased. The learned Sessions Judge erroneously interpreted the definition of “dowry” under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (for short the ‘D.P.Act’) and recorded an unsustainable finding in paragraph 30 of the judgment. He also contended that the trial Court has not considered that the accused demanded gold from Pw.1 when the deceased gave birth to a girl child. The evidence of PWs.1, 2 and 4, coupled with the medical evidence, clearly establishes the prosecution case and proves the offences punishable under Section 304-B read with Section 34 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the D.P.Act. All these evidence clearly proves that accused are responsible for the death of the deceased but the same was not considered by the trial Court. As such, prayed this Court to set aside the judgment of the trial Court by punishing the accused.
7. The contention of learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 to 5-A.1 to A.4 is that there is no illegality or infirmity in the judgment of the trial Court. Though the appellant contends that the death of the deceased was homicidal, the evidence on record is not sufficient to establish the same. The Medical Officer, in his cross-examination, admitted that he could not state whether the death was homicidal or suicidal, and he was not reexamined by the prosecution to clarify the same. Therefore, the offence under Section 302 of IPC is not made out.
8. Further to establish the offence under Section 304-B of IPC, the prosecution has to prove that the death of the deceased was within seven years of marriage, that it was otherwise than under normal circumstances, and that soon before her death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives in connection with a demand for dowry. Except proving that the death occurred within seven years of marriage and was unnatural, the prosecution failed to establish the remaining essential ingredients of the offence. She further contended that, in an appeal against acquittal, the accused is entitled to the benefit of double presumption of innocence. The first presumption arises from the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person is presumed innocent until proved guilty, and the second presumption is reinforced by the acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Therefore, the appellate Court should not interfere with the findings of the trial Court unless the judgment is perverse or the findings are such that no reasonable Court could have arrived at them. When two views are reasonably possible, the view favourable to the accused has to be preferred. Hence, learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 to 5 requested this Court to dismiss the appeal.
9. Considering the submissions made by the respective counsel and the material on record, now the points to be considered are:
1. Whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused for the offence under Section 302 of IPC ?
2. Whether the prosecution is able to prove the death of the deceased as homicidal, if so, respondent Nos.2 to 5 are responsible for the same ?
3. Whether the prosecution is able to prove that soon before the death of deceased, the respondent Nos.2 to 5 subjected the deceased to harassment with regard to demand of additional dowry ?
POINT NOs.1 TO 3 :
10. To prove the above allegations, the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 12. PW.1 is father of the deceased, PW.2 is mother of the deceased, and PW.4 is the mediator for the marriage. PWs.1, 2 and 4 deposed that the father of the deceased agreed to give Rs.7,50,000/- and one tula of gold as dowry. However, at the time of marriage, he paid Rs.5,00,000/- and one tula of gold and subsequently paid the balance amount in the year 2013, i.e., two years after the marriage. The marriage of the deceased with A.1 was performed on 01.05.2011 and she died on 22.06.2014.
11. With regard to the demand for interest on the delayed payment of the dowry amount, there are certain variations in the evidence. The complaint states that A.1 demanded interest, whereas PW.1 stated that all the accused demanded interest and PW.2 stated that A.1 alone made such a demand. Thus, the evidence on this aspect is not consistent. PWs.1 and 2 further deposed that on 22.06.2014, PW.1 invited the deceased and A.1 to his house for the Mysamma festival. As they did not come, PW.1 contacted them over phone in the evening, and the deceased informed him that A.1 had prevented her from going to her parents' house. Thereafter, PW.1 received information from LW.5 that his daughter had died. PWs.1 and 2 immediately went to the house of accused and found the deceased dead. They noticed a ligature mark around her neck and suspected that she had been killed by the accused. When they questioned A.1 about the death, he did not give any explanation and left the place. Subsequently, PW.1 lodged the complaint on the following day. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the evidence on record clearly shows that deceased died due to strangulation which amounts to homicidal death and in support of his contention, he relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed Abdul Rajjaq Shaikh V. State of Maharashtra ((2019) 10 Supreme Court Cases 778), wherein in paragraph No. 29 it is observed as under :
“29. As to what is the distinction between strangulation and throttling is also dealt within the selfsame work:
“Definition.—Strangulation is defined as the compression of the neck by a force other than hanging. Weight of the body has nothing to do with strangulation.
Ligature strangulation is a violent form of death, which results from constricting the neck by means of a ligature or by any other means without suspending the body.
When constriction is produced by the pressure of the fingers and palms upon the throat, it is called as throttling. When strangulation is brought about by compressing the throat with a foot, knee, bend of elbow, or some other solid substances, it is known as mugging (strangle hold).
A form of strangulation, known as bansdola, is sometimes practised in northern India. In this form, a strong bamboo or lathi (wooden club) is placed across the throat and another across the back of the neck. These are strongly fastened at one end. A rope is passed round the other end, which is bound together, and the unfortunate victim is squeezed to death. The throat is also pressed by placing a lathi or bamboo across the front of the neck and standing with a foot on each end of lathi or bamboo.
Garrotting is another method that was used by thugs around 1862 in India. … A rope or a loincloth is suddenly thrown over the head and quickly tightened around the neck. Due to sudden loss of consciousness, there is no struggle. The assailant is then able to tie the ligature.”
12. In State of Madhya Pradesh V. Balveer Singh ((2025) 8 Supreme Court Cases 545), it is observed as under :
“83. This Court took note of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, and laid down the following principles in paras 31 to 34 of the report: (Mir Mohammad Omar case [State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar, (2000) 8 SCC 382 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1516] , SCC p. 392)
“31. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty.
32. In this case, when the prosecution succeeded in establishing the afore-narrated circumstances, the court has to presume the existence of certain facts. Presumption is a course recognised by the law for the court to rely on in conditions such as this.
33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in relation to the facts of the case.
34. When it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that Mahesh was abducted by the accused and they took him out of that area, the accused alone knew what happened to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would enable the Court to draw the presumption that the accused have murdered him. Such inference can be disrupted if the accused would tell the Court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody.”
(emphasis supplied)
13. In Ravirala Laxmaiah V. State of Andhra Pradesh ((2013) 9 Supreme Court Cases 283), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under :
21. In Neel Kumar v. State of Haryana [(2012) 5 SCC 766 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 271] this Court observed : (SCC p. 774, para 30)
“30. It is the duty of the accused to explain the incriminating circumstance proved against him while making a statement under Section 313 CrPC. Keeping silent and not furnishing any explanation for such circumstance is an additional link in the chain of circumstances to sustain the charges against him. Recovery of incriminating material at his disclosure statement duly proved is a very positive circumstance against him. (See also Aftab Ahmad Anasari v. State of Uttaranchal [(2010) 2 SCC 583 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1054 : AIR 2010 SC 773] .)”
14. He further relied on the judgment in Jayantilal Verma V. State of Madhya Pradesh ((2021) 12 Supreme Court Cases 71) wherein in paragraph No.25, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under :
“25. We are confronted with a factual situation where the appellant herein, as a husband is alleged to have caused the death of his wife by strangulation. The fact that the family members were in the home sometime before is also quite obvious. No explanation has been given as to how the wife could have received the injuries. This is a strong circumstance indicating that he is responsible for commission of the crime. [Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 80] The appellant herein was under an obligation to give a plausible explanation regarding the cause of the death in the statement recorded under Section 313CrPC and mere denial could not be the answer in such a situation.”
15. As regards the allegation of homicidal death, PW.9, the Medical Officer, deposed that there were five injuries on the dead body and that the deceased died due to strangulation. However, in his cross-examination, he admitted that Ex.P.21 does not contain any reference to the thyroid cartilage and that he could not state whether the death was homicidal or suicidal. The Medical Officer did not give any definite opinion that the death was homicidal. The learned counsel for appellant relied on the judgment in Javed Abdul Rajjaq’s case, wherein in paragraph No.29, strangulation was defined and also explained many types of strangulations, whereas in the present case there is no definite evidence to prove that it is strangulation. Therefore, merely on the basis of evidence of PW.9 that the deceased died due to strangulation, it cannot be presumed that the death was homicidal. In the absence of clear medical evidence establishing homicidal death, the prosecution failed to prove that it is a homicidal death thereby charge under Section 302 of IPC is not proved. Further, the judgments relied on by the prosecution pertains to Section 106 of the Evidence Act, stating that though there is no presumption, the burden is on the accused to explain how victim sustained injuries, as both are husband and wife living together, whereas in the present case, there is no evidence on record to show that victim sustained any injuries, and the homicidal death itself is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. As such, those cases are not helpful to the appellant and this Court cannot presume that it is a homicidal death. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court in this regard does not call for interference.
16. Now, the other aspect to be considered is whether the prosecution established the offence under Section 304-B of IPC. There is no dispute that the deceased died within seven years of her marriage, as the marriage was performed on 01.05.2011 and she died on 22.06.2014. It is also established that her death was otherwise than under normal circumstances. Thus, these two ingredients of Section 304-B of IPC stand proved. However, the prosecution is also required to establish that soon before her death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused in connection with a demand for dowry. In the present case, PWs.1, 2 and 4 stated that Rs.5,00,000/- and one tula of gold were given at the time of marriage and the balance dowry amount was paid in the year 2013. Their evidence further refers to a demand for interest on the delayed payment. However, there is no specific evidence to show that, soon before the death of the deceased, the accused demanded additional dowry or subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with such demand.
17. Significantly, on the date of incident, when PW.1 contacted the deceased over phone, she only informed him that A.1 had prevented her from going to her parents' house. There is no evidence from PW.1 or PW.2 that the deceased informed them that A.1 had prevented her from going to her parents' house because of any demand for additional dowry. Therefore, the evidence does not establish a live and proximate demand for additional dowry soon before her death. The earlier demand for interest on the delayed payment of dowry amount, by itself, cannot be treated as a demand for additional dowry soon before the death of the deceased, particularly in the absence of any evidence connecting such demand with the death. Further, according to PW.5, the deceased was happy till the evening and was a sensitive woman, and therefore, the possibility of her committing suicide on account of being prevented from going to her parents' house cannot be completely ruled out. Further, the contention of learned counsel for respondents-A.1 to A.4 is that when two views are possible, the view which is favourable to the accused has to be considered.
18. In support of her contentions learned counsel appearing for respondents, relied on the judgment in Ballu alias Balram alias Balamukund and Another V. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 2024 Supreme Court 1678), wherein, in paragraph No.10 it is held as under :
“10. Undoubtedly, the prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence. The law with regard to conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence has very well been crystallised in the judgment of this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 487 : 1984 INSC 121] , wherein this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 184-85, paras 152-54)
“152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of M.P. [Hanumant v. State of M.P., (1952) 2 SCC 71] This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail v. State of U.P. [Tufail v. State of U.P., (1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ram Gopal v. State of Maharashtra [Ram Gopal v. State of Maharashtra, (1972) 4 SCC 625] . It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant case [Hanumant v. State of M.P., (1952) 2 SCC 71] : (Hanumant case [Hanumant v. State of M.P., (1952) 2 SCC 71] , SCC pp. 76-77, para 12)
‘12. It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.’
153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033] where the observations were made: [SCC p. 807, para 19: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
‘19. … Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between “may be” and “must be” is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.’
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.”
(emphasis in original)
….
“33. At the cost of repetition, we are compelled to say that the findings of the High Court are totally based on conjectures and surmises. Though the High Court has referred to the law laid down by this Court with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the High Court has totally misapplied the same and a very well-reasoned judgment based upon the correct appreciation of evidence by the trial court has been reversed by the High Court, only on the basis of conjectures and surmises.”
19. In the present case also the prosecution failed to prove all the circumstances to prove the guilt of respondent-accused. In State of Uttarakhand V. Sanjay Ram Tamta @ Sanju @ Prem Prakash (CRIMINAL APPEAL No.112/2014), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under :
“12. On a reading of the evidence recorded at trial, we are of the considered opinion that the demand of dowry was not proved by the prosecution. The omissions in the statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C.; which are deemed to be material contradictions put to peril the prosecution story of demand of dowry. A three judge bench of this Court on such omissions held so in Darshan Singh vs. State of Punjab 6, in 6 (2024) 3 SCC 164 paragraph 31:
"31. If the PWs had failed to mention in their statements under Section 161CrPC about the involvement of an accused, their subsequent statement before court during trial regarding involvement of that particular accused cannot be relied upon. Prosecution cannot seek to prove a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not stated to police during investigation. The evidence of that witness regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. [See: (i) Rohtash v. State of Haryana [Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589, (ii) Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra [Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657, (iii) Rudrappa Ramappa Jainpur v. State of Karnataka [Rudrappa Ramappa Jainpur v. State of Karnataka, (2004) 7 SCC 422 and (iv) Vimal Suresh Kamble v. Chaluverapinake Apal S.P. [Vimal Suresh Kamble v. Chaluverapinake Apal S.P., (2003) 3 SCC 175]"
13. Both PWs 1 and 2 admitted in their deposition that they had not personally witnessed any physical violence on the wife and PW 2-the father also deposed that the sonin- law was quite aware of his financial condition; which would not have enabled him to raise 4,00,000/- or purchase a plot for construction of a house. It was his specific statement that the son-in-law and his family was apprised of this fact at the time of marriage and they had agreed to accept his daughter, as such. The essential ingredient of a demand of dowry being absent under Section 304B of the I.P.C., we cannot find the suicidal death; though, categorized as an unnatural one, as one akin to murder inviting a punishment under Section 304B of the IPC.”
20. In the case on hand also, though the death of deceased is unnatural one, and it is within seven years of marriage, the essential ingredient of demand of dowry soon before her death is not proved.
21. In Rajesh Chaddha V. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025 SCC Online SC 1094), it was held as under :
“8. At the outset, an act of ‘cruelty’ for the purpose of Section 498A, corresponds to a willful conduct of such nature, that may cause danger to the life, limb and health of the woman, which is inclusive of the mental and physical health and the harassment caused to her, by coercing her to meet unlawful demands or impossible standards. Further, the demand for dowry in terms of Section 3 and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 refers to both a direct or indirect manner of demand for dowry made by the husband or his family members. In order to meet the threshold of the offences under Section 498A IPC & Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961, the allegations cannot be ambiguous or made in thin air.
9. In the present case, the allegations made by the Complainant are vague, omnibus and bereft of any material particulars to substantiate this threshold. Apart from claiming that Appellant husband harassed her for want of dowry, the Complainant has not given any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. The allegations in the FIR, and the depositions of the prosecution witnesses suggest that on multiple occasions, the Complainant wife was ousted from the matrimonial house, and kicked and punched in the presence of her father, PW-2 herein and she was repeatedly tormented with dowry demands, and when she was unable to honor them, the Appellant and her family physically beat her up; whereas she has not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. It is alleged that the Complainant suffered a miscarriage, as she fell down, when the Appellant and her family who pushed her out of the house; however, no medical document from any medical institution or hospital or nursery was produced to substantiate the allegations.
10. Upon carefully considering the record, we find that apart from the statements of PW-1 and PW-2, there is no evidence to substantiate the allegations of harassment and acts of cruelty within the scope of Section 498A of IPC, and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961. For this reason, we find merit in the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant, and are of the considered view that there is no material on record to establish the allegations of hurt or miscarriage, and of hurt and criminal intimidation in terms of Section 323 r/w 34 and Section 506 IPC respectively. The Trial Court has rightly held that evidence of the Complainant is the only strong evidence that she sustained injuries on various parts of her body due to the physical assault by the accused persons, and that there was no medical examination conducted by the Complainant, so as to prove that the miscarriage was a consequence of the physical assault.”
22. In Munni Devi V. State of Uttar Pradesh (2026 INSC 136), the Apex Court observed as under :
“7. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and with their assistance we have also gone through the records of the case. At the outset we may note that though the appellant was convicted by the Trial Court under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 316 and Sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1961, the High Court while maintaining the conviction of the appellant under Sections 304-B and 316 of the Penal Code has set aside her conviction under Section 498-A and Sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1961. As per Section 304-B (1) it would be necessary for the prosecution to show that the death was caused otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of the marriage and that soon before the death, the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for or in connection with any demand for dowry. In the present case the death of the appellant's daughter-in-law has occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances in view of the fact that it was a case of suicide. The death occurred within seven years of the marriage. It would therefore be necessary to examine whether any evidence has been led to prove beyond reasonable doubt that soon prior to committing suicide, the appellant's daughter-inlaw was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the appellant. This is for the reason that the appellant's conviction is under Section 304-B of the Penal Code.
8. …. The other witnesses examined including PW3 and PW4 are also members of the family of the deceased but they have also not referred to any specific instance of cruelty or harassment being caused by the appellant to the deceased. It is one thing to make a demand for dowry and another thing to inflict cruelty or harassment in connection with such demand for dowry. For sustaining the conviction under Section 304-B of the Penal Code it would be necessary for the prosecution to bring on record at least some instance of cruelty or harassment being caused to the woman in connection with any demand for dowry that results in her death occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of the marriage. Such evidence, however, is missing in the present case. It is to be noted that the High Court acquitted the appellant of the charge under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 1961 and 498A of IPC which acquittal has attained finality.”
23. In the present case also prosecution failed to bring on record the instances of dowry harassment soon before death of the deceased.
24. In Chandrappa & Others V. State of Karnataka (APPEAL (Crl.) 853 of 2006), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph No.42 observed as under :
“42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.”
25. The present appeal is filed against acquittal of the accused on the ground that prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. However, there is double presumption in favour of accused. Though this Court can reverse the acquittal judgment, the evidence on record is not sufficient to reverse the same. Further, though the death of the deceased is unnatural one and it is within seven years of marriage, the essential ingredient that she was subjected to harassment demanding dowry by the accused soon before her death is not proved, as such, the offence under Section 304-B of IPC is also not made out by the prosecution. Hence, the findings of the trial Court do not suffer from any illegality or perversity warranting interference by this Court. As such, the appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, all the points are answered.
26. IN THE RESULT, this Criminal Appeal is dismissed.
Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending shall stand closed.
