Parties : M/S Manas Salt Iodisation Industries Ltd., Dibrigarh Versus Union of India, Represented by the General Manager, Mumbai & Another
Appearing Advocates : For the Petitioner: M. Sharma, Advocate. For the Respondents: U. Chakravarty, Advocate.
Date of Judgment : 29-09-2026
Head Note :-
Civil Procedure Code - Section 114 -
Case Refered:
Shri Ram Sahu Vs. Vinod Kr. Rawat & Ors, reported in (2021) 13 SCC 1
Lily Thomas & others Vs. Union of India & Ors, reported in (2000) 6 SCC 224
Comparative Citation:
2026:GAU-AS:14474,
Judgment :-
Judgement & Order (Cav):
1. Heard Ms. M. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mrs. U. Chakravarty, learned counsel for the opposite party/respondent No.1.
2. This review petition is preferred by the petitioner, namely, M/S. Manas Salt Iodisation Industries Ltd. Cole Road, Post Office Dibrugarh, Assam, under Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 read with Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in terms of Chapter X of the Gauhati High Court Rules, seeking review of the judgment & order, dated 10.02.2025, passed by this Court in MFA No. 27 of 2016.
2.1. It is to be noted here that vide judgment & order, dated 10.02.2025, this Court was pleased to allow the appeal filed under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, and set aside the judgment and order, dated 06.08.2015, passed in Claim Application No.OA-III-15/2009 (Old) and Claim Application No. OA-III/GHY/2009/0015 (New), by the Railway Claims Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, and the matter was remanded to the learned Tribunal with a direction to decide the entitlement of the applicant/respondent, a fresh, as per Circular at Sl.No.97(G)/2006, dated 06.06.2006, and also taking note of the distance between the two stations i.e. Halvad and Dikom as mentioned in Exhibit-A21, with a further direction to carry out the exercise, within a period of three months, from the date of receipt of the judgment and order, and giving an opportunity of being heard to both the parties.
2.2. It is to be noted here that vide impugned judgment and order, dated 06.08.2015, the Railway Claims Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, has directed the appellants herein to pay a sum of Rs. 1,92,622/-, along with interest @ 6% per annum, from the date of filing the original application, i.e. 03.08.2009, with costs.
3. For the sake of convenience and for avoiding confusion, the status of the parties will be referred to as in the original claim petition.
4. The background facts leading to filing of the present petition is adumbrated herein below:-
“The petitioner, as consignee,had booked a consignment of 35597bags of salt, on 09.02.2008, under Invoice No.1 to 4 and Railway Receipt No. 212000980 to 212000983, from Halvad (HVD) to Dikam (DKM), paying all the freight money at booking point, vide M.R. No. 743789, dated 09.02.2008, and also took delivery of the consignment at destination point as per receipt. The respondent- Railway had collected freight on distance of 3236 km instead of correct freight charging distance of 3181 km and the correct freight charging rate @ Rs. 1609.10 per MT.
The pleaded case of the petitioner is that as per Railway Board’s Circular No. TCR/1125/94/3, dated 06.10.1994, read with N.F. Railway Circular No. C/374/RG/1/Pt. X, dated 21.11.1994, consignment should be booked by the shortest route and at the cheapest rate of freight.
Further case of the petitioner is that as per Railway Board’s Concession Circular No. TCR/1078/2003/1, dated 30.04.2003 and 29.05.2006, a consignment booked over distance 3001 km are entitled to get freight concession @ Rs. 25% at the time of booking, but the respondent, at booking point, made calculation mistake for which freight was overcharged. Further case of the respondent/petitioner is that HVD and DKM Stations are regular goods booking and delivery Stations, known as good shed, and these Stations are never statutorily notified by Railway as Terminal Stations. And inspite of that the Railway had collected terminal charges despite the fact that Railway Board’s Circular No. TCR/1078/2007/06, dated 29.05.2007 and 17.07.2007 and 18.09.2007, terminal charges were not leviable on commodities packed in bag, tin, cartoon, bale or crate. The petitioner then filed one representation before the respondent authority, claiming refund. But, the same failed to yield any result.
As the representation filed by the petitioner had failed to yield any result, the petitioner had approached the Railway Claims Tribunal, claiming refund of the excess amount of freight as well as terminal charges.
The respondent No.1 and 2 had filed their written statement contesting the claim of the petitioner/respondent. Besides challenging the identity of the petitioner, they had taken a stand that the terminal charges have been collected correctly. Further it is stated that according to CCM/ Rates’ letter dated 08.04.2010, the distance ex. HVD to DKM via PNU, BKI, MGS, KIR is 3255 km, but the Railway had claimed freight for 3236 km. Another stand taken by respondent No.2 is that as per Railway Board’s Rate Circular No.47 of 2006, 25% concessional freight should not be less that the concessional freight of 3000 kms. And that the freight for 3000 km was worked out to Rs. 1234.32 after granting 20% concession. Freight for 3177 km with 25% concession comes to Rs. 1206/- which is less than freight for 3000 km. And as such, only 20% concession was granted and that booking and destination stations are Railway’s own terminal and hence terminal charges were rightly collected.
Upon the pleadings of the parties, the learned Tribunal had framed following 6(six) issues for decision:-
1. Whether notice served under Section 106 of the Railway Act, 1989 by the applicant to the respondent is in time and maintainable?
2. Is the application bad for misjoinder of parties?
3. Whether the respondent realized freight as per correct distance?
4. Whether the applicant is entitled for the concession as alleged in his application?
5. Whether the respondent is entitled for terminal charges?
6. Relief and order?
Then hearing both sides, the learned Claim Tribunal, vide impugned judgment and order, dated 06.08.2015, had directed the appellants herein to pay a sum of Rs. 1,92,622, along with interest @ 6% per annum, from the date of filing the original application, i.e. 03.08.2009, with costs.
Then being aggrieved with the impugned award of the Railway Claims Tribunal, the appellant preferred an appeal on the following grounds:-
(i) The learned Tribunal had erred in law as well as on facts while passing the impugned judgment and order.
(ii) That the learned Tribunal had wrongly held that the appellant No.1 has made an admission vide Exhibit-A-21 which is nothing but information furnished under the RTI Act and thereafter, came to a conclusion that the respondent is entitled to refund of the claim amount. But the fact remains that the said letter was issued for estimate purpose only and has no relation with the alleged claim and the learned Tribunal had failed to consider the said aspect.
(iii) The learned Tribunal had wrongly interpreted the provisions as laid down under various circulars.
(iv) The learned Tribunal had wrongly placed reliance on a clarification letter No.TCR/1078/2007/6 dated 17.07.2007, while deciding Issue No.5 of the impugned judgment, which was superseded by another circular i.e. Rates Circular No.92/2007 and for non-consideration of the aforesaid circular, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.
(v) The learned Tribunal had wrongly interpreted the contents of Rates Circular No.92/2007, while deciding Issue No.5 and the learned Tribunals have failed to consider the contents of the said circular in its proper perspective.
(vi) The learned Tribunal had wrongly calculated the amount refundable to the respondent.
(vii) That the schemes (Rates Circulars) are commercial in nature and as such, each and every term appeared in the schemes should strictly be followed. But, the learned Tribunal had failed to consider the said aspect of the matter.
(viii) It is well-settled principle of law that while interpreting the statutory provision, no word can be added to a statute or read a word into it which are not part of it, especially when a literal reading of the same produces an intelligible result and the Courts have to administer the law as they find it and it is not permissible for the Court to twist the clear language of the enactment, in order to avoid any real or imaginary hardship which such literal interpretation may cause and the learned Tribunal had failed to consider the aforesaid principle and under such circumstances, it is contended to set it aside.
Thereafter, hearing both the parties this Court, vide judgment & order, dated 10.02.2025, was pleased to allow the appeal by setting aside the judgment and order, dated 06.08.2015, passed in Claim Application No.OA-III-15/2009 (Old) and Claim Application No. OA-III/GHY/2009/0015 (New) by the Railway Claims Tribunal, Guwahati Bench,and the matter was remanded to the learned Tribunal with a direction to decide the entitlement of the applicant/respondent, a fresh, as per Circular at Sl.No.97(G)/2006, dated 06.06.2006.”
5. Then being aggrieved, the present petition is preferred on the following grounds:-
(i) The finding of this Court in the judgment and order, dated 10.02.2025,is liable to be reviewed, as upon the fact that this Court had taken a view in paragraph 4 that "Further case of the applicant is that HVD and DKM stations are regular goods booking and delivery stations known as good shed and these stations are never statutorily notified by Railway as Terminal Stations....", but, due to oversight did not take into consideration the Railway Board Letter, dated 05.06.2007, which is never superseded by the Circular No. 92/2007, and the same is still in force. Hence, the judgment and order, dated 10.02.2025, may be reviewed by taking into consideration the Railway Board Letter, dated 05.06.2007, furnished by the review petitioner, before the Railway Claims Tribunal as well as before this Court.
(ii) Due to oversight, this Court did not take into consideration the judgments of this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, furnished by the review petitioner, which is squarely covered with the issue raised by the review petitioner before the learned Tribunal in the claim application, at paragraph 7(i) (d) as well as before this Court that Halvad and Dikom stations are not in the list of 50 Goods sheds in terms of the Railway Board letter dated 05.06.2007. Thus, upon the aforesaid ground, there is a requirement to review the judgment and order, dated 10.02.2025 in terms of Section 114 of the CPC, read with Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC.
(iii) The review petitioner is seeking review of paragraph 12 and 13 of the judgment, dated 10.02.2025, as this Court did not pass any observation with regard to 50 specific stations notified in the Railway Board letter dated 05.06.2007, which is never superseded by the Circular No.92/2007, and the same is still in force. Neither the learned Tribunal discussed these vital points in the impugned judgment and order, dated 06.08.2015, nor this Court passed any observation despite the issues being positively raised by the review petitioner in the pleadings as well as at the stage of hearing. Hence, there is a requirement to remand the issue of Terminal Charges to the learned Railway Claims Tribunalto decide the issue fresh based on the Railway Board Letter, dated 05.06.2007, raised by the Review Petitioner in paragraph 7(i) (d) of the claim application, as well as the prevailing judgments of this Court and of the Hon’ble Supreme Court furnished by the Review Petitioner.
(iv) The finding of this Court, in paragraph 19 of the judgment, dated 10.02.2025, shall be liable to be reviewed upon the fact that this Court was pleased to remand the matter back to the learned Railway Claims Tribunal for a fresh decision as per Circular at Sl. No. 97(G)/2006 dated 06.06.2006, by taking note of the distance between the two stations Halvad and Dikom mentioned in exhibit-A21. However, there is no findings related to the issue of Terminal Charge, as well as the arguments, citations and the Railway Board letter, dated 05.06.2007, placed by the review petitioner-respondent. Therefore, there is a requirement of reviewing the judgment, dated 10.02.2025, and to remand the issue of Terminal Charges to the learned Railway Claims Tribunal to decide the issue fresh, based on the Railway Board Letter dated 05.06.2007.
Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner:-
6. Ms. M. Sharma, learned counsel for the review petitioners, submits that there is an apparent error on the face of the judgment and order, dated 10.02.2025, in paragraphs 4, 12, 13 and 19 of the judgment with regard to the issue of refund of Terminal Charges. In the judgment, this Court had recorded the submissions of the review petitioner-respondent that "....the HVD and DKM stations are regular goods booking and delivery stations known as good shed and these stations are never statutorily notified by the Railway as Terminal Stations..." but due to oversight, did not record and take into consideration the citations placed by the review petitioner in the similar issue of Terminal charges by a co-ordinate bench of this Court and also of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and hence, the issue of Terminal Charges, in so far as 50 specific stations are concerned, was set at rest.
6.1. Ms. Sharma also submits that the review petitioner had positively argued the case based on this vital point before the learned Railway Claims Tribunal, Guwahati, as may be perused from the Claim Application, in paragraph 7(i)(d), as well as before this Court, as may be seen from the live streaming of the court proceedings, dated 21.11.2024. However, in the judgment, no such observation regarding non-applicability of Terminal Charges for both Halvad and Dikom stations was made by this Court as both the stations do not fall under the 50 specific Stations.
6.2. Ms. Sharma also submits that during the stage of hearing, the review petitioner-respondent had profoundly relied upon the judgments, dated 09.04.2024 of a co-ordinate bench of this Court in MFA No. 42/2017, in the case of Union of India & 2 Ors. versus M/s S.D. Eastern Bhutan Coals Co. Ltd. and Anr. and MFA No. 105/2017 in the case of Union of India & 2 Ors. versus M/s Fuel Sources India Pvt. Ltd., wherein this Court has held that - there is no doubt that there are 50 specific stations having all the infrastructures for loading and unloading of goods and if any of those 50 stations are used, then only the Railways can charge terminal charges. For other stations, Railway cannot levy terminal charges.
6.3. She also submits that the Railway, being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, dated 09.04.2024, had preferred Special Leave Petitions, being SLP(C) Diary No(s). 40703/2024 with SLP(C) Diary No(s). 40701/2024, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the issue related to the levy of Terminal Charges, and vide order dated 21.10.2024, has dismissed the SLP, and as such the issue of Terminal Charges, in so far as 50 specific stations are concerned, was set at rest.
6.4. Her further submission is that the respondent No.1 had illegally recovered Terminal Charges of both originating stations, Halvad (HVD) and destination station, Dikom (DKM), which do not fall in the list of 50 specific stations as per Railway Board letter, dated 05.06.2007, and the review petitioner had positively argued the case based on these vital points before this Court, however, there is no finding on these vital issues related to applicability of Terminal Charges.
6.5. According to Ms. Sharma, the aforesaid findings of this Court may be incorrect, and therefore, she has contended to review the judgment and order, dated 10.02.2025.
7. Per contra, Mrs. Chakravarty, learned counsel for the opposite party/respondent No.1, has vehemently opposed this petition. She submits that in a review petition, it is not open to this Court to re-appreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, which is only in the domain of the appellate Court. She submits that in the MFA No. 27/2016, judgment and order has been passed after recording the findings of the facts and reached a conclusion on appreciation of various Railway Board's Circulars, letters, provisions of law as produced as evidence, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of records. She also submits that to permit the review petitioner to argue on the question of appreciation of evidence would amount to controverting a review petition into an appeal in disguise, and it is well settled that the review proceedings are not way of an appeal and have to strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.
7.1. It is her further submission thatunder Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a judgment may be open to review, inter alia, if there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, cannot be describedas an error apparent on the face of the record for the court to exercise the powers of review. It is important to mention herein that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected.
7.2. Further submission of Mrs. Chakravarty is that it is also settled law that in the exercise of review jurisdiction, this Hon'ble Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion even if two views are possible in a matter and in view of the aforesaid legal proposition, it is well settled that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake, but not to substitute a view. An order of decision or Judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could be taken by the Court/Tribunal on a point of fact or law. In the present case, while exercising the power of review, this Court cannot sit in appeal over its Judgment/decision.
7.3. She further submits that in the instant review petition, the grounds of review taken by the review petitioner, as stated above, do not come under the purview of error apparent on the face of the record. Only the appeal lies by approaching the review petitioner before the appropriate Higher Forum seeking relief. In view of the above, the review petitioner has no just grounds, to review the above Judgment & Order (CAV), dated 10.02.2025, passed in MFA No. 27/2016, and hence, the review petition is not sustainable in law and liable to be dismissed.
7.4. Referring to a decision of a co-ordinate Bench this Court, dated 25.06.2015, in MFA No.100/2011, she submits that this Court has already decided the issue of terminal charges on the basis of Railway Board's various circulars and in view of the said decision, dated 25.06.2015, the review petitioner has not made out a case for reviewing the judgments under review. Moreover, the review petitioner has concealed the fact that in the case of MFA No. 27/2016, the matter was remanded to the learned Tribunal, and the learned Tribunal, vide Judgment dated 23.04.2025, passed by the Ld. RCT in claim application OA -III 15/2009 (old), OA III /GHY/2009/0015 (New), MFA No. 27/2016, decided the issue in compliance with the decision of this Court in MFA No. 27/2016.
7.5. Lastly, she submits that above judgment & order, dated 10.02.2025, was passed by this Court after hearing both the parties and examination of various documents and circulars which were on record and the decision in MFA No. 27/2016, and that there is no any perversity, illegality, unreasonableness or impropriety and therefore, it is contended to dismiss this petition.
7.6. Mrs. Chakravarty has referred following decisions in support of her submission:-
(i) Shri Ram Sahu Vs. Vinod Kr. Rawat & Ors, reported in (2021) 13 SCC 1,
(ii) Lily Thomas & others Vs. Union of India & Ors, reported in (2000) 6 SCC 224,
(iii) Tage Jerang Vs. Taje Jerang, reported in (2022)5 GLT 161,
(iv) Samsul Hoque & Ors Vs. state of Assam & Or, reported in(2023) 6 GLT 171,
(v) S. Madhusudhan Reddy Vs. V. Narayana Reddy and others, reported in2022 SCC OnLine SC 1034,
(vii) Meera Bhanja (Smt) Vs. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (Smt.), reported in (1995) 1 SCC 170;
(viii) Parsion Devi & Others Vs. Sumitri Devi and others, reported in (1997) 8 SCC715;
8. Having heard the submission of learned Advocates of both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record and have also perused the judgment and order of this Court, dated 10.02.2025, and I find substance in the submission of Mrs. Chakravarty, learned counsel for the opposite party/respondent No.1.
9. Before a discussion is directed to the issue involved, this Court deems it appropriate to state the principles of review presently occupying the field. The principles, when the review is permissible, is well settled in catena of decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court. Notable amongst them is the decision in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and others, reported in (2013) 8 SCC 320, where in Hon’ble Supreme Court had summarized the principles as under:-
“Summary of the principles
20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144: (1922) 16 LW 37: AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526 : (1955) 1 SCR 520] to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [(2013) 8 SCC 337: JT (2013) 8 SC 275]
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”
10. Keeping the above principles in mind, now an endeavour will be made to find out if there is any discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; if there is any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or if there is any other sufficient reason.
11. It is to be noted here that from a perusal of the review petition and also from the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner, it becomes apparent that the main issue pertains to Terminal Charges levied by the respondent herein upon the petitioner. And perusal of judgment and order of the learned Tribunal reveals that the learned Tribunal had framed one issue, i.e. Issue No.5- which read as under:-
Whether the respondent is entitled to terminal charges?
11.1. The learned Tribunal had dealt with the issue and answered the same as under:-
“16. As per Railway Board letter No.TCR/1078/2007/6 dated 17.07.2007 The terminal charges will be levied on all bulk and loose commodities. Whenever the commodity is packed in bag, tin, carton, drum, bale or crate, such commodity should not be treated as bulk and loose commodity. All other commodities may be treated as bulk and loose commodities. However, terminal charges will be levied on any consignment requiring crane handling. In addition, all liquid consignments moving loose in wagons will also be levied terminal charges. Moreover, if a wagon is loaded with both type of commodities, the wagon should be treated as having loaded with bulk and loose commodities. (underlined emphasized).
17. Railway Board in their Circular dated 18.09.2007 mentions supersession of only Circulars dated 29.05.2007 and 19.07.2007 and not Railway Board's letter dated 17.07.2007. In the Circular dated 18.09.2007, commodities have been categorized into three heads i.e., (i) Iron Ore traffic (2) All other traffic and (iii) Container traffic, but there is no mention about commodities which are packed in bag, tin, carton, drum, bale Original Application No. OA-III/GHY/2009/0015 (New) or crate. This shows that content of Railway Board's letter dated 17.07.2007 still holds good. The applicant had booked salt packed in bags. As such, it should not fall under the category on which Terminal Charges are levied. This point is otherwise also covered by the decision of this Bench of the Tribunal in the case of M/s. Manas Salt Iodisation Industries Limited decided in O.A. No. 16/2009 on 18.06.2015.
18. Accordingly this issue is decided in favour of the applicant.”
11.2. And this Court has dealt with the issue of Terminal Charges in the judgment under review, dated 10.02.2025, in paragraph 12 and 13, as under, even though, no point for determination was formulated on the same.
“12. It is also to be noted here that the appellant, in the memo of appeal had taken a stand that the Railway Board has been issuing various Circulars from time to time for levy of terminal charges and all the Circulars so passed by the Railway Board are binding. The Rates Circular No.92/2007, which is one of such Circulars, had superseded the earlier Rates Circular Nos.58/2007, which is on the same subject matter, and the learned Tribunal has allowed the claim on account of terminal charges on the basis of a letter dated 17.07.2007, which was nothing but a clarification of Rates Circular No.58/2007, and as the said Circular has already been superseded by the Rates Circular No.92/2007, the letter dated 17.07.2007 had lost its significance. Mrs. Chakravarty had also pointed this out at the time of hearing that this aspect has already been dealt with by a coordinate Bench of this Court in MFA No.100/2011, wherein, vide order dated 25.06.2015, it was held that the letter dated 17.07.2007 is non-est as soon as the original Rates Circular No.58/2007, was superseded and as such, the finding of the learned Tribunal is erroneous on this point and therefore, it is contended to set it aside.
13. There appears to be substance in the submission of Mrs. Chakravarty, the learned Counsel for the appellant. The stand, so taken appears to be justified and reasonable. The letter dated 17.07.2007, being a letter of clarification of the Rate Circular No.58/2007, had lost its significance with supersession of the said Rate Circular by the Rate Circular No.92/2007, which are on the same subject matter. Therefore, this court is inclined to record concurrence with the submission of Mrs. Chakravarty, the learned counsel for the appellant and also with the decision of the coordinate Bench of this Court in MFA No.100/2011.”
11.3. And while dealing with the issue, this Court has relied upon a decision, dated 25.06.2015,of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in MFA 100/2011, wherein it has been held as under:-
“12. After careful perusal of the aforesaid letter dated 05.06.2007 it does not transpires that before imposing the Terminal Charges it is mandatory to have the such facilities as desired as per the letter dated 05.06.2007.
The facilities mentioned in the letter is desirable and not mandatory to hold that for imposing Terminal Charges, such facility is required to be complied with.
Be it mentioned that prior to issuance of the said letter vide Rates Circular no.58 of 2007 dated 29.05.2007 the Central Government had accorded sanction for levying of Development Surcharge and Terminal Charges.
13. Further, it is not disputed that Changsari Terminal/Shed is owned by the Railways and as in Rates Circular No. 92 of 2007 dated 18.09.2007 the term "all other traffic" is included and the terminal charge levied on all traffic except container traffic, as such the Railway Department has rightly levied the Terminal Charges and the judgment and order dated 01.07.2011 passed by the Member Technical in Claim Application No. III-106/2008(Old) and Claim Application No. OA-III/GHY/2008/0106 (New) is liable to be set aside.
14. The learned Railway Claims Tribunal has based upon the letter dated 17.07.2007 which is non-est as soon as the original Rates Circular 58 of 2007 was superseded. Similarly, the simple assertion of the Respondent that the Terminal Charge cannot be levied for having no such facilities in terms of NF Railways letter dated 27.08.2010(reply in RTI) cannot be a ground to hold that to declare a station as a Terminal Station, having of such provision is the precondition or mandatory. The Respondent failed to produce any such Government Circular etc. to prove his assertion. As such there is no substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the Respondent on the above aspect.
15. Consequent upon the findings arrived at by the learned Railway Claims Tribunal while discussing the issues are perverse and contrary to the prevailing Government Circulars and other matters on record.”
11.4. And ultimately, the co-ordinate Bench in the aforesaid had set aside the finding of the Tribunal.
12. Thus, in view of the discussion and finding in para 11.2. above, it is incorrect to say that this Court, in the judgment and order under review, had not dealt with the issue of Terminal Charges. This Court, in paragraph No. 12 of the judgment under review had discussed the Rates Circular No.92/2007, dated 18.09.2007, by which rate Circular Nos. 58/2007, which is on the same subject matter. RC No. 92 of 2007 explicitly stated that it was issued “in supersession of rules regarding levy of terminal charges notified vide Board’s letters of even number dated 29.05.2007 (RC No. 58 of 2007) and dated 17/19.07.2007 (RC No. 74 of 2007)”. It revised the rates @ ₹40 per ton per terminal for iron ore, ₹10 for other traffic, NIL for containers and applied more broadly to Railway-owned terminals/sidings.
12.1. The Circular, dated 05.06.2007, so referred to by Ms. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, formed part of the early 2007 terminal charge instructions under the same file series (TCR/1078/2007/6), which notified only about 50 specific stations where terminal charges could be levied.
12.2. And in view of Rates Circular No.92/2007, dated 18.09.2007, the Circular, dated 05.06.2007, stands superseded and no longer holding the field. Therefore, the submission of Ms. Sharma got no legs to stand upon. Rather it appears to be misleading, and accordingly, the same stands repudiated.
12.3. With regards to the submission of Ms. Sharma that vide judgments dated 09.04.2024, of a co-ordinate bench of this Court in MFA No. 42/2017, in the case of Union of India & 2 Ors. versus M/s S.D. Eastern Bhutan Coals Co. Ltd. and Anr. and MFA No. 105/2017,in the case of Union of India & 2 Ors. versus M/s Fuel Sources India Pvt. Ltd., has held that - there is no doubt that there are 50 specific stations having all the infrastructures for loading and unloading of goods, and if any of those 50 stations are used, then only the Railways can charge terminal charges, and for other stations, Railways cannot levy terminal charges, and that the Railway being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment dated 09.04.2024, had preferred Special Leave Petitions, being SLP(C) Diary No(s). 40703/2024 with SLP(C) Diary No(s). 40701/2024, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the issue related to levy of Terminal Charges, and vide order dated 21.10.2024, has dismissed the SLP, and as such the issue of Terminal Charges in so far as 50 specific stations are concerned, was set at rest, this Court finds that the issue before the co-ordinate Bench of this Court was –
Whether the Railways can levy terminal charges for loading of goods in all stations?
12.4. And while dealing with the issue in paragraph No.10, it was held as under:-
“10. Regarding the second question, there is no quarrel with the proposition that there are 50 specific stations having all the infrastructures for loading and unloading of goods and if any of those 50 stations are used, then only the Railways can charge terminal charges. For other stations, Railways cannot levy terminal charges. The Railways has to refund the terminal charges.”
12.5. And indisputably, Hon’ble Supreme Court has, in SLP(C) Diary No(s). 40703/2024, with SLP(C) Diary No(s). 40701/2024,refused to interfere with the finding of the co-ordinate bench of this Court, vide order dated 21.10.2024. It is to be noted here that apart from the issue of Terminal Charge, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court had also dealt with another issue, i.e.
(1) Whether the Railway authorities can recover punitive charges after delivery of goods?
13. It is neither discernible from the judgments dated 09.04.2024, of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in MFA No. 42/2017, in the case of Union of India & 2 Ors. vs. M/s S.D. Eastern Bhutan Coals Co. Ltd. and Anr. and MFA No. 105/2017, in the decision ofUnion of India & 2 Ors. vs. M/s Fuel Sources India Pvt. Ltd., nor from thepleadings of the present petition as to whether Railway Board letter No.TCR/1078/2007/6, dated 17.07.2007 and Railway Board Circular dated 18.09.2007 superseding Circulars dated 29.05.2007 and 19.07.2007, were in issue or not.
13.1. Without such pleadings and the relevant facts being placed on record, this Court afraid, the law cannot be applied in vacuum. Relevant fact must be pleaded with supporting materials. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the submission of Ms. Sharma and the contention made in the review petition cannot be accepted.
13.2. It is also to be noted here that if the Railway Board Circular, dated 18.09.2007, was not the issue in MFA No. 42/2017,and in MFA No. 105/2017, then the decisions in the said MFAs’ would not advance the argument of Ms. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner.
13.3. And in the event of the issue being the same, then also the field is being occupied by a decision of another co-ordinate Bench of this Court, dated 25.06.2015,in MFA 100/2011, and in view of the Constitutional Bench decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and others, reported in (2017) 16 SCC 680, wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an earlier decision of a co-equal (coordinate) Bench is binding on a later Bench of the same strength, a coordinate Bench cannot take a contrary view; if it disagrees, the proper course is to refer the matter to a larger Bench, a later decision that does not notice or reconcile itself with an earlier coordinate-Bench ruling is not a binding precedent and may be treated as per incuriam (decided in ignorance of a binding authority), and a judgment is per incuriam if its ratio cannot be reconciled with a previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger Bench, or if a relevant statutory provision was not brought to the Court’s notice.
13.4. For the reasons indicated herein above,the judgments dated 09.04.2024, of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in MFA No. 42/2017, in the case of Union of India & 2 Ors. vs. M/s S.D. Eastern Bhutan Coals Co. Ltd. and Anr. and MFA No. 105/2017, in the decision ofUnion of India & 2 Ors. vs. M/s Fuel Sources India Pvt. Ltd., in the considered opinion of this Court, have lost its precedential value, in view of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pranay Sethi (supra).
14. Under the given factual as well as legal matrix, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present review petition is liable to be dismissed for the reason discussed above and also for the following reasons:-
(i) None of the grounds for maintaining a review petition, as mentioned in the case of Kamlesh Verma (supra) could be demonstrated by the review petitioner.
(ii) The petitioner has also failed to demonstrate any other sufficient reason.
15. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that subsequently, another co-ordinate Bench of this Court followed the decisions of co-ordinate Bench of this Court in MFA No. 42/2017, in the case of Union of India & 2 Ors. vs. M/s S.D. Eastern Bhutan Coals Co. Ltd. and Anr., and MFA No. 105/2017, in the decision of Union of India & 2 Ors. vs. M/s Fuel Sources India Pvt. Ltd. However, the said decision was never placed before this Court at the time of hearing of the present petition. Besides the said decision is subsequent to the decision of this Court in MFA No. 27/2016, and never existed at the time of hearing the MFA No. 27/2016, and even if produced, the same would not cometo the assistance of the petitioner, and on such count, this submission appears to be misleading and not a bona-fide one.
16. This Court has also gone through the contentions raised in the reply affidavit by the petitioner and the decisions referred to therein, and also gone through the decisions referred to by Mrs. Chakravarty. But, for deciding the issue in this petition, reference to all those decisions in this judgment, is found to be not necessary as the principles of review are well settled in the case of Kamlesh Verma (supra), which has already been referred to and discussed herein above.
17. In the result, this Court finds this petition devoid of merit, and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. Since the grounds for filing this petition appear to be not bona-fide one, the tone and tenor of the language in the pleading as well as in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner indecorous, this Court, while dismissing the same, is inclined to impose a cost of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand), which shall be deposited with the Gauhati High Court Legal Services Committee, within a period of four weeks from today by the review petitioner.
18. In terms of above, this review petition stands disposed of.
