(Prayer: To reject the Plaint in C.S.(Comm.Div) No.42 of 2026 as suit is barred by Limitation.)

1. This application has been filed by the defendant under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation.

2. The respondent/plaintiff purchased three flats—two in Egmore and one in T. Nagar—at auctions conducted by the applicant/defendant Bank under the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. Pursuant to the auction sales, sale certificates in respect of the Egmore properties were executed and registered on 12.09.2012, while the sale certificate in respect of the T. Nagar property was executed and registered on 26.02.2013.

3. According to the plaintiff, despite the issuance and registration of the sale certificates, the defendant Bank did not deliver vacant physical possession of the properties. The plaint refers to the proceedings initiated by the Bank under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, the legal notices issued by the plaintiff from time to time, the alleged demands for maintenance and statutory charges, and the proceedings in W.P.No.19264 of 2024. It is further pleaded that, pursuant to the order dated 02.01.2025 passed in the said writ petition, physical possession of the properties was ultimately handed over to the plaintiff on 03.01.2025.

4. Based on these averments, the plaintiff seeks to recover:

                   (i) Rs.4,61,36,432/- as interest calculated at 12% per annum on the amounts he paid, for the period between the respective dates of payment and the date of delivery of physical possession; and

                   (ii) Rs.41,90,938/- towards maintenance charges, water tax, property tax, electricity consumption charges, and other arrears allegedly accrued between 2012 and 2025.

5. The suit was instituted on 22.11.2025.

6. The applicant/defendant contends that the plaintiff’s right, if any, arose upon the execution and registration of the sale certificates in 2012 and 2013, and that the suit, having been instituted more than three years thereafter, is ex facie barred by limitation. It is also contended that the liberty reserved by this Court in W.P.No.19264 of 2024 did not revive or extend a claim that had already become barred by limitation.

7. The learned counsel for the applicant/defendant submits that the plaintiff's legal notice dated 09.01.2020 was categorically refused by the Bank's reply dated 04.02.2020, and that limitation under Article 55 or Article 113 of the Limitation Act expired, at the latest, on 04.02.2023. They also contends that any continuing breach ended with that refusal, and that at best only the damages for the three years before the suit could be claimed. It also relies on the "as is where is" terms of the sale notice and on the borrower's litigation as the cause of the delay. The applicant relies on Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra), AIR (2020)7 SCC 366 ; State of Gujarat v. M/s. Kothari & Associates (2016) 14 SCC 761; and Atul Industrial Agencies v. G.D. Gupta & Anr, AIR 2004 Raj 227.

8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the plaintiff/ respondent, contends that limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. The Bank was under a statutory duty under Rules 8 and 9(9) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 to deliver physical possession, and its failure was a continuing wrong under Section 22 of the Limitation Act that ceased only on 03.01.2025. He also relies on its notice dated 24.04.2024 and the Bank's reply dated 03.06.2024. He also contends that that the "as is where is" clause cannot override a statutory duty, and that no order of any court restrained the Bank from taking possession between December 2016 and December 2023.

9. The Learned counsel for the plaintiff relies on Samruddhi Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction (P) Ltd., (2022) 4 SCC 103, P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan, 2025 SCC ONLINE SC 975, S. Shanmuganathan v. Authorized Officer, Indian Overseas Bank, 2017 SCC ONLINE Mad 1549 ; Rakesh Kumar Kaushal v. State of U.P., 2018 SCC ONLINE ALL 5757; Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd., (2024) 2 SCC 1; and Sumitra Shridhar Khane v. Deputy Collector, Kolhapur & Ors, 2025 SCC online Bom 1747.

10. It is settled that, when considering an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, the Court must confine itself to the averments in the plaint and the documents relied upon therein. The plaint can be rejected on the ground of limitation only when the bar is apparent from the statements in the plaint itself. Where the determination of limitation depends on disputed facts, such as the nature of the obligation, the date of breach, the accrual of the right to sue, or the applicability of a particular Article of the Limitation Act, the question becomes a mixed question of fact and law, which cannot ordinarily be decided at the threshold. On this test, the authorities cited by both sides agree. Dahiben, relied on by the applicant, and Kumarakurubaran, relied on by the plaintiff, both hold that the plaint and its documents alone are to be seen, taken as true, and that a plea of limitation depending on disputed facts cannot be decided at the threshold.

11. In the present case, the cause of action pleaded in the plaint is not confined to the execution and registration of the sale certificates in 2012 and 2013. The plaintiff has also pleaded the defendant Bank's alleged continuing failure to deliver physical possession, the demands made from time to time, the accumulation of maintenance and other statutory charges up to 2025, the proceedings in W.P.No.19264 of 2024, and the eventual delivery of possession under protest on 03.01.2025. The plaint itself refers to the notice dated 09.01.2020 and the Bank's reply dated 04.02.2020. The applicant treats that reply as a final repudiation that fixed the cause of action, relying on Kothari & Associates .However, in that reply (para 3), the Bank stated that it had obtained the order under Section 14 dated 03.06.2015 and was "unable to proceed further" due to the pendency of R.A.(S.A.) No.124 of 2018. What it refused was the refund. It did not disclaim delivery of possession, which it ultimately made on 03.01.2025.

12. Whether that reply was a final repudiation, and whether the breach continued after it, cannot be decided on the plaint. Kothari & Associates was decided after trial, on facts the Court found undisputed. Kumarakurubaran , quoting Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, holds that whether a bank's refusal triggered the right to sue is a mixed question of fact and law.

13. Whether the plaintiff’s claim for interest arose on the respective dates of payment, on the dates of execution of the sale certificates, upon the alleged failure to deliver physical possession, or only upon the eventual delivery of possession; whether the alleged failure constitutes a continuing breach; and whether the whole or any part of the claim is barred by limitation are matters that require consideration in light of the parties’ pleadings and evidence. These questions cannot be conclusively determined merely by reference to the dates of the sale certificates.

14. Article 55 provides that, where the breach is continuing, time runs from when it ceases. Samruddhi’s case holds that a wrong is continuing only where the duty broken continues to subsist, and not merely because its effects continue. Kothari & Associates distinguishes successive breaches, each complete in itself. Which of these describes the Bank's obligation to deliver possession here is a question for trial.

15. The applicant's reliance on the "as is where is" terms and on the borrower's litigation raises defences on the merits, which cannot be looked into under Order VII Rule 11. For the same reason, Shanmuganathan, Rakesh Kumar Kaushal and Celir LLP, cited by the plaintiff on the Bank's statutory duty, relate to the merits and are not examined now. Atul Industrial Agencies (decided after trial) and Sumitra Khane (delay and laches in a writ petition) do not assist at this stage.

16. It is true that the liberty granted by this Court in W.P.No.19264 of 2024, by itself, neither extends the prescribed period of limitation nor revives a claim that had already become barred. Nevertheless, the effect of the said order and the subsequent delivery of possession on the plaintiff’s cause of action are matters for examination at the appropriate stage. No opinion is expressed in this order either on the applicability of any particular Article of the Limitation Act or on the plaintiff’s ultimate entitlement to the amounts claimed.

17. Further, the claim for maintenance charges, water tax, property tax, electricity consumption charges and other arrears is said to relate to different periods extending up to the year 2025. On the plaint averments, therefore, it cannot presently be concluded that the entire claim is barred by limitation. Even if a part of the monetary claim may ultimately be found time-barred, a plaint cannot be rejected in part under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The plaint must either be rejected as a whole or not at all. The principles in this regard are settled in Sejal Glass Ltd. v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd., (2018) 11 SCC 780, and Madhav Prasad Aggarwal v. Axis Bank Ltd., (2019) 7 SCC 158.

18. Notably, the applicant's own alternative plea, that damages for the three years preceding the suit could be claimed, accepts that at least part of the claim is within time. That by itself rules out rejection of the plaint as a whole.

19. Thus, the bar of limitation is not apparent from a meaningful reading of the plaint as a whole. The plea raised by the defendant involves mixed questions of fact and law. It must be decided by framing the appropriate issue and allowing the parties to adduce evidence.

20. Accordingly, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the suit or on the defendant’s plea of limitation, this application is dismissed. The defendant is at liberty to raise the plea of limitation already raised in its written statement, and it shall be considered in the suit in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.